An act of the Legislature of Arkansas, passed in 1868,
authorizes any county to subscribe to the stock of any railroad
company in that state, provided the subscription shall not exceed
$100,000, and the consent of the inhabitants of the county thereto
shall first be obtained at an election held for that purpose. At an
election held under that act, the voters of a county voted to
subscribe $100,000 to the stock of company A. and $100,000 to the
stock of company B.
Held:
1. That the act does not restrict the county to a single
subscription.
2. That the power to subscribe is general, limited only by the
subscription of $100,000 to the stock of any one company.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Page 103 U. S. 165
Mr. JUSTICE BRADLEY delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Legislature of Arkansas, in 1868, passed an act, the first
and second sections of which are as follows:
"SEC. 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of
Arkansas, that any county in this state may subscribe to the stock
of any railroad in this state, now chartered or incorporated, or
which shall hereafter be chartered or incorporated, under and in
accordance with the laws of this state, and may issue bonds for the
amount of such stock so subscribed, with coupons for interest
thereto attached, under such limitations and restrictions, and upon
such conditions as the county court may require, and the president
and directors of such company may approve,
provided that
the amount of such subscription shall not exceed one hundred
thousand dollars, and the consent of the inhabitants of such county
to such subscription shall be first obtained in the manner
hereinafter provided."
"SEC. 2. Whenever the president and directors of any such
railroad shall make application to the county court of any county
for such subscription by such county to its stock, specifying the
amount to be subscribed an the condition of such subscription, and
one hundred voters of the county shall petition the court for such
purpose, it shall be the duty of the court immediately to order an
election, to be holden at the place and in the manner other
elections in such county are holden, for the purpose of determining
whether such subscription shall be made, and at least twenty days'
notice thereof shall be given in the manner provided by law for
other elections, at which election those voting for such
subscription shall have written or printed on their ballots or
tickets the words 'for subscription' or 'against subscription,' and
if a majority of the votes cast shall be in favor of subscription,
the court shall cause such subscription to be made, and upon its
acceptance by the company, shall cause bonds to be issued in
conformity with such vote."
Under this act, Chicot County subscribed $100,000 to the stock
of the Mississippi, Ouachita, and Red River Railroad Company, and
$100,000, to the stock of the Little Rock, Pine Bluff, and New
Orleans Railroad Company, both subscriptions being made by virtue
of a single election held by the voters of the county for that
purpose. Bonds were issued for the amount of each subscription,
$100,000 thereof payable to the Mississippi, Ouachita, and Red
River Railroad Company, or bearer,
Page 103 U. S. 166
and $100,000 thereof payable to the Little Rock, Pine Bluff, and
New Orleans Railroad Company, or bearer. Each bond contained the
following recital:
"This bond is one of a series numbered from one to two hundred,
inclusively, of like date, tenor, and amount, issued under an act
of the General Assembly of the state of Arkansas, entitled 'An act
to authorize counties to subscribe stock in railroads,' approved
July 23, 1868, and in obedience to a vote of the people of said
county at an election held in accordance with the provisions of
said act authorizing a subscription of one hundred thousand dollars
to the capital stock of said railroad company."
And each bond was executed by the judge under the county seal,
and attested by the county clerk.
The present suit was brought by the defendant in error to
recover the amount of certain coupons, some of which were attached
to bonds issued to one of the railroad companies, and some of them
to bonds issued to the other company. The complaint alleged that
the plaintiff was purchaser and
bona fide owner of the
coupons for value. The county put in a plea setting up the fact of
a single election in reference to both subscriptions, and the
amount of stock subscribed and bonds issued for each road. This
plea being demurred to, the question was raised, whether the two
subscriptions, amounting in the aggregate to $200,000, were
ultra vires of the county under the proviso of the first
section of the act. The court below sustained the demurrer and gave
judgment for the plaintiff.
We do not well see how a different decision could have been
made. The act did not restrict the county to a single subscription.
Its language is,
"Any county in this state may subscribe to the stock of any
railroad in this state, . . . and may issue bonds for the amount,
&c., provided that the amount of such subscription shall not
exceed one hundred thousand dollars."
That is, the power to subscribe is general, but no subscription
shall exceed $100,000. The meaning might have been more distinctly
expressed by using the plural, "any railroads," and making the
proviso to read, "the amount of such subscriptions shall not exceed
one hundred thousand dollars to any one railroad;" but the same
sense is sufficiently indicated
Page 103 U. S. 167
by the words actually employed. The power given is a power to
subscribe to any railroad. This includes all railroads in the
state, without restriction. A subscription to one does not
extinguish the power of subscribing to any other railroad;
otherwise, a subscription of $1,000 to one railroad would exhaust
the power; for the argument is based upon the idea that a single
exercise of the power exhausts it and leaves the county
functus
officio. It may be said that such a construction might lead to
disastrous consequences by opening the door to subscriptions to a
ruinous amount. But no subscription can be made without an election
in favor of it. The law simply meant to give the county full
liberty on the subject, limiting only the amount of a single
subscription. That the limitation contained in the proviso has
reference to a single subscription only is apparent from a bare
reading of the context. Omitting surplus words, the section reads
thus:
"Any county in this state may subscribe to the stock of any
railroad in this state, and issue bonds therefor,
provided
that the amount of such subscription [that is, the subscription to
any railroad] shall not exceed one hundred thousand dollars."
Here the words "any railroad" are used distributively, including
all railroad taken severally; and the limitation has reference to
the subscription to "any railroad" -- that is, to any one railroad
taken separately. Had the legislature desired to limit the power of
subscription to $100,000, the natural and appropriate mode of doing
so would have been either to limit the county to one subscription
not to exceed $100,000, or to provide that the amount of its
subscriptions should not in the aggregate exceed $100,000. Neither
of these things was done. As the law stands, it confers a general
power to subscribe to the stock of any railroad in the state for
any amount not exceeding $100,000.
This construction of the statute disposes of the case and
renders it unnecessary to consider the other point raised by the
defendant in error -- namely that as a
bona fide holder of
the coupons, he is not obliged to go behind the recital in the
bonds to which they were attached, which amounted to a declaration
by the county authority entrusted with the power to ascertain and
determine the fact that the bonds
Page 103 U. S. 168
were issued under the act, and in obedience to an election held
in accordance with its provisions. Perhaps a criticism might be
made upon this argument that, by comparing the two classes of bonds
together, it would appear from the several recitals that the county
had issued more than $100,000 in amount.
We find no error in the record.
Judgment affirmed.