Holland v. King County Adult Detention et al, No. 2:2012cv00791 - Document 81 (W.D. Wash. 2013)
Court Description: ORDER granting 65 King County Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment. King County District Court East Division, King County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, King County and King County Adult Detention terminated. As a result, Mr. Holland has n o claim remaining against King County Defendants. Mr. Hollands only claims remaining for trial are against Defendant Washington State Trooper Anthony Brock. Motions terminated: 78 MOTIONS IN LIMINE filed by King County, by Judge James L. Robart.(MD)
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Holland v. King County Adult Detention et al Doc. 81 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 8 9 10 DWIGHT HOLLAND, Plaintiff, 11 v. 12 13 CASE NO. C12-0791JLR ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT KING COUNTY ADULT DETENTION, et al., 14 Defendants. 15 I. INTRODUCTION 16 Before the court is Defendants King County Adult Detention, King County, King 17 County District Court East Division, and King County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office’s 18 (collectively “King County Defendants”) 1 second motion for summary judgment (2d SJ 19 20 1 As the court noted in its previous order granting King County Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (10/15/13 SJ Order (Dkt. # 64) at 16, n.2.), the departments of a county are not stand-alone entities capable of being sued. See Nolan v. Snohomish Cnty., 802 P.2d 792, 796 22 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (“RCW 36.32.120(6), read together with RCW 36.01.010 and .020, 21 ORDER- 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 Mot. (Dkt. # 65).) The court has reviewed the motion, all submissions filed in support 2 and opposition thereto, the balance of the record, and the applicable law. Being fully 3 advised and no party having requested oral argument, the court GRANTS King County 4 Defendants’ second motion for summary judgment. 5 6 II. BACKGROUND The court has previously stated the factual background pertaining to this case in its 7 two previous summary judgment orders. (See 7/3/13 SJ Order (Dkt. # 42) at 2-12; 8 10/15/13 SJ Order (Dkt. # 64) at 2-6.) Briefly, this lawsuit arises out of Defendant 9 Washington State Trooper Anthony Brock’s September 16, 2011, arrest of Plaintiff 10 Dwight Holland on suspicion of driving while under the influence of alcohol. (See 11 Holland Decl. (Dkt. # 56-7) ¶ 6.) Trooper Brock transported Mr. Holland to the King 12 County Jail where jail personnel booked and detained him. (Holland Decl. ¶¶ 7-9.) Jail 13 personnel also seized and stored his personal possessions, including his wallet and cell 14 phone, pending his release. (Id.) 15 Approximately ten hours after his initial booking, Mr. Holland posted bail and was 16 released. (See Kanner Decl. (Dkt. # 45) Exs. 1, 2.) Mr. Holland was later charged with 17 driving under the influence of intoxicants; however, the charges were eventually 18 dismissed on August 3, 2012. (See Resp. to OSC (Dkt. # 12) at 9-10.) Subsequently, Mr. 19 20 makes clear the legislative intent that in a legal action involving a county, the county itself is the 21 only legal entity capable of suing and being sued.”). As all claims against individually named King County Deputy Prosecutor Lakeysha Washington have been dismissed on summary judgment (see 10/15/13 SJ Order at 22), the remaining claims are made against Defendant King 22 County only. ORDER- 2 1 Holland filed the present suit against numerous Washington State and King County 2 defendants, alleging, among other things, several violations of his constitutional rights. 3 (See generally Am. Compl. (Dkt. # 7).) 4 On July 3, 2012, the court granted in part and denied in part Defendants 5 Washington State Patrol, Washington State Department of Licensing, and Washington 6 State Trooper Anthony Brock’s (collectively “State Defendants”) motion for summary 7 judgment. (See 7/3/13 SJ Order.) Later, on October 15, 2013, the court granted King 8 County Defendants’ first motion for summary judgment. (See 10/15/13 SJ Order.) 9 Specifically, the court dismissed Mr. Holland’s state law tort claims and his 42 U.S.C. 10 § 1983 claim for cruel and unusual punishment stemming from the failure of King 11 County Jail personnel to provide Mr. Holland with accommodations for his sleep apnea 12 during his ten hour incarceration. (Id. at 22.) The court also dismissed Mr. Holland’s 13 claims against King County Defendants for prosecutorial misconduct. (Id.) However, as 14 the court noted, Mr. Holland’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unlawful imprisonment 15 and seizure of his property remained intact because King County Defendants failed to 16 include any reference to this claim in their first summary judgment motion. (Id. at 14 17 n.5.) 18 King County Defendants now move for summary judgment regarding Mr. 19 Holland’s remaining 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for unlawful imprisonment and seizure of 20 his property. (See 2d SJ Mot.) 21 22 ORDER- 3 1 III. ANALYSIS 2 A. Legal Standard 3 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, “[s]ummary judgment for a defendant 4 is appropriate when the plaintiff fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the 5 existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear 6 the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); see also 7 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden of showing there is “no 8 genuine issue as to any material fact” and he or she is entitled to prevail as a matter of 9 law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. A genuine issue exists when a rational fact finder, 10 considering the evidence currently in the record, could find in favor of the non-moving 11 party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). A fact is material if it might affect the 12 outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). If the moving party meets its burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the 13 14 pleadings and identify facts that show a genuine dispute for trial. Cline v. Indus. Maint. 15 Eng’g. & Contracting Co., 200 F.3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 2000). In judging the 16 sufficiency of the evidence, the court is required to resolve all doubts and draw all 17 reasonable inferences in the non-moving party’s favor. Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 18 530-31 (2006). If, however, the moving party fails to carry its initial burden of 19 production, the opposing party has no obligation to produce countervailing evidence. 20 Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 21 2000). 22 ORDER- 4 1 B. Mr. Holland’s Claim for Unlawful Imprisonment and Seizure of His Property 2 King County Defendants move for summary judgment with respect to Mr. 3 Holland’s remaining 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for unlawful imprisonment and seizure of 4 property on two grounds. First, King County Defendants argue that they are not liable 5 under § 1983 because Mr. Holland’s complaint fails to allege that any King County 6 employee actually caused his imprisonment. (2d SJ Mot. at 3.) Second, King County 7 Defendants assert that Mr. Holland’s remaining claim fails because he cannot point to a 8 specific policy or custom that caused the alleged constitutional deprivation. (Id. at 4.) 9 The court agrees with both grounds. 10 Generally, “a public official is liable under § 1983 only ‘if he causes the plaintiff 11 to be subjected to deprivation of his constitutional rights.’” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 12 137, 142 (1979) (emphasis in original) (internal citation omitted). Further, a local 13 governmental entity is not liable under § 1983 for the acts of its employees unless the acts 14 or omissions alleged to have caused the constitutional deprivation were “visited” under a 15 governmental custom or policy. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-94 16 (1978). Thus, to maintain a cause of action against King County Defendants under 17 § 1983, Mr. Holland must identify a custom or policy of the county that was the “moving 18 force” of his alleged constitutional deprivation. Id. at 694-95; Villegas v. Gilroy Garlic 19 Festival Ass’n, 541 F.3d 950, 957 (9th Cir. 2008). 20 King County Defendants assert that it was not the actions of jail personnel that 21 were the “moving force” of Mr. Holland’s alleged constitutional deprivation. Rather, it 22 was State Trooper Brock who initially arrested Mr. Holland. (See Holland Decl. ¶ 6.) ORDER- 5 1 Pursuant to the arrest, State Trooper Brock transported Mr. Holland to King County Jail 2 where he was booked. (Id. ¶ 7; Kanner Decl. (Dkt. # 45) Ex. 1.) King County 3 Defendants point to a December 2004 Washington State Attorney General Opinion that 4 states that county jails are required to accept arrestees from state patrol officers no matter 5 the nature of the crime charged. (See 2d SJ Mot. at 3 (citing attached Attorney General 6 Opinion, 2005 Op. Wash. Att’y Gen. No. 4).) Based on this policy, King County 7 Defendants maintain that jail personnel had no discretion with respect to Mr. Holland’s 8 booking and temporary detainment—a contention Mr. Holland does not dispute. Thus, 9 the court agrees with King County Defendants’ assertion that the conduct of jail 10 personnel cannot be characterized as the “moving force” behind Mr. Holland’s alleged 11 unconstitutional detention or wrongful seizure of his property. 12 Even if, however, some aspect of the conduct of jail personnel could be 13 characterized as the “moving force” behind Mr. Holland’s alleged constitutional 14 deprivations, Mr. Holland fails to provide evidence of a policy, custom, or practice at the 15 jail that would prevent the entry of summary judgment. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-94; 16 see also Baculanta v. Baily, CV No. 12-8467-DMG (MAN), 2012 WL 5456395, at *4 17 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2012) (ruling that pro se plaintiff’s failure to allege the policy at issue 18 in a § 1983 claim is fatal to plaintiff’s Monell claim). The only references Mr. Holland 19 makes to any King County policy or practice are conclusory allegations that King County 20 was negligent in supervising and training its employees. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 94-101, 21 106-15.) 22 ORDER- 6 1 A governmental agency can be held liable under a § 1983 Monell claim if the 2 policy at issue amounts to “deliberate indifference” to the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. 3 Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Plumeau v. Sch. 4 Dist. No. 40 Cnty. of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997)). Failure to train may 5 amount to a policy of “deliberate indifference” under Monell, if the need to train was 6 obvious and the failure to do so renders a constitutional violation likely. Id. (citing City 7 of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989)). Likewise, failure to supervise under 8 similar circumstances may also amount to “deliberate indifference.” Id. (citing Davis v. 9 City of Ellensburg, 869 F.2d 1230, 1235 (9th Cir. 1989)). “Mere negligence in training 10 or supervision, however, does not give rise to a Monell claim.” Id. (internal citation 11 omitted). 12 Although Mr. Holland asserts conclusory allegations of negligent training or 13 supervision (see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 94-101, 106-15), he neither claims nor provides 14 evidence that King County’s alleged negligent training and supervision amounted to 15 “deliberate indifference” to his constitutional rights. See Dougherty, 654 F.3d at 901. 16 The court, therefore, grants King County Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and 17 dismisses this claim. See also Beed v. Cnty. of L.A., CV No. 06 1236 GAF(PLAX), 2007 18 WL 1723717, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 7, 2007) (rejecting Monell liability on the part of the 19 county where plaintiff was incarcerated in county jail following her arrest due to 20 mistaken identity, but plaintiff presented no evidence of a county policy of ignoring 21 mistaken identity claims). 22 ORDER- 7 1 At least one other district court in this circuit has reached a similar conclusion. As 2 indicated by the record, King County Jail was nothing more than a custodial agent and, as 3 a subsequent custodial agent, was not, under the alleged facts, required by the 4 Constitution to explore Mr. Holland’s claims of innocence. See Reyes v. City of 5 Glendale, No. CV 05-0253 CAS (MANx), 2009 WL 2241602, at *17-19 (C.D. Cal. July 6 23, 2009); see also Baker, 443 U.S. at 145-46) (“Given the requirements that arrest be 7 made only on probable cause . . . , we do not think a sheriff executing an arrest warrant is 8 required by the Constitution to investigate independently every claim of innocence, 9 whether the claim is based on mistaken identity or a defense such as lack of requisite 10 intent . . . .”). In Reyes, the plaintiff was erroneously arrested and detained because city 11 police had mistaken his identity for that of another person listed in an arrest warrant. Id. 12 at *3. The plaintiff in Reyes was subsequently transferred from city to county jail. Id. In 13 dismissing the defendant county, the district court relied on the fact that the county 14 played no role in procuring the warrant or identifying the plaintiff prior to and following 15 his arrest. Id. at *19. Similarly, King County Defendants played no part in the initial 16 stop and arrest of Mr. Holland. Rather, King County Jail merely held Mr. Holland, as 17 required under state law, for a period of approximately 10 hours until he posted bail and 18 was released. 19 Mr. Holland has not come forward with any evidence or identified any facts that 20 would allow a rational trier of fact to conclude that his allegedly unconstitutional ten21 hour incarceration was caused by an actionable policy or custom of King County 22 Defendants. Mr. Holland also fails to make any argument that the seizure of his property ORDER- 8 1 was in any way unlawful apart from being incidental to his temporary incarceration. 2 Accordingly, Mr. Holland has failed to raise a material issue of fact regarding his 3 remaining claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against King County Defendants for wrongful 4 imprisonment or seizure of his property. 5 6 IV. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, the court GRANTS King County Defendants’ motion for 7 summary judgment with respect to Mr. Holland’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for 8 wrongful imprisonment and seizure of his property (Dkt. # 65). As a result, Mr. Holland 9 has no claim remaining against King County Defendants. Mr. Holland’s only claims 10 remaining for trial are against Defendant Washington State Trooper Anthony Brock. 11 (See 7/3/13 Order (Dkt. # 42).) Therefore, the motions in limine filed by King County 12 Defendants are now moot (Dkt. # 78), and the court DIRECTS the clerk to strike the 13 noting date for these motions in limine from its calendar. 14 Dated this 10th day of December, 2013. 15 17 A 18 JAMES L. ROBART United States District Judge 16 19 20 21 22 ORDER- 9
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