Decided: an appeal lies to the Supreme Court from an order of
the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia quashing an
inquisition in the nature of a writ
ad quod damnum.
The Circuit Court for the District of Columbia has no
jurisdiction, upon motion to quash an inquisition taken under the
act "to authorize the making of a turnpike road from Mason's causey
to Alexandria."
Error to the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia sitting
at Alexandria, which had quashed an inquisition taken by the
marshal condemning land of Mr. Custiss for a turnpike road.
The inquisition was taken under the 7th section of the Act of
Congress of 3 March, 1809, "to authorize the making of a turnpike
road from Mason's causey to Alexandria," vol. 9, p. 276, which
provides that it shall be lawful for the president and directors of
the turnpike company to agree with the owners of any ground to be
occupied by the road and the necessary toll houses and gates, for
the right thereof, and, in case of disagreement,
"on application to one of the judges of the circuit court, he
shall issue a warrant directed to the marshal of the district to
summon a jury of 24 inhabitants of the District of Columbia, of
property and reputation, not related to the parties nor in any
manner interested, to meet on the land to be valued, at a day to be
expressed in the warrant, not less than ten nor more than twenty
thereafter, and the marshal, upon receiving the said warrant, shall
forthwith summon
Page 10 U. S. 234
the said jury, and when met, provided there be not less than
twelve, shall administer an oath or affirmation to every juryman
that shall appear, that he shall faithfully, justly, and
impartially value the lands and all damages the owner thereof shall
sustain by opening the road through such land, according to the
best of his skill and judgment, and that the inquisition thereupon
taken shall be signed by the marshal and the jurymen present, and
returned by the marshal to the clerk of the county, to be by him
recorded; and upon every such valuation the jury is hereby directed
to describe and ascertain the bounds of the land by them valued,
and their valuation shall be conclusive upon all persons, and shall
be paid by the president and directors to the owner of the land or
his or her legal representatives, and on payment thereof the said
land shall be taken and occupied for a public road, and for the
necessary tollhouses and gates forever."
On the application of the president and directors of the
company, a warrant was granted and an inquisition taken and
returned to the clerk. Before it was recorded, the president and
directors obtained from the Circuit Court of the District of
Columbia, sitting at Alexandria, a rule upon Mr. Custiss to show
cause why the inquisition should not be quashed. Mr. Custiss
appeared and objected to the jurisdiction of the court, but the
court overruled the objection and, upon hearing, quashed the
inquest.
Page 10 U. S. 235
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court as
follows:
At the opening of this case, some doubt was entertained
respecting the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, but that doubt is
removed by an inspection of the act by which the Circuit Court of
the District of Columbia is constituted. The words of that act,
descriptive of the appellate jurisdiction of this Court, are more
ample than those employed in the Judicial Act. They are that
"Any final judgment, order, or decree in said circuit court
wherein the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, shall exceed the
value of $100 may be reexamined and reversed or affirmed in the
Supreme Court."
The jurisdiction of this Court being admitted, the proceedings
of the circuit court in ordering the inquisition
Page 10 U. S. 236
taken between these parties to be quashed comes on to be
examined.
The first objection to this proceeding is that the court of
Alexandria could take no cognizance of the subject by way of
motion.
The validity of this objection depends entirely on the act of
Congress under which this inquisition was taken. If it was to be
recorded by order of the court, if the judgment of the court was in
any manner to be exercised upon it, then in all which has been done
the court has exercised its jurisdiction, and the inquiry will be
whether there was sufficient cause for refusing to permit the
inquisition to be recorded. If, on the other hand, the clerk was a
mere ministerial officer directed, by law to perform a ministerial
act, without any superintending agency on the part of the court,
then the court could not, upon motion, prohibit the clerk to
perform his duty, and could not legitimately quash the
inquisition.
The act of Congress directs
"that the inquisition, when taken, shall be signed by the
marshal and by the jurymen present and returned by the marshal to
the clerk of the county, to be by him recorded."
That the legislature may direct the clerk of a court to perform
a specified service without making his act the act of the court
will not be controverted, and if this may be done, it is difficult
to conceive words which convey this idea more clearly than those
which are employed in this act.
The inquisition is not returnable to the court, but to the
clerk. It is not to be recorded by order of the court, but is to be
recorded by the clerk, on receiving it from the marshal. It does
not derive its validity from being recorded, but remains afterwards
liable to all the objections which might be taken to it previous
thereto. If, for example, an inquisition should be recorded which
was found by eleven jurors, that inquisition would neither vest the
land in the company nor give a right to
Page 10 U. S. 237
the former proprietor to demand the money to which it was
valued. The inquisition, then, is to be recorded solely for
preservation, and the act of recording is a ministerial act which
the law directs the clerk to perform, without submitting the paper
to the judgment of the court. The law asks not the intervention of
the court, and requires no exercise of judicial functions.
The difference between this act and those the execution of which
is superintended by the court is apparent. In those cases, the
instrument is to be brought into court and acted upon by the court;
in this it is to be delivered to the clerk at any time, and acted
on by him without the intervention of the court.
This Court is unanimously of opinion that the Circuit Court for
the County of Alexandria could not legally entertain the motion for
quashing the inquisition found in this case, nor legally prevent
their clerk from recording it. Their judgment therefore is
Reversed and the motion to be dismissed.
