Under the Constitution of Illinois of 1848, a bill passed by
both houses of the legislature became a law when it was approved
and signed by the governor of the state within ten days after its
presentation to him; and this notwithstanding the fact that when
the bill was so approved and signed, the legislature had adjourned
sine die.
This is an action by George B. Ellery against the Town of Seven
Hickory, Ill., to recover upon certain bonds issued by it March 1,
1872, which recite that they are issued
"in pursuance of authority conferred by an act of the General
Assembly of the State of Illinois, entitled 'An Act to incorporate
the Tuscola, Charleston, and Vincennes Railroad Company,' approved
March 7, 1867, and 'An Act to amend the foregoing act,' approved
March 25, 1869, and of an election of the legal voters of the town
of Seven Hickory, Ill., on the second day of April, 1867, under the
provisions of said act of incorporation."
The defendant objected to the validity of the bonds on the
ground that the General Assembly by which the bill for the Act of
March 7, 1867, was passed adjourned
sine die Feb. 28,
1867, on which day the bill was presented to the governor, in whose
bands it remained until March 7, when it was approved and signed by
him and delivered to the secretary of state, in whose office it was
filed, and thereupon published as a low of the state. The defendant
also proved that after such adjournment there was no session of the
General Assembly until June, 1867.
The court having overruled the objection, found the issues in
favor of the plaintiff, and rendered judgment accordingly. The
defendant sued out this writ of error.
Sec. 21, art. 4, of the Constitution of Illinois of 1848, is as
follows:
"Every bill which shall have passed the Senate and House of
Representatives shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the
governor; if he approve, he shall sign it; but if not, he shall
return it, with his objections, to the House in which it shall have
originated;
Page 103 U. S. 424
and the said House shall enter the objections at large on their
journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such
reconsideration, a majority of the members elected shall agree to
pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to
the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered; and if
approved by a majority of the members elected, it shall become a
law, notwithstanding the objections of the governor; but in all
such cases, the votes of both Houses shall be determined by yeas
and nays, to be entered on the journal of each House, respectively.
If any bill shall not be returned by the governor within ten days
(Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the
same shall be a law, in like manner as if he had signed it, unless
the General Assemble shall, by their adjournment, prevent its
return; in which case, the said bill shall be returned on the first
day of the meeting of the General Assembly after the expiration of
said ten days, or be a law."
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The single question we have now to consider is whether a bill
passed by both Houses, and presented to the governor before the
legislature adjourns, becomes a law when signed by the governor
after the session of the legislature has been terminated by an
adjournment, but within ten days from its presentation to him. We
have no hesitation in saying it does. There is certainly no express
provision of the constitution to the contrary. All that instrument
requires is that, before any bill, which has passed the two Houses,
can become a law, it shall be presented to the governor. If he
approves it, he may sign it. If he does sign it within the time,
the bill becomes a law. That is not said in so many words, but is
manifestly implied. After a bill has been signed, the legislature
has nothing more to do with it. Undoubtedly, if the legislature
should be in session when the signing is done, it would not be
inappropriate for the governor to communicate his approval to one
or both the Houses; but there is nothing in the constitution which
requires him to do so. The filing of the bill by the governor in
the office of the secretary of state with his signature of
approval
Page 103 U. S. 425
on it is just as effectual in giving it validity as a law, as
its formal return to the legislature would be. The bill becomes a
law when signed. Everything done after that is with a view to
preserving the evidence of its passage and approval.
The other parts of the article of the constitution under
consideration relate only to what is to be done if the governor
fails to indicate his approval of the bill by signing it. If the
legislature continues in session and he positively disapproves the
bill, he may, within ten days from the time of its presentation to
him, return it with his objections to the house in which it
originated. Under such circumstances, the bill cannot become a law
until it has again passed both houses, and this time by a majority
of all the members elected. Such a second passage, if secured and
entered on the journal, makes the bill a law notwithstanding its
disapproval by the governor. If the governor remains passive and
neither signs nor returns the bill within ten days, the legislature
being at the time in session, it becomes a law without his
approval.
In this way, provision is made for every case that can arise,
except when the governor fails to sign the bill and the legislature
adjourns for the session before the expiration of the ten days. To
meet such a state of things it was provided that the governor might
return the bill with his objections on the first day of the next
session, and that, if he did not, the bill was then to become a
law. If he did, the bill must again be passed over his objections
as in case of a return before an adjournment and within the ten
days. If thus passed, it became a law, otherwise not. So that,
under the Constitution of Illinois, if a bill is passed by both
Houses of the legislature it becomes a law -- 1, when approved and
signed by the governor within ten days after its presentation to
him; 2, when the legislature being in session, the governor fails
to sign the bill or return it with his objections to the House in
which it originated within the ten days; 3, when, after being
returned within the ten days, it is passed by the requisite
majorities over his objections; 4, when, if the session of the
legislature terminates by an adjournment before the expiration of
the ten days, he fails to return the bill with his objections the
first day of the next session; and, 5, when, having returned it
with objections of the first day of the
Page 103 U. S. 426
next session, it is again passed by the requisite majorities in
both Houses. And it becomes a law at the time when the event
happens which is to give it validity. In the present case the bill
was approved and signed within the ten days, and, therefore, as we
think, it become a law from the date of the approval,
notwithstanding the legislature was not in session at the time.
This is in accordance with the ruling of the Court of Appeals of
New York in
The People v. Bowen, 21 N.Y. 517; of the
Supreme Court of Louisiana in
State ex rel. Belden, Attorney
General v. Fagan, 22 La.Ann. 545, and of the Supreme Court of
Georgia in
Solomon v. Commissioners of Cartersville, 41
Ga. 157, upon provisions somewhat similar in the constitutions of
those states. In the last case, the decision was put on the ground
that the practice of the governor had been to sign the bills within
the limited time, whether the legislature was in session or not,
but not afterwards. The bill of exceptions in the present case
shows that the practice in Illinois has been to sign after the
legislature had adjourned.
In every view of the case, we think the judgment below was
right, and it is consequently
Affirmed.
