The Act of Congress approved March 2, 1853, entitled "An Act to
establish the territorial government of Washington," 10 Stat. 172,
enacts that the district courts of the territory shall have and
exercise the same jurisdiction in all cases arising under the
Constitution and laws of the United States as is vested in the
circuit and district courts of the United States, and also of all
cases arising under the laws of the territory.
Held that
the district courts of the territory have jurisdiction in admiralty
cases.
This is a proceeding in admiralty commenced in the District
Court of the Third Judicial District of the Territory of Washington
by Mary Phelps, her husband, against the steamship "City of
Panama," owned and claimed by the Pacific Mail Steamship Company,
to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by the libellant
Mary Phelps while a passenger on board said steamship.
The remaining facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
MR. JUSTICE CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the Court.
Judicial power as well as legislative is conferred upon the
territorial government by the organic act establishing the
territory, the provision being that the judicial power shall be
vested in a Supreme Court, district courts, probate courts, and in
justices of the peace. Appellate jurisdiction from the district
courts to the Supreme Court is also given, and with that view the
provision is that writs of error, bills of exception, and appeals
shall be allowed under such regulations as may be prescribed by
law, from which it plainly follows that the district courts created
by the organic act are and were intended to be courts of general
original jurisdiction.
Provision is also made for writs of error and appeals from the
territorial Supreme Court to the Supreme Court of the United States
in the same manner and under the same regulations as are required
to remove here the judgment or decree of the federal
Page 101 U. S. 454
circuit court for reexamination, where the value of the property
or the amount in controversy exceeds two thousand dollars, or where
the Constitution of the United States or an act of Congress or a
treaty is brought in question.
Express power is also given to the district courts of the
territory to have and exercise the same jurisdiction in all cases
arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States as is
vested in the circuit and district courts of the United States, and
also of all cases arising under the laws of the territory. 10 Stat.
175; Rev.Stat., secs. 1910, 1911.
Matters of fact of a preliminary nature, disconnected with the
question of jurisdiction, are not controverted; as, for example, it
is not disputed that the steamship is owned by the respondent
steamship company, and that she is one of the line they employ in
the transportation of passengers and freight between the port of
Seattle, one of the ports of Puget Sound, and the port of San
Francisco, in the State of California; nor is it denied that the
complaining party purchased a ticket as a cabin passenger for a
passage, at the time alleged, from the former to the latter port,
nor that she went on board for that purpose, and that a stateroom
was assigned to her for use during the voyage by the proper officer
or agent in charge.
None of these matters is denied in the argument here, and the
injured party alleges that while she had stepped into her stateroom
for a few minutes a portion of a concealed hatchway in the floor of
the cabin near the door of her stateroom was uncovered by some of
the officers, agents, of employees of the company, and was by their
gross carelessness and negligence left open and unguarded, in
consequence of which and without her fault she, in returning from
her stateroom to the cabin, fell through the hatchway down into the
hold of the steamship, a distance of about twenty feet, whereby she
broke and crushed the bones of her right arm and received other
grievous injuries, which, as she believes, will disable her for
life.
Compensation for her injuries being refused by the company, she,
her husband joining with her, instituted the present suit
in
rem against the steamship in the proper district court of the
territory to recover such redress as the law affords in such cases.
Service
Page 101 U. S. 455
was made and the respondents appeared and demurred to the libel
for several causes, of which the following are the most material in
this investigation: (1) that the district court had no jurisdiction
of the subject matter alleged in the libel; (2) that neither the
acts of Congress nor the admiralty rules of practice promulgated by
the Supreme Court apply in the courts of the territory.
Hearing was had and the district court overruled the demurrer
and the respondents excepted. Other proceedings took place before
the respondents answered the libel, but they are omitted as now
unimportant. Brief reference to the answer of the respondents will
be sufficient, as the question of jurisdiction is the one chiefly
discussed in this Court. Apart from that, the material matters of
defense set forth in the libel consisted of a denial that the
allegations of the fourth and fifth articles were true, and the
respondents expressly denied that the injuries of the complaining
party were in any respect caused by the carelessness or negligence
of the officers or employees of the steamship. Testimony was taken,
hearing had, and the district court having made a finding of facts
entered a decree in favor of the libellants for the sum of five
thousand dollars. Both parties appealed to the territorial Supreme
Court, where they were allowed to adduce evidence in open court.
All of the testimony introduced was taken down by the order of the
court and is reported in a document called a bill of exceptions.
Certain motions were made by the respective parties which are not
deemed material, and the parties having been again fully heard, the
Supreme Court entered a decree in favor of the libellants in the
sum of fifteen thousand dollars, from which the respondents
appealed to this Court. Since the cause was entered here the
respondents have filed the assignment of errors set forth in their
brief, numbered from one to eleven inclusive, of which the first
two call in question the jurisdiction of the territorial
courts.
Jurisdiction of the territorial Supreme Court cannot be
successfully denied if it be established that the original
jurisdiction of the cause was vested in the district court, as the
organic act provides that writs of errors, bills of exception, and
appeals shall be allowed in all cases from the final decisions of
said
Page 101 U. S. 456
district court to the Supreme Court, under such regulations as
may be prescribed by law, from which it follows that the present
investigation is necessarily limited to the inquiry whether the
district court had jurisdiction to hear and determine the
controversy.
Chancery, as well as common law, jurisdiction is in terms vested
both in the supreme and district courts, and the same section
provides that the district courts shall have and exercise the same
jurisdiction under the Constitution and laws of the United States
as is invested in the circuit and district courts of the United
States, which is a plain reference to the enactments of Congress
defining the original jurisdiction of those courts. Appellate
jurisdiction is in some cases exercised by the federal circuit
courts, but inasmuch as the entire appellate judicial jurisdiction
of the territory had previously been given to the Supreme Court by
the same section of the organic act, it is obvious that it is
original and not appellate jurisdiction that is there conferred by
that clause.
Cognizance of an original character was given to the district
courts, concurrent with the circuit courts, by the ninth section of
the Judiciary Act as amended, long prior to the passage of the
organic act in question, of all crimes and offences against the
authority of the United States, the punishment of which is not
capital, whether committed in their respective districts or upon
the high seas. 1 Stat. 16; 5
id. 517.
Admiralty and maritime cognizance, original and exclusive, was
also vested in those courts of all civil causes of the kind,
including all seizures under laws of impost, navigation, or trade,
where the seizures are made on waters navigable from the sea by
vessels of ten or more tons burden. Rev.Stat. sec. 568.
Original cognizance in certain cases, concurrent with the courts
of the several states, was given to the circuit courts in suits of
a civil nature at common law or in equity, and of all crimes and
offences cognizable under the federal authority, except where that
act otherwise provides, and concurrent jurisdiction of the crimes
and offences cognizable in the district courts. 1 Stat. 88;
Rev.Stat. sec. 629.
Such jurisdiction of the territorial district courts within
the
Page 101 U. S. 457
respective districts is made co-extensive with both the federal
circuit and district courts, for reasons which will be obvious to
any one who will compare the two sections, one with the other, in
their practical operation. Two classes of courts are created in the
federal system for the exercise of the necessary original
jurisdiction, but in the territory, as provided in the organic act,
there is but one class of courts created for that purpose. Had
Congress limited the jurisdiction of the territorial district
courts to that exercised by the federal district courts, then those
courts could not have taken cognizance of controversies in patent
cases nor of crimes or offences against the authority of the United
states, where the punishment is death, and if their jurisdiction
had been limited to that exercised by the circuit courts, then
those courts would have had no cognizance whatever of admiralty and
maritime causes, or of seizures on water where the proceeding is
according to the course of the admiralty law.
Power to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the
public territory is vested in Congress, and in the frequent
exercise of that power the usual form for an organic act in such a
case has become a very complete and well digested preparatory
system of government. Two examples of courts having such
jurisdiction are found in the tenth section of the Judiciary Act,
where the federal district courts in two districts were empowered
to exercise jurisdiction in addition to what was conferred by the
ninth section of the Judiciary Act of all other causes, except
appeals and writs of error, made cognizable in a circuit court, and
with authority to proceed therein in the same manner as a circuit
court.
Argument to show that jurisdiction in admiralty cases is
properly exercised by the federal district courts under the ninth
section of that act is quite unnecessary, as every one knows that
jurisdiction in such cases has been exercised by those courts under
that provision from the passage of the act to the present time,
with the sanction of every federal court organized pursuant to the
Constitution and the laws of Congress. Doubt at one time was
suggested whether those courts could properly exercise judicial
cognizance in prize cases, inasmuch as the section does not in
terms confer such jurisdiction, but the Supreme
Page 101 U. S. 458
Court held that prize was a branch of the admiralty and that as
such jurisdiction was vested in the district courts by the ninth
section of the Judiciary Act.
The
Admiral, 3 Wall. 609,
70 U. S. 612;
Glass v. Sloop Betsey, 3
Dall. 16.
Prior to the act of the 3d of March, 1863, the Supreme Court had
no jurisdiction in prize cases, except when the same were removed
here from the circuit courts, but the acts of Congress referred to
provides that the decrees in such case may be appealed from the
district court directly to the Supreme Court, which leaves the
circuit courts without jurisdiction in prize cases. Beyond all
question admiralty jurisdiction, including jurisdiction in prize
cases, was vested in the territorial district courts by the ninth
section of the organic act, the explicit language of the act being
that the district courts of the territory shall have and exercise
the same jurisdiction in all cases arising under the Constitution
and laws of the United states, as is vested in the circuit and
district courts of the United states, and also of all cases arising
under the laws of the territory.
Earnest effort is made in argument to show that inasmuch as a
case in admiralty does not strictly arise under the Constitution
and laws of the United states, that the clause of the organic act
referred to does not vest jurisdiction to hear and determine such
cases in the territorial district courts, for which proposition
they refer to one of the decisions of this Court.
The
American Insurance Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511,
26 U. S.
546.
Select passages of the opinion in that case, when detached from
the context, may appear to support the theory of the respondents,
but the actual decision of the court is explicitly and undeniably
the other way.
Cotton in bales to a large amount was shipped at New Orleans for
transportation to Havre de Grace, and it appears that the ship was
wrecked off Florida, from which the cotton was saved and was
carried to Key West, where it was sold by order of the territorial
court to satisfy a claim for salvage amounting to seventy-six per
cent of the property saved. Prior to the loss the shippers had
effected insurance, and they abandoned the same to the
underwriters. Part of the cotton subsequently arrived at
Charleston, when the underwriters
Page 101 U. S. 459
libeled the same as their property by virtue of the abandonment.
Hearing was had and the district court pronounced the proceeding of
the territorial court at Key West a nullity, and ordered the
property to be restored to the libellants, subject to a certain
deduction for salvage. Both parties appealed to the circuit court,
where the decree of the district court was reversed and a decree
entered restoring the cotton to the claimant, when the libellants
appealed to the Supreme Court.
State courts have no jurisdiction in admiralty cases, nor can
courts within the states exercise such jurisdiction, except such as
are established in pursuance of the third article of the
Constitution, but this Court in that case, Mr. Chief Justice
Marshall giving the opinion, decided expressly that the same
limitation does not extend to the territories; that in legislating
for the territories, Congress exercises the unlimited powers of the
general and of a state government, which is a complete confirmation
of the proposition that the construction given to the ninth section
of the organic act by the Supreme Court of the territory is
correct.
Confirmation of that view is also derived from other remarks
made by the chief justice in that same case. We think, then, he
said, that the act of the territorial legislature creating the
court, by whose decree the cargo of the wrecked ship was sold, is
not "inconsistent with the laws and Constitution of the United
states," and that it is valid. Consequently the sale made in
pursuance of it changed the property, and the decree of the circuit
court awarding restitution of the property to the claimant ought to
be affirmed.
Admiralty jurisdiction in that case had been exercised by a
court created by a territorial statute, but the court whose
jurisdiction is called in question in this case was created by the
organic act passed by Congress to establish the territory.
Conkling's Treatise (5th ed) 290.
Existing territories are all organized under organic acts
containing similar provisions, and in most or all the federal power
is vested in a supreme court, district courts, probate courts, and
justices of the peace; and the organic act of each describes the
jurisdiction of the district courts in substantially the same
Page 101 U. S. 460
language, which is also found in the organic acts of former
territories since admitted as states.
Our Constitution, in its operation, is co-extensive with our
political jurisdiction, and wherever navigable waters exist within
the limits of the United states, it is competent for Congress to
make provision for the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction, either
within or outside of the states; and in organizing territories,
Congress may establish tribunals for the exercise of such
jurisdiction, or they may leave it to the legislature of the
territory to create such tribunals. Courts of the kind, whether
created by an act of Congress or a territorial statute, are not, in
strictness, courts of the United states; or, in other words, the
jurisdiction with which they are invested is not a part of the
judicial power defined by the third article of the Constitution,
but is conferred by Congress in the execution of the general power
which the legislative department possesses to make all needful
rules and regulations respecting the public territory and other
public property.
Sit days of every term of such district courts, or so much
thereof as shall be necessary, are required by the act of Congress
to be appropriated to the trial of causes arising under the
Constitution and laws of the United states, which of itself is
sufficient to show that, in the view of Congress, their
jurisdiction extends to all such matters of controversy.
Cases arising under the Constitution, as contradistinguished
from those arising under the laws of the United states, are such as
arise from the powers conferred, or privileges granted, or rights
claimed, or protection secured, or prohibitions contained in the
Constitution itself, independent of any particular statutory
enactment. Examples of the kind are given by Judge Story in his
commentaries, which fully illustrate what is meant by that
constitutional phrase. On the other hand, it is equally plain that
cases arising under the laws of the United states, are such as grow
out of the legislation of Congress within the scope of their
constitutional authority, whether they constitute the right,
privilege, claim, protection, or defense of the party, in whole or
in part, by whom they are asserted or invoked. 2 Story Const., sec.
1647.
Instances where such jurisdiction has been exercised by the
Page 101 U. S. 461
territorial district courts under such acts are numerous, and
they extend from the time our territorial system was organized to
the present time, and the power has always been exercised without
challenge from any quarter and without the least doubt of their
constitutional or legal authority. Were the meaning of the act
doubtful, which cannot be admitted, the rule is universal that the
contemporaneous construction of such a statute is entitled to great
respect, especially where it appears that the construction has
prevailed for a long period, and that a different interpretation
would impair vested rights --
contemporanea expositio est
fortissima in lege. Sedgw.Stats. (2d ed.) 213.
Maritime cases, in every form of admiralty proceeding, have been
heard and determined in the territorial district courts, and by
appeal in the supreme courts of the territories.
Cutter v.
Steamship, 1 Ore. 101;
Price v. Frankel, 1 Wash.T.
43;
Meigs v. The Steamship Northerner, id., 91;
Griffin v. Nichols, id., 375;
Phelps v. City of
Panama, id., 320.
Two cases, being cross-suits, were appealed to this Court from
decrees rendered by the supreme court of the territory for
reexamination as admiralty appeals. Nobody questioned the
jurisdiction either of the subordinate courts or of this Court, and
the parties were fully heard in both cases. Both decrees were
reversed, and the causes remanded with directions to dismiss the
libel in the cross-suit, and in the other to enter a decree in
favor of the libellants for the amount of the damage.
Steamship
Northerner v. Steam-tug Resolute, Dec.Term, 1863, not
reported.
Judges of long experience heard and decided those cases, no one
of whom ever intimated any doubt that the territorial courts had
such jurisdiction in admiralty causes as is vested in the federal,
district and circuit courts. For these reasons we are all of the
opinion that the objection to the jurisdiction of the courts below
must be overruled.
Prior to the recent act of Congress no provision was ever
enacted for a trial by jury in an admiralty cause, and it is so
clear that the existing provision does not afford any countenance
to the complaint of the respondents, in view of the facts disclosed
in the record, that it is not deemed
Page 101 U. S. 462
necessary to give the subject any further consideration. 18
Stat. 315.
Injuries of the kind alleged give the party a claim for
compensation, and the cause of action may be prosecuted by a libel
in rem against the ship; and the rule is universal that if the
libel is sustained, the decree may be enforced
in rem, as
in other cases where a maritime lien arises. These principles are
so well known and so universally acknowledged that argument in
their support is unnecessary.
Owners of vessels engaged in carrying passengers assume
obligations somewhat different from those whose vessels are
employed as common carriers of merchandise. Obligations of the kind
in the former case are in some few respects less extensive and more
qualified than in the latter, as the owners of the vessel carrying
passengers are not insurers of the lives of their passengers, nor
even of their safety, but in most other respects the obligations
assumed are equally comprehensive and even more stringent. Carriers
of passengers by land, it was said in one of the early cases, are
not liable for injuries happening to passengers from unforeseen
accident or misfortune, where there has been no negligence or
default; but it was held in the same case that the smallest
negligence would render the carrier liable, and that the question
of negligence was for the jury.
Aston v. Heaven, 2 Esp.
533.
Passengers must take the risk incident to the mode of travel
which they select, but those risks in the legal sense are only such
as the utmost care, skill, and caution of the carrier, in the
preparation and management of the means of conveyance, are unable
to avert.
Hegeman v. The Western Railroad Corporation, 13
N.Y. 9.
When carriers undertake to convey persons by the powerful but
dangerous agency of steam, public policy and safety require that
they be held to the greatest possible care and diligence, the true
requirement being that the personal safety of the passengers shall
not be left to the sport of chance or the negligence of careless
agents.
Philadelphia and Reading
Railroad Company v. Derby, 14 How. 468,
55 U. S.
486.
Persons transported in such conveyances contract with the
proprietors or owners of the conveyance and not with their
Page 101 U. S. 463
agents as principals, and the question of the liability of the
proprietor or owner is wholly unaffected by the fact that the
defective ship, car, engine, or other apparatus was purchased of
another, if the defect is one that might have been discovered by
any known means.
Mistakes sometimes occur in the investigation of such a case by
overlooking the fact that it is the carrier, whether shipowner,
corporation, or individual that assumes the obligation, for a
breach of which a right of action accrues to the passenger. Proof
of a formal contract is not required, as the obligation of the
carrier is implied from his undertaking to transport the
passenger.
Tested by these considerations, it is clear that the rulings and
decision of the court below are correct, and that the fourth and
fifth assignments of error must be overruled.
Pendleton v.
Kinsley, 3 Cliff. 416, 421;
Stokes v.
Saltonstall, 13 Pet. 181.
Comment upon the sixth assignment of error is unnecessary, as
there was no satisfactory evidence introduced by the respondents to
show that the libellant was guilty of any negligence whatever.
Complaint is also made that the amount allowed for injuries
received is excessive, which makes it necessary to refer to the
finding of facts exhibited in the transcript, from which it appears
that the libellant was wholly unaware of the hatchway, and that in
coming from her stateroom she, without fault on her part, fell
through it into the hold of the ship, whereby her arm was broken,
and she was greatly bruised and permanently injured, as is more
fully set forth in the findings and evidence.
Exceptions were filed in the district court setting forth the
evidence, which was sent up to the Supreme Court with the
transcript. Due appeal having been taken by each party, the cause
was heard in the Supreme Court upon the findings and evidence made
and given in the court of original jurisdiction, and sent up with
the transcript, together with the evidence adduced in the appellate
court. Application for a rehearing was made in the Supreme Court,
which was denied, and the Supreme Court made an extended finding of
facts as
Page 101 U. S. 464
showing the basis of their judgment. Without entering into those
details, it must suffice to say that it shows conclusively that the
complaint of the respondents, that the amount allowed is excessive,
is not well founded, and is therefore overruled.
Other minor objections are taken to the proceedings in the
Supreme Court, all of which may be sufficiently answered by
referring to that part of the organic act, which allows an appeal
from the district court to the territorial supreme court, and from
the final judgment of the latter court to this Court, in the same
manner and under the same regulations as from the federal circuit
courts. 10 Stat. 176.
Damages in such a case must depend very much upon the facts and
circumstances proved at the trial. When the suit is brought by the
party for personal injuries, there cannot be any fixed measure of
compensation for the paid and anguish of body and mind, nor for the
permanent injury to health and constitution, but the result must be
left to turn mainly upon the good sense and deliberate judgment of
the tribunal assigned by law to ascertain what is a just
compensation for the injuries inflicted.
Railroad v.
Barron, 5 Wall. 90,
72 U. S. 105;
Curtis v. Rochester and Syracuse Railroad Company, 18 N.Y.
534, 543.
Viewed in the light of these suggestions we see no just ground
to conclude that the amount allowed by the Supreme Court is
excessive, and accordingly overrule the remaining assignment of
errors.
Wood's Maine, 73;
Wright v. Compton, 53
Ind. 337.
Decree affirmed.