Seagram v. David's Towing & Recovery, Inc. et al, No. 3:2014cv00414 - Document 12 (E.D. Va. 2014)

Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge James R. Spencer on 10/17/2014. (walk, )

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Seagram v. David&#039;s Towing & Recovery, Inc. et al Doc. 12 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA RICHMOND DIVISION COLBY G. SEAGRAM, Plaintiff, v. DAVID S TOWING & RECOVERY, INC., et al., Civil Action No. 3:14 CV 414 Defendants. MEMORAN D U M OPIN ION THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants Motion to Dism iss ( Motion ) (ECF No. 7), pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and lack of subject m atter jurisdiction with respect to Counts 3 and 4. The issues are fully briefed, and neither party sought a hearing. Accordingly, this m atter is ripe for disposition. For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants Motion. Specifically, the Court DENIES the Motion as to Counts 1 and 2, but GRANTS the Motion as to Counts 3 and 4 and the punitive dam ages claim . I. FACTU AL BACKGROU N D Plaintiff, Colby G. Seagram ( Seagram ), is a form er em ployee of Defendant, David s Towing & Recovery, Inc. ( David s Towing ). Defendant Stacey Wilbourne is the owner of David s Towing and his wife, Defendant Marie Wilbourne, is the financial and hum an resources m anager of David s Towing.1 David s Towing is an entity that provides towing and recovery services. Seagram worked for David s Towing from approxim ately April 20 12 to April 20 14. He was 19 years old when he began working there, and 21 years old when he left. Seagram was 1 Hereinafter, the term Defendants is used to collectively refer to all three defendants, David s Towing, Stacey Wilbourne and Marie Wilbourne. Dockets.Justia.com prim arily a truck driver, although he perform ed other services as well. Each day the com pany dispatcher assigned Seagram vehicles to tow. He drove to the assigned vehicle, loaded it onto the tow truck, secured the vehicle to the truck, and transported the vehicle to the assigned ending destination, which could involve transporting the vehicle to another state. Seagram was scheduled to work Monday through Friday, 7:0 0 a.m . to 7:0 0 p.m . However, he frequently worked longer as m any tows involved driving long distances back to the Richm ond area after reaching the end destination. In addition, Seagram was scheduled to work every other weekend as the on call tow truck driver, which involved Seagram responding to tow assignm ents all weekend for a 60 hour period (Friday evening at 7:0 0 p.m . to Monday m orning at 7:0 0 a.m .). Seagram thus worked m ore than forty hours per workweek he notes he averaged 75 hours per workweek. David s Towing did not m aintain records of the total num ber of hours Seagram worked nor did they m aintain records regarding the basis on which wages were paid, the regular hourly pay rate, or the total overtim e earnings for each workweek. Seagram and David s Towing never had a written agreem ent for a particular rate of pay. Rather, the description of his pay on his paycheck indicated com m 1. 2 During the course of his em ploym ent Seagram occasionally had to use his own m oney for certain expenses, including buying fuel for the tow truck. Additionally, Seagram would perform m echanical labor on the truck as necessary. In early 20 14, Seagram asked Stacey Wilbourne for a sm all personal loan to help cover his phone bill and rent. Mr. Wilbourne gave Seagram $ 150 cash for the phone bill, and $ 30 0 cash for rent. However, Seagram and Mr. Wilbourne never discussed how these loans would be repaid. On April 24, 20 14, $ 20 0 was deducted from Seagram s paycheck and another $ 350 was deducted from his May 7, 20 14 paycheck. Seagram alleges that these deductions were 2 Defendants argue that because Seagram s paycheck contained no statement of hours and Seagram has failed to allege any hourly rate or salary, there is a reasonable inference that Seagram was paid on a commission basis. (Mot at 1 n.2.) 2 unauthorized. Furtherm ore, additional deductions were taken from Seagram s paycheck to cover the costs of the com pany s uniform that he was required to purchase. Seagram left his em ploym ent in April 20 14. David s Towing did not give him his last paycheck. Seagram argues that Defendants behavior was knowing, willful, wanton, oppressive, and carried out with m alice. His Com plaint alleges four counts against Defendants. First, Seagram argues that David s Towing paid him less than m inim um wage for the hours he worked for the com pany in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act ( FLSA ), 29 U.S.C. § 20 6. Second, he alleges that he was never paid any overtim e pay for the hours he worked over forty in a given workweek in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 20 7. Third, Seagram alleges a claim for quantum m eruit, based on the fact that he was not reasonably com pensated for his towing and other services. Finally, fourth, Seagram alleges a claim of unjust enrichm ent on a sim ilar basis. Seagram requests that the Court enter an award of dam ages in an am ount equal to the unpaid m inim um wages and overtim e com pensation due to him as well as the im proper deductions taken from his paychecks. Additionally, Seagram requests liquidated dam ages in an am ount equal to the award of dam ages under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Furtherm ore, Seagram requests the Court to enter a declaration that Defendants violated his rights under the FLSA. Finally, Seagram requests dam ages for the unjust enrichm ent of David s Towing, punitive dam ages based on his state law claim s, and attorn ey s fees and costs incurred pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). II. LEGAL STAN D ARD S A. D is m is s al fo r Failu re to State a Claim Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a defendant to raise a num ber of defenses to a com plaint at the pleading stage, including failure to state a claim . A m otion to dism iss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted challenges the legal sufficiency of a claim , rather than the facts supporting it. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Goodm an v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 464 (4th Cir. 20 0 7); Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 3 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992). A court ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) m otion m ust accept all of the factual allegations in the com plaint as true, see Edw ards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999); W arner v. Buck Creek N ursery , Inc., 149 F. Supp. 2d 246, 254 55 (W.D. Va. 20 0 1), in addition to any provable facts consistent with those allegations, Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), and m ust view these facts in the light m ost favorable to the plaintiff, Christopher v. Harbury , 536 U.S. 40 3, 40 6 (20 0 2). To survive a m otion to dism iss, a com plaint m ust contain factual allegations sufficient to provide the defendant with notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Tw om bly , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (20 0 7) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Rule 8(a)(2) requires the com plaint to allege facts showing that the plaintiff s claim is plausible, and these [f]actual allegations m ust be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. Tw om bly , 550 U.S. at 555 & n.3. In other words, the plaintiff s com plaint m ust consist of m ore than a form ulaic recitation of the elem ents of a cause of action or naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancem ent. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (20 0 9) (citations om itted). The Court need not accept legal conclusions that are presented as factual allegations, Tw om bly , 550 U.S. at 555, or unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or argum ents, E. Shore Mkts., Inc. v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 20 0 0 ). Although a m otion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) invites an inquiry into the legal sufficiency of the com plaint, not an analysis of potential defenses to the claim s set forth therein, dism issal nevertheless is appropriate when the face of the com plaint clearly reveals the existence of a m eritorious affirm ative defense. Brooks v. City of W inston-Salem , 85 F.3d 178, 181 (4th Cir. 1996) (citation om itted). B. FLSA Stan d ard s The FLSA im poses m inim um wage and m axim um hour requirem ents on em ployers. 29 U.S.C. §§ 20 6 and 20 7. Specifically, the FLSA sets a m inim um wage requirem ent of $ 7.25 an 4 hour, 29 U.S.C. § 20 6(a)(1)(C), and requires em ployers to pay em ployees tim e-and-a-half wages for hours worked over forty hours per week. 29 U.S.C. § 20 7(a)(1). III. D ISCU SSION A. Co u n ts 1 an d 2 : Failu re to State a Claim u n d e r th e FLSA a. Pa r t ie s Ar g u m e n t s Defendants argue that Seagram fails to allege the term s of his com pensation agreem ent with Defendants, fails to allege what com pen sable tim e allegedly worked was tim e which Defendants knew or should have known about, and fails to allege any estim ate or approxim ation of his allegedly unpaid m inim um wages or his allegedly unpaid overtim e com pensation. By only alleging an average of 75 com pensable work hours per week, Defendants contend that Seagram has failed to m eet his burden of producing sufficient evidence to show the am ount and extent of his com pensable work as a m atter of just and reasonable inference. In response, Seagram argues that he has pled each of the elem ents required for an unpaid overtim e wages claim , and has also alleged not only his approxim ate wages but rather his actual wages. Finally, Seagram argues that Defendants knew or should have known about his unpaid wages because Defendants assigned him to work 12-hour shifts, and was then assigned to head out on additional towing calls (som e long distances from Richm ond) up until the end of those shifts. b. An a ly s is In Count 1, Seagram alleges a violation of 29 U.S.C. § 20 6, which entitles em ployees to m inim um wage. To establish a claim for nonpaym ent of m inim um wages under 29 U.S.C. § 20 6, a plaintiff s com plaint m ust show that: (1) the plaintiff was em ployed by the defendant; (2) the plaintiff was engaged in com m erce . . .; (3) the plaintiff was not com pensated for all hours worked during each work week at a rate equal to or greater than the then applicable m inim um wage; and (4) none of the exem ptions in 29 U.S.C. § 213 applied to the plaintiff s position. Portillo v. King of Pita Bakery , Inc., No. 1:12-cv-110 3, 20 13 WL 3479651, at *6 (E.D. Va. J uly 9, 5 20 13). Additionally, the com plaint m ust at least allege approxim ate wages such that the Defendants will be able to fram e a m eaningful response. W alker v. Serv. Corp. Int l., No. 4:10 cv-0 0 0 48, 20 11 WL 1370 575, at *7 (W.D. Va. Apr. 12, 20 11) ( [A] wage and hour com plaint, whether brought under the FLSA or as a breach of contract action, m ust at least allege approxim ate wages. ). Based on the Portillo standard, Seagram has sufficiently stated a claim for relief. First, Seagram pled that he was em ployed by David s Towing as a tow truck driver from approxim ately April 20 12 to April 20 14. Com pl. ¶ 10 11. Second, Seagram pled that he was assigned to tow vehicles from one location to an end destination, which could include another part of Virginia or an adjoining state. Id. at ¶ 13. The vehicles he towed som etim es had out-of-state license plates. Id. Thus, Seagram was engaged in com m erce as a tow truck driver. Third, Seagram pled that he was paid less than m inim um wage for the hours he worked. Id. at ¶¶ 30 , 47. Defendants argue that Seagram failed to allege any estim ate or approxim ation of his allegedly unpaid m inim um wages, Mot. at 4; however, Seagram alleged that he worked 75 hours per work week, Com pl. ¶ 19, and he attached two earnings statem ents that list his approxim ate wages. Com pl. Ex. 1. Based on these facts, the Defendants can fram e a m eaningful response to Seagram s claim of unpaid m inim um wages. W alker, 20 11 WL 1370 575, at *7. Finally, fourth, Seagram pled that he was entitled to receive m inim um wage under the FLSA, Com pl. ¶ 46, and none of the exem ptions under 29 U.S.C. § 213(a) apply to his m inim um wage claim . Therefore, because Seagram has stated a claim for unpaid m inim um wages, the Motion is DENIED with respect to Count 1. In Count 2, Seagram alleges a violation of 29 U.S.C. § 20 7, which requires em ployers to pay overtim e com pensation to an em ployee who works m ore than forty hours per workweek. 29 U.S.C. § 20 7(a)(1). Generally, to assert a claim for overtim e com pensation pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 20 7, a plaintiff m ust plead (1) that he worked overtim e hours without com pensation; and (2) that the em ployer knew or should have known that he worked overtim e but failed to com pensate 6 him for it. Butler v. DirectSat USA, LLC, 80 0 F. Supp. 2d 662, 667 (D. Md. 20 11). However, courts have expressed differing views regarding the level of factual detail required to be pled in an FLSA claim in order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) m otion to dism iss. In Butler, the Maryland District Court adopted a m ore lenient approach stating, There would be little benefit to dism issing this claim and requiring Plaintiffs to am end to provide an estim ate of the num ber of the overtim e hours worked. The existing com plaint details the types of work activities that occupied Plaintiffs alleged overtim e hours and provides Defendants with sufficient notice of the basis of the allegations to form a response. Thus, Plaintiffs have stated a plausible claim for their entitlem ent to overtim e wages. Id. at 668. In Rodriguez v. F & B Solutions LLC, this Court adopted Butler s lenient approach, noting that a record of the precise num ber of hours worked is norm ally in the possession of the em ployer and as such, can often be obtained through discovery. Rodriguez v. F & B Solutions LLC, No. 1:14-cv-0 0 183-GBL-IDD, 20 14 WL 20 69649, at *2 (E.D. Va. Apr. 29, 20 14); see also Pforr v. Food Lion, Inc., 851 F.2d 10 6, 10 8 (4th Cir. 1988) ( [A] plaintiff [need not] prove each hour of overtim e work with unerring accuracy or certainty. ); Harder v. ARCO W elding, Inc., 3:11-cv-396, 20 11 WL 5599396, at *3 (E.D. Va. Nov. 17, 20 11) (citations om itted) ( To assert a claim for unpaid overtim e wages, a plaintiff m ust properly allege: (1) that he [or she] worked overtim e hours without com pensation, (2) the am ount and extent of the work as a m atter of just and reasonable inference, and (3) that [the em ployer] knew of the uncom pensated overtim e. ). Based on the test described in Butler, Seagram has also satisfied the initial requirem ents for stating a claim for relief for Count 2. First, Butler requires that a plaintiff plead that he worked overtim e hours without com pensation. Butler, 8 0 0 F. Supp. 2d at 667. The plaintiff need not plead these hours with exact certainty; rather, approxim ations are sufficient. Here, Seagram s com plaint states that he averaged 75 hours of work per week for the com pany during his em ploym ent. Com pl. ¶ 19. The Com plaint also details the activities that occupied his alleged 7 overtim e hours, including additional towing assignm ents and on call weekend work. Thus, Seagram has satisfied this first prong. Second, Butler requires that the em ployer knew or should have known that [the plaintiff] worked overtim e but failed to com pensate him for it. 80 0 F. Supp. 2d at 667. Seagram alleges that David s Towing scheduled him to work Monday through Friday, 7:0 0 a.m . to 7:0 0 p.m . Com pl. ¶ 17. In addition to his weekday schedule, David s Towing scheduled him to work every other weekend as the on call tow truck driver, which required Seagram to respond to tow assignm ents all weekend for a 60 hour period. Id. at ¶ 18. A com pany dispatcher was responsible for assigning Seagram vehicles to tow. Id. at ¶ 13. More specifically, Stacey Wilbourne is the Officer, Director, and President of David s Towing & Recovery and is deeply involved in its day-to-day operations. Id. at ¶ 5. Marie Wilbourne is described as the hum an resources m anager and is responsible for hum an resources docum entation, em ployer policies, and em ployee pay and leaves of absence. Id. at ¶ 6. A reasonable inference exists that, based on their m anagerial positions, Mr. and Mrs. Wilbourne knew or should have known about Seagram s assigned overtim e schedule. Additionally, although David s Towing did not m aintain records of Seagram s total hours, as a corporate em ployer, it also should have known of Seagram s overtim e work. For those reasons, Seagram has sufficiently stated a claim for overtim e com pensation and thus the Motion is DENIED as to Count 2. B. Co u n t 2 : Failu re to State a Claim o f U n p aid Ove rtim e Co m p e n s atio n be cau s e o f th e Mo to r Carrie r Act Exe m p tio n a. Pa r t ie s Ar g u m e n t s Defendants argue that Seagram has failed to state a claim for unpaid overtim e com pensation under the FLSA because Seagram was exem pt from such com pensation pursuant 8 to the Motor Carrier Act exem ption set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(1).3 In response, Seagram argues that the Motor Carrier Act exem ption does not apply to David s Towing because the com pany s interstate activities were negligible, or legally de m inim is. Seagram believes that this issue cannot be decided on a m otion to dism iss and it cannot be decided on the record as a m atter of law. Rather, David s Towing bears the burden of presenting hard num bers about the extent of its interstate business and revenue. Furtherm ore, Seagram argues that when considering the application of the de m inim is exception, the Court should also consider whether the carrier acquired the appropriate federal licensing to operate in interstate transportation and whether it held itself out as an interstate carrier. See Brennan v. Schw erm an Trucking Co. of Va., Inc., 540 F.2d 120 0 , 120 4 (4th Cir. 1976). David s Towing does not have authorization as an interstate carrier. The com pany is not registered with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Adm inistration and does not have a U.S. Departm ent of Transportation num ber. Thus, by not registering as a com m on carrier in interstate com m erce, David s Towing held itself out as not being an interstate m otor carrier. b. An a ly s is The overtim e requirem ent of the FLSA does not apply to all em ployees as exem ptions m ay be applicable. 29 U.S.C. § 213(b). One such exem ption is the Motor Carrier Act. 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(1). Under this Act, the overtim e requirem ents of the FLSA do not apply to any em ployee to whom the Secretary of Transportation (previously, the Interstate Com m erce Com m ission) has [the] power to establish qualifications and m axim um hours of service pursuant to the provisions of section 3150 2 of title 49. Id. The Secretary of Transportation can prescribe the requirem ents for m axim um hours of service of em ployees of, and safety of operation and equipm ent of, a m otor carrier. 49 U.S.C. § 3150 2(b)(1). A m otor carrier is defined as a person providing m otor vehicle transportation for com pensation. 49 U.S.C. § 3 Defendants also contend that Seagram is exempt from the overtime requirements of the FLSA pursuant to the commission paid exemption. 29 U.S.C. § 207(i). However, establishing the basis for the claim would require facts not contained within the Complaint and therefore the issue is not presently before this Court. (See Mot. at 8 n.4.) 9 1310 2(14). This section applies to transportation in interstate com m erce, which includes transportation between at least two states. See 49 U.S.C. § 1350 1(1)(A). The Fourth Circuit has held that in determ ining whether the Motor Carrier Act exem ption applies, the Court m ust consider both whether the em ployee s duties affect the safety of operation of m otor vehicles in transportation on public highways and whether that transportation involves interstate com m erce. See Troutt v. Stavola Bros., Inc., 10 7 F.3d 110 4, 110 7 110 9 (4th Cir. 1997). However, the Court m ust also consider the de m inim is exception to the Motor Carrier Act exem ption. See Py ram id Motor Freight Corp. v. Ispass, 330 U.S. 695, 70 8 (1947). In Morris v. McCom b, 332 U.S. 422 (1947), the Suprem e Court decided whether the Interstate Com m erce Com m ission has the power, under the Motor Carrier Act, to establish qualifications and m axim um hours of service with respect to drivers and m echanics em ployed by a com m on carrier, when the services rendered through such em ployees in interstate com m erce constituted only 3% to 4% of the carrier s total carrier services. Id. at 423. The Suprem e Court noted that it is the character of the activities rather than the proportion of either the em ployee s tim e or of his activities that determ ines the actual need for the Com m ission s power to establish reasonable requirem ents with respect to qualifications, m axim um hours of service, safety of operation and equipm ent. Id. at 431 32. The Court concluded that the petitioner s interstate com m erce trips were a natural, integral and apparently inseparable part of the com m on carrier service . . . . Id. at 433. Thus, the Court held that the Com m ission had the requisite power to establish qualifications and m axim um hours of service pursuant to the Motor Carrier Act. Id. at 434. On the other hand, the Fourth Circuit has noted that the de m inim is exception would apply in situations when an em ployee s activities directly related to the safety of interstate vehicles were trivial in relation to his overall duties. Blankenship v. Thurston Motor Lines, Inc., 415 F.2d 1193, 1196 (4th Cir. 1969). 10 With this in m ind, the Court m ust consider whether the em ployee s duties affected the safety of operation of m otor vehicles in transportation on public highways and whether that transportation involved interstate com m erce. See Troutt, 10 7 F.3d at 110 7 110 9. Here, the parties do not apparently dispute either of these elem ents. Rather the dispute lies as to whether that transportation involved sufficient interstate com m erce or whether instead his involvem ent was only de m inim is. However, for purposes of this Motion to Dism iss, the Court cannot as a m atter of law declare whether or not the Motor Carrier Act exem ption applies. For that reason, the Motion as to Count 2 is DENIED. C. Co u n ts 3 a n d 4 : Plain tiff s State Law Claim s a. Pa r t ie s Ar g u m e n t s Defendants argue that Counts 3 and 4 are preem pted by the FLSA. Defendants allege that Seagram s state law claim s are sim ply an attem pt to restate his unpaid wage claim s. Seagram , on the other hand, contends that these state law claim s assert m ore and different wrongs that are not covered by the FLSA. b. An a ly s is In Count 3 Seagram alleges a claim of quantum m eruit and in Count 4 he alleges a claim of unjust enrichm ent. Virginia courts interchangeably use the term s quantum m eruit and unjust enrichm ent. Although each term is technically a distinct cause of action, the desired result of both is the sam e that the plaintiff who provided a benefit or service to the defendant receives com pensation for that benefit or service. Quantum m eruit recovery is based upon an im plied [in fact] contract to pay the reasonable value of services rendered. Mongold v. W oods, 278 Va. 196, 20 3 (Va. 20 0 9) (citing Hendrickson v. Meredith, 161 Va. 193, 198 (1933)). An im plied in fact contract is one im plied from the conduct of the parties. Hendrickson, 161 Va. at 20 0 . Thus, where a contract has been form ed based on the parties conduct, but nothing has been said regarding com pensation, the law provides that the person who perform s the services shall be paid for the reasonable value of 11 the work perform ed. Mongold, 278 Va. at 20 3 (citation om itted). However, the benefiting party m ust have requested and accepted the services rendered; [m ]erely rendering services alone does not create a contract im plied-in-law. Appleton v. Bondurant & Appleton, P.C., 67 Va. Cir. 95, at *6 (Va. Cir. Ct. 20 0 5) (citation om itted). On the other hand, unjust enrichm ent is based on a contract im plied in law. Po River W ater and Sew er Co. v. Indian Acres Club of Thornburg, Inc., 255 Va. 10 8, 114 (Va. 1998). This theory is based on the principle that a person should not be allowed to retain a benefit im posed upon him without paying for the services rendered. See W hitehurst v. Cho, No. 92231, 1992 WL 884510 , at *1 (Va. Cir. Ct. Feb. 19, 1992) (citing Kern v. Freed Co., 224 Va. 678, 680 81 (1983)). Thus, regardless of any independent agreem ent or presum ed intention, the court m ay still im ply a liability to pay. Po River W ater and Sew er Co., 255 Va. at 114. Both a claim for quantum m eruit and unjust enrichm ent require the plaintiff to allege that: (1) he conferred a benefit on the defendant; (2) the defendant knew of the benefit and reasonably should have expected to pay for it; and (3) the defendant accepted or retained the benefit without paying for its value. Schm idt v. Household Fin. Corp., II, 276 Va. 10 8, 116 (Va. 20 0 8). Although not expressly stated in the Act, courts have held that state law claim s will be preem pted by the FLSA where those claim s have m erely duplicated FLSA claim s. Anderson v. Sara Lee Corp., 50 8 F.3d 181, 194 (4th Cir. 20 0 7). A Rule 12(b)(6) m otion to dism iss is a proper vehicle by which a court m ay consider a preem ption claim . W alker, 20 11 WL 1370 575, at *3. In this case, the FLSA directly addresses and provides relief for Seagram s allegation that David s Towing did not pay him reasonable com pensation for his towing and other services. Com pl. ¶¶ 69, 75. Seagram is attem pting to assert a claim for unpaid wages, which clearly falls within the FLSA s exclusive rem edies. Seagram cannot circum vent the exclusive rem edy prescribed by Congress by asserting equivalent state law claim s in addition to the FLSA claim . 12 N ettles v. Techplan Corp., 70 4 F. Supp. 95, 10 0 (D.S.C. 1988). For that reason, the Motion is GRANTED with respect to Counts 3 and 4. D . Pu n itive D am age s Claim a. Pa r t ie s Ar g u m e n t s Defendants argue that (1) quantum m eruit is a contractual cause of action for which punitive dam ages are not available and (2) Seagram has failed to allege facts that would dem onstrate any willful, wanton or m alicious acts that would support an award of such dam ages. Seagram in response argues that logic dictates that Defendants behavior toward him was knowing, willful, wanton, oppressive, and carried out with m alice. Seagram alleges that David s Towing actually com m itted conversion by wrongfully depriving Seagram of the m oney owed to him . Seagram and Mr. Wilbourne never had an agreem ent as to repaym ent and thus Mr. Wilbourne had no legal right to Seagram s m oney. By pleading the tort of conversion, Seagram argues that is entitled to punitive dam ages. b. An a ly s is Punitive dam ages m ay be awarded in tort actions when the Court deem s it appropriate to punish the wrongdoer and deter sim ilar conduct. See Kam lar Corp. v. Haley , 224 Va. 699, 70 6 (Va. 1983). In contrast, in contract actions dam ages are intended to com pensate the plaintiff. Id. Dam ages are lim ited to those losses which are reasonably foreseeable when the contract is m ade. Id. The m ajority of courts have refused to grant an award of punitive dam ages for a sim ple breach of contract action. Id. Only when the plaintiff has provided evidence of an independent, willful tort will the court consider awarding punitive dam ages. Id. at 70 7. Seagram is not entitled to punitive dam ages on his state law claim s as both quantum m eruit and unjust enrichm ent rely on a contractual theory. See M ongold, 278 Va. at 20 3; Po River W ater and Sew er Co., 255 Va. at 114. Furtherm ore, dam ages for the alleged state law claim s are lim ited to the reasonable value of services rendered. Mongold, 278 Va. at 20 3. 13 In his opposition brief Seagram attem pts to argue that his Com plaint actually pled a tort of conversion. Thus, he appears to concede that punitive dam ages are not perm itted for his alleged state law claim s as he instead attem pts to argue his claim under a theory of conversion. However, Seagram s argum ent on the basis of conversion also fails. Although Seagram alleges that logic dictates that Mr. Wilbourne s action s were knowing, willful and with m alice, Pl. s Opp n to Defs. Mot. to Dism iss 11, he provides no factual basis for his claim s. Therefore, the Motion is GRANTED with respect to the punitive dam ages claim . IV. CON CLU SION For the foregoing reasons, the Motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Specifically, the Court DENIES the Motion as to Counts 1 and 2, but GRANTS the Motion as to Counts 3 and 4 and the punitive dam ages claim . Let the Clerk send a copy of this Mem orandum Opinion to all counsel of record. An appropriate Order will issue. _____________________/s/________________ James R. Spencer Senior U. S. District Judge ENTERED this _ 17th_ day of October 20 14. 14

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