Figueroa-Vazquez v. Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico et al, No. 3:2019cv01980 - Document 21 (D.P.R. 2020)

Court Description: OPINION AND ORDER granting 14 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim filed by Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico, Departamento de Correccion y Rehabilitacion de Puerto Rico. Signed by Judge Juan M. Perez-Gimenez on 2/12/2020.(PMA)

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Figueroa-Vazquez v. Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico et al Doc. 21 IN TH E U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT COU RT FOR TH E D ISTRICT OF PU ERTO RICO PABLO J . FIGU EROA-VAZQU EZ, Plaintiff, CIVIL NO. 19-1980 (PG) v. D EPARTAMEN TO D E CORRECCION Y REH ABILITACION D E PU ERTO RICO, ET AL., Defendants. OPIN ION AN D ORD ER I. BACKGROU N D On October 15, 20 19, plaintiff Pablo J . Figueroa-Vazquez (“Figueroa” or “Plaintiff”) filed the above-captioned claim against the Com m onwealth of Puerto Rico and its Departm ent of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“DCR”). See Docket No. 3. At the outset, Figueroa m oved to proceed in form a pauperis (Docket No. 1) and this court granted his request (Docket No. 4). The Plaintiff, an inm ate in a state institution, com plains that defendants violated his civil rights by providing him with only two (2) daily hours of active recreation, but failing to “give him his hours in passive recreation” (Docket No. 3-1 at 2). In addition, Plaintiff asserts that the correctional institution in which he is an inm ate does not “have regular services” of psychological or psychiatric psychotherapy for his “Post Traum atic Stress Disorder” or to “treat his Major Depression condition” (Docket No. 3-1 at 2). Further, Plaintiff alleges that he has not been given m edication to treat his m ental health conditions and has been threatened by correctional guards in order to deter him from filing an adm in istrative claim (Docket No. 3-1 at pages 2-3). Dockets.Justia.com Civ. No. 19-1980 (PG) Page 2 of 7 In his petition form , Figueroa states that he has filed grievances and requests for reconsideration, to no avail. See Docket No. 3 at page 3. As a result, Plaintiff now filed the above-captioned claim seeking econom ic com pensation from the Com m onwealth of Puerto Rico and its dependency—the DCR—for the alleged discrim in ation, injury and prejudice suffered due to the con ditions of his confinem ent. See Docket No. 3. On Decem ber 18, 20 19, the Com m onwealth of Puerto Rico and the DCN filed a m otion to dism iss arguing that defendants are im m une from suit pursuant to the Eleventh Am endm ent and that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust adm inistrative rem edies. See Docket No. 14. Instead of filing a response in opposition, Plaintiff filed a one-page m otion for sum m ary judgm ent reiterating the violation to his constitutional rights and requesting a hearing. See Docket No. 20 . After a thorough review of the com plaint and the pending m otions, the court GRAN TS defendants’ m otion to dism iss for the reasons explain ed below. II. STAN D ARD OF REVIEW When ruling on a m otion to dism iss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a district court m ust “accept as true the well-pleaded factual allegations of the com plaint, draw all reasonable inferen ces therefrom in the plaintiff’s favor, and determ ine whether the com plaint, so read, lim ns facts sufficient to justify recovery on any cognizable theory.” Rivera v. Centro Medico de Turabo, Inc., 575 F.3d 10 , 15 (1st Cir. 20 0 9) (citing LaChapelle v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 142 F.3d 50 7, 50 8 (1st Cir. 1998)). Even though detailed factual allegations are not necessary for a com plaint to survive a m otion to dism iss, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlem ent to relief’ requires m ore than labels an d conclusions, and a form ulaic recitation of the elem ents of a cause of action will not do [.]” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twom bly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (20 0 7). Those nonconclusory factual Civ. No. 19-1980 (PG) Page 3 of 7 allegations that the court accepts as true m ust be sufficient to give the claim facial plausibility. See Quiros v. Munoz, 670 F. Supp. 2d 130 , 132 (D.P.R. 20 0 9). “Determ ining whether a com plaint states a plausible claim for relief will … be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and com m on sense.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (20 0 9). When deciding m otions to dism iss, the analysis of the courts is not lim ited solely to the facts alleged in the com plaint. See Rederford v. US Airways, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 47, 50 (D.R.I. 20 0 8). A court m ay consider the com plaint alongside any “facts extractable from docum entation annexed to or incorporated by referen ce in the com plaint and m atters susceptible to judicial notice.” J orge v. Rum sfeld, 40 4 F.3d 556, 559 (1st Cir. 20 0 5). Furtherm ore, courts m ay consider docum ents that are “integral or explicitly relied upon in a com plaint, even if that docum ent is not ann exed to the com plaint.” Id. III. D ISCU SSION A. Ele ve n th Am e n d m e n t Im m u n ity In the m otion to dism iss, defendants argue that the case m ust be dism issed because the Eleventh Am endm ent of the United States Constitution bars the instant suit for m onetary relief in federal courts. See Docket No. 14. The court agrees. States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, com m en ced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. U.S. Const. am end. XI. The Eleventh Am en dm ent thus bars the com m encem ent and prosecution in federal court of suits claim ing dam ages brought against any state, including Puerto Rico, without its consent. See Toledo v. Sanchez, 454 F.3d 24, 31 (1st Cir.20 0 6); Fresenius Med. Care Cardiovascular Res., Inc. v. Puerto Rico an d Caribbean Cardiovascular Ctr. Corp., 322 F.3d 56, 61 (1st Cir.20 0 3); Futura Dev. v. Estado Civ. No. 19-1980 (PG) Page 4 of 7 Libre Asociado, 144 F.3d 7, 12– 13 (1st Cir.1998). “[F]or Eleventh Am endm ent purposes, the Com m onwealth [of Puerto Rico] is treated as if it were a state; consequently, the Eleventh Am endm ent bars any suit brought against it.” Gotay– Sánchez v. Pereira, 343 F.Supp.2d 65, 71– 72 (D.P.R.20 0 4) (citing Metcalf & Eddy, Inc. v. P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth., 991 F.2d 935 (1st Cir.1993)). Also, “[a]n adm inistrative arm of the state is treated as the state itself for the purposes of the Eleventh Am endm ent, and it thus shares the sam e im m unity.” Vaqueria Tres Monjitas, Inc. v. Irizarry, 587 F.3d 464, 477 (1st Cir.20 0 9) (citing Hafer v. Melo, 50 2 U.S. 21, 25 (1991)). Since “the Departm ent of Corrections and Rehabilitation is an arm of the state, it cannot be sued in federal court, and hence, it is im m une from suits under the Eleventh Am endm ent.” J ohnson v. Departam ento De Correccion y Rehabilitacion, No. CV 16-140 0 (DRD), 20 17 WL 2589273, at *7 (D.P.R. J une 14, 20 17). Pursuant to the foregoing, Plaintiff cannot m aintain claim s for m onetary dam ages against the Com m onwealth and the DCR. Thus, the court GRAN TS defendants’ request for dism issal on Eleventh Am endm ent grounds. Plaintiff’s claim s for m onetary dam ages again st defendants are hereby D ISMISSED . B. Failu re to Exh au s t Ad m in is trative Re m e d ie s Defendants also argue that Plaintiff failed to com ply with the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s m andatory requirem ent of exhausting all available adm inistrative rem edies. Specifically, defendants aver that although Plaintiff filed adm inistrative claim s within the DCR, he did not seek a reconsideration of som e of the relevant determ inations and did not request judicial review of any of these before the Puerto Rico Court of Appeals. 1 See Docket No. 14. 1 In support of this contention, defendants affirm ed having searched on the State Court platform www.ram ajudicial.pr and on Westlaw Next platform to confirm that Plaintiff’s allegations or adm inistrative claim s were not appealed before the P.R. Court of Appeals. See Docket No. 14 at page 2. Civ. No. 19-1980 (PG) Page 5 of 7 Claim s arising under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”) require exhaustion of adm inistrative rem edies prior to filing suit in court. Pursuant to the PLRA, “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such adm inistrative rem edies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The PLRA’s exhaustion requirem ent applies to “all inm ate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circum stances, or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or som e other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (20 0 2). “The failure to exhaust adm inistrative rem edies is an affirm ative defen se that ‘m ust be raised and proved by the defense.’” Rodriguez Rodriguez v. Garcia, No. CIV. 0 9-10 94 J AF/ J P, 20 11 WL 60 57746, at *1 (D.P.R. Dec. 6, 20 11) (citing Cruz– Berrios v. Gonzalez– Rosario, 630 F.3d 7, 11 (1st Cir.20 10 )). The prisoner m ust exhaust adm in istrative rem edies even if the adm in istrative procedures “would appear to be futile at providing the kind of rem edy sought.” J ernigan v. Stuchell, 30 4 F.3d 10 30 , 10 32 (10 th Cir. 20 0 2). In fact, even if the plaintiff seeks m onetary relief which the prison adm inistrative process does not encom pass, the inm ate is still not excused from com pleting the prison adm in istrative process. See Lopez-Vigo v. Puerto Rico, No. 13-10 71, 20 14 WL 495721, at *3 (D.P.R. February 0 6, 20 14) (citing Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (20 0 1)); see also Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (20 0 6). “[P]ursuant to the PLRA, exhaustion of all available adm in istrative rem edies is ‘m andatory’ and ‘a prerequisite to suit.’” Arroyo-Morales v. Adm inistracion de Correccion, 20 7 F. Supp. 3d 148, 151 (D.P.R. 20 16) (citing Porter, 534 U.S. at 524). Civ. No. 19-1980 (PG) Page 6 of 7 The applicable adm in istrative rem edies are defined not by the PLRA, but by the prison grievance process itself. See Tom assini v. Correctional Health Services Corp., No. 0 920 59, 20 12 WL 160 1528, at *1 (D.P.R. May 0 7, 20 12) (citing J ones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (20 0 7)). “Accordingly, to determ ine the relevant boundaries of exhaustion in this case, the Court m ust look to the particulars of the [DCR’s] internal grievance process.” ArroyoMorales, 20 7 F. Supp. 3d at 151. The Puerto Rico Departm ent of Corrections an d Rehabilitation has adopted adm inistrative rules and regulations for the application an d review of requests for adm in istrative rem edies by incarcerated inm ates. See Torres Garcia v. Puerto Rico, 40 2 F.Supp.2d 373, 379 (D.P.R. 20 0 5). The DCR’s “Regulation to Address the Applications for Adm inistrative Rem edies Filed by Mem bers of the Correctional Population” sets forth the grievance procedures for inm ates under their custody. See Regulation No. 8145 of J anuary 19, 20 12; see also Cruz-Berrios v. Oliver-Baez, 792 F.Supp.2d 224, 228 -229 (D.P.R. 20 11) (detailed description of the proceeding set forth in Regulation No. 8 145). That procedure basically consists of five tiers of review, as follows: (1) review of the prisoner’s petition by an evaluator, (2) an appeal, following the evaluator’s respon se, to the regional coordinator, (3) a m otion to have the regional coordinator reconsider his decision, (4) an appeal to the program director if the prisoner is unsatisfied with the regional coordin ator’s resolution, and (5) a request for judicial review before the Puerto Rico Court of Appeals. Arroyo-Morales, 20 7 F. Supp. 3d at 152. “If an inm ate fails to pursue even one of these steps, he has failed to exhaust his adm inistrative steps fully as required by the PRLA.” Cruz-Berrios v. Puerto Rico Dep’t of Correction & Rehab., No. CV 16-3155 (RAM), 20 19 WL 5858 157, at *4 (D.P.R. Nov. 8 , 20 19) (citing Arroyo-Morales, 20 7 F. Supp. 3d at 151). Civ. No. 19-1980 (PG) Page 7 of 7 In the case at hand, it stem s from the com plaint itself that although Figueroa has filed grievance procedures in the institution he is in, he adm its not having filed suit in court regarding the facts of his grievances. See Docket No. 3 at pages 1, 4. Hence, Plaintiff failed to com ply with the final step of the exhaustion requirem ent, to wit, seeking judicial review of the Departm ent’s determ inations. Moreover, defendants also evin ce that Figueroa did not even request a reconsideration of som e of these determ in ations, thereby falling even shorter in the process. See Docket No. 14 at page 13; Docket No. 14-1; Docket No. 17 (Certified Translation). “In other words, by pursuing only som e of the steps available and not appealing any of the decisions issued as part of the grievance procedure, Plaintiff failed to exhaust the adm in istrative rem edies available to him .” Torres-Vega v. Adm inistracion De Correccion, No. CIV. 14-10 15 J AG, 20 15 WL 3720 250 , at *3 (D.P.R. J une 15, 20 15). Because “unexhausted claim s cannot be brought in court,” J ones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (20 0 7), it follows that Figueroa’s claim s m ust be dism issed on those grounds. IV. CON CLU SION For the reasons stated above, the m otion to dism iss (Docket No. 14) is hereby GRAN TED and plaintiff Figueroa’s claim s against the Com m onwealth and the DCR are hereby D ISMISSED . J udgm ent shall be entered accordingly. IT IS SO ORD ERED . In San J uan, Puerto Rico, February 12, 20 20 . S/ J UAN M. PÉREZ-GIMÉNEZ JU AN M. PEREZ-GIMEN EZ SEN IOR U .S. D ISTRICT JU D GE

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