Santana-Vasquez v. USA, No. 3:2017cv01771 - Document 6 (D.P.R. 2018)
Court Description: OPINION AND ORDER denying 1 Motion to Vacate. Final judgment dismissing case shall be entered accordingly. Signed by Judge Juan M. Perez-Gimenez on 10/24/2018. (NNR)
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Santana-Vasquez v. USA Doc. 6 IN TH E U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT COU RT FOR TH E D ISTRICT OF PU ERTO RICO Lis a n d ro San tan a-Vas qu e z, Petitioner, CIVIL NO. 17-1771 (PG) Related Crim . No. 98-0 66 (PG) v. U n ite d State s o f Am e rica, Respon dent. OPIN ION AN D ORD ER Before the court is petitioner Lisandro Santana-Vasquez’s (“Petitioner” or “Santana”) m otion to vacate, set aside or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Docket No. 1), and the United States’ (or the “governm ent”) opposition thereto (Docket No. 3). For the reasons explained below, the court D EN IES Petitioner’s m otion to vacate. I. BACKGROU N D On April 21, 1998 , a grand jury returned a three-count indictm ent charging Santan a with violations stemm ing from a carjacking incident. See Crim . No. 98-0 66 (PG) (hereinafter “Crim .”), Docket No. 12. He plead guilty to two of the counts, resulting in convictions for aiding and abetting a carjacking resulting in death, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119(3) (“Count One”), and possession of a firearm during and in relation to a crim e of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (“Count Two”). See Crim . Docket No. 10 3. On J uly 9, 1999, the court sentenced Santana to a total term of 480 m onths of im prisonm ent—420 m onths as to Count One and 60 m onths as to Count Two, to be served consecutively. Id. Dockets.Justia.com Civil No. 17-1771 (PG) Page 2 of 4 II. LEGAL STAN D ARD Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a federal prisoner m ay m ove to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence “upon the ground that the sentence was im posed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to im pose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the m axim um authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack.” 28 U.S.C § 2255(a); Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 426-427 (1962); Ellis v. United States, 313 F.3d 636, 641 (1st Cir. 20 0 2). III. D ISCU SSION On J une 8, 20 17, Santana filed the pen ding m otion to vacate, set aside or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See Docket No. 1. In his petition, Santana claim s that the court must vacate his convictions because: (1) Section 924(c)’s residual clause 1 is unconstitutionally vague after J ohnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (20 15) (“J ohnson II”); and (2) his carjacking convictions fail to categorically qualify as crim es of violence under the statute’s force clause. See Docket No. 1 at pp. 2-14. In support, Santana contends that intim idation does not am ount to the use, attem pted use, or threatened use of “violent force,” and that aiding an d abetting does not require “violent force.” Id. at pp. 12-13. Additionally, 1 Section 924(c) m akes it a crim e for any person to use or carry a firearm during and in relation to any crim e of violence, or to possess a firearm in furtherance of any such crim e. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (alteration in original) (quotation m arks om itted). The statute then defines a “crim e of violence” as: [A]n offense that is a felony and (A) has as an elem ent the use, attem pted use, or threaten ed use of physical force against the person or property of another, or (B) that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another m ay be used in the course of com m itting the offense. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3). The first clause is known as the “force clause,” while the second, as the “residual clause.” See, e.g., Un ited States v. Rose, 8 96 F.3d 10 4, 10 6 (1st Cir. 20 18); Echevarria-Pacheco v. United States, Civil No. 17-1269 (PG), 20 18 WL 4676945, at *1-2 (D.P.R. Sept. 26, 20 18 ) (providing definition of both clauses, but discussing only the force clause in the context of a federal habeas petition er’s challenge to his federal carjacking conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2119). Civil No. 17-1771 (PG) Page 3 of 4 Santana avers that a carjacking which results in death does not necessarily require physical force. See id. at p. 12. The governm ent subm its Santana’s claim s fail because (1) J ohnson II’s ruling was lim ited to ACCA2 cases and Santana is not challenging an ACCA enhan cem ent, and (2) even if Section 924(c)’s residual clause was unconstitutionally vague, carjackin g qualifies as a crim e of violence under Section 924(c)’s force clause. See Docket No. 3 at pp. 5-9. The court need not reach the m erits of Santana’s void-for-vagueness challenge to Section 924(c)’s residual clause because his carjacking conviction under Section 2119 qualifies as a “crim e of violence” under Section 924(c)’s force clause, as recently held by the First Circuit. See United States v. Cruz-Rivera, 90 4 F.3d 63, 66 (1st Cir. 20 18 ) (holding that carjacking is a crim e of violence under the force clause, even though the offense m ay be com m itted through intim idation alone). Furtherm ore, this court has previously rejected the argum ent that aiding and abetting does not require “violent force.” See Echevarria-Pacheco v. United States, 20 18 WL 4676945, at *4; Cruz-Arboleda v. United States, Civil No. 16-2216 (PG), 20 18 WL 30 31480 at *3 (D.P.R. J une 14, 20 18) (citing United States v. Mitchell, 23 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1994)) (holding that aidin g and abetting the com m ission of a crim e of violence is a crim e of violence itself). Moreover, the court finds without m erit Santana’s contention that the use of physical force is not necessary for death to occur as a result of a carjacking offense. The Suprem e Court has held that intentionally causing physical injury—or death in this case—necessarily involves the use of physical force. See United States v. Castlem an, 134 S. Ct. 140 5, 1414 2 “ACCA” stands for the Arm ed Career Crim inal Act of 1984. Civil No. 17-1771 (PG) Page 4 of 4 (20 14) (holding that the knowing or intentional causation of bodily injury necessarily involves the use of physical force). As such, death as a result of a carjacking under Section 2119 qualifies under Section 924(c)’s “force clause.” See Cruz-Arboleda, 20 18 WL 30 3148 0 at *2 (citing Castlem an, 134 S. Ct. at 1414) (holding that death as a result of a carjackin g under Section 2119 qualifies under Section 924(c)’s “force clause”). Consistent with the above-cited decisions, Santana’s claim s necessarily fail. IV. CON CLU SION Based on the above, the court D EN IES Santana’s request for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Docket No. 1). Consequently, the case is D ISMISSED W ITH PREJU D ICE. J udgm ent shall be entered accordingly. V. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY It is further ordered that no certificate of appealability should be issued in the event tha Petitioner files a notice of appeal because there is no substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right within the m eaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). IT IS SO ORD ERED . In San J uan, Puerto Rico, October 24, 20 18. S/ J UAN M. PÉREZ-GIMÉNEZ JU AN M. PÉREZ-GIMÉN EZ SEN IOR U .S. D ISTRICT JU D GE
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