Neal v. Commissioner of Social Security, No. 4:2016cv05131 - Document 17 (E.D. Wash. 2017)
Court Description: ORDER denying ECF No. 14 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and granting ECF No. 15 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. CASE CLOSED. Signed by Senior Judge Edward F. Shea. (TR, Case Administrator)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Neal v. Commissioner of Social Security Doc. 17 1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 5 6 7 RACHEL MARIE NEAL, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Plaintiff, 8 v. 9 10 No.: 4:16-CV-5131-EFS COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 11 Defendant. 12 13 Before the Court are cross summary judgment motions. ECF Nos. 14 & 14 15. Plaintiff Rachel Marie Neal appeals a denial of benefits by the 15 Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). ECF No. 14. Ms. Neal contends that the 16 ALJ erred because she (1) failed to properly evaluate medical opinion 17 evidence 18 (2) inappropriately found Ms. Neal not fully credible; and (3) failed to 19 meet her burden at steps four and five of the disability analysis. ECF 20 No. 14. The Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) asks the 21 Court 22 performing past relevant work as a receptionist. ECF No. 15. After 23 reviewing the 24 informed. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Defendant’s 25 Motion for Summary Judgment and denies Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary 26 Judgment. to from treating, affirm the record examining, ALJ’s and decision relevant and reviewing that Ms. authority, medical Neal the is Court sources; capable is of fully 27 28 ORDER - 1 Dockets.Justia.com I. 1 Statement of Facts1 2 Ms. Neal was born in 1985. AR 51. She obtained her Associate’s 3 Degree in 2011. AR 210. Ms. Neal has been diagnosed with congenital 4 fusion of the vertebrae, spondylosis, and degenerative disc disease. See 5 AR 101. In the past, Ms. Neal has treated her back pain with injections, 6 opiate pain medication, muscle relaxers, massage, and physical therapy. 7 See, e.g., AR 242. At the time of her application, it appears that Ms. 8 Neal was using only ibuprofen to address her pain. AR 73–74. Ms. Neal 9 spends her days caring for her young son and performing household 10 chores, and she engages in social activities with friends periodically. 11 AR 235–242. 12 Ms. Neal has significant employment history up until her alleged 13 disability onset date. AR 223–234. Just prior to filing this claim, Ms. 14 Neal was working as a receptionist in an orthopedic office, AR 223–224. 15 She had worked in that position for approximately two years, AR 223–224, 16 prior to relocating to a different city, see AR 355. Ms. Neal also 17 reports working as a caretaker and in various retail positions. AR 18 223-234. 19 II. 20 Procedural History On November 12, 2013, Ms. Neal protectively applied for disability 21 insurance 22 security income, AR 186-192. Her alleged onset date was July 1, 2013. 23 AR 184, 24 reconsideration. AR 88–139, 141–144. Ms. Neal filed a written request benefits, 186. Ms. AR 184–185, Neal’s and claims filed were a claim denied for supplemental initially and upon 25 26 27 1 The facts are only briefly summarized. Detailed facts are contained in the administrative hearing transcript, the ALJ’s decision, the parties’ briefs, 28 and the underlying records. ORDER - 2 1 for an administrative hearing, AR 145–146, which was held before ALJ 2 Caroline Siderius on February 23, 2015, AR 34. On March 30, 2015, the ALJ issued a decision denying Ms. Neal’s 3 4 claims. 5 decision. 6 appealing the ALJ’s decision. ECF Nos. 1 & 4. The parties subsequently 7 filed the instant summary judgment motions. ECF Nos. 14 & 15. 8 III. Disability Determination A 9 AR 20–29. AR 1–4. The On “disability” Appeals October is Council 6, defined denied 2016, as Ms. the review Neal of filed “inability to the this engage ALJ’s lawsuit in any 10 substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 11 physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death 12 or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period 13 of 14 1382c(a)(3)(A). 15 evaluation process to determine whether a claimant is disabled. 16 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. not less than twelve months.” The decision maker 42 U.S.C. uses a §§ 423(d)(1)(A), five-step sequential 20 17 Step one assesses whether the claimant is engaged in substantial 18 gainful activities during the relevant period. If she is, benefits are 19 denied. 20 decision maker proceeds to step two. 21 20 Step C.F.R. two assesses whether not, medically If the 24 combination of impairments, 25 the not have disability C.F.R. the severe impairment is severe, the evaluation proceeds to the third step. does 20 a is 416.920(c). claimant impairments. has she 23 28 of claimant If impairment 27 combination the 416.920(b). 22 26 or §§ 404.1520(b), a severe claim is §§ 404.1520(c), impairment denied. If or the Step three compares the claimant’s impairment with a number of listed impairments acknowledged by the Commissioner to be so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity. ORDER - 3 20 C.F.R. §§ 404 Subpt. P 1 App. 1, 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925, 416.926. 2 If the impairment meets or equals one of the listed impairments, the 3 claimant is conclusively presumed to be disabled. If the impairment does 4 not meet or equal one of the listed impairments, the evaluation proceeds 5 to the fourth step. Step four assesses whether the impairment prevents the claimant 6 7 from performing work she has 8 determining the claimant’s residual functional capacity (RFC). 20 C.F.R. 9 §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). performed If the in claimant the is past. able This to includes perform her 10 previous work, she is not disabled. If the claimant cannot perform this 11 work, the evaluation proceeds to the fifth step. 12 Step five, during in this view claimant of sequential her can see Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137 (1987). shifts economy the 15 proof national whether education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g); of the assesses 14 burden in step, perform The work final 13 16 other the age, disability 17 analysis. The claimant has the initial burden of establishing a prima 18 facie case of entitlement to disability benefits. Rhinehart v. Finch, 19 438 F.2d 920, 921 (9th Cir. 1971). The claimant meets this burden if she 20 establishes 21 engaging in her previous occupation. The burden then shifts to the 22 Commissioner to show that (1) the claimant can perform other substantial 23 gainful activity, and (2) a “significant number of jobs exist in the 24 national economy” which the claimant can perform. Kail v. Heckler, 722 25 F.2d 1496, 1498 (9th Cir. 1984). A claimant is disabled only if her 26 impairments are of such severity that she is not only unable to do her 27 28 previous that work but a physical cannot, or mental considering impairment her age, prevents education, her and from work experiences, engage in any other substantial gainful work that exists in ORDER - 4 1 sufficient quantity in the national economy. 2 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B). In this case, the ALJ determined that Ms. Neal was not disabled. 3 4 At 5 substantial 6 date. AR 22. At step two, the ALJ found that Ms. Neal has the severe 7 impairment of degenerate disc disease of the cervical and lumbar spine. 8 AR 22–23. At step three, the ALJ found that Ms. Neal’s impairments did 9 not meet or medically equal the severity of any listed impairments. AR 10 step one, the gainful ALJ determined activity that Ms. Neal had following her alleged not engaged disability in onset 23. At step four, the ALJ found: [T]he claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except she can lift twenty pounds occasionally, ten pounds frequently; she can perform no work that requires stretching arms out in any direction to lift more than five pounds or push and/or pull with upper extremities more than five pounds. She can sit for up to six hours in an eight-hour workday, but for no more than two hours at one time; stand or walk for up to four hours in an eighthour workday, but for one hour at a time. She can occasionally squat, kneel, climb ramps and stairs, but never crawl or climb ladders, rope or scaffolds and no work at unprotected heights or operation of heavy machinery or equipment. She should avoid constant turning of the neck in all directions and jobs that require holding the head in a flexed position for more than thirty minutes at a time. 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 AR 23–24. This finding was based in part on the ALJ’s determination that 21 Ms. Neal’s statements regarding the severity of her symptoms were “not 22 entirely credible.” AR 25. Based on this assessment, the ALJ concluded 23 that Ms. Neal could perform past relevant work as a receptionist. AR 24 28-29. Accordingly, the ALJ concluded at step four that Ms. Neal is not 25 disabled. AR 29. 26 IV. Standard of Review 27 On review, the Court considers the record as a whole, not just the 28 evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision. Weetman v. Sullivan, 877 F.2d ORDER - 5 1 20, 22 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Kornock v. Harris, 648 F.2d 525, 526 2 (9th Cir. 1980)). The Court upholds the ALJ’s determination that the 3 claimant is not disabled if the ALJ applied the proper legal standards 4 and there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support 5 the decision. Delgado v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 570, 572 (9th Cir. 1983) 6 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)); Brawner v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 7 839 F.2d 432, 433 (9th Cir. 1987). Substantial evidence is more than a 8 mere scintilla, Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119 n.10 (9th 9 Cir. 1975), but less than a preponderance, McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 10 F.2d 599, 601-02 (9th Cir. 1989); Desrosiers v. Sec’y of Health & Human 11 Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988). “It means such relevant 12 evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 13 conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citations 14 omitted). “[S]uch inferences and conclusions as the [ALJ] may reasonably 15 draw from the evidence” will also be upheld. Mark v. Celebrezze, 348 16 F.2d 289, 293 (9th Cir. 1965). If the evidence supports more than one 17 rational 18 decision. Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984). 19 20 21 22 V. interpretation, a reviewing court must uphold the ALJ’s Analysis The Court addresses each of Ms. Neal’s challenges to the ALJ’s decision in turn. A. Evaluation of Medical Opinion Evidence 23 “In disability benefits cases . . . physicians may render medical, 24 clinical opinions, or they may render opinions on the ultimate issue of 25 disability — the claimant’s ability to perform work.” Garrison v. Colvin, 26 759 F.3d 995, 1012 (9th Cir. 2014) (alteration in original). There are 27 three types of physicians: treating physicians, examining physicians, and 28 non-examining physicians. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. ORDER - 6 1 1995). The ALJ must provide “clear and convincing” reasons for rejecting 2 an 3 without 4 “substantial 5 substantial evidence requirement by setting out a detailed and thorough 6 summary 7 interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012 8 (internal quotation marks omitted). examining physician’s providing of “specific evidence” the facts 1. 9 opinions in and the and and may not legitimate record. conflicting Id. reject such reasons” “An clinical ALJ opinions supported can evidence, satisfy stating by the his Dr. Sahota and Physical Therapist Randy Bruce 10 Ms. Neal argues that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinions of 11 treating physician, Dr. Sahota, and physical therapist, Randy Bruce. Mr. 12 Bruce 13 approved 14 limitations reflected in the statement were not supported by the record. 15 Ms. Neal argues that this was inappropriate because Dr. Sahota’s findings 16 were entitled to deference as findings of a treating physician, Mr. 17 Bruce’s opinions were also entitled to consideration, and the findings 18 were not contradictory to other medical evidence in the record. completed and a Medical signed by Source Dr. Statement, Sahota. The ALJ and that found that statement some of was the As an initial matter, under the Social Security regulations, “only 19 20 licensed 21 considered acceptable medical sources.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 22 1111 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotes omitted). Physical therapists are 23 not “acceptable medical sources,” and their opinions are not entitled to 24 the 25 § 404.1513(a), (d); see also Huff v. Astrue, 275 F. App’x 713, 716 (9th 26 Cir. 2008) (explaining that the “ALJ was entitled to give the physical 27 28 physicians same therapist’s deference opinion and as less certain other acceptable weight” when qualified medical the specialists sources. opinion 20 are C.F.R. “contradicted the findings of other acceptable medical sources in the record, and the ALJ ORDER - 7 1 properly relied on the acceptable medical sources”). Still, the opinions 2 of “other sources” such as physical therapists may be used to “show the 3 severity 4 claimant’s] ability to work,” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(d), and, in this 5 case, 6 acceptable medical source. of the [the claimant’s] report prepared impairment(s) by Mr. Bruce and was how also it affects approved [the by an 7 The ALJ assigned “some weight” to opinions in the report prepared 8 by Mr. Bruce and signed by Dr. Sahota because “much of their opinion is 9 generally consistent with the objective medical evidence.” AR 27. The 10 ALJ found, however, that “the opinion regarding missed days and 11 limitations for focus and concentration are not supported by treating 12 source findings that described the claimant as stable or with only mild 13 symptoms.” AR 27. The ALJ also found that the weight of the opinion was 14 lessened due to the fact that Ms. Neal “has not undergone any consistent 15 treatment with no treatment for more than two years and no consistent 16 pain treatment.” AR 27. The ALJ concluded that “most of the restrictions 17 prescribed by Mr. Bruce and Dr. Sahota have been incorporated by the 18 undersigned into the residual functional capacity assessment in this 19 decision.” AR 27. 20 The Court finds that the ALJ did not err in rejecting the findings 21 as to missed days and limitations on focus and concentration in the 22 statement prepared by Mr. Bruce, an “other source,” and approved by Dr. 23 Sahota, a treating source. The ALJ appropriately explained that she was 24 rejecting 25 treating source records and the fact that Ms. Neal had not undergone 26 treatment 27 28 those for findings over two because years and they used were only inconsistent both over-the-counter with pain medication to alleviate her symptoms. See AR 27. The ALJ noted that treating records of Dr. Sahota himself described Ms. Neal’s condition as ORDER - 8 1 “stable” and a treating record from Dr. Wahl described Ms. Neal’s 2 symptoms as mild. See AR 26–27. The ALJ did not err by giving more 3 weight to opinions from acceptable medical sources than to the statement 4 prepared by Mr. Bruce and approved by Dr. Sahota. In addition, the ALJ 5 did not reject the statement or even assign the opinion “little weight,” 6 and instead gave the opinion “some weight” and accepted most of the 7 findings in the statement because they were supported by the record. 8 Ms. Neal also argues that the limitations suggested by Mr. Bruce 9 and Dr. Sahota were not contradicted by the record and were confirmed by 10 the medical examiner, Dr. Thompson. This argument is not supported by 11 the record. While Dr. Thompson did not expressly disagree with the 12 limitations proposed by Mr. Bruce and Dr. Sahota, his findings differed 13 from 14 follows: 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 their findings. The exchange proceeded, in relevant part, Dr. Thompson: The RFC of Exhibit 10F, I believe, is what counsel is referring to, and the opinion of the examining doctors is considered. My job is not to disagree, and I don’t necessarily disagree. However, I have to offer an RFC based on strictly the objective musculoskeletal evidence in the written record. That’s my charge. Consequently I have a somewhat more — somewhat less restrictive RFC. AR 42. Claimant’s Attorney: [T]he attending sources have said that she would be limited to seldom, meaning only up to about 10 percent of the time, of twisting the torso, or twisting the neck, and that she should avoid maintaining a flexed neck posture, and maintaining a forward bent posture, such as trying to reach over a conveyor belt, something like that. Would you concur with those restrictions? Dr. Thompson: Yes, I would. *** 26 27 28 Claimant’s Attorney: The attending physician also opined that she is probably going to have episodic flare ups of symptoms that absenteeism is likely to exceed two to three days per ORDER - 9 as 5 month. Would you have any reason to disagree with that observation? Dr. Thompson: I do not have reason to disagree. Obviously my role here is not to — not so much to make that estimate, because I think that those kind of estimates, unless there’s absolute evidence, is beyond the scope of what my roles [sic] is. 6 AR 44–45. After this line of questioning, the ALJ asked Dr. Thompson to 7 clarify: 1 2 3 4 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 ALJ: I just want to clarify one of the limitations, doctor, with her arms and the position of her head and her neck. Could you just give me an idea of what kind of limitations she would need in an eight hour day? *** Dr. Thompson: So consequently a prolonged positioning in a head down position really would be avoided. And it is indeed time limited. People can do it for a period of time, and then there has to be breaks or change positions [sic], or lie down sometimes. *** ALJ: It sounds like you would recommend limiting the movement of the head. You don’t want a job where you’re having to look up, look down, look sideways constantly. It sounds like this is a person who would need to remain pretty much upright, and without doing a lot of heavy lifting in any direction, or really even light lifting in any direction. Dr. Thompson: That’s my belief, your honor. AR 46–48 (“sic” in original). Claimant’s attorney then followed up with additional questions: 23 24 25 26 27 28 Claimant’s Attorney: Doctor I think you were saying that even if we’ve got an upright position, or we’ve got the table in the right place, because they’re trying to do something with their hands, and if that job then requires them to look down to do that, it’[s] that flexion of the neck that, with her degenerative condition, she probably wouldn’t tolerate that more than on a seldom basis, meaning about 10 percent of the day? Is that fair? ORDER - 10 1 2 3 Dr. Thompson: It’s very hard to make a number, but it would certainly be limited. And it would probably not really meet the definition of occasional, which is a third of a day. Would doubt that. 4 AR 49. This exchange demonstrates that Dr. Thompson did not expressly 5 agree with the findings of Dr. Sahota and Mr. Bruce as to Ms. Neal’s 6 absenteeism or as to the finding that Ms. Neal’s flexion of the neck 7 would be limited to seldom. While Dr. Thompson also did not expressly 8 disagree with the statement findings, he did note that he would not 9 assign a number to Ms. Neal’s ability to perform certain activities and 10 found that assigning a number as to absenteeism was beyond the scope of 11 his responsibilities as a medical expert. Accordingly, the ALJ reasonably 12 found that the statement prepared by Mr. Bruce and signed by Dr. Sahota 13 was not fully supported by Dr. Thompson. 14 Thus, because the ALJ noted contradictory evidence in the record 15 and Dr. Thompson’s testimony did not fully support the findings of Dr. 16 Sahota and Mr. Bruce, the ALJ was justified in rejecting portions of the 17 statement that she found to be unsupported by the record. 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 2. Dr. Thompson Ms. Neal contends that the ALJ failed to properly consider the opinion of the medical examiner, Dr. Thompson, because the ALJ’s RFC did not reflect all limitations found by Dr. Thompson, and the ALJ did not provide an explanation for rejecting Dr. Thompson’s opinion. This argument is not supported by the transcript of the hearing. As reflected in the exchange above, Dr. Thompson did not find, as 25 Ms. Neal asserts, that Ms. Neal should be limited to seldom twisting her 26 torso and neck or that Ms. Neal would need to avoid any forward flexion 27 of the low back. Dr. Thompson stated that he agreed with the findings of 28 Dr. Sahota and Mr. Bruce that Ms. Neal could conduct these activities ORDER - 11 1 only on a seldom basis “or something like that.” AR 44. Dr. Thompson 2 later clarified that Ms. Neal’s ability to perform these tasks would be 3 “limited,” but declined to assign a particular number to how often Ms. 4 Neal could do such tasks. AR 49. In addition, in response to the ALJ’s 5 questioning, Dr. Thompson stated that Ms. Neal’s ability to look down 6 and flex the neck is time limited. AR 46. The ALJ’s RFC finding that Ms. 7 Neal cannot turn her head constantly and cannot hold her head in a 8 flexed position for more than 30 minutes is a reasonable interpretation 9 of Dr. Thompson’s statements. 10 In addition, Dr. Thompson stated that he had no reason to disagree 11 with the finding of Dr. Sahota and Mr. Bruce regarding absenteeism, but 12 rather than agreeing with that finding, Dr. Thompson stated that such a 13 finding 14 expert. 15 recommendation when she declined to include absenteeism in the RFC. 16 17 was beyond the Accordingly, The Court scope the therefore of ALJ holds his did responsibilities not that the contradict ALJ did as Dr. not a medical Thompson’s reject Dr. Thompson’s findings. 18 B. Credibility Determination 19 Ms. Neal argues that the ALJ improperly found that she was not 20 fully credible based on cherry-picking evidence from the record and a 21 flawed finding that Claimant’s daily activities were inconsistent with 22 her symptom testimony. 23 A two-step analysis is used by the ALJ to assess whether a 24 claimant’s testimony regarding subjective pain or symptoms is credible. 25 Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1014. Step one requires the ALJ to determine 26 whether 27 impairment, which could reasonably be expected to produce some degree of 28 the pain or other symptoms alleged. Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d ORDER - 12 the claimant presented objective medical evidence of an 1 1028, 1035–36 (9th Cir. 2007); Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1282 (9th 2 Cir. 1996). Objective medical evidence of the pain or fatigue, or the 3 severity thereof, need not be provided by the claimant. Garrison, 759 4 F.3d at 1014. 5 If the claimant satisfies the first step of this analysis, and 6 there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ must accept the claimant’s 7 testimony about the severity of her symptoms unless the ALJ provides 8 specific, clear, and convincing reasons for rejecting the claimant’s 9 symptom-severity testimony. Id. An ALJ is not “required to believe every 10 allegation of disabling pain” or other non-exertional impairment. Orn v. 11 Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 635 (9th Cir. 2007). To discredit a claimant’s 12 testimony after finding that a medical impairment exists, however, “the 13 ALJ 14 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Factors that an ALJ may consider in 15 weighing a claimant’s credibility include reputation for truthfulness, 16 inconsistencies in testimony or between testimony and conduct, daily 17 activities, and unexplained, or inadequately explained, failure to seek 18 treatment or follow a prescribed course of treatment.” Id. at 636. must provide the 22 intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not 23 entirely credible . . . .” AR 25. The ALJ explained that “[s]upport for 24 this conclusion has been derived from the objective medical evidence, 25 the lack of treating medical opinion during the relevant period, as well 26 as the opinions of the independent medical expert at the hearing and the however, the claimant’s be Neal’s Id. alleged reasonably Ms. disbelief.” 21 symptoms; that the determinable could found for 20 impairment ALJ reasons In 28 case, cogent 19 27 this specific, expected statements to “medically cause the concerning the opinions of non-examining state agency medical consultants who had the opportunity to evaluate the documentary evidence of record.” AR 25. ORDER - 13 1 The ALJ noted: “[Ms. Neal] has not been referred to a chronic pain 2 management facility or undergone treatment for pain; she has undergone 3 generally 4 treatment, 5 evaluating 6 objective findings during the examinations.” AR 25. These findings are 7 supported by the record, and the Court holds that it was appropriate for 8 the ALJ to consider these inconsistencies between Ms. Neal’s conduct and 9 her testimony. conservative has medical After 10 been treatment sporadic sources describing the with and have inconsistent noted medical over-the-counter no more evidence in and than the Ibuprofen; treating mild or record, and stable the ALJ 11 further explained that Ms. Neal’s “allegation of total disability is not 12 reflective of the objective medical evidence.” AR 28. The ALJ reasoned 13 that “the level of activity reported by the claimant is inconsistent 14 with 15 caring for, playing with, and lifting her young son; spending time on 16 the computer and time with friends; being able to walk a half mile; 17 doing 18 driving a car; going shopping; paying bills and managing money; doing 19 crafts; and participating in game nights. AR 28. The ALJ also noted that 20 “the claimant acknowledged that she stopped working after the birth of 21 her son and her husband finding a better job so she could stay at home 22 with her son.” AR 28. her allegation dishes, of laundry, total disability” vacuuming, because sweeping, Ms. mopping, Neal reported cooking meals; 23 Although the Ninth Circuit has held that “impairments that would 24 unquestionably preclude work and all of the pressures of a workplace 25 environment will often be consistent with doing more than merely resting 26 in bed all day,” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1016, the Court holds that the 27 28 ALJ appropriately considered the types of activities performed by Ms. Neal and whether those activities were consistent with the level of ORDER - 14 1 disability claimed. See Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 2 1989). The Court holds that the ALJ’s finding that Ms. Neal’s reported 3 activities include activities that are consistent with light work is 4 reasonable and supported by substantial evidence in the record. 5 The ALJ provided specific, clear, and convincing reasons for not 6 fully crediting Ms. Neal’s testimony as to symptom severity. The ALJ, 7 therefore, did not err in finding Ms. Neal’s testimony not entirely 8 credible 9 Neal’s daily activities, Ms. Neal’s failure to pursue treatment, and 10 other evidence in the record such as Ms. Neal’s statement that her 11 decision not to work was based on factors other than disability. 12 based C. on inconsistencies with the objective evidence, Ms. Step Four and Step Five Findings 13 Ms. Neal argues that the ALJ failed to meet her burden at steps 14 four and five of the disability inquiry. Ms. Neal argues that the ALJ 15 erred at step four by failing to include restrictions suggested by Dr. 16 Thompson, Dr. Sahota, and Mr. Bruce. Ms. Neal argues that the ALJ was 17 required to advance to step 5 and that the ALJ failed to meet her burden 18 at step five because the hypothetical she posed to the vocational expert 19 did not fully capture Ms. Neal’s limitations. 20 “If an ALJ finds a severe impairment at step two, that impairment 21 must be considered in the remaining steps of the sequential analysis.” 22 Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 2009). 23 If the hypothetical posed to the vocational expert “does not reflect all 24 the claimant’s limitations, we have held that the expert’s testimony has 25 no evidentiary value to support a finding that the claimant can perform 26 jobs in the national economy.” DeLorme v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841, 850 27 (9th Cir. 1991). The hypothetical should be “accurate, detailed, and 28 supported by the medical record.” Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1165 ORDER - 15 1 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1101 (9th Cir. 2 1999)). It is, however, “proper for an ALJ to limit a hypothetical to 3 those 4 record.” Id. impairments The 5 Court that has are held supported that the by substantial ALJ did not evidence fail in to the include 6 restrictions suggested by Dr. Thompson, reasonably declined to fully 7 credit Ms. Neal’s testimony, and reasonably rejected portions of the 8 statement prepared by Mr. Bruce and approved by Dr. Sahota. Based on 9 these determinations, the Court now holds that the hypothetical the ALJ 10 posed to 11 limitations supported by the record in this matter. Based on the opinion 12 of the vocational expert, the ALJ appropriately concluded that Ms. Neal 13 could perform past relevant work as a receptionist. Thus, Ms. Neal does 14 not 15 regulations, and the ALJ was not required to advance to step five. 16 VI. meet the vocational the definition expert of was a reasonable disabled under the reflection Social of the Security Conclusion 17 For the reasons outlined above, the Court finds that the ALJ’s 18 finding of nondisability is both reasonable and supported by substantial 19 evidence in the record. The Court therefore denies Plaintiff’s Motion 20 for Summary Judgment and grants Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. 21 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 22 1. 2. 25 26 Neal’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 14, is DENIED. 23 24 Ms. The Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 15, is GRANTED. 3. The Clerk’s Office is to enter Judgment in favor of the 27 Commissioner. 28 4. ORDER - 16 The case shall be CLOSED. 1 2 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. The Clerk’s Office is directed to enter this Order and provide copies to counsel and ALJ Caroline Siderius. DATED this 14th day of August 2017. 4 5 ___s/Edward F. Shea__ EDWARD F. SHEA Senior United States District Judge 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Q:\EFS\Civil\2016\5131.Neal.ord.deny.smj.ss.lc02.docx ORDER - 17
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
