1. It is competent for general carriers of passengers, by
specific regulations, distinctly brought to the knowledge of the
passenger, which are reasonable, and not inconsistent with a
statute or their duties to the public, to protect themselves
against liability as insurers of his baggage which exceeds a fixed
amount in value, except upon additional compensation proportioned
to the risk.
2. As a condition precedent to a contract for its
transportation, they may require information from him as to its
value, and demand extra compensation for any excess beyond that
which he may reasonably demand to be transported as baggage under
the contract to carry the person.
3. They may be discharged from liability for its full value if
he, by any device or artifice, evades inquiry as to such value,
whereby a responsibility is imposed upon them beyond what they are
bound to assume in consideration of the ordinary fare charged for
the transportation of the person.
4. In the absence of legislation or of special regulations by
the carriers or of conduct by him misleading them as to such value,
his failure to disclose it when no inquiry is made of him is not,
in itself, a fraud upon them.
5. To the extent that articles taken by him for his personal use
when traveling exceed in quantity and value such as are ordinarily
or usually taken by passengers of like station and pursuing like
journeys, they are not baggage for which the carriers are, by
general law, responsible as insurers.
6. Whether he has taken such an excess of baggage is a question
not of law for the sole or the final determination of the court,
but of fact for the jury, under proper guidance as to the law of
the case. Their determination of it upon the evidence -- no error
of law appearing -- is not subject to reexamination here.
7. Sec. 4281, Rev.Stat., has no reference to the liability of
carriers by land for the baggage of passengers.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a writ of error to a judgment rendered against the New
York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company in an action by Olga
de Maluta Fraloff to recover the value of certain articles of
wearing apparel alleged to have been taken from her trunk while she
was a passenger upon the cars of the
Page 100 U. S. 25
company, and while the trunk was in its charge for
transportation as part of her baggage.
There was evidence before the jury tending to establish the
following facts:
The defendant in error, a subject of the Czar of Russia,
possessing large wealth and enjoying high social position among her
own people, after traveling in Europe, Asia, and Africa, spending
some time in London and Paris, visited America in the year 1869 for
the double purpose of benefiting her health and seeing this
country. She brought with her to the United States six trunks of
ordinary travel-worn appearance, containing a large quantity of
wearing apparel, including many elegant, costly dresses, and also
rare and valuable laces, which she had been accustomed to wear upon
different dresses when on visits, or frequenting theatres, or
attending dinners, balls, and receptions. A portion of the laces
was made by her ancestors upon their estates in Russia. After
remaining some weeks in the City of New York, she started upon a
journey westward, going first to Albany, and taking with her, among
other things, two of the trunks brought to this country. Her
ultimate purpose was to visit a warmer climate, and, upon reaching
Chicago, to determine whether to visit California, New Orleans,
Havana, and probably Rio Janeiro. After passing a day or so at
Albany, she took passage on the cars of the New York Central and
Hudson River Railroad Company for Niagara Falls, delivering to the
authorized agents of the company for transportation as her baggage
the two trunks above described, which contained the larger portion
of the dress laces brought with her from Europe. Upon arriving at
Niagara Falls, she ascertained that one of the trunks, during
transportation from Albany to the Falls, had been materially
injured, its locks broken, its contents disturbed, and more than
two hundred yards of dress lace abstracted from the trunk in which
it had been carefully placed before she left the City of New York.
The company declined to pay the sum demanded as the value of the
missing laces, and, having denied all liability therefor, this
action was instituted to recover the damages which the defendant in
error claimed to have sustained by reason of the loss of her
property.
Page 100 U. S. 26
Upon the first trial of the case in 1873, the jury, being unable
to agree, was discharged. A second trial took place in the year
1875. Upon the conclusion of the evidence in chief at the last
trial, the company moved a dismissal of the action and, at the same
time, submitted numerous instructions which it asked to be then
given to the jury, among which was one peremptorily directing a
verdict in its favor. That motion was overruled, and the court
declined to instruct the jury as requested. Subsequently, upon the
conclusion of the evidence upon both sides, the motion for a
peremptory instruction in behalf of the company was renewed, and
again overruled. The court thereupon gave its charge, to which the
company filed numerous exceptions, and also submitted written
requests, forty-two in number, for instructions to the jury. The
court refused to instruct the jury as asked, or otherwise than as
shown in its own charge. To the action of the court in the several
respects indicated the company excepted in due form. The jury
returned a verdict against the company for the sum of $10,000,
although the evidence, in some of its aspects, placed the value of
the missing laces very far in excess of that amount.
It would extend this opinion to an improper length, and could
serve no useful purpose, were we to enter upon a discussion of the
various exceptions, unusual in their number, to the action of the
court in the admission and exclusion of evidence, as well as in
refusing to charge the jury as requested by the company. Certain
controlling propositions are presented for our consideration, and
upon their determination the substantial rights of parties seem to
depend. If in respect of these propositions no error was committed,
the judgment should be affirmed without any reference to points of
a minor and merely technical nature, which do not involve the
merits of the case or the just rights of the parties.
In behalf of the company it is earnestly claimed that the court
erred in not giving a peremptory instruction for a verdict in its
behalf. This position, however, is wholly untenable. Had there been
no serious controversy about the facts, and had the law upon the
undisputed evidence precluded any recovery whatever against the
company, such an instruction
Page 100 U. S. 27
would have been proper. 1 Wall.
68 U. S. 369;
11 How.
52 U. S. 372;
19 How.
60 U. S. 269;
22 Wall.
89 U. S. 121.
The court could not have given such an instruction in this case
without usurping the functions of the jury. This will, however,
more clearly appear from what is said in the course of this
opinion.
The main contention of the company upon the trial below was that
good faith required the defendant in error, when delivering her
trunks for transportation, to inform its agents of the peculiar
character and extraordinary value of the laces in question, and
that her failure in that respect, whether intentional or not, was
in itself a fraud upon the carrier which should prevent any
recovery in this action.
The circuit court refused, and, in our opinion, rightly, to so
instruct the jury. We are not referred to any legislative enactment
restricting or limiting the responsibility of passenger carriers by
land for articles carried as baggage. Nor is it pretended that the
plaintiff in error had, at the date of these transactions,
established or promulgated any regulation as to the quantity or the
value of baggage which passengers upon its cars might carry,
without extra compensation, under the general contract to carry the
person. Further, it is not claimed that any inquiry was made of the
defendant in error, either when the trunks were taken into the
custody of the carrier or at any time prior to the alleged loss, as
to the value of their contents. It is undoubtedly competent for
carriers of passengers, by specific regulations, distinctly brought
to the knowledge of the passenger, which are reasonable in their
character and not inconsistent with any statute or their duties to
the public, to protect themselves against liability, as insurers,
for baggage exceeding a fixed amount in value, except upon
additional compensation, proportioned to the risk. And in order
that such regulations may be practically effective, and the carrier
advised of the full extent of its responsibility, and,
consequently, of the degree of precaution necessary upon its part,
it may rightfully require, as a condition precedent to any contract
for the transportation of baggage, information from the passenger
as to its value, and if the value thus disclosed exceeds that which
the passenger may reasonably demand to be transported as baggage
without extra compensation, the
Page 100 U. S. 28
carrier, at its option, can make such additional charge as the
risk fairly justifies. It is also undoubtedly true that the carrier
may be discharged from liability for the full value of the
passenger's baggage if the latter, by false statements or by any
device or artifice, puts off inquiry as to such value, whereby is
imposed upon the carrier responsibility beyond what it was bound to
assume in consideration of the ordinary fare charged for the
transportation of the person. But in the absence of legislation
limiting the responsibility of carriers for the baggage of
passengers, in the absence of reasonable regulations upon the
subject by the carrier, of which the passenger has knowledge, in
the absence of inquiry of the passenger as to the value of the
articles carried under the name of baggage for his personal use and
convenience when traveling, and in the absence of conduct upon the
part of the passenger misleading the carrier as to the value of his
baggage, the court cannot as matter of law, declare, as it was in
effect requested in this case to do, that the mere failure of the
passenger, unasked, to disclose the value of his baggage is a fraud
upon the carrier which defeats all right of recovery. The
instructions asked by the company virtually assumed that the
general law governing the rights, duties, and responsibilities of
passenger carriers prescribed a definite, fixed limit of value
beyond which the carrier was not liable for baggage, except under a
special contract or upon previous notice as to value. We are not,
however, referred to any adjudged case, or to any elementary
treatise which sustains that proposition, without qualification. In
the very nature of things, no such rule could be established by the
courts in virtue of any inherent power they possess. The quantity
or kind or value of the baggage which a passenger may carry under
the contract for the transportation of his person depends upon a
variety of circumstances which do not exist in every case. "That
which one traveler," says Erle, C.J., in
Philpot v.
Northwestern Railway Co., 19 C.B.N.S. 321,
"would consider indispensable would be deemed superfluous and
unnecessary by another. But the general habits and wants of mankind
will be taken in the mind of the carrier when he receives a
passenger for conveyance."
Some of the cases seem to announce the broad doctrine that,
Page 100 U. S. 29
by general law, in the absence of legislation, or special
regulations by the carrier, of the character indicated, a passenger
may take, without extra compensation, such articles adapted to
personal use as his necessities, comfort, convenience, or even
gratification may suggest, and that whatever may be the quantity or
value of such articles, the carrier is responsible for all damages
or loss to them, from whatever source, unless from the act of God
or the public enemy. But that, in our judgment, is not an accurate
statement of the law. Whether articles of wearing apparel, in any
particular case, constitute baggage, as that term is understood in
the law, for which the carrier is responsible as insurer depends
upon the inquiry whether they are such in quantity and value as
passengers under like circumstances ordinarily or usually carry for
personal use when traveling. "The implied undertaking," says Mr.
Angell,
"of the proprietors of stage coaches, railroads, and steamboats
to carry in safety the baggage of passengers is not unlimited, and
cannot be extended beyond ordinary baggage, or such baggage as a
traveler usually carries with him for his personal
convenience."
Angell, Carriers, sec. 115. In
Hannibal Railroad v.
Swift, 12 Wall. 272, this Court, speaking through
MR. JUSTICE FIELD, said that the contract to carry the person
"only implies an undertaking to transport such a limited
quantity of articles as are ordinarily taken by travelers for their
personal use and convenience, such quantity depending, of course,
upon the station of the party, the object and length of his
journey, and many other considerations."
To the same effect is a decision of the Queen's Bench in
Macrow v. Great Western Railway Co., Law Rep. 6 Q.B. 121,
where Chief Justice Cockburn announced the true rule to be
"that whatever the passenger takes with him for his personal use
or convenience, according to the habits or wants of the particular
class to which he belongs, either with reference to the immediate
necessities or to the ultimate purpose of the journey, must be
considered as personal luggage."
2 Parsons, Contr., 199. To the extent, therefore, that the
articles carried by the passenger for his personal use exceed in
quantity and value such as are ordinarily or usually carried by
passengers of like station and pursuing like journeys, they are not
baggage for which the carrier,
Page 100 U. S. 30
by general law, is responsible as insurer. In cases of abuse by
the passenger of the privilege which the law gives him, the carrier
secures such exemption from responsibility, not, however, because
the passenger, uninquired of, failed to disclose the character and
value of the articles carried, but because the articles themselves,
in excess of the amount usually or ordinarily carried, under like
circumstances, would not constitute baggage within the true meaning
of the law. The laces in question confessedly constituted a part of
the wearing apparel of the defendant in error. They were adapted to
and exclusively designed for personal use, according to the
convenience, comfort, or tastes, during the extended journey upon
which she had entered. They were not merchandise, nor is there any
evidence that they were intended for sale of for purposes of
business. Whether they were such articles in quantity and value as
passengers of like station and under like circumstances ordinarily
or usually carry for their personal use, and to subserve their
convenience, gratification, or comfort while traveling, was not a
pure question of law for the sole or final determination of the
court, but a question of fact for the jury, under proper guidance
from the court as to the law governing such cases. It was for the
jury to say to what extent, if any, the baggage of defendant in
error exceeded in quantity and value that which was usually carried
without extra compensation, and to disallow any claim for such
excess.
Upon examining the carefully guarded instruction given to the
jury, we are unable to see that the court below omitted anything
essential to a clear comprehension of the issues or announced any
principle or doctrine not in harmony with settled law. After
submitting to the jury the disputed question as to whether the
laces were in fact in the trunk of the defendant in error when
delivered to the company at Albany for transportation to Niagara
Falls, the court charged the jury in substance that every traveler
was entitled to provide for the exigencies of his journey in the
way of baggage, was not limited to articles which were absolutely
essential, but could carry such as were usually carried by persons
traveling, for their comfort, convenience, and gratification upon
the such journeys; that the liability of carries could not be
maintained to
Page 100 U. S. 31
the extent of making them responsible for such unusual articles
as the exceptional fancies, habits, or idiosyncrasies of some
particular individual may prompt him to carry; that their
responsibility as insurers was limited to such articles as it was
customary or reasonable for travelers of the same class, in
general, to take for such journeys as the one which was the subject
of inquiry, and did not extend to those which the caprice of a
particular traveler might lead that traveler to take; that if the
company delivered to the defendant in error, aside from the laces
in question, baggage which had been carried, and which was
sufficient for her as reasonable baggage, within the rules laid
down, she was not entitled to recover; that if she carried the
laces in question for the purpose of having them safely kept and
stored by railroad companies and hotel keepers, and not for the
purpose of using them as occasion might require for her
gratification, comfort, or convenience, the company was not liable;
that if
any portion of the missing articles were
reasonable and proper for her to carry, and all was not, they
should allow her the value of
that portion.
Looking at the whole scope and bearing of the charge and
interpreting what was said as it must necessarily have been
understood both by the court and jury, we do not perceive that any
error was committed to the prejudice of the company, or of which it
can complain. No error of law appearing upon the record, this Court
cannot reverse the judgment because, upon examination of the
evidence, we may be of the opinion that the jury should have
returned a verdict for a less amount. If the jury acted upon a
gross mistake of facts or were governed by some improper influence
or bias, the remedy therefore rested with the court below under its
general power to set aside the verdict. But that court, finding
that the verdict was abundantly sustained by the evidence and that
there was no ground to suppose that the jury had not performed
their duty impartially and justly, refused to disturb the verdict
and overruled a motion for new trial. Whether its action in that
particular was erroneous or not, our power is restricted by the
Constitution to the determination of the questions of law arising
upon the record. Our authority does not extend to a re examination
of facts which have been tried by the jury under instructions
Page 100 U. S. 32
correctly defining the legal rights of parties.
Parsons v.
Bedford, 3 Pet. 446; 21 How.
62 U. S. 167;
Insurance Company v.
Folsom, 18 Wall. 249.
It is perhaps proper to refer to one other point suggested in
the elaborate brief of counsel for the company. Our attention is
called to section 4281 of the Revised Statutes, which declares
that
"If any shipper of platina, gold, gold dust, coins, jewelry, . .
. trinkets, . . . silk in a manufactured or unmanufactured form,
whether wrought up or not wrought up with any other material, furs
or laces, or any of them, contained in any parcel, package, or
bundle, shall lade the same as freight or baggage on any vessel,
without, at the time of such lading, giving to the master, clerk,
agent, or owner of such vessel receiving the same a written notice
of the true character and value thereof, and having the same
entered on the bill of lading therefor, the master and owner of
such vessel shall not be liable as carriers thereof in any form or
manner, nor shall any such master or owner be liable for any of
such goods beyond the value and according to the character thereof,
so notified and entered."
It is sufficient to say that the section has no application
whatever to this case. It has reference alone to the liability of
carriers by water who transport goods and merchandise of the kind
designated. It has no reference to carriers by land, and does not
assume to declare or restrict their liability for the baggage of
passengers.
Judgment affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE FIELD, with whom concurred MR. JUSTICE MILLER and
MR. JUSTICE STRONG, dissenting.
I dissent from the judgment of the Court in this case. I do not
think that two hundred and seventy five yards of lace, claimed by
the owner to be worth $75,000, and found by the jury to be of the
value of $10,000, can, as a matter of law, be properly considered
as baggage of a passenger, for the loss of which the railroad
company, in the absence of any special agreement, should be held
liable.