1. Owing to the partial exhaustion of the appropriation, A., a
clerk in the Treasury Department, was granted leave of absence
without pay for five months from Feb. 1, 1874. He performed no
service thereafter. His name was continued on the rolls to allow
his transfer to some other bureau, should an opportunity offer. He
was, June 30, informed in writing by the Secretary of the Treasury
that his services had terminated January 31.
Held that he
has no claim against the United States after the last-mentioned
date.
2. The joint resolution approved June 23, 1874, 18 Stat., part
3, p. 289, providing for two months' pay to clerks and employee of
the executive departments at Washington, applied to such only as
should be discharged at the close of the fiscal year by reason of
the reductions made necessary by the legislation of that session of
Congress.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
On the 3d of May, 1873, Murray, the claimant, was appointed to a
clerkship of class 1 in the Treasury Department, for a probationary
term of three months. At the end of that period, the board of
examiners having reported favorably on his fitness for a clerkship
of that class, he was, on the 5th of November, reappointed, and
assigned to duty in the office of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue from the 3d of that month.
Owing to the abolition by law of the offices of assessor and
assistant assessor of internal revenue, in May, 1873, a large
additional amount of labor was thrown on the office of the
commissioner, to meet which more clerical force became necessary,
and was employed during the summer, fall, and winter following.
This unusual demand upon the appropriation for clerical service in
that office for the year ending June 30, 1874, caused an only
partial exhaustion of that appropriation, and created a necessity
to dispense with the services of a number of the clerks employed in
that office from different
Page 100 U. S. 537
dates in January and February, 1874, till the close of the
fiscal year. In consequence of that necessity, leave of absence
without pay was given some of the clerks until the end of the year.
Murray was included among the rest, and his leave dated on the 1st
of February. Leave of absence was granted instead of an absolute
dismissal from office, as a favor to the clerks, and to give them
an opportunity of getting a transfer to some other bureau, if
opportunity offered. The order of leave was accompanied by a notice
that, if a transfer should not be effected, dismissal would occur
at the end of the year.
On the 23d of June, 1874, Congress passed the following joint
resolution:
"That the Secretary of the Treasury be, and he is hereby,
authorized to pay, when discharged, two months' pay to such clerks
and employees of the executive departments in Washington, D.C., as
shall be discharged at the close of the present fiscal year without
fault on their part, but by reason of the reductions made necessary
by the legislation of the present session of Congress,
provided that the amount paid under this resolution shall
be deducted from the salary of any person receiving the same who
shall be reappointed within six months from the date of such
discharge."
Murray performed no service after the date of his furlough, and
at the end of the fiscal year was dismissed, with a note from the
Secretary of the Treasury as follows:
"SIR -- The necessity for your services in the office of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue no longer existing, they
terminated Jan. 31, 1874, on which date you ceased to serve."
This suit was brought to recover pay for the time included in
the furlough, and also for the two months allowed by the joint
resolution of Congress. The Court of Claims being divided in
opinion, gave a
pro forma judgment for the full amount of
the claim, and from that judgment the United States appealed.
To our minds it is clear the judgment below was wrong. While
under the regulations of the department an employee is not entitled
to a leave of absence with pay for more than thirty days in any one
year, there is nothing to prevent the Secretary from putting him on
furlough without pay at any time, if the
Page 100 U. S. 538
exigencies of the service require it. He may be dismissed
absolutely, and it is difficult to see why, if this can be done, he
may not be furloughed without pay, which is in effect a partial
dismissal. If he desires to be free from all obligations to serve
in the future, he may resign; but if he permits his name to
continue on the rolls, it must be on such terms as are imposed by
the department. In this case, an extraordinary demand for clerical
service caused an early partial exhaustion of the appropriation for
the year, and it became necessary to dispense with a part of the
force, so as to reduce the expenses of the office. Absolute
dismissals were not made, but, as a favor to the clerks, their
names were kept on the rolls without pay. Murray remonstrated
against what was done, but seems to have preferred the furlough to
an absolute discharge. Under these circumstances, having rendered
no service, he cannot claim compensation.
Neither do we think the case comes within the provision of the
joint resolution of Congress. That resolution contemplated the
extra pay only when discharges occurred in consequence of a
reduction of clerical force made necessary by the legislation of
that session of Congress. It nowhere appears that Murray was
discharged on any such account. On the contrary, the fair inference
from the findings below is that he was appointed originally on
account of the necessary temporary increase of force brought about
by the abolition of the offices of assessor and assistant assessor,
under a law of the previous session, and that he was discharged
because the additional labor was no longer required. He was kept on
furlough in order that he might, if possible, effect a transfer to
some other branch of the service. This clearly implies that the
special work to which he had been assigned was finished. At any
rate, it does not appear affirmatively or by any fair implication
that his discharge was made necessary on account of any legislation
which was had at the session of Congress at which the resolution
was adopted.
The judgment of the Court of Claims is reversed, and the cause
remanded with instructions to dismiss the petition.
So ordered.