1. A., although out of possession of certain lands in
Mississippi, filed his bill under a statute of that state to remove
a cloud upon his title to them. The question of title was directly
raised and litigated by the parties. The court being of opinion
that he was not entitled to any relief in the premises, dismissed
the bill. A. thereupon brought ejectment against B., the
defendant
in the former suit.
Held that the decree did not render
the main controversy
res judicata, as the court merely
decided in effect that the bill would not lie.
2. A power to "sell and exchange" lands includes the power to
make partition of them.
3. Where a testator devising land in Mississippi appointed a
trustee with power "to dispose of all or any portion of it" that
might fall to the devisees and "invest the proceeds in such manner
as he might think proper for their benefit," this court, without
laying down as a general rule that the words "dispose of" import a
power to make partition, holds, in view of the opinion of the
Supreme Court of Mississippi on the precise point in a case between
the same parties, although not announced under such conditions as
made it
res judicata, that the trustee had power to make
partition.
4. It is not a valid objection to the partition that the trustee
authorized to make it did not give his personal attention to it,
but by agreement with one of the heirs demanding it, submitted it
to disinterested persons, whose arbitrament he confirmed by
executing the necessary indenture.
The facts are fully stated in the opinion of the Court.
MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY delivered the opinion of the Court.
This was an action of ejectment for certain lands in Sharkie
County, Mississippi, brought by Alonzo J. Phelps and Mary B.
Phelps, his wife, the plaintiffs in error, against the defendants
in error, of whom George C. Harris and Helen S. Harris, his wife,
were admitted to defend as landlords, the other defendants being
their tenants in possession of the property in dispute. The
principal question in the case is whether Henry W. Vick, father of
the plaintiff, Mary B. Phelps, and trustee under a deed made by his
wife, Sarah, in 1850, and also trustee under the will of his
brother, Grey Jenkins Vick, made in 1849, had authority under those
instruments to make partition
Page 101 U. S. 371
of the lands given and devised therein to, and for the use of,
his children. If he had such authority, and exercised it in a
proper manner, the plaintiffs have no title, and the judgment must
be affirmed. If he had not such authority, or did not exercise it
effectually, the plaintiffs are entitled to recover either all the
land in controversy or an undivided part thereof, and the judgment
must be reversed. The facts of the case are set out in a special
finding of the court below.
By the deed of Sarah Vick, referred to (in which her husband
joined), she conveyed certain lands of which she was seised, to a
trustee, to be held upon trust for her own separate use for life,
with remainder to her children in fee, subject to certain powers of
sale and exchange, and with the following proviso:
"
Provided further that said trustee is to permit the
said Henry W. Vick, as agent for said trustee, and as agent and
trustee for said Sarah Vick, during her life, and as agent and
trustee for her children after her death, to superintend, possess,
manage, and control said property for the benefit of all concerned.
Said Henry W. Vick is to have power to sell and exchange said
property after the death of said Sarah Vick, and to apply the
proceeds to the payment of the debt due to the trustees of the Bank
of the United States; if such debt is paid, the proceeds of the
sale to be reinvested, and be subject to the trusts of this
deed."
The deed closes with this paragraph:
"My intention is that said Henry W. Vick shall be regarded, for
the purposes of this deed, not merely as an agent, but also a
co-trustee, and I desire he may be required to give no security for
the performance of his duties; and the said Jonathan Pearce [the
trustee] is not, in any manner, to be responsible for the acts and
conduct of said Henry W. Vick."
Sarah Vick died in 1850, leaving four children by her said
husband,
viz., Mary B. Vick (now said Mary B. Phelps),
Henry G. Vick (under whom the defendants claim), Ann P. Vick, and
George R. C. Vick, all of whom were then under age and
unmarried.
By the will of Grey Jenkins Vick referred to, the said Grey
devised certain lands and other property to the grandchildren
Page 101 U. S. 372
of his father and mother, among whom were the said children of
Henry W. and Sarah Vick, and constituted the said Henry W. Vick
trustee for his said children, giving him full power to dispose of
all or any portion of said property which might fall to said
children, and invest the proceeds in such manner as he might think
proper for their benefit. After the said Grey's death, the said
Henry W., as trustee of his said children, became seised in
severalty by partition with the other devisees, of the proportion
of lands devised to his said children, upon the trusts of the
will.
In December, 1856, Henry G. Vick, the eldest of said four
children of Henry W. and Sarah Vick, became of age, and soon after
demanded from his father an account of his trust, and that his
portion of the property held under said deed and will should be set
off to him in severalty, and threatened to file a bill in equity
for that purpose. They finally agreed to leave the matter to their
attorneys, who decided that Henry G. Vick, having become of age,
had the right to demand a division of the property, and to have his
share set off to him; and the said attorneys signed a written
instrument proposing the mode in which such division should be
made, to-wit, through the intervention of disinterested persons to
be chosen by the parties. This plan was adopted; and Henry W. Vick
and his son entered into a written agreement to that effect,
designating the persons for making the partition, and binding
themselves to stand to and abide by their decision. The arbitrators
made an award by which the lands in controversy in this suit were
allotted to said Henry G. Vick; an indenture was made between him
and his father to carry the partition into effect; and he remained
in possession of the lands set off to him until his death in May,
1859. It is this partition which is called in question by the
plaintiffs.
Henry G. Vick died without issue, having first made a will by
which he devised the lands in controversy, which were set off to
him as aforesaid, to Helen S. Johnston, now said Helen S. Harris,
who, after his death, went into possession thereof, and has ever
since continued in possession.
The contention of the plaintiffs is, that Henry W. Vick had no
authority, either under his wife's deed, or under the will of
Page 101 U. S. 373
Grey Jenkins Vick, to make partition of the lands, that the
partition made with Henry G. Vick was void, that he acquired no
separate estate thereby, and had no power to devise the lands
specifically, and that the plaintiff, Mary B. Phelps, as sole
surviving child of Henry W. and Sarah Vick (the others having died
without issue), is entitled to recover the property.
In pursuit of the supposed rights of Mary B. Phelps, the
plaintiffs, in February, 1871, exhibited a bill in the Chancery
Court of Washington County, Mississippi (in which the lands in
controversy were then situated), against the defendants, George C.
Harris and Helen his wife, to remove the cloud from the supposed
title of said Mary, raised by said partition and the will of Henry
G. Vick. The defendants relied on the validity of said partition
and will, and the question was fully contested. In November, 1873,
a decree was made dismissing the bill. An appeal was taken, and the
supreme court affirmed the decree. The plaintiffs then brought this
action of ejectment, and one of the questions in the cause is
whether the decree in the chancery suit did not render the
controversy
res judicata. The plaintiffs contended that it
did not, and that the only effect of the decree was to decide that
a bill to remove the cloud from the title would not lie, leaving
the parties to all their legal rights in an action at law.
On this question the court below finds and concludes as
follows:
"And the court here now finds as a fact, from an inspection of
the record in the said chancery cause, that the question as to the
validity of the partition of the lands aforesaid, made by the said
Henry W. Vick and the said Henry G. Vick under the deed of the said
Sarah Vick and the will of said Grey J. Vick, and the power of said
Henry W. Vick to make such partition, as well as the validity of
the devise made by the said Henry W. Vick to the said Helen S.
Harris, was directly raised by the bill in said cause and litigated
between the parties; and that the said supreme court adjudged and
decided that the said partition and devise were both valid and
effectual, and that the said Henry W. Vick had full power and
authority to make the said partition with the said Henry G. Vick.
Which decision so made by said court was done to determine the
jurisdiction
Page 101 U. S. 374
of the court in said cause, and that said supreme court decided
that the said chancery court had no jurisdiction thereof, and that
if the said complainants therein have any right to the lands
described therein, and which are the same for which this action of
ejectment is brought, it is a legal title which must be enforced in
an action at law."
The decree of the Chancery Court of Washington County, which was
affirmed by the supreme court, was in the following words:
"The court being of opinion that the complainants are not
entitled to the relief prayed for in their bill, or to any relief
in the premises from this court, it is therefore ordered, adjudged,
and decreed that the said complainants' bill of complaint be and
the same is dismissed, and that complainants pay the costs,
&c."
The bill was filed under a statute of Mississippi, which
declared as follows:
"When any person, not the rightful owner of any real estate in
this state shall have any deed or other evidence of title thereto,
or which may cause doubt or suspicion in the title of the real
owner, such real owner may file a bill in the chancery court of the
county in which the real estate is situated, to have such deed or
other evidence of title cancelled, and such cloud, doubt, or
suspicion removed from said title, whether such real owner be in
possession, or be threatened to be disturbed in his possession or
not, &c."
Rev. Stat. Miss., 1871, sec. 975, p. 191.
It is probable that the only effect of this statute was to
enable owners of land not in possession to file a bill for the
removal of clouds upon their title, since the ordinary jurisdiction
of a court of chancery is sufficient to enable owners in possession
to file such a bill. The questions, what constitutes such a cloud
upon the title, and what character of title the complainant himself
must have, in order to authorize a court of equity to assume
jurisdiction of the case, are to be decided upon principles which
have long been established in those courts. Prominent amongst these
are, first, that the title or right of the complainant must be
clear, and secondly that the pretended title or right which is
alleged to be a cloud upon it, must not only be clearly invalid or
inequitable, but must be such as may, either at the present or at a
future time, embarrass
Page 101 U. S. 375
the real owner in controverting it. For it is held that, where
the complainant himself has no title, or a doubtful title, he
cannot have this relief. "Those only," said Mr. Justice Grier,
"who have a clear legal and equitable title to land connected
with possession, have any right to claim the interference of a
court of equity to give them peace or dissipate a cloud on the
title."
Orton v.
Smith, 18 How. 263;
and see 67 U.
S. Chamberlain, 2 Black 430,
67 U. S. 444;
West v. Schnebly, 54 Ill. 523;
Huntington v.
Allen, 44 Miss. 654;
Stark v.
Starrs, 6 Wall. 402. And as to the defendant's
title, if its validity is merely doubtful, it is more than a cloud,
and he is entitled to have it tried by an action at law; and if it
is invalid on its face, so that it can never be successfully
maintained, it does not amount to a cloud, but may always be
repelled by an action at law.
Overing v. Foote, 43 N.Y.
290;
Meloy v. Dougherty, 16 Wis. 269. Justice Story
says:
"Where the illegality of the agreement, deed, or other
instrument appears upon the face of it, so that its nullity can
admit of no doubt, the same reason for the interference of courts
of equity, to direct it to be cancelled or delivered up, would not
seem to apply; for in such a case, there can be no danger that the
lapse of time may deprive the party of his full means of defense;
nor can it in a just sense be said that such a paper can throw a
cloud over his right or title, or diminish its security; nor is it
capable of being used as a means of vexatious litigation, or
serious injury."
2 Eq.Jur. sec. 700, a.
The Supreme Court of Mississippi, in their opinion in
Phelps
v. Harris, 51 Miss. 789, a case between the present parties,
say:
"This jurisdiction of equity cannot properly be invoked to
adjudicate upon the conflicting titles of parties to real estate.
That would be to draw into a court of equity from the courts of
law, the trial of ejectments. He who comes into a court of equity
to get rid of a legal title, which is allowed to cast a shadow on
his own title, must show clearly the validity of his own title, and
the invalidity of his opponent's.
Banks v. Evans, 10 S.
& M. 35;
Huntington v. Allen, 44 Miss. 662. Nor will
equity set aside the legal title on a doubtful state of case. The
complainant, to enable him to maintain such a suit, must be the
real owner of the land, either in law or equity. Had the
Page 101 U. S. 376
defendant, Mrs. Harris, derived her title to the property in
controversy even from a doubtful exercise of power, that of itself
would be sufficient to preclude the complainants from a resort to
equity, upon the well settled principles above laid down. The
proper forum to try titles to land is a court of law, and this
jurisdiction cannot be withdrawn at pleasure, and transferred to a
court of equity under the pretence of removing clouds from
title,"
p. 793. The court further concludes that this limited
jurisdiction does not draw to it the right to take jurisdiction of
the whole controversy in relation to the title to the land, right
of possession, rents, &c., and thus usurp the jurisdiction
belonging to the courts of law.
It is true that the court, in the former part of its opinion,
discussed the question of the validity of the partition made by H.
W. Vick and his son, and held that the partition was good, and that
the title of Henry G. Vick to the lands in controversy was perfect,
and, as a consequence, that the defendant's title was also perfect.
But this discussion was entered into for the purpose of showing
that the title of the defendant was not so devoid of validity as to
constitute a mere cloud on the title, and consequently that the
case was not one in which a court of equity could give relief.
We think therefore that the court below was right in determining
that the decree in the equity case did not render the main
controversy
res judicata, but only decided that the bill
would not lie; in other words, that it was not a proper case for a
court of equity to determine the rights of the parties.
This brings us to the merits of the controversy, involving the
question whether the partition made between Henry W. Vick and his
son Henry G. Vick was valid. The plaintiffs contend that neither
the deed of Sarah Vick, nor the will of Grey Jenkins Vick, gave to
Henry W. Vick the power to make partition. The substance of those
instruments, so far as relates to the question under consideration,
has been recited. By the deed of Sarah Vick, the trustee therein
named was directed to permit her husband, Henry W. Vick, as his
agent, and as agent and trustee for herself and her children, "to
superintend, possess, manage, and control said property for the
benefit of all concerned." And it is added,
"Said Henry W. Vick is to
Page 101 U. S. 377
have power to sell and exchange said property after the death of
said Sarah Vick, and to apply the proceeds to the payment of the
debt due to the trustees of the Bank of the United States; if such
debt is paid, the proceeds of the sale to be reinvested and be
subject to the trusts of this deed."
The codicil to the will of Grey Jenkins Vick, made Henry W. Vick
a trustee for his, Henry W. Vick's, children, and gave him full
power to dispose of all or any portion of the property devised by
said will, which might fall to said Henry's children, and to invest
the proceeds in such manner as he might think proper for their
benefit. These were the express powers granted. Henry G. Vick, one
of the children, came of age and demanded his portion separate from
the rest. No question is made about his right to have such division
made. Had Henry W. Vick no power to cooperate with him in making
such a division? That is the question. In the one case, power is
given to sell and exchange, superintend, possess, manage, and
control for the benefit of all concerned; in the other, full power
to dispose of all or any portion, and invest the proceeds in any
manner he might think proper for the children's benefit.
The question whether a naked power to sell or exchange implies a
power to make partition is discussed by Sir Edward Sugden in his
work on Powers. He says:
"It is clear that a power to make partition of an estate will
not authorize a sale or exchange of it; but it has frequently been
a question amongst conveyancers, whether the usual power of sale
and exchange does not authorize a partition, and several partitions
have been made by force of such powers under the direction of men
of eminence. This point underwent considerable discussion on the
title, which afterwards led to the case of
Abell v.
Heathcote, 4 Bro.C.C. 278; 2 Ves.Jun. 98. Mr. Fearne thought
the power did authorize a partition, on the ground that a partition
was in effect an exchange."
Sugden adds that the lords commissioners, Eyre, Ashurst, and
Wilson, before whom the case was first heard, all thought that the
power was to receive a liberal construction, as its object was to
meliorate the estate. Eyre thought, that upon the word
sell, the trustees should have a power of making
partition, because it was in effect to take quite a new estate.
Ashurst and Wilson thought, that whatever
Page 101 U. S. 378
power might be derived from the word
sell, the other
words of the power,
convey for an equivalent (which were
also used), were sufficient. But they made no decision. Upon the
cause coming before Lord Rosslyn, he determined that the power was
well executed, and founded his opinion upon its being in effect an
exchange, as the consequences and effects of a partition and an
exchange, as to the interests of the parties, are precisely the
same. Sir Edward then notices the decision of Lord Eldon in the
case of
McQueen v. Farquhar, 11 Ves. 467, that a power to
sell simply, does not authorize a partition. He then adds:
"Until the question shall receive further decision, it can scarcely
be considered clear that a power to exchange will authorize a
partition," but he proceeds to show that the decision in
Abell
v. Heathcote must have been based on the power to exchange,
and not on any additional words. After referring to the case of
Attorney General v. Hamilton, 1 Madd. 122, which was not
decisive of the point, Sugden closes his discussion by saying:
"But, as Lord Rosslyn has observed, this objection may be
obviated where there is a power of sale. The undivided part of the
estate may be sold, the trustees may receive the money and then lay
it out in the purchase of the divided part, and although the sale
is merely fictitious in order to effect the partition, it should
seem that the transaction cannot be impeached."
2 Sugden, Powers, 479-482 (7th ed.) 1845.
We have quoted more largely from Sugden's work because of his
great authority on questions of real estate and equity. It will be
seen that he regards it as doubtful whether the power to make
partition is included in the power to sell and exchange; but that
partition may be effected indirectly under the power to sell, by
actually selling the undivided interest, and purchasing a separate
interest with the proceeds. The last edition of Sugden on Powers,
published in 1861, has no change in the text on this subject.
In the case of
Doe v. Spencer, 2 Exch.Rep. 752, decided
in 1848, Baron Rolfe, afterwards Lord Cranworth, speaking for the
court, held, in accordance with Mr. Preston's note to Shepherd's
Touchstone, p. 292, that two tenants in common might effect a
partition by the exchange of a moiety in one part for a moiety in
the other part, and thence concluded that
Page 101 U. S. 379
a power of exchange given to trustees would be sufficient to
enable them to effect a partition with their co-tenant in this way;
although it was supposed that between more than two parties it
could not be done. Vice-Chancellor Kindersly, in a subsequent case,
reviewing this decision of the Court of Exchequer, well remarked,
that if this can be done between two tenants in common, there seems
to be no good reason why it may not be done between three or
more.
The plaintiffs place great reliance on the case of
Brassey
v. Chalmers, 16 Beav. 223, in which the master of the rolls
held that a power to sell and dispose did not give the power to
make partition; at least he refused to compel a purchaser to accept
a conveyance where such a partition had been made. The case,
however, was appealed, and the lords justices, without deciding the
point, suggested the filing of a bill for partition, upon which the
partition made might be confirmed, if found beneficial. This course
was adopted, and resulted in a confirmation of the partition, and a
decree confirming the title. 4 DeG. M. & G. 528;
S.C.,
31 Eng.L. & Eq. R. 115. So that this case left the point still
undetermined. This was in 1853, and no notice of the case is taken
in the last edition of Sugden on Powers, published in 1861.
A review of the cases and textbooks on this subject was made by
Vice-Chancellor Kindersly in 1856 in the case of
Bradshaw v.
Fane, 2 Jur.N.S. 247, and the conclusion to which he came was,
that it was still doubtful whether a power to sell and exchange
would, or would not, authorize a partition. The same thing is
stated in Lewin on Trusts and Trustees, 3d ed., p. 417.
In a recent case, however,
In re Frith and Osborne, 3
Ch.D. 618, decided in 1876 by Sir George Jessel, Master of the
Rolls, it was distinctly adjudged, after a masterly review of all
the previous authorities, that a power to sell and exchange does
include the power to make partition. In delivering his judgment,
the Master of the Rolls concludes as follows:
"This is the state of the authorities. Lord St. Leonards says
that it wants another decision to make it quite clear. I am willing
to give the decision (supposing the doubt is not taken away by the
decision of the Court of Exchequer followed by the
vice-chancellor,
Page 101 U. S. 380
Kindersly) that the passage in the Touchstone [declaring that
joint-tenants, tenants in common, and co-parceners cannot exchange
the lands they do so hold, one with another, before they make
partition] is not good law, and that you can have such an exchange,
and if you can have such an exchange, why could not the power
authorize the exchange of an undivided moiety in Whiteacre for
another undivided moiety in Blackacre? I decide that it does. We
have conflicting opinions between what the judges said in
Doe
v. Spencer and what the vice-chancellor intimated his opinion
to be. It is not necessary for me to decide that question. I must
say, if I had to decide it, I should be inclined to follow the
opinion of the vice-chancellor instead of the Court of Exchequer,
for if it can be done as between two, I do not see why it could not
be done as between more than two, but I have not to decide that
question now."
It would seem, therefore, to be finally settled in England, that
a power to sell and exchange does include the power to make
partition, and that all doubt on the subject has been removed, and
we have not been referred to any decisions in this country which
lead to a contrary result. This disposes of the case so far as the
power under the deed of Sarah Vick is concerned.
The power given to the trustee by the codicil to the will of
Grey Jenkins Vick is not quite so clear. The testator constituted
Henry W. Vick a trustee for his children, and gave him full power
to dispose of all or any portion of the property devised in the
will that might fall to them, and invest the proceeds in such
manner as he might think proper for their benefit. The expression
"to dispose of" is very broad, and signifies more than "
to
sell." Selling is but one mode of disposing of property. It is
argued, however that the subsequent direction to
invest the
proceeds indicates that a sale was meant. But this does not
necessarily follow. Proceeds are not necessarily money. This is
also a word of great generality. Taking the words in their ordinary
sense, a general power to dispose of land or real estate and to
take in return therefor such proceeds as one thinks best, will
include the power of disposing of them in exchange for other lands.
It would be a disposal of the
Page 101 U. S. 381
lands parted with, and the lands received would be the proceeds.
It is to be considered that the words used are contained in a will,
to which the rules of construction applicable to ordinary speech
are to be applied, except where technical terms are employed. In a
well considered book on the construction of wills, the rule of
interpretation is laid down thus:
"1. In construing a will, the words and expressions used are to
be taken in their
ordinary, proper, and grammatical sense
-- unless upon applying them to the facts of the case, an ambiguity
or difficulty of construction, in the opinion of the court, arises,
in which case the primary meaning of the words may be modified,
extended, or abridged, and words and expressions supplied or
rejected, in accordance with the presumed intention, so far as to
remove or avoid the difficulty or ambiguity in question, but no
farther."
"2. As a corollary to, or a part of, the last proposition --
technical words and expressions must be taken in their
technical sense, unless a clear intention can be collected
to use them in another sense, and that other can be
ascertained."
Hawkins, Construction of Wills, pp. 2, 4.
Now whilst it may be true that when the words "disposed of" are
used in connection with the word "sell," in the phrase "
to sell
and dispose of," they may often be construed to mean a
disposal by sale; it does not necessarily follow that when power is
given generally, and without qualification by associated words, to
dispose of property, leaving the mode of disposition to the
discretion of the agent, that the power should not extend to a
disposal by barter or exchange, as well as to a disposal by sale.
The word is
nomen generalissimum, and standing by itself,
without qualification, has no technical signification. Taking the
whole clause in the codicil together, it is equivalent to an
authority to dispose of the property as the trustee should deem
most for the interest of his children, and this would include the
power to barter or exchange as well as the power to sell.
In re Frith and Osborne, already cited, the terms of
the power were "to sell, dispose of, convey, and assign the
tenements, or any part thereof, by way of absolute sale for such a
price in money, or by way of
exchange for such equivalent
in lands, as to the trustees should seem reasonable." The
master
Page 101 U. S. 382
of the rolls, in analyzing this phraseology, said:
"Of course the word 'sell' refers to 'sale,' and the word
'exchange' refers to 'dispose of,' and, therefore, it comes to
this, whether a trust including a power to dispose of by way of
exchange for an equivalent in other lands, authorizes trustees to
dispose of the undivided moiety, which they are empowered to
dispose of, for another undivided moiety."
This quotation shows that the words "dispose of" are properly
applied to an exchange.
If this construction of the language of the will is correct, the
conclusion arrived at in relation to the power given by the deed of
Sarah Vick is applicable to that given by the will, for, since it
imports a power to exchange, it likewise imports a power to make
partition.
But without assuming to lay down as a general rule the
interpretation which we have suggested, in view of the clearly
expressed opinion of the Supreme Court of Mississippi on the
precise point, we feel justified in adopting it in this case. In
disposing of the equity case on appeal, that court fully considered
the power of the trustee, Henry W. Vick, both under the deed and
under the will, and came to the unanimous conclusion that he had
full power and authority to make the partition in question. As to
the power under the will the court had no doubt, and as to that
given by the deed they relied on the authority of
Abell v.
Heathcote and the opinions of Sugden and Fearne. And although
this conclusion was not embraced in the decree so as to become
res judicata, yet it was the ground on which the decree
was rested. The precise question before the court was, whether the
power exercised by the trustee was or was not clearly in excess of
powers given by the instruments under which he assumed to act. The
court looked into these instruments, and said, without hesitation:
"The trustee acted entirely within the scope of his powers, and
therefore it is not clear that he acted in excess of those powers,
but the contrary." Whilst the point adjudicated was the conclusion
that he had not clearly exceeded his powers, the reason for that
conclusion, namely, the decided opinion that he had acted within
the scope of his powers, was fairly within the inquiry presented
for determination. The opinion is not absolutely binding, it is
true, but it is entitled to great
Page 101 U. S. 383
weight on the question as to the actual law of Mississippi, and
can hardly be called an extrajudicial opinion.
The objection that the trustee did not give his personal
attention to the division of the property, but, by agreement with
his son, submitted it to the arbitrament of disinterested persons,
we do not regard as sufficient to invalidate the transaction. It
was confirmed and carried into effect by his executing the
requisite indenture for that purpose. Had the matter been carried
into the courts a commission would have been appointed to make the
partition, in whose appointment the trustee would have had less to
say than he had in the selection of the persons mutually chosen by
himself and his son. And it seems to us that the intervention of
disinterested persons for appraising the property and making the
allotment was judicious and proper. It is the course most commonly
pursued by those who desire to make a division of property. It is
laid down as a rule that "trustees may justify their administration
of the trust fund by the instrumentality of others, where there
exists a moral necessity for it;" and this is said to arise
"from the usage of mankind. If the trustee acts as prudently for
the trust as he would have done for himself, and according to the
usage of business, as, if a trustee appoint rents to be paid to a
banker at that time in credit, but who afterwards breaks, the
trustee is not answerable; so in the employment of stewards and
agents."
Lewin on Trusts and Trustees, 3d ed., p. 293. Again:
"The trustee cannot without responsibility delegate the general
trust for sale; but there seems to be no objection to the
employment of agents by him, where such a course is conformable to
the common usage of business, and the trustee acts as prudently for
the
cestui que trust as he would have done for
himself."
Id., p. 422.
But this is rather a question affecting the responsibility of
the trustee than the validity of his acts. The trustee in this case
had power to make partition. He did make partition, and carried it
out by executing the proper conveyance between himself and his
co-tenant. The partition is valid, although the trustee may be
responsible for the manner in which it was effected by him.
Decree affirmed.