This Court will not pass upon the charge below where the bill of
exceptions does not set forth the evidence and there is nothing to
show that the question of law to which the charge relates is
involved in the issue.
This was ejectment for lands in Jacksonville, Florida, brought
by John and Mary E. Buckell against Jones and others. Plea, not
guilty. There was a verdict for the plaintiffs, upon which judgment
was rendered. The defendants sued out this writ.
The bill of exceptions does not contain any of the evidence on
the trial, but relates to the charge, which is set out in the
opinion of this Court.
The following agreement signed by the attorneys of the
respective parties was filed in the court below:
"The plaintiffs and defendants, by their attorneys, admit the
following to be true, without the necessity of introducing evidence
in proof thereof, that is to say:"
"The plaintiffs admit the regularity of all the proceedings in
the confiscation suit in the District Court for the Northern
Page 104 U. S. 555
District of Florida against the property of Charles Willey, and
that there was a decree of condemnation and sale of said property.
The defendants are not required to introduce certified copies of
such proceeding or the original papers, and that John S. Sammis was
the purchaser at confiscation sale."
"The defendants on their part admit that Francis E. Yale and
Mary E. Buckell are the children and only heirs-at-law of Charles
Willey, and that the lands in controversy are the same lands which
the defendants were in possession of at the date of the service of
summons in this suit."
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question argued in this case is whether, under the Act of
Aug. 6, 1861, c. 60, "to confiscate property used for
insurrectionary purposes," 12 Stat. 319, a condemnation carried the
fee of lands confiscated, or only the life estate of the owner, but
we cannot discover that such a question is fairly presented by the
record for our consideration. The ruling of the court below on the
motion for a new trial is not reviewable here. This is well
settled.
Henderson v.
Moore, 5 Cranch 11;
Railway Company v.
Heck, 102 U. S. 120.
The only questions, therefore, arising on the bill of exceptions
are those presented by the exception to the following opinion and
charge of the court to the jury:
"The acts of 1861 and 1862, though differing in some respects,
are in
pari materia; while the one treats of property, the
other of the person, both are on account of the acts of the person
offending. The Armstrong Foundry case shows that you cannot proceed
against the offending thing without coupling with it the guilty
knowledge and consent of the person, and that pardon of the
offender absolved the property as well as the person. Upon review
of the whole case, the court charges you that the condemnation and
sale of the lot in question, purporting to convey a fee simple,
only conveys an estate for the life of Charles Willey, and that
the
Page 104 U. S. 556
heirs of the said Charles Willey are entitled to recover the
same."
The pleadings nowhere show that the rights of the parties depend
on the construction or effect of the act of 1861, and no part of
the evidence is set out in the bill of exceptions. Copies of deeds
and a stipulation in respect to evidence are found in the
transcript, but they are nowhere referred to in the bill of
exceptions, and it is not even stated in the record that they were
used at the trial. As long ago as
Dunlop
v. Munroe, 7 Cranch 242,
11 U. S. 270,
it was said by this Court that
"each bill of exceptions must be considered as presenting a
distinct and substantive case, and it is on the evidence stated in
itself alone that the Court is to decide."
Of course, evidence may be included in a bill of exceptions by
appropriate reference to other parts of the record, and if that had
been done here, it might have been enough. But with no issue made
directly by the pleadings and no evidence set forth or referred to
in the bill of exceptions showing the materiality of the charge
complained of, the case presents to us only an abstract proposition
of law which may or may not have been stated by the court in a way
to be injurious to the plaintiffs in error. Such a proposition we
are not required to consider.
Reed v.
Gardner, 17 Wall. 409.
Judgment affirmed.