1. Where an act of Congress admitting a state into the Union, or
organizing a territorial government, provides, in accordance with a
treaty stipulation, that the. lands in the possession of an Indian
tribe shall not be a part of such state or territory, the new
government has no jurisdiction over them.
Harkness v.
Hyde, 98 U. S. 476,
qualified and explained.
2. Where, in a civil suit before a justice of the peace of the
Territory of Idaho, it appears by the answer of the defendant,
verified by his affidavit, that the question of title to real
estate is necessarily involved, the justice should certify the case
to the district court for trial. If he proceeds to try it, it must,
on appeal from his judgment, be dismissed.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
MR. JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
Langford, the plaintiff in error, who was plaintiff below,
brought an action before a justice of the peace in the nature of
forcible detainer, to recover of Charles E. Monteith the possession
of buildings and grounds occupied by the latter under the agent of
the United States for the Nez Perce Indians.
The plaintiff, in his petition, charges that under a lease from
him the defendant entered with a condition to deliver possession to
the plaintiff on ten days' notice, which was given.
The defendant answers by alleging that at the time of making the
lease he was in possession under John B. Monteith, Indian agent;
that he was induced to take the lease by the false representation
of the plaintiff that he was the owner of the property; that said
buildings and grounds were then and are now the property of the
United States, and that the government had issued orders to defend
its possession against the plaintiff.
Another allegation of the defense is that the property is
situated within an Indian reservation, to which the Indian title
has never been extinguished, and therefore forms no part of the
Territory of Idaho. Of course, if this latter allegation be
Page 102 U. S. 146
true, neither the justice of the peace before whom the case was
first tried, nor the district court to which it afterwards came by
appeal, had any jurisdiction over it. The opinion of this Court in
Harkness v. Hyde, 98 U. S. 476, is
relied on by the defendant.
The principle announced in that case is sound, namely that when,
by the act of Congress organizing a territorial government, lands
are excepted out of the jurisdiction of the government thus brought
into existence, they constitute no part of such territory, although
they are included within its boundaries. Congress, from which the
power to exercise the new jurisdiction emanates, has undoubted
authority to exclude therefrom any part of the soil of the United
States, or of that whereto the Indians have the possessory title,
when, by our solemn treaties with them, a stipulation to that
effect has been made.
The applicability of this doctrine to the jurisdiction of places
in which the United States have constructed permanent forts,
arsenals, &c., before such governments are organized, will be
seen at once. Congress has also acted on this principle on the
admission of new states into the Union. The act for the admission
of Kansas, 12 Stat. 126, after describing its exterior boundaries,
and declaring that the new state is admitted into the Union on an
equal footing with the original states, in all respects whatever,
adds, that nothing contained in the Constitution of the state shall
be construed
"to include any territory which by treaty with such Indian tribe
is not, without the consent of said tribe, to be included within
the territorial limits or jurisdiction of any state or territory;
but all such territory shall be excepted our of the boundaries and
constitute no part of the state of Kansas, until said tribe shall
signify their assent to the President of the United States to be
included within said state."
Between the United States and the Shawnees a treaty then existed
by which the United States guaranteed that their lands should never
be brought within the bounds of any state or territory, or subject
to the laws thereof. In
United States v. Ward, 1 Woolw. 1,
the circuit court held that the state courts had no jurisdiction in
the lands of the Shawnees, and this was repeated in
United
States v. Stahl, id., 192.
Page 102 U. S. 147
The Act of Congress of March 3, 1863, to provide a temporary
government for the Territory of Idaho, 12 Stat. 808, contains a
clause precisely similar to that in the act admitting Kansas into
the Union.
This court, in
Harkness v. Hyde, supra, relying upon an
imperfect extract found in the brief of counsel, inadvertently
inferred that the treaty with the Shoshones, like that with the
Shawnees, contains a clause excluding the lands of the tribe from
territorial or state jurisdiction. In this it seems we were
laboring under a mistake. Where no such clause or language
equivalent to it is found in a treaty with Indians within the
exterior limits of Idaho, the lands held by them are a part of the
territory and subject to its jurisdiction, so that process may run
there, however the Indians themselves may be exempt from that
jurisdiction. As there is no such treaty with the Nez Perce tribe,
on whose reservation the premises in dispute are situated, and as
this is a suit between white men, citizens of the United States,
the justice of the peace had jurisdiction of the parties, if the
subject matter was one of which he could take cognizance.
Sec. 347 of the act to regulate proceedings in civil cases in
the courts of that territory declares that, on a trial before a
justice of the peace, if it appear from the plaintiff's own
showing, or from the answer of the defendant verified by his oath,
that the determination of the action will necessarily involve the
decision of a question of title to real property, the justice of
the peace shall suspend all further proceedings, and certify the
case to the district court of the county, which shall thereafter
have jurisdiction over the case as if originally brought in that
court.
The record is imperfect, but it appears that an appeal was taken
from the judgment of the justice of the peace to the district
court, and that the latter overruled the motion of the defendant to
dismiss the case because the justice of the peace was without
jurisdiction to try it. The same matter was urged in the supreme
court on appeal from the judgment of the district court.
We are of opinion that the justice of the peace had no
jurisdiction to try the case after the sworn answer of the
defendant
Page 102 U. S. 148
was filed, and that it was his duty to certify it for primary
trial to the district court. When removed there on appeal, it
should have been dismissed, because there could have been no lawful
trial before the justice.
That the issue tendered by the sworn answer of the defendant
involved the title is clear. If he was holding under the United
States, his attornment to the plaintiff and taking a lease were
void. The question would then arise, whether the title of plaintiff
or that of the United States, set up by defendant, was valid. For
the trial of that title, the action brought by the plaintiff and
the forum in which it was commenced were inappropriate. The
judgment of the Supreme Court of Idaho on the effect of their own
code of procedure in this respect will not be reversed here.
Judgment affirmed.