Aponte-Bermudez v. Berrios et al, No. 3:2015cv01034 - Document 225 (D.P.R. 2020)
Court Description: OPINION AND ORDER: DENYING Docket No. 219 Motion for Attorney Fees filed by Cooperativa de Seguros Multiples. Signed by US Magistrate Judge Camille L. Velez-Rive on April 6, 2020. (ASE) Modified on 4/7/2020 to correct document type (gmm).
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Aponte-Bermudez v. Berrios et al Doc. 225 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO YEITZA MARIE APONTE BERMUDEZ, et als., Plaintiffs, CIVIL NO. 15-10 34 (CVR) v. HECTOR H. BERRIOS, et als., Defendants. OPIN ION AN D ORD ER The present case is the result of an accident where Plaintiff Yelitza Marie Aponte Berm údez was injured when a car crashed into the outside terrace of a bar where she was sitting. Plaintiff settled the case with som e of the Defendants, and then proceeded to trial only against co-Defendants Carm en Gloria Fernández Torres, Eligio Rafael Colón Fernández, Luis Alberto Colón Fernández, Ricardo Colón Fernández, Marigloria Colón Fernández, Manuel Pablo Colón Fernández, Maricarm en Colón Fernández and Marirosa Colón Fernández, and their insurer Cooperativa de Seguros Múltiples (“Defendants”). Defendants offered a Rule 50 m otion for judgm ent as a m atter of law at the close of Plaintiffs’ case in chief. The Court granted the m otion. Accordingly, the Court dism issed the case with prejudice. Plaintiffs then appealed the Court’s ruling to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, which affirm ed the Court’s Rule 50 dism issal. Before the Court now is Defendants’ “Motion for Attorney’s Fees” (Docket No. 219) and Plaintiffs’ Opposition thereto. (Docket No. 224). The general rule is that a prevailing party in a case m ust bear its own attorneys’ fees and m ay not collect them from the losing party, unless there is an enforceable Dockets.Justia.com Yeitza Marie Aponte Berm údez, et. als v. Héctor H. Berríos, et. als Civil No. 15-10 34 (CVR) Opinion and Order Page 2 contract or a statutory provision providing for attorneys’ fees. Va. Dept. of Health, 532 U.S. 598, 60 2 (20 0 1). See Buckhannon v. West Puerto Rico state law governs this issue in a Court sitting under diversity jurisdiction, where it has been well established that in the absence of a statutory or contractual provision, the prevailing party “m ay be entitled to attorneys’ fees ... when the losing party has ‘acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.’” See Peckham v. Continental Cas. Ins. Co., 895 F.2d 830 , 841 (1st Cir. 1990 ) and Rodríguez-Torres v. Governm ent Developm ent Bank of Puerto Rico, 70 8 F.Supp.2d 195, 198 (D.P.R. 20 10 ) (quoting Cham bers v. NASCO, Inc., 50 1 U.S. 32, 45-46, 111 S.Ct. 2123 (1991)). Specifically, Rules 44.1(d) and 44.3 of the Puerto Rico Rules of Civil Procedure provide the basis for an attorney’s fee award in this case, and perm its fees only where a “party or its lawyer has acted obstinately or frivolously.” P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 32, App. III, Rule 44.1(d) and Rule 44.3. In order for the Court to find that the losing party has been “obstinate,” it m ust find that the party has been “unreasonably adam ant or stubbornly litigious, beyond the acceptable dem ands of the litigation, thereby wasting tim e and causing the court and the other litigants unnecessary expense and delay.” De León-López v. Corporación Insular de Seguros, 931 F.2d 116, 126-127 (1st Cir. 1991). This seeks to penalize a party whose “stubbornness, obstinacy, rashness, and insistent frivolous attitude has forced the other party to needlessly assum e the pains, costs, efforts, and inconveniences of a litigation.” Top Entertainm ent, Inc. v. Torrejón, 351 F.3d 531, 533 (1st Cir. 20 0 3) (quoting Fernández v. San J uan Cem ent Co., 118 D.P.R. 713, 718 (1987)). Defendants subm it that Plaintiff was frivolous in pursuing her claim s against them , because the dism issal of the case at the Rule 50 stage evidenced there was a total lack of evidence that could sustain Plaintiff’s claim s against them . The Court disagrees Yeitza Marie Aponte Berm údez, et. als v. Héctor H. Berríos, et. als Civil No. 15-10 34 (CVR) Opinion and Order Page 3 and cannot find that Plaintiffs behaved in a m anner that would warrant an award of attorney’s fees in the present case. On the record as it stands, the Court cannot find that Defendants were stubbornly litigious, or displayed behavior beyond the acceptable dem ands of the litigation, the standard that the First Circuit has determ ined necessary for order for an award of attorneys’ fees to proceed. Cf. Rishell v. Medical Card System , Inc., 982 F.Supp.2d 142 (D.P.R. 20 13) (“The Court finds that plaintiffs’ pursuit of repetitive, piecem eal litigation qualifies as obstinate litigation”). Furtherm ore, Courts m ay consider several factors, such as whether a litigant’s conduct needlessly prolonged the litigation, wasted the other party’s and the court’s tim e, acted in bad faith and if the other party and the court incurred in needless procedures, unreasonable efforts and expenses. Renaissance Marketing, Inc. v. Monitronics Intern., Inc., 673 F.Supp.2d 79, 84 (D.P.R. 20 0 9). These factors were likewise not present in this case. This was a relatively straightforward case where an unfortunate accident resulted in injury to Plaintiff Aponte-Berm údez. litigation or a m isuse of tim e. There was no needless prolongation of the On the contrary, the Court finds that both parties worked diligently in prosecuting their respective cases and both had experts and witnesses prepared for trial. The fact that, at the Rule 50 stage, the Court dism issed Plaintiffs’ case is not autom atically indicative of bad faith by them . Moreover, Defendants can point to nothing specific in the record that would warrant the Court to find that Plaintiffs acted in bad faith or otherwise m eet the criteria established by Puerto Rico law for an award of attorney’s fees. For these reasons, Plaintiffs’ “Motion for Attorneys’ Fees” (Docket No. 219) is Yeitza Marie Aponte Berm údez, et. als v. Héctor H. Berríos, et. als Civil No. 15-10 34 (CVR) Opinion and Order Page 4 DENIED. IT IS SO ORDERED. In San J uan, Puerto Rico, this 6 th day of April of 20 20 . s/ CAMILLE L. VELEZ-RIVE CAMILLE L. VELEZ-RIVE UITED STATES MAGISTRATE J UDGE
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
