Stockings of worsted, or of worsted and cotton, made on frames
and imported after June. 22, 1874, are dutiable as knit goods under
schedule L, class 3, sec. 2504, of the Revised Statutes.
Subsequently to June 22, 1874, Vietor imported into New York
stockings. Some of them were wholly worsted. The others were
composed of cotton and worsted, cotton being the material of chief
value. They were intended to be worn by men, women, and children,
and were made on frames. They were also "knit goods," this term
comprising all goods made on frames, and also all hand-knit
stockings and other knitted articles of various kinds.
They were classified by the appraiser as worsted knit goods
costing over eighty cents a pound, and Arthur, the collector of
customs of the port of New York, exacted a duty at the rate of
ninety percent of fifty cents per pound and thirty-five percent ad
valorem, holding that the goods were, as knit goods, subject to the
duty prescribed by schedule L, class 3 sec. 2504, Rev.Stat. The
importer claimed that they were dutiable as stockings made on
frames, worn by men, women, and children, and subject to the duty
prescribed in schedule M. Both schedules are set out in the opinion
of this Court.
The duties claimed by the collector were paid under protest, and
Vietor brought this suit against him. Judgment having been rendered
for the defendant, Vietor sued out this writ.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the court.
The question in this case is whether stockings of worsted, or
worsted and cotton, made on frames and worn by men, women, and
children, imported after the Revised Statutes went into effect,
June 22, 1874, are dutiable as knit goods, under
Page 104 U. S. 499
Schedule L, class 3, sec. 2504, or as stockings, under Schedule
M. The two provisions under which the parties make their respective
claims are as follows:
"
Sched. L. -- Flannels, blankets, hats of wool, knit
goods, balmorals, woolen and worsted yarns, and all manufactures of
every description composed wholly or in part of worsted, the hair
of the alpaca, goat, or other like animals, except such as are
composed in part of wool, not otherwise provided for, valued at not
exceeding forty cents per pound: twenty cents per pound; valued at
above forty cents per pound and not exceeding sixty cents per
pound: thirty cents per pound; valued at above sixty cents per
pound and not exceeding eighty cents per pound: forty cents per
pound; valued at above eighty cents per pound: fifty cents per
pound; and in addition thereto, upon all the above-named articles,
thirty-five percentum
ad valorem."
"
Sched. M. -- Clothing, ready-made, and wearing apparel
of every description, of whatever material composed, except wool,
silk, and linen, made up or manufactured wholly or in part by the
tailor, seamstress, or manufacturer, not otherwise provided for,
caps, gloves, leggings, mitts, socks, stockings, wove shirts and
drawers, and all similar articles made on frames, of whatever
material composed, except silk and linen, worn by men, women, or
children, and not otherwise provided for, articles worn by men,
women, or children, of whatever material composed, except silk and
linen, made up or made wholly or in part by hand, not otherwise
provided for: thirty-five percentum ad valorem."
In
United States v. Bowen, 100 U.
S. 508, we held that the Revised Statutes must be
treated as a legislative declaration of what the statute law of the
United States was on the 1st of December, 1873, and that when the
meaning was plain, the courts could not look to the original
statutes to see if Congress had erred in the revision. That could
only be done when it was necessary to construe doubtful language.
We applied this rule in
Arthur v. Dodge, 101 U. S.
34, to the construction of the revision of the tariff
laws.
It is also well settled that when Congress has designated an
article by its specific name and imposed a duty on it by such name,
general terms in a later act or other parts of the same act,
although sufficiently broad to comprehend such article, are
Page 104 U. S. 500
not applicable to it.
Movius v. Arthur, 95 U. S.
144;
Arthur v. Lahey, 96 U. S.
112.
It is conceded that stockings made on frames have been dutiable
eo nomine since 1842, and by four different enactments:
subd. 7 and 9 of sec. 1 of the Act of Aug. 30, 1842, c. 270, 5
Stat. 549; sched. C of sec. 11 of the Act of July 30, 1846, c. 74,
9 Stat. 44; sec. 22 of the Act of March 2, 1861, c. 68, 12 Stat.
191; sec. 2 of the Act of July 14, 1862, c. 163.
Id., 556.
Now when we find, as we do in schedule M of sec. 2504, "stockings .
. . made on frames, of whatever material composed, except silk and
linen, worn by men, women, and children," it seems to us clear
beyond question that goods coming within that specific description
are dutiable in the way thus provided, rather than as "knit goods .
. . composed wholly or in part of worsted." It may be true, as
suggested, that if there had been no revision and we had been
required to construe the statutes as they stood before Dec. 1,
1873, a different conclusion might have been reached. We have not
deemed it necessary to institute such an inquiry, for it would be
contrary to all the rules of construction to say that where in one
part of a section of a statute it was provided that "stockings made
on frames, of whatever material composed, except silk or linen,"
should pay duties at a certain rate, it was not plain such articles
were not in any just sense "otherwise provided for" in a preceding
clause of the same section fixing the duties to be paid on "knit
goods composed wholly or in part of worsted." The judgment below
was before
United States v. Bowen, supra, was decided
here.
Judgment reversed and a venire de novo awarded.
NOTE -- This opinion was announced at the last term. A petition
for rehearing filed on the last day of that term was continued
under advisement, and at the present term overruled.