Certain articles were imported by A. from Liverpool, Nov. 14,
1871, upon which the collector of the port of New York exacted the
duty of six cents per pound, imposed by sec. 5 of the Act of July
14, 1862, 12 Stat. 547, upon "argols or crude tartar." A. claimed
that they were "argols crude," and as such were, by sec. 22 of the
Act of July 14, 1870, 16
id. 266, exempt from duty. A.
paid the duty under protest and brought suit against the collector
to recover it. The court instructed the jury that it was for them
to determine from the evidence whether the argols in question were
"argols crude," then known as such to commerce or to science, or
whether they were argols that were more or less refined.
Held that the instruction was proper, and covered the
entire ground of the controversy.
This was a suit brought against Murphy, then collector of
customs at the port of New York, by Recknagel & Co. to recover
the amount of certain duties which they paid to him under the
following protest:
"NEW YORK, Dec. 27, 1871"
"SIR -- We protest against the assessment of duty at six cents
per lb. upon the argols imported by us in the City of New York from
Liverpool, and entered for consumption Nov. 14, 1871, because the
Act of July 14, 1862, sec. 5, as far as it relates to argols or
crude tartar, is repealed by the Act of July 14, 1870, sec. 22. We
pay under duress to get our goods."
"RECKNAGEL & CO."
"COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS,"
"New York City"
Judgment was rendered for the defendant. The plaintiffs' sued
out this writ of error.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
MR. JUSTICE SWAYNE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The subject to which the controversy relates is an article known
in commerce as argols.
Page 102 U. S. 198
Sec. 5 of the Act of Congress of July 14, 1862, 12 Stat. 547,
imposed upon "argols or crude tartar" a duty of "six cents per
pound."
Sec. 22 of the Act of July 14, 1870, 16 Stat. 266, exempted
"argols crude" wholly from duty, by putting the article in the free
list created by that act.
Both these acts were in force when the importations in question
were made.
The controversy between the parties therefore narrows itself
down to the question whether the argols of the plaintiffs upon
which the duties complained of were exacted and paid were "argols
crude" or not. If crude, they were not dutiable, and the plaintiffs
were entitled to recover; otherwise, the defendant was entitled to
a verdict in his favor.
The subject was a proper one to be enlightened by evidence and
passed upon by the jury. Both were done, and a verdict and judgment
for the defendant was the result.
When wine ferments, certain deposits cling to the sides or fall
to the bottom of the casks. These deposits are mingled with a
variety of impurities, such as glucose, leaves, sticks and
particles of dust, silicate and other like things. By washing in
cold water, these impurities are removed and the crude tartar is
left free from their presence. The effect of the cold water is
mechanical. When boiling water is applied sufficiently,
crystallization and re-crystallization take place, and the product
is the cream of tartar of medicine and commerce. There is
refinement in the latter case, but no chemical change is wrought.
Argols are used also for making tartaric acid, Rochelle salts, the
preparation of tartrate of antimony, and potash called tartar
emetic, as a mordant in dyeing, and for other purposes. Argols and
crude tartar are synonyms. The phrases are used convertibly by
those who deal in the article.
The lexical definition of crude is: "In its natural state; not
cooked or prepared by fire or heat; undressed; not altered,
refined, or prepared for use by any artificial process; raw."
See Webster's Dic.
Upon the trial, the plaintiffs produced and identified samples
of argols of the several importations upon which the duties were
paid, and gave proof tending to support their case. The
Page 102 U. S. 199
defendant then gave proof tending to maintain the claim of the
government. The testimony of the witnesses on both sides is set out
at length in the bill of exceptions. That paper then proceeds:
"A large number of witnesses were called by the defendant from
the trade and from among the manufactures of cream of tartar, and
dealers and others, whose testimony tended to prove that there was
an article of commerce and importation unlike the plaintiffs'
samples which was in fact 'crude argols;' that the plaintiffs'
samples exhibited at the trial were not 'crude argols;' that said
samples differed from 'crude argols,' &c. . . . These witnesses
also testified uniformly that plaintiffs' samples were refined
argols, and in that there was a difference between them and crude
argols, &c. . . . Samples of 'crude argols' were exhibited
which differed as above stated from those exhibited by the
plaintiffs. Also that there was a difference between crude argols
and the lees of wine, and that all these differences were well
understood by the trade and by manufacturers."
The court, after recapitulating with entire fairness the
substance of the testimony, said to the jury:
"The only question for you to determine is whether these argols
were 'argols crude,' those known to commerce as such or those known
to science as such, or whether they were argols that were more or
less refined."
This instruction was clear and accurate, and it covered the
entire ground of the controversy. Nothing more was necessary to be
said. No amount of verbiage would have improved it. The jury could
have no difficulty in applying it intelligently to the facts before
them.
They knew from the evidence that if there were no substantial
change in the condition of the argols, as they were when they came
from the wine cask, they were crude. On the other hand, if there
were such change wrought by a process to which the argols were
subjected, they lost their identity, and took their place in a new
and different category. According to the nomenclature of commerce,
they ceased to be crude, and became refined. They could not be both
at the same time. The measure of refinement was of no consequence,
provided it was sufficient to be material. The elaborate brief
submitted for the
Page 102 U. S. 200
government shows that, in the customers laws passed from time to
time by Congress, exact analogies to the case in hand have
constantly occurred and are numerous. It is unnecessary
particularly to advert to them.
In cases like this, the law recognizes the authority of those
engaged in commerce and adopts necessarily and as conclusive the
meaning which they have given to words and phrases employed in
their daily business.
It is needless to notice specifically the several assignments of
error. They relate to the instruction given, and to several asked
by the counsel for the plaintiffs and refused by the court. As
regards the former, we have expressed our approval.
If the latter were in conflict with it, they were properly
refused for that reason.
Conceding that they were correct, the instruction given was
sufficient for the case. Nothing more could, therefore, be required
of the court.
National Bank v. Burkhardt, 100 U.
S. 686.
Judgment affirmed.