McCracken et al v. Verisma Systems, Inc. et al, No. 6:2014cv06248 - Document 150 (W.D.N.Y. 2018)
Court Description: ORDER denying 132 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Hon. Michael A. Telesca on 8/28/18. (JMC)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
rds requests more than its costs incurred.”), appeal docketed as Spiro, et al. v. Healthport Technologies, LLC, No. 18-1034 (2d Cir. Apr. 11, 2018). Plaintiffs and the Hospital Defendants argue that a district court decision cannot be “controlling law” for purposes of Rule 54(b). See Pls.’ Mem. at 4-5; Hosp. Defs.’ Mem. at 2-3. Verisma counters by rephrasing the reconsideration standard as being warranted when a party points to “a controlling or significant -3- change in the law.” Verisma’s Mem. at 4 (citing Moog, Inc. v. United States, No. MISC. CIV-90-215E, 1991 WL 255371, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 1991) (quoting Above the Belt, Inc. v. Mel Bohannan Roofing, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D. Va. 1983)) (emphasis added)). Verisma contends that the March 2018 Ruzinskaya decision is “significant” and therefore warrants reconsideration. As Plaintiffs point out, the “or significant” language on which Verisma relies originated in an out-of-district, out-of-circuit case and does not articulate the proper standard in this Circuit. Above the Belt, Inc., a decades-old Virginia district court case which was not appealed, does not cite any precedent for its phrasing of the reconsideration standard. See Above the Belt, Inc., 99 F.R.D. at 101. The Second Circuit, when considering motions for reconsideration, has repeatedly described the test as whether there has been an intervening change in “controlling” law. Cty. Strip Search Cases, 639 F. App’x 746, In re Nassau 749 (2d Cir.) (unpublished opn.) (“[T]he dispositive word from the Rule 54(b) framework described above is ‘controlling.’”), cert. denied sub nom. Nassau Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, Div. of Correction v. Augustin, 137 S. Ct. 313 (2016); Doe v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 709 F.2d 782, 789 (2d Cir. 1983) (“The major grounds justifying reconsideration are ‘an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error -4- or prevent manifest injustice.’”) (quoting 18 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4478, at 790 (1981) (footnote omitted in original)) (quoted in Cox v. Donnelly, 432 F.3d 388, 390 (2d Cir. 2005)). Furthermore, it is established beyond debate that district courts are “bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States and those of the Circuit Court of Appeals in their own circuit, but are not bound by those of a federal court of co-ordinate jurisdiction, or even the decisions of a federal Circuit Court of Appeals in another circuit.” Cont’l Sec. Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 165 F. 945, 959–60 (C.C. S.D.N.Y. 1908); see also Blair v. Deboo, No. CIV.A. 304CV1357CFD, 2004 WL 3052022, at *2 (D. Conn. Dec. 30, 2004) (district court in Connective stated that it “is not bound by the decisions of any courts other than the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court”) (citing 18 Moore’s Federal Practice § 134.02[2] (“The decisions of the court of appeals for one circuit are not binding upon the courts of appeal for other circuits”); other citations omitted). It necessarily follows that a district court decision cannot constitute an intervening change of controlling law sufficient to warrant reconsideration. See, e.g., Langsam v. Vallarta Gardens, No. 08 CIV.2222(LAP), 2009 WL 2252612, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 2009) (district judge in Southern District of New York stated that “[c]ontrolling decisions include decisions -5- from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; they do not include decisions from other circuits or district courts, even courts in the Southern District of New York”) (citing Ades v. Deloitte & Touche, 843 F. Supp. 888, 892 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Boatswain v. New York, No. 12-CV-6078 SLT MDG, 2013 WL 129330, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2013) (finding that “neither the report and recommendation [of a Vermont magistrate judge] nor the district court order adopting it are controlling upon” a district court in the Eastern District of New York) (citing Herman Miller, Inc. v. Worth Capital, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 7878(SAS), 1998 WL 226202, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 1998) (“The decision of a fellow district court is not a ‘controlling’ one” for the purposes of a motion for reconsideration)). Even assuming arguendo that the March 2018 Ruzhinskaya district court decision potentially could qualify as “controlling law” for purposes of reconsideration, the fact that the case is currently on inappropriate appeal to the Second Circuit renders it an basis on which to overturn this Court’s previous decision. III. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, Verisma’s Motion for Reconsideration is denied. However, the Second Circuit in the Ruzhinskaya appeal eventually may reach a conclusion contrary to that reached by this Court on the proper interpretation of the -6- scope of PHL § 18. Therefore, the denial of reconsideration is without prejudice. SO ORDERED. S/Michael A. Telesca HONORABLE MICHAEL A. TELESCA United States District Judge DATED: August 28, 2018 Rochester, New York -7-
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
