1. The verdict of a jury upon an issue which a court of chancery
directed them to try is merely advisory.
2. A party lawfully settling upon a portion of a quarter-section
of public land who in good faith complies with the statutory
requirements is entitled as against subsequent settlers to preempt
that quarter-section, and they derive no right thereto by
purchasing the claim of a prior settler unless, by an actual entry
at the proper office, he has a transferable interest in the
land.
3. The courts cannot exercise a direct appellate jurisdiction
over the rulings of the officers of the Land Department nor reverse
or correct them in a suit between private parties.
4. Where, by misconstruing the law, those officers have withheld
from a party his just rights or misrepresentation and fraud have
been practiced necessarily affecting their judgment, the courts may
in a proper proceeding interfere and refuse to give effect to their
action.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
MR. JUSTICE FIELD delivered the opinion of the Court.
This was an action for the possession of certain real property
in the County of Los Angeles, in the State of California. The
complaint is in the usual form in such actions according to the
system of pleading prevailing in that state, alleging the ownership
of the premises by the plaintiff and his right to their possession
on a day designated, the wrongful entry thereon by the defendant,
and his subsequent occupation thereof, to the plaintiff's
damage.
It also alleges the value of the rents and profits during the
occupation of the defendant and prays judgment for restitution of
the premises to the plaintiff, for his damages for their
occupation, and for the rents and profits lost.
The answer of the defendant denies the several allegations of
the complaint and then sets up in a special count, by way of a
cross-complaint, various matters which, as he claims, constitute in
equity a good defense to the action and entitle him
Page 104 U. S. 421
to a decree, that he has an equitable right to the premises, and
that the plaintiff holds the legal title for him.
Under the system of pleading which obtains in California, an
equitable defense of this nature, as well as a defense at law, may
be set up to an action for the possession of land. In such case,
the grounds of equitable relief must be set forth separately from
the defense at law. The answer presenting them is in the nature of
a bill in equity, and must contain all its essential allegations.
It must disclose a case which, if established, will justify a
decree adjudging that the title be transferred to the defendant, or
enjoining the further prosecution of the action. The equitable
defense is therefore first to be disposed of by the court before
the legal remedy is considered. Upon its disposition the necessity
of proceeding with the legal action will depend. When that action
does proceed, the ordinary rules as to the controlling influence of
the legal title will apply.
Estrada v. Murphy, 19 Cal.
248, 273;
Arguello v. Edinger, 10
id. 150.
This statement will explain
Estrada v. Murphy, 19 Cal.
248, singular in the record, that one judge heard the issues raised
by the special answer in the nature of a cross-complaint in equity,
and another judge of the same court subsequently tried the issues
in the action at law. There was no more impropriety in this hearing
of the different issues by different judges, or incongruity with
established modes of procedure, than there would have been had the
issues in the cross-action been presented in an independent
suit.
The grounds put forth for equitable relief consist of alleged
erroneous rulings of the Land Department upon two matters -- the
possession and improvement of the lands in controversy by the
parties claiming a preemption right to them and the time when that
portion of the lands in controversy, claimed to be within the
limits of a confirmed Mexican grant, was shown, by a survey of the
grant and the appropriation of other lands to its satisfaction, to
be without them and thus open to settlement and preemption.
1. The lands in controversy constitute the west half and the
southeast quarter of a quarter-section. The plaintiff, Conlan,
entered upon them in February, 1865, occupying a
Page 104 U. S. 422
portion thereof and declaring his purpose to acquire, as a
settler, a preemption right to them. The township was surveyed by
the authorities of the United States in February, 1868, and the
plat filed in the proper land office in April following. In May,
1868, Conlan filed his declaratory statement in the form required
by law, claiming the quarter-section as a preemptor. In May, 1869,
four years after Conlan's settlement, the defendant, Quinby,
settled upon the quarter-section, occupying a portion thereof,
declaring his intention to acquire as a settler a preemptive right
to the land, and in November, 1871, he filed his declaratory
statement claiming it as a preemptor. Previously to his possession,
various parties had occupied portions of the section and had
conveyed to him whatever interest they held. It would seem from the
answer and the frequent reference to the prior occupation of these
parties that it was supposed that this fact in some way increased
the equity of his possession and gave him a better preemptive right
to the lands than that claimed by the plaintiff. But to this
position there are two answers: 1st, it does not appear that the
grantors of the defendant ever contemplated the acquisition of a
preemptive right to the lands by their settlement, and 2d, the act
of Congress forbids the sale of preemptive rights to the public
lands acquired by settlement and improvement. The general
preemption law declares that all transfers and assignments of
rights thus obtained prior to the issuing of the patent shall be
null and void. This court held -- looking at the purpose of the
prohibition -- that it did not forbid the sale of the land after
the entry was effected -- that is, after the right to a patent had
become vested -- but did apply to all prior transfers. The policy
of preventing speculation through the instrumentality of temporary
settlers would otherwise be defeated.
Myers v.
Croft, 13 Wall. 291.
The claim of the defendant to a right of preemption stands,
therefore, in no better plight than if there had been no prior
occupant of the lands. His own settlement can alone be considered,
and that dates, as already said, from May, 1869. He had no claim to
the lands when the plaintiff settled upon them, and he acquired
none by his purchase of parties who had previously occupied
them.
Page 104 U. S. 423
He must also be considered as settling upon them with notice of
the plaintiff's prior claim by his declaratory statement filed in
the land office the year before. The plaintiff could not, it is
true, have asserted a preemptive right to the whole quarter-section
as against parties at the time of his settlement in the occupation
of a portion of them. Had such parties followed up their occupation
and improvement by a declaratory statement when the public surveys
were extended over the lands, the case would have been different. A
settlement cannot be made upon public land already occupied; as
against existing occupants, the settlement of another is
ineffectual to establish a preemptive right. Such is the purport of
our decisions in
Atherton v. Fowler, 96 U. S.
513, and
Hosmer v. Wallace, 97 U. S.
575.
But a settlement upon a portion of a quarter-section, and making
the improvements required by law, will sustain a preemptive claim
to the whole quarter-section as against subsequent settlers, and
such subsequent settlement is not improved, or in any respect
rendered more efficacious, by the fact of purchase from earlier
occupants. The settlement which the law of Congress will recognize
-- except where the claim is made by a widow or heirs of a deceased
settler -- must be personal to the settler, and not that of others
who may have conveyed to him.
2. As to the time when the portion of the land in controversy,
originally claimed to be within the boundaries of a Mexican grant,
was, by the survey of the grant, and the appropriation of other
lands to its satisfaction, excluded from them, and thus became open
to settlement and preemption, only a few words are necessary.
It does not clearly appear from the record what portion of the
land in controversy was covered by the claim under the Mexican
grant. It would seem from the complaint to have been the southeast
quarter of the quarter-section, but it is not material. The court
found that the grant was surveyed in January or February, 1868,
under the Act of Congress of July 3, 1866, c. 219, entitled "An Act
to quiet land titles in California," that such survey was finally
approved, and a patent issued upon it, and that the land in
controversy was not included
Page 104 U. S. 424
within it, but "was public land and subject to preemption" at
the time the plaintiff filed his declaratory statement. The jury,
it is true, found generally the reverse of this -- that the land
was claimed to be within the boundaries of the grant when the
declaratory statement was filed. Hence it is contended that the
approval of the survey must be considered as subsequently given. It
is also contended that a similar conclusion must follow from the
period, required by the Act of July 1, 1864, for the publication of
notice of the survey of a confirmed Mexican grant, before it could
be forwarded to the Land Office at Washington for approval. But to
this argument or assumption there is a satisfactory answer. If
there be in an equity case -- and so far as the issues upon the
cross-complaint are concerned, they are to be treated as arising in
a proceeding of that character -- a conflict between the finding of
the court and that of the jury, the former prevails. The finding of
the jury is only advisory, and the court may disregard it and
follow its own judgment upon the evidence.
Basey v.
Gallagher, 20 Wall. 670,
87 U. S.
680.
The survey in the case was made under the eighth section of the
act of 1866, and was not subject to the provisions of the act of
1864, requiring publication of it before approval by the
Commissioner of the General Land Office. The statute of 1866
declares that in cases where no request is made within ten months
after its passage or within that period after any subsequent final
confirmation for a survey of a claim under a confirmed Mexican
grant, pursuant to secs. 6 and 7 of the act of 1864, the Surveyor
General of the United States for California shall cause the line of
the public surveys to be extended over the land and shall set off,
in full satisfaction of the grant and according to the lines of the
public surveys, the quantity confirmed, and that the land not
included in the grant thus set off by him shall be subject to the
general laws of the United States. The survey by that officer of
the grant, and the application of land to its satisfaction as thus
prescribed, could undoubtedly have been disapproved by the
Commissioner of the General Land Office, and, had their correctness
been contested, they might have been treated as inoperative until
approved. But the approval by that officer,
Page 104 U. S. 425
when given, took effect by relation as of the date when the
survey and appropriation were made. They must be held valid from
that time, so as to protect proceedings taken in accordance with
them.
There was therefore nothing in the showing made by the defendant
to justify the court below in granting the relief prayed, even if
we were to take into consideration the facts stated as grounds of
relief.
But, independently of this conclusion, there is a general answer
to the alleged erroneous rulings of the officers of the Land
Department as grounds for the interference of the court. Those
rulings were upon mere matters of fact, or upon mixed questions of
law and fact, which were properly cognizable and determinable by
the officers of that department.
The laws of the United States prescribe with particularity the
manner in which portions of the public domain may be acquired by
settlers. They require personal settlement upon the lands desired
and their inhabitation and improvement, and a declaration of the
settler's acts and purposes to be made in the proper office of the
district, within a limited time after the public surveys have been
extended over the lands. By them a land department has been created
to supervise all the various steps required for the acquisition of
the title of the government. Its officers are required to receive,
consider, and pass upon the proofs furnished as to the alleged
settlements upon the lands, and their improvement, when preemption
rights are claimed, and, in case of conflicting claims to the same
tract, to hear the contesting parties. The proofs offered in
compliance with the law are to be presented in the first instance
to the officers of the district where the land is situated, and
from their decision an appeal lies to the Commissioner of the
General Land Office, and from him to the Secretary of the Interior.
For mere errors of judgment as to the weight of evidence on these
subjects by any of the subordinate officers, the only remedy is by
an appeal to his superior of the department. The courts cannot
exercise any direct appellate jurisdiction over the rulings of
those officers or of their superior in the department in such
matters, nor can they reverse or correct them in a collateral
proceeding between private parties.
Page 104 U. S. 426
In this case, the allegation that false and fraudulent
representations as to the settlement of the plaintiff were made to
the officers of the Land Department is negatived by the finding of
the court. It would lead to endless litigation and be fruitful of
evil if a supervisory power were vested in the courts over the
action of the numerous officers of the Land Department on mere
questions of fact presented for their determination. It is only
when those officers have misconstrued the law applicable to the
case, as established before the department, and thus have denied to
parties rights which, upon a correct construction, would have been
conceded to them, or where misrepresentations and fraud have been
practiced necessarily affecting their judgment, that the courts can
in a proper proceeding interfere and refuse to give effect to their
action. On this subject we have repeatedly and with emphasis
expressed our opinion, and the matter should be deemed settled.
Johnson v.
Towsley, 13 Wall. 72;
Shepley v. Cowan,
91 U. S. 330,
91 U. S. 340;
Moore v. Robbins, 96 U. S. 530.
And we may also add, in this connection, that the
misconstruction of the law by the officers of the department which
will authorize the interference of the court must be clearly
manifest, and not alleged upon a possible finding of the facts from
the evidence different from that reached by them. And where fraud
and misrepresentations are relied upon as grounds of interference
by the court, they should be stated with such fullness and
particularity as to show that they must necessarily have affected
the action of the officers of the department. Mere general
allegations of fraud and misrepresentations will not suffice.
United States v. Atherton, 102 U.
S. 372.
In the present case, the respective claims of the parties to a
preemptive right to the land in controversy from their settlement
and improvements had been the subject of earnest contestation
before the officers of the Land Department, and a decision in favor
of the plaintiff was finally rendered by the Secretary of the
Interior. And the question whether the land in controversy had been
so freed from its reservation under the Mexican grant as to be open
to settlement and preemption depended upon matters disclosed by the
record of proceedings
Page 104 U. S. 427
in the Land Department -- namely that the public surveys had
been extended over the land and that other lands had been
appropriated to the satisfaction of the grant.
Judgment affirmed.