1. Where, in a case in admiralty, the decree below, determining
the liability of the respective vessels in a collision was rendered
before the Act of Feb. 18, 1875, c. 77, 18 Stat., pt. 3, p. 315,
took effect, this Court, the case being properly here on appeal,
will reexamine the evidence and, if the appellant does not show
that in the concurring action of the courts below error was
committed to his prejudice, the decree will be affirmed.
2. Where, after such a decree and the taking effect of that act,
the ascertainment of the amount of damages sustained by the vessel
not in fault was referred to a master, the action of the circuit
court upon exceptions to his report, all of which relate to
questions of fact, will not be reviewed here.
This was a libel filed by Shirley and others, owners of the
steamboat
Sabine. They allege, in substance, that between
two and three o'clock of the morning of Feb. 11, 1872, while she
was descending the Mississippi River about twelve miles above New
Orleans, the steamer
Richmond ran into and sunk her; that
the collision was owing entirely to the gross and culpable
negligence of the officers and pilot of the
Richmond, and
that the libellants suffered damages to the sum of $37,500.
The owners of the
Richmond filed an answer and
cross-libel, claiming $12,000 damages.
The Merchants' Mutual Insurance Company filed its libel against
the
Richmond and the
Sabine, alleging that it
Page 103 U. S. 541
had insured the cargo of the
Sabine, and paid a large
sum on the policy, and that both vessels were at fault.
Other intervenors appeared and filed their respective
libels.
The suits were consolidated. The district court dismissed the
libel April 14, 1873. An appeal was prayed for and allowed to the
circuit court, which adjudged and decreed, April 19, 1875, that the
libel of the
Sabine be dismissed with costs; that the
Richmond recover of the
Sabine all damages the
Richmond suffered by the collision; that the libel of the
Merchants' Mutual Insurance Company against the
Sabine and
the
Richmond be dismissed as to the
Richmond; and
that said company and intervenors have judgment against N. C.
Selby, master of the steamer
Sabine, for all damages
sustained by the company by reason of said collision, with
privilege on any balance of the proceeds in the registry arising
from the sale of the
Sabine.
It was further ordered that it be referred to J. W. Gurley,
United States commissioner, to ascertain and report the damage
sustained by the
Richmond, the Merchants' Mutual Insurance
Company, and the intervenors. He reported June 4, 1875, that the
Richmond had sustained damages in the sum of $7,392.60. He
subsequently filed a report of the losses of the Merchants' Mutual
Insurance Company and of the various insurance companies, subrogees
of the individual intervenors.
The court, March 11, 1876, confirmed the report and condemned
the sureties on the bond of the
Sabine to pay the amount
for which they respectively bound themselves. The owners of the
Sabine and the various insurance companies prayed an
appeal from the decrees of the circuit court.
The insurance companies who claimed to be subrogated to the
rights of the individual intervenors filed no new pleadings.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an appeal from a decree in admiralty which was
Page 103 U. S. 542
entered before the Act of Feb. 16, 1875, c. 77, went into
effect; consequently the whole case comes up. On examination, we
find that so far as the merits are concerned, the questions
involved are of fact only. Two courts have already found against
the appellants. Under such circumstances, the burden is on the
appellants to show the error, with every presumption in favor of
the decrees below.
The S. B.
Wheeler, 20 Wall. 385. The testimony is voluminous
and conflicting, but it certainly makes no such clear case in favor
of the appellants as will justify us in reversing the decrees
against them.
The decree of the circuit court will be consequently affirmed,
and as it will serve no useful purpose to enter into a discussion
of the evidence in detail, no further opinion will be delivered.
Having reached this conclusion, it is unnecessary to consider how
much of the case has been brought here by the appeals that were
taken.
Decree affirmed.
A petition for rehearing having been filed, MR. CHIEF JUSTICE
WAITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
We are asked to rehear this case on two grounds: 1, because on
the evidence the decree below should have been reversed, and 2,
because the exceptions to the commissioner's report were not
considered.
Notwithstanding what has been said in the briefs filed with this
application, we still think the question of the liability of the
Richmond is one of fact only. She was not a carrier of the
Sabine's cargo, and consequently not liable in any respect
as such. If not at fault for the collision, she is no more liable
for damages to the cargo of the
Sabine than she is for the
damages to the
Sabine, on which the cargo was carried.
So far as the
Sabine or her cargo, therefore, is
concerned, the only question presented on this application is
whether, in law, the
Richmond was in fault for the
collision, and that depends on the fact whether the
Sabine
had "fled to the wall," and for that purpose had gone closer to the
left-hand shore than her pilot had ever seen a boat before, and the
Richmond followed her. On that question of fact the case
hinges, for if
Page 103 U. S. 543
the
Richmond did what is thus claimed against her, the
law clearly charges her with fault. As to the fact the testimony is
voluminous and conflicting. Two courts have already, on the same
testimony, decided against the
Sabine and the insurers of
her cargo. As long ago as 1861, we said, speaking through Mr.
Justice Grier, in the case of
The Ship
Marcellus, 1 Black 414:
"We have had occasion to remark more than once that when both
courts below have concurred in the decision of questions of fact, .
. . parties ought not to expect this Court to reverse such a decree
by raising a doubt founded on the number or credibility of
witnesses. The appellant in such a case has all presumptions
against him, and the burden is cast on him to prove affirmatively
some mistake made by the judge below in the law or in the evidence.
It will not do to show that on one theory, supported by some
witnesses, a different decree might have been rendered, provided
there be sufficient evidence to be found on the record to establish
the one that was rendered."
This rule thus stated from the preceding cases was uniformly
followed afterwards until the Act of Feb. 16, 1875, c. 77, 18
Stat., pt. 3, p. 315, which took effect on the first day of the
following May, relieved us from the labor of weighing evidence.
Newell v. Norton and
Ship, 3 Wall. 257;
The
Hypodame, 6 Wall. 216;
The S. B.
Wheeler, 20 Wall. 385;
The Lady
Pike, 21 Wall. 1. It is true that notwithstanding
this rule, we were required "to reexamine the facts as well as the
law of the case,"
The Baltimore,
8 Wall. 377, but we did not reverse except in a clear case. Such
was the well established rule of decision.
The decree on the merits was rendered April 19, 1875, a few days
before the act of 1875 took effect. We were therefore, as we
thought at the hearing, compelled to consider and weigh the
evidence on the question involved when that decree was rendered. We
are clear now, as we were on the first hearing, that the
presumptions in favor of the correctness of the two decrees below
have not been overcome. If one set of witnesses are to be believed,
the decree is right; if the other, it is wrong. There is, to say
the least, no such preponderance in favor of the appellants as to
justify us in overruling the decisions of the two courts below.
Page 103 U. S. 544
As to the exceptions to the report of the commissioner. It was
presented June 4, 1875, after the law of 1875 went into effect. The
exceptions were filed the next day. All the exceptions that were
argued in the court below or here relate only to questions of fact,
depending on the weight of evidence. The court omitted to find the
facts, and the case comes here on the evidence. This, since the act
of 1875, we are not bound to consider. If the appellants had
desired to press their exceptions, they should have got a finding
of the facts, so as to present questions of law alone. The case on
its merits came up under the old law, and we were compelled to
consider the testimony, but on the master's report, the act of 1875
was applicable, and our review is confined to questions of law.
Petition denied.
