Notwen Corporation et al v. American Economy Insurance Co, No. 2:2005cv00396 - Document 25 (E.D. Wash. 2005)

Court Description: ORDER Granting Safeco's 1 Motion to Quash and Denying Motion for Protective Order. Signed by Judge Cynthia Imbrogno. (LS, Courtroom Deputy)

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Notwen Corporation et al v. American Economy Insurance Co Case 2:05-cv-00396-CI Doc. 25 Document 25 Filed 12/15/2005 1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 7 8 IN RE; SUBPOENA DIRECTED TO SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, 9 10 11 12 [NOTWEN CORPORATION, WCH/GAN PARTNERS, LTD., and WILLIAM C. NEWTON, Plaintiffs, v. AMERICAN ECONOMY INSURANCE CO., Defendant, Cause No. 05-CV-104J, District of Wyoming] 13 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) NO. CV-05-396-CI ORDER GRANTING SAFECO’S MOTION TO QUASH AND DENYING MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER 14 BEFORE THE COURT are third-party Safeco’s Motions to Quash 15 subpoena and for Protective Order, submitted to the court following 16 oral argument on December 7, 2005. 17 Timothy J. Bommer appeared pro hac vice for third-party Safeco; 18 Wyoming attorney George E. Powers, Jr., of Sundahl, Powers, Kapp & 19 Martin, appeared 20 Schroeder, of Paine, Hamblin, Coffin, Brooke & Miller, LLP, for 21 Plaintiffs. pro hac vice, (Ct. Rec. 1.) Wyoming attorney with local counsel William J. 22 The matter is before the undersigned by operation of LMR 1(9), 23 Local Rules for the Eastern District of Washington. The parties, in 24 compliance with LR 37.1(b), Local Rules for the Eastern District of 25 Washington, have conferred and attempted to settle this matter 26 without court intervention. 27 filings in this matter shall reflect Cause No. CV-05-396-CI. (Ct. Rec. 4 at 7-8.) All future 28 ORDER GRANTING SAFECO’S MOTION TO QUASH AND DENYING MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER - 1 Dockets.Justia.com Case 2:05-cv-00396-CI Document 25 Filed 12/15/2005 THE OREGON LITIGATION 1 2 Plaintiffs, investors in an Oregon company, were sued in the 3 Circuit Court of the State of Oregon, County of Multnomah, Lezak v. 4 Expand Cellular, Inc., et al., referenced by Plaintiffs as the Lezak 5 litigation. 6 Plaintiffs sought insurance coverage under two policies: a personal 7 homeowners policy issued by Safeco on William Newton’s personal 8 residence in Jackson, Wyoming, Policy No. OM552051, and a commercial 9 policy issued by American Economy Insurance Company (AEIC), insuring In response to claims made in that litigation, 10 Mr. Newton’s business interests, policy number 02BO904634. 11 and 12 companies denied coverage. The Oregon case was litigated during the 13 spring of 2005. 14 Plaintiffs were exonerated of all claims against them after trial in 15 March and April 2005. AEIC are subsidiaries of the same parent company. Safeco Both Counsel represented during oral argument that THE WYOMING LITIGATION 16 17 In response to denial of coverage by AEIC, Plaintiffs filed 18 breach of contract / bad faith claims against AEIC1; Safeco was not 19 included as a party and Plaintiffs continue to represent they do not 20 intend to file a claim against Safeco. 21 filed in state court and removed by AEIC to the United States 22 District Court for the District of Wyoming. The suit initially was 23 On September 27, 2005, Plaintiffs issued an amended subpoena 24 from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 25 26 1 Notwen Corporation, WCH/GAN Partners, LTD. and William C. 27 Newton, Plaintiffs v. American Economy Insurance Co., Defendant, 28 Cause No. 05-CV-104J, District of Wyoming. ORDER GRANTING SAFECO’S MOTION TO QUASH AND DENYING MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER - 2 Case 2:05-cv-00396-CI Document 25 Filed 12/15/2005 1 Washington, directing Safeco employee, Neil Jacot, to appear for 2 deposition with the entire Safeco homeowner’s claim file. (Ct. Rec. 3 8.) Plaintiffs contend the rationale behind the decision to deny 4 coverage under the homeowner’s policy is relevant to AEIC’s decision 5 to 6 commercial policy. deny coverage and a defense under its separately issued Plaintiffs advised the court during oral argument that the 7 8 discovery cut-off for the Wyoming litigation has passed (the 9 Subpoena was issued prior to the cut-off date), but that counsel 10 involved reached an informal agreement that should this court permit 11 access to the Safeco claim file, no objection would be raised as to 12 untimeliness. 13 cut-off has not been presented to the federal trial court. It appears the issue of extension of the discovery LEGAL ISSUES 14 15 Safeco asserts it is entitled to an order quashing the subpoena 16 and/or protective order because the claim file (1) is not relevant 17 to the denial of coverage under the commercial policy issued by 18 AEIC; 19 privilege; and (3) includes documents protected under work product 20 doctrine. 21 Safeco and AEIC are subsidiaries of the same parent company, share 22 office space, access to each other’s claim files, policies, and 23 procedures. 24 policy language in the homeowner’s policy is relevant to the 25 allegations against AEIC with respect to the commercial policy. 26 27 (2) includes documents protected under attorney/client Plaintiffs respond the claim file is relevant because Thus, Plaintiffs contend Safeco’s interpretation of AEIC’S POSITION AEIC sets forth their position as to coverage in a letter dated 28 ORDER GRANTING SAFECO’S MOTION TO QUASH AND DENYING MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER - 3 Case 2:05-cv-00396-CI Document 25 Filed 12/15/2005 1 August 17, 2004. (Ct. Rec. 15, Ex. B.) After a review of the 2 claims in Lezak lawsuit, AEIC denied coverage noting the claims 3 involved misappropriation of trade secrets, tortious interference, 4 and conversion, and the facilitation of same by corporate board 5 members and investors including Plaintiffs. 6 AEIC commercial policy, a covered business liability includes any 7 “occurrence” for which there is bodily injury or property damage. 8 Occurrence is defined as an accident. 9 law, Reisig v. Union Insurance Company, 870 P.2d 1066 (Wyo. 1994), 10 concluded claims involving civil conversion and/or misappropriation 11 were not “accidents” that would trigger an occurrence. 12 15, Ex. B at 2, Hormel letter.) 13 exclusions in the policy excluding coverage for intentional acts. 14 Finally, AEIC denied coverage on grounds they were not promptly 15 notified of the lawsuit. Under the terms of the AEIC, referencing Wyoming (Ct. Rec. Additionally, there were coverage SAFECO’S POSITION 16 17 Safeco, in a letter dated September 1, 2004, denied coverage on 18 grounds there was no bodily injury or property damage caused by an 19 “occurrence” as alleged in the Complaint and as those terms were 20 defined in the homeowner’s policy. 21 letter.) 22 damages alleged were caused by an ‘occurrence’” as defined in the 23 policy. 24 stated: 25 26 27 (Ct. Rec. 15, Ex. D at 2, Jacot Additionally, Mr. Jacot noted “it is questionable whether Occurrence is defined as an “accident.” Mr. Jacot then Further, it is questionable whether the alleged damages were caused by an accident. It is my understanding that the Wyoming Supreme Court discussed the definition of “accident” in the case of Matlock v. Mountain West Farm Bureau, 44 P.3d 73 (Wyo. 2002). Under that recent decision, there does not appear to be an accident that 28 ORDER GRANTING SAFECO’S MOTION TO QUASH AND DENYING MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER - 4 Case 2:05-cv-00396-CI 1 2 3 Document 25 Filed 12/15/2005 gives rise to coverage for the intentional torts alleged. However, we recognize your argument that in some jurisdictions an accident refers to whether the damages were intended. We, therefore, do not base our coverage decision solely on whether or not an accident occurred. 4 (Ct. Rec. 15, Ex. D at 3.) 5 language which Plaintiffs contend they have a right to explore 6 through deposition of Mr. Jacot and review of the claims file. They 7 contend 8 provided by AEIC, creating sufficient ambiguity in the definition of 9 the terms in the AEIC policy to give rise to AEIC’s obligation to this (Emphasis added.) interpretation is contrary to It is the emphasized the interpretation 10 defend. Additionally, it is argued, the deposition of Mr. Jacot 11 should go forward because it may produce relevant evidence of bad 12 faith and/or breach of contract. 13 they intended to secure evidence that, under Mr. Jacot’s analysis, 14 an argument could be made Safeco would have recommended tendering a 15 defense because of doubt as to whether the claims constituted an 16 occurrence, but for the absence of property damage. 17 Ex. D at 2.) (Ct. Rec. 15, DISCOVERY 18 19 Specifically, Plaintiffs argued Under Rule 26, FED. R. CIV. P., parties to litigation may 20 discover all relevant, non-privileged information. 21 States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 699-700 (1974). 22 CIV. P. 45(c)(1) and 35 U.S.C. § 24, ancillary jurisdiction resides 23 in this court to enforce subpoenas directed to residents in this 24 district and issued by the District Court for the Eastern District 25 of Washington. 26 1998). 27 See United Pursuant to FED. R. In re Sealed Case, 141 F.3d 337, 341 (D.C. Cir. District courts addressing such motions must decide whether the 28 ORDER GRANTING SAFECO’S MOTION TO QUASH AND DENYING MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER - 5 Case 2:05-cv-00396-CI Document 25 Filed 12/15/2005 1 testimony or material sought is “relevant to the claim or defense” 2 of any party; additionally, for “[g]ood cause shown, the court may 3 order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter 4 involved in the action” if it would be “reasonably calculated to 5 lead to . . . admissible evidence.” 6 amended April 17, 2000, effective December 1, 2000; see also Elvig 7 v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 967 (9th Cir. 2004). 8 However, issues involving the admissibility of evidence must be 9 directed to the court where the underlying action is pending, in FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1), as 10 this case, the Wyoming court. 11 connection with a case is supervision of discovery ancillary to an 12 action in another district should be ‘especially hesitant to pass 13 judgment on what constitutes relevant evidence thereunder’. 14 relevance is in doubt . . . the court should be permissive.” 15 Truswal Systems Corp. v. Hydro-Air Engineering, Inc., 813 F.2d 1207, 16 1211-12 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (citation omitted); Compaq Computer Corp. 17 v. Packard Bell Electronics, Inc., 163 F.R.D. 329, 335 (N.D. Cal. 18 1995). 19 “[A] district court whose only Where BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM 20 The underlying cause of action for breach of contract is being 21 litigated in Federal District Court for the District of Wyoming. 22 Under federal law, issues of insurance contract interpretation are 23 governed by state law. 24 174 F.3d 1077, 1083 (9th Cir. 1999). 25 to Wyoming law governing insurance contract interpretation. Stanford Univ. Hosp. v. Federal Ins. Co., Thus, this court looks first 26 Review of the breach of contract claim against AEIC requires 27 the court to interpret the AEIC policy under the usual rules of 28 ORDER GRANTING SAFECO’S MOTION TO QUASH AND DENYING MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER - 6 Case 2:05-cv-00396-CI contract 2 America, 864 P.2d 1018, 1023 (Wyo. 1993). 3 Mountain West Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., Inc., 707 P.2d 161, 166 4 (Wyo. 1985): 6 7 8 Doctors’ Filed 12/15/2005 1 5 interpretation. Document 25 Co. v. Insurance Corp. of As set forth in Arnold v. If a contract is clear on its face, we must assume it reflects the intent of the parties. Schacht v. First Wyoming Bank, N.A.-Rawlins, Wyo., 620 P.2d 561 (1980). We are not free to rewrite contracts under the guise of interpretation. Adobe Oil & Gas Corp. v. Getter Trucking, Inc., Wyo., 676 P.2d 560 (1984). So long as there is no ambiguity, we are bound to apply the contract as it is written. Rouse v. Munroe, 658 P.2d 74 (Wyo. 1983). 9 10 See also Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Dahlheimer, 3 P.3d 820, 821-822 11 (Wyo. 2000). 12 is limited to the four corners of the document. 13 Insurance Company v. Summit Well Service, Inc., 57 P.3d 1257, 1261 14 (Wyo. 2002); Evans v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 34 P.3d 284, 285 15 (Wyo. 2001); In re Sierra Trading Post, Inc. v. Hinson, 996 P.2d 16 1144, 1148 (Wyo. 2000). 17 contract, the insured must show the existence of a contract, breach 18 and damages. 19 second and third, the breach and damages are limited to AEIC’s 20 refusal to defend. If the contract is “clear and unambiguous,” inquiry Principal Life To establish breach of an insurance Here, there is no issue as to the first; as to the 21 The Wyoming courts have held the duty of an insurer to defend 22 a claim is broader than the duty of the insurer to indemnify. Aetna 23 Ins. Co. v. Lythgoe, 618 P.2d 1057, 1061 (Wyo. 1980) (citing Lanoue 24 v. Fireman’s Fund American Ins. Cos., 278 N.W.2d 49 (Minn. 1979); 25 Boston Ins. Co. v. Maddux Well Serv., 459 P.2d 777 (Wyo. 1967)). 26 Analysis of the duty to defend is not made based on the ultimate 27 liability of the insurer to indemnify the insured or on the basis of 28 ORDER GRANTING SAFECO’S MOTION TO QUASH AND DENYING MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER - 7 Case 2:05-cv-00396-CI underlying action is Filed 12/15/2005 1 whether 2 Lythgoe, 618 P.2d at 1061 (citing Employers’ Fire Ins. Co. v. Beals, 3 240 A.2d 397 (R.I. 1968); Burger v. Continental Nat’l American 4 Group, 441 F.2d 1293 (6th Cir. 1971)). 5 is based on an examination of the facts alleged in the complaint 6 upon which the claim is based. Lythgoe, 618 P.2d at 1061 n.2. The 7 analysis of those facts is undertaken in the light of the language 8 of the insurance policy. 9 defend, the Wyoming court will compare the terms of the insurance 10 the Document 25 groundless or unsuccessful. Instead, the duty to defend To determine whether AEIC owed a duty to policy with the allegations set forth in the Oregon complaint. The 11 discovery sought by Plaintiffs neither involves the 12 production of relevant evidence, nor is it reasonably calculated to 13 lead 14 interpreting the terms of the AEIC policy or determining whether 15 those terms are rendered ambiguous by the language in that contract. 16 An ambiguous contract “is an agreement which is obscure in its 17 meaning, because of indefiniteness of expression, or because a 18 double meaning is present.” 19 Chemical Co., 612 P.2d 463, 464 (1980), citing Bulis v. Wells, 565 20 P.2d 487, 490 (Wyo. 1977). Ambiguity justifying extraneous evidence 21 is not generated by the later disagreement of the parties concerning 22 the meaning of the contract or its terms. Homestake-Sapin Partners 23 v. United States, 375 F.2d 507 (10th Cir. 1967). 24 extraneous evidence may be admissible to interpret the parties’ 25 intent, that evidence is limited to the contemporaneous or later 26 negotiations between the parties. 27 Cheyenne, 969 P.2d 132, 140 (Wyo. 1998) (the court must look to all to evidence which would assist the Wyoming court in Amoco Production Co. v. Stauffer Thus, although Polo Ranch Company v. City of 28 ORDER GRANTING SAFECO’S MOTION TO QUASH AND DENYING MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER - 8 Case 2:05-cv-00396-CI Document 25 Filed 12/15/2005 1 the surrounding circumstances and extrinsic evidence pertaining to 2 the context within which the contract was formed to determine the 3 parties’ intent). 4 Evidence from Mr. Jacot and the Safeco claims file would add 5 nothing to the contractual relationship between AEIC and Plaintiffs 6 with respect to the commercial policy. Differing interpretations of 7 a 8 admission of extrinsic evidence. Moncrief v. Louisiana Land and 9 Exploration Company, 861 P.2d 516, 524 (Wyo. 1993). To the extent 10 extrinsic or parole evidence does not exist to clarify an ambiguity, 11 the ambiguity will be construed against the drafter, the insurance 12 company. 13 Company, 873 P.2d 598, 600 (Wyo. 1994). 14 sought 15 interpretation of Safeco’s separately issued homeowner’s policy is 16 not relevant to interpretation of the AEIC commercial policy. 17 Finally, the evidence sought would not assist the Wyoming court in 18 determining the nature of the claims alleged in the Oregon lawsuit. 19 BAD FAITH CLAIM 20 contract alone will Prudential from Mr. not create Preferred Jacot and/or an ambiguity Properties facts v. requiring Underwood the Ranch Therefore, the evidence or rationale related Additionally, Plaintiffs have sued AEIC for bad faith. to A 21 breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing gives 22 rise to an independent actionable tort and damage relief. 23 recovery in tort is premised upon the existence of the special 24 relationship created by the unequal bargaining power between an 25 insurer and the insured. 26 Shrader, 882 P.2d 813, 825 (Wyo. 1994). 27 obligation that “neither party will do anything to injure the right A State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. 28 ORDER GRANTING SAFECO’S MOTION TO QUASH AND DENYING MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER - 9 The tort imposes an Case 2:05-cv-00396-CI Document 25 Filed 12/15/2005 1 of the other to receive the benefits of the agreement.” Shrader, 2 citing Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973). 3 Liability is imposed not for a bad faith breach of contract, but for 4 the failure to comply with the duty of good faith and fair dealing. 5 That duty is not referenced in the terms of the policy; it is an 6 independent obligation imposed by law under which the insurer must 7 act 8 responsibilities. 9 established an insurer’s duty to defend is broader than its duty to 10 provide coverage. Shoshone First Bank v. Pacific Employers Insurance 11 Co., 2 P.3d 510, 513-14 (Wyo. 2000). If the policy potentially 12 covers one or more claims, the insurer has a duty to defend all 13 claims, and any doubts about coverage should be resolved against the 14 insurer. Alm v. Hartford Fire Insurance Company, 369 P.2d 216, 219 15 (Wyo. 1962). 16 fairly and in good As faith noted in discharging earlier, Wyoming its contractual case law has Additionally, Wyoming has adopted an objective standard of care 17 as a measure of the required conduct of insurers. 18 citing Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368 (Wis. 1978). 19 Under this standard, “where a claim was not fairly debatable, 20 refusal to pay would be bad faith and, under appropriate facts, 21 could give rise to an action for tortious refusal to honor the 22 claim.” 23 insurer would have denied or delayed payment of the claim for 24 benefits under the facts and circumstances. 25 McCullough, 789 P.2d at 860; Anderson, 271 N.W.2d at 376. Therefore, 26 to establish a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, 27 the insured must show: (1) the absence of any reasonable basis for Id. Shrader, at 825, A claim is “fairly debatable” when a reasonable 28 ORDER GRANTING SAFECO’S MOTION TO QUASH AND DENYING MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER - 10 Shrader at 825, citing Case 2:05-cv-00396-CI Document 25 Filed 12/15/2005 1 denying a claim for benefits; and (2) the insurer’s knowledge or 2 reckless disregard of the lack of a reasonable basis for denying the 3 claim for benefits. 4 822 P.2d 820, 824 (Wyo. 1991); McCullough, 789 P.2d at 860 (quoting 5 Anderson, 271 N.W.2d at 376). Id., citing Darlow v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 6 The AEIC commercial policy set forth the following provisions: 7 1. 8 a. We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of “bodily injury”, “property damage”, “personal injury” or “advertising injury” to which this insurance applies. We will have the right and duty to defend the insured against any “suit” seeking those damages. However, we will have no duty to defend the insured against any “suit” seeking damages for “bodily injury”, “property damage”, “personal injury” or “advertising injury” to which this insurance does not apply. We may at our discretion, investigate any “occurrence” and settle any claim or “suit” that may result. 9 10 11 12 13 Business Liability 14 .... 15 b. This insurance applies: 16 (1) To “bodily injury” and “property damage” only if: 17 (a) The “bodily injury” or “property damage” is caused by an “occurrence” that takes place in the “coverage territory”; and 18 19 (b) The “bodily injury” or “property damage” occurs during the policy period.” 20 21 The policy defined 22 continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general 23 harmful conditions.” 24 Oregon allegations involved statutory trade secrets violations, 25 specifically 26 misappropriate assets and approved of that misappropriation, as well 27 as claims of tortious interference and conversion. that “occurrence” as “an accident, (Ct. Rec. 15, Ex. B at 2.) Plaintiffs assisted other 28 ORDER GRANTING SAFECO’S MOTION TO QUASH AND DENYING MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER - 11 including AEIC noted the defendants to The declination Case 2:05-cv-00396-CI Document 25 Filed 12/15/2005 1 letter then concluded, after referring to Reisig v. Union Insurance 2 Co., 870 P.2d 1066 (Wyo. 1994): “it is clear that a claim for civil 3 conversion and/or misappropriation in Wyoming is not an ‘accident’ 4 such that it would trigger an ‘occurrence’ pursuant to the policy.” 5 (Ct. Rec. 15, Ex. B at 2.) 6 policy exclusions may apply, including the following: 1. 7 Additionally, the letter noted certain Applicable to Business Liability Coverage This insurance does not apply to: 8 a. Expected or Intended Injury 9 “Bodily injury” or “property damage” expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured. This exclusion does not apply to “bodily injury” resulting from the use of reasonable force to protect persons or property. 10 11 12 13 In contrast to AEIC’s position, Safeco refused to tender a 14 defense on a theory of damages--that the Oregon complaint did not 15 allege property damage as defined under the terms of the policy; 16 alternatively, Mr. Jacot admitted some room for argument “in some 17 jurisdictions” with respect to Safeco’s obligation to defend based 18 solely on the theory of liability alleged in the Complaint. 19 Rec. 15, Ex. D at 3.) 20 he noted the dispositive case was Matlock v. Mountain West Farm 21 Bureau, 44 P.3d 73 (Wyo. 2002) (coverage for damages resulting from 22 intentional tort 23 to give rise to duty to defend). (Ct. However, with respect to coverage in Wyoming, of conversion did not constitute an “occurrence” 24 AEIC refused coverage on a theory of liability--that the Oregon 25 complaint did not allege an “occurrence” or “accident” as defined 26 under 27 intentional acts which (1) did not meet the definition of occurrence the terms of its policy; rather, 28 ORDER GRANTING SAFECO’S MOTION TO QUASH AND DENYING MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER - 12 the claims alleged Case 2:05-cv-00396-CI Document 25 Filed 12/15/2005 1 and (2) fell within policy exclusions. 2 evidence would be relevant with respect to creating an ambiguity as 3 to the definition of “occurrence,” there is no showing the evidence 4 would be relevant or reasonably calculated to rebut AEIC’s position 5 the claims fell within the policy exclusions. 6 at 2.) 7 the Safeco claim file would produce relevant evidence of AEIC’s 8 alleged 9 However, the ultimate issue of whether AEIC’s evidentiary showing is 10 sufficient to support its decision to deny a defense is for the 11 Wyoming court to decide. 12 13 14 15 16 1. Even assuming extrinsic (Ct. Rec. 15, Ex. B It follows this court cannot say production of Mr. Jacot or unreasonable or reckless decision to a defense. Accordingly, Third-party Safeco’s Motion to Quash (Ct. Rec. 1) is GRANTED; Safeco’s Motion for Protective Order is DENIED AS MOOT. 2. The District Court Executive is directed to file this Order and provide a copy to counsel of record. DATED December 15, 2005. 17 18 deny S/ CYNTHIA IMBROGNO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ORDER GRANTING SAFECO’S MOTION TO QUASH AND DENYING MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER - 13

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