1. In 1873, A. imported certain manufactured shirtings, not made
up, composed of linen and cotton, the latter being the material of
chief value and largely predominating.
Held that they
were, within the meaning of the tariff acts, manufactures of
cotton, and as such subject to the duty imposed by the first
section of the Act of March 3, 1865, c. 80. 13 Stat. 491.
2. The ruling in
Solomon v. Arthur, 102 U.
S. 208, that goods made of mixed materials were not
dutiable under the mixed-material clause of the twenty-second
section of the act of March 2, 1861, c. 192, 12 Stat. 192, if they
came properly within any other description found in the tariff acts
reaffirmed.
Page 103 U. S. 432
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a suit to recover back duties paid under protest. The
goods imported were manufactured shirtings, not made up, composed
of linen and cotton, the cotton being the material of chief value
and largely predominating. There were more than two hundred threads
to the square inch, counting the warp and filling.
The Act of March 2, 1861, c. 68, sec. 22, 12 Stat. 192, provided
for a duty of thirty percent
ad valorem on "manufactures
not otherwise provided for, composed of mixed materials, in part of
cotton, silk, wool or worsted, or flax." The same act, sec. 14,
provided for specific duties on all manufactures of cotton not
bleached, &c., having certain numbers of threads to the square
inch, counting the warp and filling and being of certain weights.
An addition was made to the duties on manufactures of mixed
materials by the Act of July 14, 1862, c. 163, sec. 13.
Id., 557. By the Act of June 27, 1864, c. 171, sec. 6, 13
id. 208, the duties on manufactured cottons, as provided
in the Act of 1861, were to some extent changed and a general
clause added at the end of the section as follows: "All other
manufactures of cotton, not otherwise provided for, thirty-five
percentum ad valorem." On the 3d of March, 1865, c. 80, sec. 1,
id., 491, the rates of duty on manufactures of cotton
dependent on the weight and the number of threads to the square
inch were somewhat changed.
By the Act of April 30, 1842, c. 270, sec. 20, 5
id.
565, now sec. 2499 of the Revised Statutes, it was provided that
there should be levied and collected on each and every
nonenumerated article which bears a similitude either in material,
quality, texture, or the use to which it may be applied, to any
enumerated article chargeable with duty, the same rate of duty
which is levied and charged on the enumerated article it most
resembles
Page 103 U. S. 433
in any of the above particulars, and if any nonenumerated
article equally resembles two or more enumerated articles on which
different rates of duty are chargeable, it shall pay the highest
rate, and on all articles manufactured from two or more materials,
the duty shall be assessed at the highest rate chargeable on any of
its component parts.
The collector in this case demanded and collected the duties at
the rates chargeable on manufactures of cotton exceeding two
hundred threads to the square inch, while the importer claimed the
goods were dutiable under the acts of 1861 and 1862, as composed of
mixed materials. The suit was brought to recover back the excess
charged by the collector, and on the trial the court instructed the
jury on the conceded facts to bring in a verdict for the defendant.
This instruction is assigned for error here.
We decided in
Solomon v. Arthur, 102 U.
S. 208, that the mixed-material clause of the Act of
1861 was descriptive, rather than denominative, and that because
goods were made of mixed materials they were not necessarily
stamped with the name of mixed goods. Consequently goods made of
mixed materials were not dutiable under that clause if they came
properly within any other description found in the tariff acts. The
Act of 1864 provides for all manufactures of cotton, so that the
question here is whether these goods are essentially of that
character. If they are, they are not dutiable under the
mixed-material clause.
In
Stuart v.
Maxwell, 16 How. 150, it was held that the Act of
1842 brought goods made of linen and cotton within the provision of
the Tariff Act of 1846, c. 74, sec. 11, 9 Stat. 46, sched. D, which
imposed a duty on "manufactures composed wholly of cotton, not
otherwise provided for." It was conceded that manufactures of
cotton and linen were not enumerated in the Act of 1846, but we
said that,
"By providing for the principal thing, it has provided for all
other things which the law declares to be the same. It is only upon
this ground that sheer and manifest evasions can be reached.
Suppose an article is designedly made to serve the uses and take
the place of some article described, but some trifling or colorable
change is made in the fabric or some of its incidents. It is new in
the market.
Page 103 U. S. 434
No man can say he has ever seen it before, or known it under any
commercial name. But it is substantially like a known article which
is provided for. The law of 1842 then declares that it is to be
deemed the same and to be charged accordingly."
The effect of this is to hold that such an article "is provided
for under the name of what it resembles." Here, all manufactures of
cotton are provided for in the Act of 1864 and its amendments, and
the article now in question, in material, quality, and texture as
well as the use to which it is to be applied, is precisely like
cotton shirtings. As cotton largely predominates, we think the
burden was cast on the importer to show that the change was
substantial and not for the purpose of evading the requirements of
the law. It is not pretended that the new article had acquired any
distinctive name in commerce or that it was in any material respect
different from similar goods manufactured entirely of cotton. The
only difference between this case and that of
Stuart v.
Maxwell is that here it is claimed the articles are enumerated
as mixed goods, while there that they were not enumerated at all.
There it was held that they were not nonenumerated because they
were substantially cotton goods, and here we think for the same
reason they are not mixed goods. They are substantially, and
therefore, within the meaning of the tariff acts, actually
manufactures of cotton. Linen has been used to a limited extent,
not to make goods of "mixed materials," but to make "manufactures
of cotton" more useful for some purposes. To hold upon the facts as
they are admitted to be that these goods were something radically
different from cotton shirtings would be to encourage evasions of
the descriptive terms in the tariff laws "by some trifling or
colorable change in the fabric, or some of its incidents." This we
are not inclined to do.
Judgment affirmed.