1. The regularly appointed clerk of a paymaster in the navy is a
"person in the naval service of the United States" within the
meaning of art. 14, sec. 1624, of the Revised Statutes, and, for a
violation of its provisions, is subject to be tried, convicted, and
sentenced by a naval general court-martial.
2. The "regulations for the administration of law and justice"
in that service, established by the Secretary of the Navy with the
approval of the President, have the force of law.
3. Where, pursuant to such regulations, a general court-martial
is duly ordered, the officer clothed with the revising authority
may, before it is dissolved, direct it to reconsider its
proceedings and sentence, and if it, upon being reconvened, renders
a sentence which he approves, such sentence cannot be collaterally
impeached for mere errors or irregularities if any such were
committed by the court while acting within the sphere of its
authority.
4. A., the clerk of a paymaster in the navy, was, by a
court-martial, found guilty of certain charges and specifications
of malfeasance in the discharge of his official duties. Sentence
was passed upon him, and transmitted, with the record, to the
revising officer, who returned it with a letter stating that the
finding was in accordance with the evidence, but that he differed
with the court as to the adequacy of the sentence. The court
proceeded to revise it, and, after revoking it, substituted
another, which he approved, inflicting upon A. a severer
punishment. A., who was imprisoned pursuant thereto, alleging that
it was illegal and void and that he was thereby unlawfully deprived
of his liberty, prayed for a writ of habeas corpus.
Held
that the court-martial had jurisdiction of the person and of the
subject matter and was competent to pass the sentence whereof A.
complained.
MR. GEORGE S. BOUTWELL presented the following petition of Alvin
R. Reed for a writ of habeas corpus:
"To the Supreme Court of the United States:"
"The petition of Alvin R. Reed, of Medford, in the County of
Middlesex and State of Massachusetts, respectfully shows:"
"
First, that on or about the twenty-sixth day of June,
A.D. 1878, your petitioner was ordered to appear before a naval
general court-martial convened by Rear-Admiral Ed. T. Nichols, on
board the U.S. ship
Essex, then stationed in the waters of
Rio Janeiro, South America, to answer to certain charges and
specifications of malfeasance in the discharge of his official
duties as clerk to George L. Davis, then a paymaster in the Navy of
the United States."
"
Secondly that in obedience to said order, your
petitioner appeared before said court-martial, and on the fifth day
of July,
Page 100 U. S. 14
A.D. 1878, pleaded not guilty to the several charges and
specifications then made and read to him; and that thereupon, from
day to day, the trial proceeded until the sixteenth day of July,
A.D. 1878, when the said court-martial found him guilty of certain
of the charges and specifications."
"
Thirdly that on the said sixteenth day of July, A.D.
1878, the court passed sentence upon your petitioner, made a record
thereof in their proceedings, and transmitted the sentence to
Rear-Admiral Nichols after the members of the court had affixed
their signatures thereto."
"
Fourthly that on the nineteenth day of July, A.D.
1878, Rear-Admiral Nichols returned the said sentence to the
president of the court-martial with a communication in writing in
which the admiral says that the finding is in accordance with the
evidence, but regrets to be compelled to differ with the court as
to the adequacy of the sentence."
"
Fifthly that on the twentieth day of July, A.D. 1878,
the court-martial proceeded to revise the sentence so returned, and
adopted an order that the following sentence be placed on the
record in substitution of the former sentence, which is hereby
revoked:"
"That the said Alvin R. Reed, paymaster's clerk, U.S. Navy, be
imprisoned in such place as the honorable Secretary of the Navy may
designate for the term of two years; to lose all pay which may
become due him during such confinement, excepting the sum of $10
per month, this loss amounting to $1,960; to be fined in the sum of
$500, which fine must be paid before or at the end of the term of
confinement. Should such fine not be paid at end of term of
confinement, to be detained in confinement without pay until such
fine be paid, and at the expiration of term of confinement to be
dishonorably dismissed from the naval service of the United
States."
"W. S. SCHLEY,
Commander U.S.N., President of
Court"
"H. T. STANCLIFF,
Past Assistant Paymaster and
member"
"CHAS. H. BLACK,
Lieutenant and member"
"E. S. HOUSTON,
Lieutenant and member"
"ASA WALKER,
Lieutenant and member"
"W. P. DAY,
Lieutenant and member"
"ROBERT L. MEAD,
Captain U.S.M.C., Judge Advocate"
"
Sixthly that the second sentence, so imposed, was more
severe upon your petitioner than the sentence passed upon him
on
Page 100 U. S. 15
the sixteenth day of July, A.D. 1878, and revoked by the
court-martial as aforesaid."
"
Seventhly, And your petitioner further represents that
in his capacity as paymaster's clerk, as aforesaid, he was not
amenable to trial by court-martial, nor subject to the jurisdiction
of said court."
"
Eighthly, That under said second sentence your
petitioner has been for a long time, and now is confined on the
U.S. ship
Wabash, at the navy yard, Boston, Mass., and
under the custody of Capt. S. L. Breese, commander of said
ship."
"
Ninthly, That on or about the twelfth day of April,
A.D. 1879, your petitioner presented his petition to the Hon. John
Lowell, Circuit Judge of the United States in the First Circuit,
praying for a writ of habeas corpus; that a hearing thereupon was
had before the Hon. Thomas L. Nelson, judge of the district court,
sitting in the said circuit court, and such proceedings were
thereon had that on the twelfth day of June, A.D. 1879, the said
circuit court, to which said writ was returnable, remanded your
petitioner and discharged said writ."
"And your petitioner now is, and ever since the said twelfth day
of June, A.D. 1879, has been, a prisoner confined on said ship, at
the navy yard, at said Boston, in the custody of said S. L. Breese,
under the said illegal sentence pronounced on him on the said
twentieth day of July, A.D. 1878, and restrained of his liberty in
violation of the Constitution of the United States and of the laws
of the country."
"Wherefore your petitioner prays that a writ of habeas corpus
issue directed to the said S. L. Breese, commander of the said ship
Wabash, commanding him to produce your petitioner before
this honorable court, at the City of Washington, at such time as
the court shall direct, and that he then and there show the cause
of your petitioner's detention, to the end that your petitioner may
be discharged from custody."
"And your petitioner also prays that a writ of certiorari may
issue to John G. Stetson, clerk of the U.S. Circuit Court for the
District of Massachusetts, commanding him to certify to your
honorable court the petition of your petitioner before referred to,
the return thereto, and all the records of said court respecting
the same, and the adjudication thereon, to the end that the errors
therein may be corrected by this honorable court."
"And your petitioner will ever pray."
"ALVIN R. REED"
"Dated BOSTON, Sept. 3, 1879 "
Page 100 U. S. 16
The petition was duly verified, and the facts therein stated
were set forth with more fullness and particularity in an agreed
statement filed therewith.
Page 100 U. S. 19
MR. JUSTICE SWAYNE delivered the opinion of the Court.
There is no controversy in this case about the facts. The
questions we are called on to consider are all questions of law. A
brief summary of the facts will therefore be sufficient.
The petitioner, Reed, was the clerk of a paymaster in the navy
of the United States. He was duly appointed, and had accepted by a
letter, wherein, as required, he bound himself "to be subject to
the laws and regulations for the government of
Page 100 U. S. 20
the navy and the discipline of the vessel." His name was placed
on the proper muster roll, and he entered upon the discharge of his
duties. While serving in this capacity, charges of malfeasance were
preferred against him, and on the 26th of June, 1878, he was
directed by Rear-Admiral Nichols to appear and answer before a
general court-martial, convened pursuant to the order of that
officer on board the United States ship
Essex, then
stationed at Rio Janeiro, in Brazil. The court found the petitioner
guilty and sentenced him accordingly. The admiral declined to
approve the sentence, and remitted the proceedings back to the
court, that the sentence might be revised. The court thereupon
pronounced the following sentence in substitution for the former
one:
"That the said Alvin R. Reed, paymaster's clerk, U.S. Navy, be
imprisoned in such place as the honorable Secretary of the Navy may
designate for the term of two years, to lose all pay which may
become due him during such confinement, excepting the sum of $10
per month, this loss amounting to $1,960; to be fined in the sum of
$500, which fine must be paid before or at the end of the term of
confinement. Should such fine not be paid at end of the term of
confinement, to be detained in confinement without pay until such
fine be paid, and at the expiration of the terms of confinement to
be dishonorably dismissed from the naval service of the United
States."
This sentence was different from the preceding one in two
particulars, and in both it was more severe. It was approved by the
admiral and ordered to be carried out. The court was subsequently
dissolved. While in confinement under the sentence on board a naval
vessel at Boston, the petitioner sued out a writ of habeas corpus,
and brought his case before the Circuit Court of the United States
for the District of Massachusetts. After a full hearing, that court
adjudged against him, and ordered him back into the custody of the
naval officer to whom the writ was addressed. The petitioner
thereupon made this application in order that the conclusions
reached by the circuit court may be reviewed by this tribunal.
It is supposed that courts-martial were intended originally to
be a partial substitute for the court of chivalry of former
times.
Page 100 U. S. 21
3 Christian's Bl. 68, 108; Bouv.Law Dict., tit. Courts-martial.
The difference between military law and martial law is too well
known to require any remark. 1 Kent, Com. (12th ed.) 241, note
(
a).
". . . The common law . . . knew no distinction between citizen
and soldier, so that if a life-guardsman deserted, he could only be
sued for a breach of contract, and if he struck his officer, he was
only liable to an indictment or an action of battery."
3 Campbell's Lives of Chief Justices 91.
The constitutionality of the acts of Congress touching army and
navy courts-martial in this country, if there could ever have been
a doubt about it, is no longer an open question in this Court.
Const., art. I, sec. 8, and amendment 5. In
Dynes v.
Hoover, 20 How. 65, the subject was fully
considered and their validity affirmed.
The regularity of the original organization of the court here in
question is not denied.
Three points in support of the petition have been brought to our
attention. It is insisted:
1. That the court had no jurisdiction to try a paymaster's
clerk.
2. That when the first sentence was pronounced, the power of the
court was exhausted, and that the second sentence was therefore a
nullity.
3. That the court could revise its former sentence only on the
ground of mistake, and that there was no mistake, and consequently
no power of revision.
The first of these propositions is clearly not maintainable.
Where the punishment is death or fine and imprisonment, the
jurisdiction in question is extended to all persons "in the naval
service of the United States," Rev.Stat., sec. 1624, arts. 4, 14,
and it embraces, besides the frauds enumerated, "any other fraud
against the United States."
Id., art. 14.
In case of conviction, adequate punishment is required to be
adjudged.
Id., art. 51.
Except where the sentence is death or the dismissal of a
commissioned or warrant officer, it may be executed when confirmed
by the officer ordering the court.
Id., art. 53.
The place of paymaster's clerk is an important one in the
Page 100 U. S. 22
machinery of the navy. Their appointment must be approved by the
commander of the ship. Their acceptance and agreement to submit to
the laws and regulations for the government and discipline of the
navy must be in writing and filed in the department. They must take
an oath and bind themselves to serve until discharged. The
discharge must be by the appointing power and approved in the same
manner as the appointment. They are required to wear the uniform of
the service; they have a fixed rank; they are upon the payroll, and
are paid accordingly. They may also become entitled to a pension
and to bounty land. Navy Regulations of Aug. 7, 1876, p. 95;
In
re Bogart, 2 Sawyer 396;
United States v. Bogart, 3
Benedict 257; Rev.Stat., secs. 4695 and 2426.
The good order and efficiency of the service depend largely upon
the faithful performance of their duties.
If these officers are not in the naval service, it may well be
asked who are.
The second and third points will be considered together.
The Secretary of the Navy is authorized to establish
"Regulations of the Navy," with the approval of the President. 12
Stat. 565; Rev.Stat., sec. 1547. Such "Regulations for the
Administration of Law and Justice" were issued on the 15th of
April, 1870. Thereby it is declared as follows:
"The authority who ordered the court is competent to direct it
to reconsider its proceedings and sentence for the purpose of
correcting any mistake which may have been committed."
"It is not the power of the revising authority to compel a court
to change its sentence, where, upon being reconvened by him, they
have refused to modify it, nor directly or indirectly to enlarge
the measure of punishment imposed by sentence of a
court-martial."
"The proceedings must be sent back for revision before the court
shall have been dissolved."
Reg., c. 5, secs. 262-264.
Such regulations have the force of law.
Gratiot v.
United States, 4 How. 80.
The proceedings with respect to the revision of the second
sentence were in conformity to these provisions.
It is clear that the court was not dissolved until after the
approval of the second sentence by the admiral.
Page 100 U. S. 23
The court had jurisdiction over the person and the case. It is
the organism provided by law and clothed with the duty of
administering justice in this class of cases. Having had such
jurisdiction, its proceedings cannot be collaterally impeached for
any mere error or irregularity, if there were such, committed
within the sphere of its authority. Its judgments, when approved as
required, rest on the same basis and are surrounded by the same
considerations which give conclusiveness to the judgments of other
legal tribunals, including as well the lowest as the highest, under
like circumstances. The exercise of discretion, within authorized
limits, cannot be assigned for error and made the subject of review
by an appellate court.
We do not overlook the point that there must be jurisdiction to
give the judgment rendered, as well as to hear and determine the
cause. If a magistrate having authority to fine for assault and
battery should sentence the offender to be imprisoned in the
penitentiary or to suffer the punishment prescribed for homicide,
his judgment would be as much a nullity as if the preliminary
jurisdiction to hear and determine had not existed. Every act of a
court beyond its jurisdiction is void.
Cornett v.
Williams, 20 Wall. 226;
Windsor v.
McVeigh, 93 U. S. 274; 7
Wait's Actions and Defenses 181. Here, there was no defect of
jurisdiction as to anything that was done. Beyond this we need not
look into the record. Whatever was done that the court could do
under any circumstances we must presume was properly done. If error
was committed in the rightful exercise of authority, we cannot
correct it.
A writ of habeas corpus cannot be made to perform the functions
of a writ of error. To warrant the discharge of the petitioner, the
sentence under which he is held must be not merely erroneous and
voidable, but absolutely void.
Ex Parte
Kearney, 7 Wheat. 38;
Ex parte
Watkins, 3 Pet. 193;
Ex parte
Milligan, 4 Wall. 2.
The application of the petitioner is therefore
Denied.
