Drayton v. South Carolina, The State of et al, No. 0:2022cv01990 - Document 42 (D.S.C. 2022)

Court Description: OPINION AND ORDER adopting the 37 Report and Recommendation and dismissing the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus without prejudice and without requiring the Respondent to file a return. It is further ordered that a certificate of appealability is denied because Petitioner has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Signed by Honorable Joseph F. Anderson, Jr. on 10/13/2022. (dist)

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Drayton v. South Carolina, The State of et al 0:22-cv-01990-JFA Date Filed 10/13/22 Entry Number 42 Page 1 of 5 Doc. 42 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA Marcus T. Drayton, C/A No. 0:22-cv-1990-JFA-PJG Petitioner, vs. OPINION AND ORDER The State of South Carolina and The County of Richland Fifth Circuit Solicitors Office, Respondents. I. INTRODUCTION Petitioner Marcus T. Drayton, a self-represented state prisoner, filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the case was referred to the Magistrate Judge for pretrial proceedings. After reviewing Drayton’s petition, the Magistrate Judge assigned to this action prepared a thorough Report and Recommendation (“Report”), which opines that the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus should be dismissed without prejudice and without requiring the Respondent to file a return. (ECF No. 37). The Report sets forth, in detail, the relevant facts and standards of law on this matter, and this Court incorporates those facts and standards without a recitation. Petitioner filed objections on October 11, 2022. (ECF No. 41). Thus, this matter is ripe for review. 1 Dockets.Justia.com 0:22-cv-01990-JFA II. Date Filed 10/13/22 Entry Number 42 Page 2 of 5 STANDARD OF REVIEW The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this Court. The recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility to make a final determination remains with the Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261 (1976). A district court is only required to conduct a de novo review of the specific portions of the Magistrate Judge’s Report to which an objection is made. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); Carniewski v. W. Virginia Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 974 F.2d 1330 (4th Cir. 1992). In the absence of specific objections to portions of the Magistrate’s Report, this Court is not required to give an explanation for adopting the recommendation. See Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199 (4th Cir. 1983). Thus, the Court must only review those portions of the Report to which Petitioner has made a specific written objection. Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 316 (4th Cir. 2005). “An objection is specific if it ‘enables the district judge to focus attention on those issues—factual and legal—that are at the heart of the parties’ dispute.’” Dunlap v. TM Trucking of the Carolinas, LLC, No. 0:15-cv-04009-JMC, 2017 WL 6345402, at *5 n.6 (D.S.C. Dec. 12, 2017) (citing One Parcel of Real Prop. Known as 2121 E. 30th St., 73 F.3d 1057, 1059 (10th Cir. 1996)). A specific objection to the Magistrate Judge’s Report thus requires more than a reassertion of arguments from the complaint or a mere citation to legal authorities. See Workman v. Perry, No. 6:17-cv-00765-RBH, 2017 WL 4791150, at *1 (D.S.C. Oct. 23, 2017). A specific objection must “direct the court to a specific error in the magistrate’s proposed findings and recommendations.” Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982). 2 0:22-cv-01990-JFA Date Filed 10/13/22 Entry Number 42 Page 3 of 5 “Generally stated, nonspecific objections have the same effect as would a failure to object.” Staley v. Norton, No. 9:07-0288-PMD, 2007 WL 821181, at *1 (D.S.C. Mar. 2, 2007) (citing Howard v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991)). The Court reviews portions “not objected to—including those portions to which only ‘general and conclusory’ objections have been made—for clear error.” Id. (citing Diamond, 416 F.3d at 315; Camby, 718 F.2d at 200; Orpiano, 687 F.2d at 47) (emphasis added). Because Petitioner is representing himself, these standards must be applied while liberally construing his filings in this case. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). III. DISCUSSION As stated above, the relevant facts and standards of law on this matter are incorporated from the Report and therefore no further recitation is necessary here. (ECF No. 37). In response to the Report, Petitioner submitted a filing in which he reiterates his qualms with his current ongoing state criminal proceedings. (ECF No. 41). For instance, Petitioner states that “While the fifth Circuit Court of General Sessions refuses to acknowledge my right to speedy trial and effective counsel, I petition this court to dismiss indictments . . .” (ECF No. 41, p. 6-7). Among other reasons, the Magistrate Judge based her recommendation of dismissal on the abstention doctrine established in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971). Petitioner’s objections make no reference to these findings in the Report or otherwise address the conclusion that this action should be dismissed. Accordingly, 3 0:22-cv-01990-JFA Date Filed 10/13/22 Entry Number 42 Page 4 of 5 Petitioner has failed to put forth any argument that, even when construed liberally, can reasonably be considered a specific objection. In summation, Petitioner’s filing fails to offer any specific reference to the Report which would allow the undersigned to focus on any issue, either factual or legal, with which Petitioner feels has been reached in error. “Generally stated, nonspecific objections have the same effect as would a failure to object.” Staley v. Norton, No. 9:07-0288-PMD, 2007 WL 821181, at *1 (D.S.C. Mar. 2, 2007). Because Petitioner has failed to offer any specific objections which would allow for a de novo review, the court is only required to review the Report for clear error and is not required to give an explanation for adopting the recommendation. See Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199 (4th Cir. 1983). Consequently, this court has reviewed the Report and finds no error which would warrant any further action or correction. IV. CONCLUSION After a thorough review of the Report, the applicable law, and the record of this case, the Court finds no clear error in the Report. After a de novo review of each part of the Report to which Petitioner specifically objected, the Court hereby adopts the Report and Recommendation. (ECF No. 37). For the reasons discussed above and in the Report, the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus be dismissed without prejudice and without requiring the Respondent to file a return. 4 0:22-cv-01990-JFA Date Filed 10/13/22 Entry Number 42 Page 5 of 5 It is further ordered that a certificate of appealability is denied because Petitioner has failed to make “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). 1 IT IS SO ORDERED. October 13, 2022 Columbia, South Carolina Joseph F. Anderson, Jr. United States District Judge 1 A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find both that his constitutional claims are debatable and that any dispositive procedural rulings by the district court are also debatable or wrong. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683 (4th Cir. 2001). In the instant matter, the court finds that Petitioner has failed to make “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 5

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