Quiles-Marcucci et al v. Cooperativa de Ahorro y Credito de Juana Diaz, Inc., No. 3:2008cv01913 - Document 51 (D.P.R. 2009)
Court Description: ORDER AMENDING 38 Opinion and Order to strike part III-C-4 and to DISMISS all federal claims WITH PREJUDICE. We DENY as MOOT 43 Plaintiffs' motion in compliance and 46 Defendant's motion for summary judgment. We DISMISS Plaintiffs' claims under Puerto Rico law WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Judgment to be entered accordingly. Signed by Chief Judge Jose A Fuste on 8/5/09.(mrj)
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Quiles-Marcucci et al v. Cooperativa de Ahorro y Credito de Juana Diaz, Inc. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Doc. 51 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO CELINÉS QUILES-MARCUCCI, et al., Plaintiffs, Civil No. 08-1913 (JAF) v. COOPERATIVA DE AHORRO Y CRÉDITO DE JUANA DÍAZ, INC., Defendant. O R D E R 13 On June 30, 2009, we issued an Opinion and Order granting 14 partial summary judgment to Defendant Cooperativa de Ahorro y Crédito 15 de Juana Díaz. (Docket No. 38.) We ordered Plaintiffs Celinés Quiles- 16 Marcucci (“Quiles”), Oscar Guillermo Rosselló-Rodríguez, and the 17 conjugal partnership between them to show cause why we should not 18 also grant summary judgment for Defendant on their disparate impact 19 claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 20 U.S.C. §§ 621-34. (Id.) On July 17, 2009, Plaintiffs submitted a 21 motion in compliance with our order. (Docket No. 43.) On July 27, 22 2009, Defendant moved for summary judgment on the remaining ADEA 23 claim. (Docket No. 46.) We find that both motions are moot as we 24 partly reconsider our prior order to correct an oversight. 25 Under Rule 60(a), “[t]he court may correct a mistake arising 26 from oversight or omission whenever one is found in a judgment.” 27 Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a). Relief is proper if “‘the intentions of the Dockets.Justia.com Civil No. 08-1913 (JAF) -2- 1 parties are clearly defined . . . [and no] cerebration or research 2 into the law . . . is required.’” 3 Donuts, Inc., 490 F.3d 27, 29 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting United States 4 v. Kellogg, 12 F.3d 497, 504-05 (5th Cir. 1994)). Bowen Inv., Inc. v. Carneiro 5 Our prior order misconstrued Plaintiffs’ complaint to have 6 pleaded a claim for disparate impact. (See Docket No. 38.) Claims for 7 “disparate 8 facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in 9 fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be 10 justified by business necessity. Proof of discriminatory motive . . . 11 is not required under a disparate-impact theory.” Hazen Paper Co. v. 12 Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993) (quoting Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. 13 United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977)). To establish disparate 14 impact under the ADEA, a plaintiff must “‘isolat[e] and identif[y] 15 the specific employment practices that are allegedly responsible for 16 any observed statistical disparities.’” Meacham v. Knolls Atomic 17 Power Lab., __ U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 2395, 2405 (2008) (quoting Smith 18 v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 241 (2005)). To prove the existence 19 of 20 comparing the defendant’s workforce with the general “population in 21 the relevant labor market.” 22 U.S. 642, 650 (1989); see Meacham, 128 S. Ct. at 2405-06 (holding impact disparities, . a . . involve plaintiff must employment adduce practices statistical that are evidence Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 Civil No. 08-1913 (JAF) -3- 1 that elements for prima-facie case in Wards Cove apply to disparate 2 impact claims under ADEA). 3 In their complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant 4 “discriminated against all the employees who were over the protected 5 age, replacing them with young employees.” (Docket No. 1.) This brief 6 averment relates to a claim for disparate treatment under the ADEA, 7 see Arroyo-Audifred v. Verizon Wireless, Inc., 527 F.3d 215, 218-19 8 (1st Cir. 2008), and not to a claim for a “facially neutral” policy 9 that in effect favors younger employees, see Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 10 609. Therefore, Plaintiffs never intended to plead a claim for 11 disparate impact under the ADEA in their complaint. 12 As Plaintiffs’ intention is plain from the face of their 13 complaint, we reform our prior judgment under Rule 60(a) to reflect 14 the claims they meant to present. See Bowen Inv., Inc., 490 F.3d at 15 29. Accordingly, we strike the discussion on disparate impact under 16 the ADEA from our prior Opinion and Order (Docket No. 38, part III-C- 17 4). This correction renders moot the parties’ latest motions (Docket 18 Nos. 43, 46). As no federal claims remain at issue, we decline to 19 exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ associated claims 20 under Puerto Rico law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Rivera v. Murphy, 21 979 F.2d 259, 264 (1st Cir. 1992). 22 In view of the foregoing, we hereby AMEND our Opinion and Order 23 dated June 30, 2009, to strike part III-C-4 and to DISMISS all Civil No. 08-1913 (JAF) -4- 1 federal claims WITH PREJUDICE (Docket No. 38). We DENY as MOOT 2 Plaintiffs’ motion in compliance (Docket No. 43) and Defendant’s 3 motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 46). We DISMISS Plaintiffs’ 4 claims under Puerto Rico law WITHOUT PREJUDICE (Docket No. 1). 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 5th day of August, 2009. 7 8 9 S/José Antonio Fusté JOSE ANTONIO FUSTE Chief U.S. District Judge
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