Blake et al v. US Bank National Association et al, No. 2:2012cv02186 - Document 32 (W.D. Wash. 2013)
Court Description: ORDER granting 24 Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 28 Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment by Judge Marsha J. Pechman.(MD, cc to pltfs)
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Blake et al v. US Bank National Association et al Doc. 32 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 8 9 10 11 CHRISTOPHER A. BLAKE and LINDA B. BLAKE, Plaintiffs, 12 13 14 15 v. U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION as trustee for the Stanwich Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2012-2 and CARRINGTON MORTGAGE SERVICES, LLC, et al., Defendants. CASE NO. C12-2186 MJP ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 THIS MATTER comes before the Court on cross motions for summary judgment by Defendants U.S. Bank, N.A and Carrington Mortgage Services, LLC (Dkt. No. 24) and pro se Plaintiffs Christopher A. Blake and Linda B. Blake (Dkt. No. 28). Having considered the motions, Plaintiffs’ Complaint (Dkt. No. 1), and all related papers, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment. 23 24 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 Background 2 On March 5, 2007, Plaintiffs entered into an agreement with Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., for 3 a residential loan in the principal amount of $699,250.00. (See Compl. ¶¶ 8–10, Dkt. No. 1; Croft 4 Decl. ¶ 9, Dkt. No. 26) The loan was memorialized by an Initial Interest Adjustable Rate Note 5 executed on the same day. (See Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 9; Dkt. No. 26 at ¶ 9.) Wells Fargo retained 6 possession of the Note until the loan was sold and securitized pursuant to a Mortgage Loan 7 Purchase Agreement ( MPLA ) and Pooling and Servicing Agreement ( PSA ) between 8 Stanwich Mortgage Acquisition Company II, LLC, as depositor, Defendant Carrington Mortgage 9 Services, LLC, as servicer, Defendant U.S. Bank, N.A., as trustee, and Wells Fargo. (See Dkt. 10 No. 1 at ¶ 11; Exh. A, Dkt. No. 26 at 4.) At that time, the Note, indorsed in blank by Wells 11 Fargo, was transferred to Carrington as servicer for Stanwich Mortgage Loan Trust Series 201212 3 (the Trust ). (See Dkt. No. 26 at ¶ 10–11.) As servicer for the Trust, Carrington is responsible 13 for providing notices regarding the loan and initiating foreclosure proceedings following default. 14 (See Dkt. No. 26 at ¶¶ 4–5.) Carrington has retained custody of the Note and its counsel is 15 prepared to produce the original Note if called to do so. (Parker Decl., Dkt. No. 25 at ¶ 2; Ex. C, 16 Dkt. No. 25 at 3.) 17 On December 14, 2012, Plaintiffs filed a scattershot complaint seeking injunctive relief 18 against foreclosure (Second Cause of Action) and a declaratory judgment to the effect that 19 Defendants lack the authority to foreclose (First and Fourth Cause of Action). (Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 20 44–54; 58–67.) They also ask the Court to quiet title to the property in their name (Third Cause 21 of Action). (Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 55–57.) 22 Plaintiffs and Defendants now move for summary judgment. 23 24 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 2 1 Analysis 2 I. Legal Standard on a Motion Summary Judgment 3 Federal Rule 56(a) provides that the court shall grant summary judgment if the movant 4 shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 5 judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In determining whether a factual dispute 6 requiring trial exists, the court must view the record in the light most favorable to the 7 nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). All material facts 8 alleged by the non-moving party are assumed to be true, and all inferences must be drawn in that 9 party’s favor. Davis v. Team Elec. Co., 520 F.3d 1080, 1088 (9th Cir. 2008). 10 A dispute about a material fact is genuine only if the evidence is such that a 11 reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. 12 There is no genuine issue for trial [w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational 13 trier of fact to find for the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 14 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). When a lawsuit consists of multiple causes of action, the court may 15 grant summary judgment on all or any part thereof. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 16 II. 17 In their Complaint, Plaintiffs explain, The gravamen of Plaintiffs’ lawsuit is, 1) Declaratory Judgment and Lack of Authority to Foreclose 18 Defendants and the TRUST are not holders or holders in due course of the NOTE and 2) 19 Defendants and the TRUST are not beneficiaries under the [Deed of Trust], and accordingly do 20 not have standing to enforce the [Deed of Trust]. (Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 15.) Plaintiffs’ first cause of 21 action for declaratory relief is based on this theory that Defendants do not hold the Note or are 22 not the beneficiaries and therefore cannot foreclose on Plaintiffs’ loan. (Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 44–50.) 23 24 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 3 1 Plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action ( Lack of Standing to Foreclose ) is based on the same general 2 allegations. (Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 58–67.) 3 Plaintiffs’ show me the note tactic of forestalling foreclosure has been thoroughly 4 discredited by federal courts in this district. Petree v. Chase Bank, No. 12-cv-5548-RBL, 2012 5 WL 6061219, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 6, 2012) (collecting cases). Under Washington law, the 6 only proof of beneficial ownership required prior to foreclosure is a declaration by the 7 beneficiary made under penalty of perjury stating that the beneficiary is the actual holder of the 8 promissory note. RCW 61.24.030(7). There is no requirement that the foreclosing party show 9 the borrower the actual note. Having submitted a declaration establishing that servicer 10 Carrington has been the holder of the Note since May 2012—as well as submitting a copy of the 11 Note itself—Defendants have conclusively established beneficial ownership and thus authority to 12 foreclose. (See Dkt. No. 25, 26.) In contrast, Plaintiffs rely on a vague, irrelevant statement 13 purportedly made by counsel for Defendants during a discovery dispute. (Pl’s Mot. Summ. Judg., 14 Dkt. No. 28 at 3.) Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, Defendants 15 have shown that there is no issue of material fact with respect to the authority of Carrington to 16 foreclose on Plaintiffs’ defaulting loan. 17 Plaintiffs also attempt to challenge the validity of the [Deed of Trust] as of the date the 18 NOTE was assigned without a concurrent assignment of the underlying [Deed of Trust]. (Dkt. 19 No. 1 at ¶ 49.) The Court understands this allegation to be a variation on a split the note 20 argument—the theory that if ownership of a deed of trust is split from the ownership of the 21 underlying promissory note, one or both of those documents becomes unenforceable and no 22 party can foreclose. This argument has also been rejected by courts in Washington. See Abrams 23 v. Wachovia Mortg., No. C12-1679 JLR, 2013 1855746, at *2 (W.D. Wash. April 30, 2013). The 24 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 4 1 power to initiate foreclosure lies with the holder of the promissory note regardless of any 2 assignment of the deed of trust. See Bain v. Metropolitan Mortg. Group, Inc., 175 Wn.2d 83, 89 3 (2012). 4 To the extent that Plaintiffs argue that securitization process itself is an impediment to 5 foreclosure (see Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 42), this argument also lacks merit. See Cuddeback v. Bear 6 Stearns Residential Mortg. Corp., No. 12-1300 RSM, 2013 WL 5692846, *3 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 7 10, 2013). The authority to foreclose on a defaulting loan remains with the noteholder when a 8 loan is securitized. 9 10 III. Injunctive Relief Plaintiffs’ second cause of action is labeled Injunctive Relief. (Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 51–54.) 11 Injunctive relief is a remedy and not a cause of action. Kwai Ling Chan v. Chase Home Loans, 12 Inc., No. C12–0273 JLR, 2012 WL 1576164, *7 (W.D. Wash. May 4, 2012). As discussed 13 above, Plaintiffs have not established their right to any remedy, much less the extraordinary 14 remedy of injunctive relief. 15 IV. 16 Finally, Plaintiffs bring a claim to quiet title to the underlying property. (Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ Quiet Title 17 55–57.) To succeed in a quiet title action, Plaintiff must first pay the outstanding debt on which 18 the subject mortgage or deed of trust is based. Thein v. Reconstruct Co., N.A., No. C11-5939 19 BHS, 2012 WL 527530, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Feb 16., 2012). Plaintiffs have not alleged that they 20 have paid or offered to pay the balance on their loan, so summary judgment is warranted on this 21 claim as well. 22 23 24 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 5 1 2 3 Conclusion Because there is no genuine dispute with respect to the facts giving Defendants the 4 authority to initiate foreclosure proceedings on a defaulting Note, the Court GRANTS 5 Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary 6 Judgment. 7 8 The clerk is ordered to provide copies of this order to Plaintiffs and all counsel. 9 Dated this 27th day of November, 2013. 10 A 11 12 Marsha J. Pechman Chief United States District Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 6
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