2. A verdict for the plaintiff, if it declares that the land in
dispute "was claimed by the defendants," is in substantial
compliance with the requirements of the code.
Riley, claiming to be the owner in fee simple of a large body of
land containing 3,000 acres, consisting of several tracts in the
County of Ritchie, State of West Virginia, brought this action, on
the 28th of March, 1868, to recover the same from the plaintiffs in
error, who, it is alleged, unlawfully withheld from him the
possession thereof. The plea, following the requirements of the
local law, was "not guilty of unlawfully withholding premises
claimed by the plaintiff in his declaration." A trial resulted in a
verdict for the defendants, which was on motion set aside. Upon a
second trial, the jury found for him, the verdict being in these
words:
"We, the jury, find for the plaintiff the land described in the
declaration [here follows a description of the boundary of the
entire tract of 3,000 acres], except as to two undivided thirds of
[here follows a description of separate tracts, aggregating 1,834
acres, and claimed by the respective defendants]. And as to the
two-thirds of the lands hereinbefore described and excepted, we
find for the said defendants; and as to the remaining one-third of
the lands hereinbefore excepted and claimed by the said defendants,
we find the following facts: That Frederick Swetzer died on the ___
day of ___, 1823, possessed in fee of lot No. 4 and the lower half
of No. 5, as hereinbefore
Page 104 U. S. 323
found for the plaintiff, leaving three heirs at law who
inherited said property, one of whom, Polly, had, prior to his
death, intermarried with Abraham Wagoner; and that subsequently to
his death, to-wit, on the ___ day of January, 1868, the said
Abraham Wagoner and Polly his wife conveyed to the plaintiff in
this cause all right and title in said lands; and that before the
commencement of this suit, Abraham Wagoner died, on the ___ day of
February, 1868, and the said Polly Wagoner died afterwards, on the
___ day of March, 1868, and we further find that at the date of the
deed executed by the said Abraham and Polly Wagoner to the
plaintiff in this cause, the said Abraham Wagoner's right to
recover against the said defendants was barred by the statute of
limitations. Upon this state of facts as to the interest of Polly
Wagoner, if the law be for the plaintiff, then we find for the
plaintiff in fee the remaining one-third of the several tracts of
land claimed as aforesaid by the defendants, and of which
two-thirds have been found for them; if the law be for the
defendants, then we find for the said defendants the one undivided
third part of the said land conveyed by the said Abraham Wagoner
and wife, of which we have herein found two undivided third parts
for the defendants."
Riley moved the court to enter judgment in his behalf upon the
special verdict. The defendants moved to arrest judgment for him,
and, "for various reasons appearing upon the face of the record,"
to enter judgment in their favor. The motion of the plaintiff was
granted and that of the defendants denied, whereupon they sued out
this writ of error.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, after stating the case, delivered the
opinion of the Court.
On behalf of Riley it is contended that the verdict is a general
finding in his favor as to the undivided one-third of the several
tracts claimed by the defendants respectively, and should be
followed by a judgment for him unless the facts, specially stated,
preclude his recovery. In that view we are
Page 104 U. S. 324
unable to concur. The finding is, in form, a special verdict as
to the undivided one-third of the lands in controversy, and was so
treated, in the court below by both parties. It has all the
essential requisites of a special verdict, which is one wherein the
jury
"state the naked facts, as they find them to be proved, and pray
the advice of the court thereon, concluding conditionally that if
upon the whole matter the court should be of opinion that the
plaintiff had a cause of action, they then find for the plaintiff;
if otherwise, then for the defendant."
3 Bl.Com., p. 377. The inquiry, therefore, is not whether the
facts stated prevent the court from entering a judgment in favor of
Riley in pursuance of a general finding for him, but whether the
facts stated -- "this state of facts as to the interest of Polly
Wagoner" -- affirmatively establish his right to any judgment
against the present defendants for the recovery of that
interest.
The main proposition advanced by the plaintiffs in error is that
even if Riley, as between himself and his grantors, acquired that
interest by an effectual conveyance, this action was barred by the
statute of limitations.
The statute, which it is conceded, governs this case
provides:
"That no person shall make an entry on, or bring an action to
recover, any land, but within fifteen years next after the time at
which the right to make such entry, or to bring such action, shall
have first accrued to himself, or to some person through whom he
claims."
Va. Code, 1860, tit. 45, c. 149, sec. 1.
"That if, at the time the right shall have first accrued, such
person was an infant, married woman, or insane, then such person,
or the person claiming through him, may, notwithstanding the period
of fifteen years shall have expired, make an entry on, or bring an
action to recover, such land within ten years next after the time
at which the person to whom such right shall have first accrued
shall have ceased to be under such disability as existed when the
same so accrued, or shall have died, whichever shall first have
happened."
Id., sec. 3.
A subsequent section makes the foregoing limitations of the
right of entry on, or action for, land subject to these
provisos:
Page 104 U. S. 325
"That no such entry shall be made or action brought by any
person who at the time at which his right to make or bring the same
shall have first accrued, shall be under any such disability, or by
any person claiming through him, but within thirty years next after
the time at which such right shall have first accrued, although the
person, under disability at such time, may have remained under the
same during the whole of such thirty years, or although the term of
ten years from the period at which he shall have ceased to be under
any such disability, or have died, shall not have expired. And
further, when any person shall be under any such disability at the
time at which his right to make an entry or bring an action shall
have first accrued, and shall depart this life without having
ceased to be under any such disability, no time to make an entry,
or to bring an action, beyond the fifteen years next after the
right of such person shall have first accrued, or the ten years
next after the period of his death, shall be allowed by reason of
any disability of any other person."
Sec. 4.
Recurring to the facts stated in the special verdict, it will be
observed that Polly Wagoner was under the disability of coverture
at the time she inherited the lands in controversy. The interest
thus inherited nevertheless passed to Riley by the conveyance of
January, 1868, unless her rights had been previously lost through
adverse possession or hostile claim by others. But whether there
was, prior to that conveyance, any such adverse possession or
hostile claim, even as against the husband, is not distinctly
found. The special verdict, it is true, states that the husband's
right to recover against the defendants was barred by the statute
of limitations. That, we think, is a conclusion of law, rather than
a statement of facts upon which it rests. If, however, we give that
finding the fullest effect claimed for it --
viz., that
the defendants had held continuous adverse possession of, or had
asserted a hostile claim to, the lands, long enough to bar an
action upon the part of the husband -- we are still not informed by
the special verdict as to the time such adverse possession in fact
commenced, or when such hostile claim was in fact first asserted by
defendants. It may have existed for only fifteen years prior to
Page 104 U. S. 326
the conveyance by Wagoner and wife to Riley. If it continued for
that length of time, the husband's right to the possession of the
lands would, under the statute, have been lost. But if adverse
possession, or an adverse claim by defendants, for that length of
time, be conceded -- and there is no reason why it should be
presumed to have continued for a longer period -- it would not
follow that the wife's right of entry was barred. The statute
expressly declares that a woman shall not be barred of her right of
entry into land, even by a judgment in her husband's lifetime, by
default or collusion; and further that
"No conveyance, or other act suffered or done by the husband
only, of any land which is the inheritance of the wife shall be or
make any discontinuance thereof or be prejudicial to the wife or
her heirs or to anyone having right or title to the same by her
death, but they may respectively enter into such land, according to
their right and title therein, as if no such act had been
done."
Va.Code, 1860, c. 133, sec. 2, p. 608.
If the special verdict had stated that defendants and those
under whom they claim had adversely held and claimed the land for a
period sufficiently long anterior to January, 1868, to show that
the wife, notwithstanding the disability of coverture, had been
barred of her right of action, then the law would be with the
defendants. But no such facts are found. The verdict is, as we have
seen, wholly silent as to when their adverse possession or claim
commenced, and the court is asked to adjudge as matter of law that
she was barred simply because, at the date of the conveyance to
Riley, her husband's right to recover was cut off by limitation. By
the express words of the statute, she had ten years after the
disability of coverture was removed in which to assert her right of
entry, provided thirty years from the date when her right first
accrued had not expired. Notwithstanding, therefore, her husband's
right of possession may have been barred when the deed to Riley was
made, that conveyance, in the absence of evidence that she was
barred, must be held to have passed whatever interest she then had
in the lands.
Further, if it be conceded, as perhaps it must be, that the
husband and wife -- the former being barred -- could not
Page 104 U. S. 327
have brought a joint action to recover the lands, and that
during the life of the husband Riley could not have asserted his
right, as against the defendants, it would not follow that he got
nothing by the conveyance. He certainly did acquire the wife's
interest, and when her disability was removed, he could enter upon
the land, or bring an action for its recovery precisely as she
could have done upon the death of the husband had she not joined in
the conveyance. This is clear from a comparison of the limitation
act of Virginia, passed Feb. 25, 1819, with the provision of the
code of 1860. The former, while prescribing twenty years as the
time within which an action for the recovery of land must be
brought, gave to infants,
feme coverts, and others under
disability, and to their heirs, ten years after such disability was
removed in which to sue, notwithstanding twenty years may have
passed after the right to sue accrued. Va.Rev.Code, 1819, vol. i.
p. 488. On the other hand, the code of 1860, as we have seen, saved
the rights of those who claimed through the person to whom the
right of entry or action accrued. Riley undoubtedly claimed through
the wife, and could sue by virtue of his ownership of her interest,
because she could have sued had no conveyance been made.
But it is argued that the special verdict must contain all the
facts from which the law is to arise; that whatever is not found
therein is, for the purposes of a decision, to be considered as not
existing; that it must present, in substance, the whole matter upon
which the court is asked to determine the legal rights of the
parties, and cannot, therefore, be aided by intendment or by
extrinsic facts, although such facts may appear elsewhere in the
record. It is not necessary, in the view we take of this case, to
controvert any of these propositions. They undoubtedly embody a
correct statement, as far as it goes, of the law in reference to
special verdicts. But we do not perceive that their application in
this case would lead to any result different from the one already
indicated. We have taken the special verdict as presenting the
whole case as to Polly Wagoner's interest in the lands. It shows
that Swetzer, under whom both sides claim, was, at his death, the
owner of the land; that upon his death, an undivided third thereof
was
Page 104 U. S. 328
inherited by his daughter Polly; and that her interest was
conveyed in 1868 to Riley, by the joint deed of herself and
husband. No fact is stated justifying the conclusion that her
interest in the land had been lost prior to the conveyance either
by adverse possession or by adverse claim. If such fact existed it
was the duty of the defendants, who relied upon limitation, to have
established it by proof and caused it to be stated in the special
verdict. The record contains no bill of exceptions, and were we at
liberty to look beyond the special verdict, we should find in the
record no evidence whatever upon that point. We cannot presume that
any such evidence was offered. It was not for Riley to prove that
Mrs. Wagoner's right had not been lost by adverse possession or
adverse claim by others. That was matter of defense. Counsel for
the plaintiffs in error have proceeded, in their argument, upon the
assumption that the special verdict sets forth facts showing that
her right was barred at the time of the conveyance to Riley or at
the commencement of the action. But evidently it shows nothing more
than that the husband was barred as to his right of possession.
Another proposition advanced by counsel for plaintiffs in error
deserves notice. It is that the special verdict does not show that
they were, at the institution of the suit, in possession of or
claimed title to the interest of Polly Wagoner in the lands in
dispute.
By the Code of Virginia of 1860 it is declared that
"If the jury be of opinion [in actions of ejectment] for the
plaintiffs, or any of them, the verdict shall be for the
plaintiffs, or such of them as appear to have right to the
possession of the premises, or any part thereof, and against such
of the defendants as were in possession thereof, or claimed title
thereto, at the commencement of the action."
P. 612. There was a similar provision in the Code of 1849, p.
561. The verdict in this case is in substantial conformity with
this statutory requirement. The issue to be tried was whether the
defendants unlawfully withheld from the plaintiff the premises
described in the declaration. The verdict finds for the defendants
as to the undivided two-thirds of the land in dispute. If that be
not, in legal effect, a finding that defendants were in possession
of the
Page 104 U. S. 329
entire land, there is a finding that defendants, respectively,
claimed title to the several tracts in controversy. The verdict
describes by metes and bounds each tract embraced in the suit,
giving the name of each defendant by whom it is claimed and finding
for defendants as to two-thirds, undivided, of the respective
tracts. It then proceeds to find as "to the remaining one-third of
the lands hereinbefore excepted, and claimed by said defendants."
Although the verdict does not state in terms that the defendants
were in possession, it does state that they claimed the lands in
dispute. And that seems to be sufficient under the local law. In
reference to the case of
Southgate v. Walker, 2 W.Va. 427,
it is sufficient to say that it related to an action of ejectment
commenced in 1848, before the adoption of the above-recited
provision. We are referred to no decision of the state court in
conflict with the construction we have given to that provision.
We deem it unnecessary to comment upon any other objections
urged against the special verdict. There is no error in the
judgment, and it is
Affirmed.