Jones v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, No. 3:2011cv00634 - Document 34 (D. Or. 2012)
Court Description: OPINION & ORDER: Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (2241- Federal) 1 is Denied and this proceeding is Dismissed without prejudice. Signed on 5/2/12 by Magistrate Judge Paul Papak. (gm)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON PORTLAND DIVISION TODD R. JONES, Petitioner, v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, Respondent. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 3: 11-cv-00634-PK OPINION AND ORDER Stephen R. Sady Chief Deputy Federal Public Defender 101 S.W. Main Street, Suite 1700 Portland, Oregon 97204 Attorney for Petitioner S. Amanda Marshall United States Attorney Ronald K. Silver Assistant .United States Attorney 1000 S.W. Third Avenue, Suite 600 Portland, Oregon 97204-2902 Attorneys for Respondent 1 - OPINION AND ORDER PAPAK, Magistrate Judge. Todd R. Institution, Jones, an Sheridan, inmate at the Federal Correctional Oregon, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. brings this habeas corpus action 2241. In accordance with Fed. R. Ci v . P. § 73(b), the parties consent to have the undersigned conduct any and all proceedings in this case, including order the entry of final judgment. Because the Court finds Jones' briefed claim is neither properly before the Court, nor ripe for review, relief on the Petition [1] is DENIED. BACKGROUND In May 2009, Jones was sentenced to an 86-month term of imprisonment and a 3 year term of supervised release upon pleading guilty to violations of 18 U.S.C. 922(g) (1), Unlawful Possession § of a Firearm and Ammunition by a Convicted Felon (Count 2); and 19 U.S.C. § 924(d) and 28 Attach. 1. § 2461c, Forfeiture (Count 4). Decl. [18], His projected release date is April 15, 2015, via good conduct time. Id. at 2. Notably, in September 2008, while the above referenced federal charges were Washington pending, for Attach. 3 at 16. resolve this Jones driving under was the influence in Kittitas of County, alcohol. Id. , Jones contends that he has diligently tried to pending state charge imposition of his federal sentence. 2-4. arrested both before and after the See Brief in Support [27] at While the parties disagree about what Kittitas County's 2 - OPINION AND ORDER intentions are vis-a-vis Jones' pending charge, the Court's review (1) no detainer has been lodged with of the record reveals that: FCI-Sheridan; disposition (2) of a in response Failure to to BOP Appear inquiries (FTA) related to warrant for the Jones, Kittitas County sent a fax on December 1, 2009 stating that "[w)e are no longer interested in inmate Jones, Todd 7-31-68. We are unable to extradite him from Oregon on a misdemeanor warrant[.) Please drop our hold on him."; and (3) nevertheless denied Jones repeated the Kittitas County Judge requests made in February, August and October 2010 asking the Court to resolve his case, quash the outstanding warrant and dismiss the charges against him. Finally, at the time Jones filed this petition on May 24, 2011, he had not applied nor was he eligible to be considered for placement in the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) Residential Drug Treatment Program (RDAP) . An inmate's application for participation in RDAP will not be considered until he is within 2436 months of release. Decl. [19) at 2. Accordingly, the BOP would not consider an application from Jones before April 2012. DISCUSSION I. Improperly Raised Claim Jones' Challenge to the Validity of BOP Rules Eligibility for RDAP and Community Programming Governing In \o[hat the Court construed as a pro se § 2241 habeas petition (titled "Motion to Compel"), Jones alleged that due to his pending case in Kittitas County, he "suffers irreparable harm because [he) 3 - OPINION AND ORDER cannot participate in R.D.A.P., half-way house programs, and the [BOP] is forced to hold [him] in medium [security classification] custody." Petition [1] at 2. Jones sought an Order from the Court enjoining the BOP from giving effect to the outstanding Kittitas County warrant. In his counseled supporting memorandum, however, Jones challenges the validity of what he characterizes as the BOP's rules categorically excluding charges, even warrants from charges states inmates with unadjudicated state involving with no non-extraditable interest in the participating in RDAP and cormnunity programming. [27] at 1 & prisoners, from Brief in Support 8-9. A petitioner must petition. misdemeanor See Rules set forth his claims for relief in his Governing Proceedings in District Courts - Habeas Corpus Rule l(b) and 2(c). United States In general, a prisoner's pro se complaint is held to a less stringent standard than one drafted by lawyers and is liberally construed by the Erickson v. court. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2010). 94 (2007); Porter v. Here, even liberally construing Jones' pro se petition, the Court concludes he did not raise a claim challenging the validity of BOP rules governing entry into RDAP and cormnunity prograrmning. Rather, Jones sought the Court's intervention to remedy what he perceives as a violation of his constitutionally protected speedy trial rights. at 2-3. Petition [1] The Court thus finds that the claim argued in Jones' 4 - OPINION AND ORDER counseled supporting memorandum was not raised in his pro se petition and is not properly before the Court. II. Standing and Ripeness Even assuming Jones raised a challenge to the validity of the BOP's rules in his pro se petition, the Court would deny relief on the petition. Jones filed the petition both before applying for RDAP and before he was eligible for consideration in that program. In addition, Kittitas he cannot demonstrate that his pending charge in County community categorically programming based bars on his the entry into challenged RDAP BOP and rules. Accordingly, Jones lacks standing to challenge these rules and this claim is not ripe for review. The Court has no jurisdiction to review claims unless they are ripe. United States v. Streich, 560 F.3d 926, 931 (9th Cir. 2009). According to the Supreme Court, the basic rationale [of the ripeness doctrine) is to prevent courts, though avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967). A claim is not ripe "if it involves contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, Streich, 560 F. 3d at 931 or indeed may not occur at all." (quoting Thomas v. Prods. Co., 473 U. S. 568, 580 - 81 ( 1985) ) . 5 - OPINION AND ORDER Union Carbide Agr. The requirement that a party have "standing" to bring an action is part of the case-or-controversy provisions of Article III of the Constitution. 560 (1992). Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, There are three elements to standing: First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact-an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of-the injury has to be fairly ... trace [able) to the challenged action of the defendant, and not ... th[e) result [of) independent action of some third party not before the court. Third, it must be likely as opposed to merely speculative that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Id. at 50-51 (internal quotations and citations omitted). The two doctrines are related: as standing on a timeline" "ripeness can be characterized and often standing's injury in fact prong." "coincides squarely with Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, 220 F. 3d 1134, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). To have standing, a party must demonstrate a realistic danger that he will suffer some injury as the result of the operation of the challenged statute or regulation. Id. at 1139. Jones maintains that he need not apply and be denied entry into RDAP or community programing to suffer an injury in fact because the BOP has already made an eligibility determination in his case by establishing criteria that preclude his participation in RDAP. This is so, Jones argues, because: (1) the BOP's rules impermissibly require that he be able to complete the residential 6 - OPINION AND ORDER re-entry center (RRC) component of the program in order to participate in RDAP; and (2) his pending state charge categorically precludes because him from "BOP rules eligibility for provide that a community prisoner must outstanding charges that would lead to conviction' placement 'arrest, not (RRC) have any confinement or in order to be considered for community placement. Program Statement 7310.04 at 4 (Dec. 16, 1998)." Brief in Support [27] at 8. In response, respondent contends that Jones' claim is not ripe for review because he has not yet been considered for RDAP, there is no evidence he has been advised he cannot apply, and "[h]e may still be admitted into RDAP." Reply [32] at 4. Moreover, respondent asserts that while the BOP has discretion to find an individual with a detainer or pending charges ineligible for RDAP, There is no prohibition against [Jones] applying for RDAP once he reaches the window of eligibility for timing purposes [and] [h]e is not categorically precluded from RDAP on the basis of his pending charges in Washington. Id. at 7 (emphasis added). The Court concurs. Congress charged the BOP with preparing prisoners for reentry to the community imprisonment. during the See 18 U.S.C. § final 3624(c). months of their terms of Pursuant to this section, inmates may be placed in an RRC or in home confinement. Placement designations under § 3624(c) require individualized consideration of five statutory factors including: facility contemplated; (2) 7 - OPINION AND ORDER (1) the resources of the the nature and circumstances of the offense; (3) the history and characteristics of the prisoner; (4) any statement by the court that imposed the sentence; and (5) any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(a) (2) of title 28. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b). The BOP's policies related to RRCs are set forth in the agency's Program Statement 7310.04. This policy includes the following relevant limitation on eligibility for RRC placement: 10. LIMITATIONS ON ELIGIBILITY FOR CCC REFERRALS. Inmates in the following categories shall not ordinarily participate in CCC programs: * * * f. Inmates with unresolved pending charges, or detainers, which will likely lead to arrest, conviction, or confinement. PS 7310.04 , Community Corrections Center Transfer Procedure, section (10) (f). (CCC) Utilization and However, as respondent notes, a BOP memorandum dated November 10, 2010 offers guidance on this issue: Pending Charges A pending charge without a formal detainer may not necessarily prevent an inmate from completing the community confinement component of the RDAP. Thus, an inmate may still be qualified to participate in RDAP. An inmate can be interviewed for the RDAP, placed on the waiting list, and start the program while waiting for an RRC determination to be made. In such cases, the [Drug Abuse Program Coordinator] DAPC or designee will request a 3621 (e) Offense Revie\v from the DSCC Legal Department in accordance with PS 5331.02, Early Release Procedures under 18 U.S.C 3621(e). The inmate will remain eligible for early release until institution staff determines whether the pending charge or charges will affect the inmate's ability to release to a RRC. 8 - OPINION AND ORDER * * * (3) Declo I f the charge remains pending and no formal detainer will be filed, the DAPC or designee will consult with the inmate's Unit Team to determine whether the pending chargers) will affect RRC placement. In accordance with PS 7310.04, Community Corrections Center (CCC) Utilization and Transfer Procedure, section (10) (f), inmates with "unresolved pending charges, or detainers, which will likely lead to arrest, conviction, or confinement", shall not ordinarily participate in RRC programs (emphasis added). [33], Attach. 1 at 2-3. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds Jones cannot demonstrate that the BOP will categorically exclude him, based on his pending state charge, from participation in RDAP and community programming.! satisfy the Accordingly, the Court finds this action does not case-or-controversy requirement establishing Court's jurisdiction to review the briefed claim. this Since it concurs with respondent that Jones' does not have standing to challenge the subject BOP rules and that such challenge is not ripe for review, it declines to address the merits of this claim. III 1 The Court notes its finding is in accord with Judge Acosta's reasoning in Sams v. Thomas, 3: ll-cv-00333-AC wherein he held that to the extent the BOP would rely on PS 7310.04 section (10) (f) to categorically exclude the petitioner there from eligibility for RRC placement consideration, the Program Statement conflicts with the superceding statute. Moreover, the Court could find no rule, Program Statement, or guideline "justifying categorical exclusion from individualized consideration for RRC placement based upon outstanding warrants." No. 11-333-AC, 2011 WL 2457407 (D. Or. May 12, 2011). 9 - OPINION AND ORDER CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, Corpus [1) Jones' Petition for Writ of Habeas is DENIED, and this proceeding is DISMISSED, without prejudice. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED this 2 'N/t day Paul Papak United States Magistrate Judge 10 - OPINION AND ORDER
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