Sedillo v. Social Security Administration, No. 1:2021cv00748 - Document 27 (D.N.M. 2022)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Steven C. Yarbrough denying 23 Motion to Remand. (kfo)
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Sedillo v. Social Security Administration Doc. 27 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO JULIE S.,1 Plaintiff, v. Civ. No. 21-748 SCY KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiff argues that the Commissioner committed error when she denied her claim for disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-434. Because Plaintiff does not point to any reversible error, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand, Doc. 23, and affirms the decision below.2 APPLICABLE LAW A. Disability Determination Process An individual is considered disabled if she is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period 1 In the interest of privacy, this opinion uses only the first name and the initial of the last name of the non-governmental party or parties in this case. Where applicable, this opinion uses the same designation for a non-governmental party’s immediate family member. 2 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties consented to the undersigned to conduct any or all proceedings and to enter an order of judgment. Docs. 7, 11, 12. The Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s final decision under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c). The Court reserves discussion of the background, procedural history, and medical records relevant to this appeal for its analysis. Dockets.Justia.com of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (pertaining to disability insurance benefits); see also id. § 1382c(a)(3)(A) (pertaining to supplemental security income disability benefits for adult individuals). The Social Security Commissioner has adopted the familiar fivestep sequential evaluation process (“SEP”) to determine whether a person satisfies the statutory criteria as follows: (1) At step one, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is engaged in “substantial gainful activity.”3 If the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, she is not disabled regardless of her medical condition. (2) At step two, the ALJ must determine the severity of the claimed physical or mental impairment(s). If the claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that is severe and meets the duration requirement, she is not disabled. (3) At step three, the ALJ must determine whether a claimant’s impairment(s) meets or equals in severity one of the listings described in Appendix 1 of the regulations and meets the duration requirement. If so, a claimant is presumed disabled. (4) If, however, the claimant’s impairments do not meet or equal in severity one of the listings described in Appendix 1 of the regulations, the ALJ must determine at step four whether the claimant can perform her “past relevant work.” Answering this question involves three phases. Winfrey v. Chater, 92 F.3d 1017, 1023 (10th Cir. 1996). First, the ALJ considers all of the relevant medical and other evidence and determines what is “the most [the claimant] can still do despite [her physical and mental] limitations.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1). This is called the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”). Id. §§ 404.1545(a)(3), 416.945(a)(3). Second, the ALJ determines the physical and mental demands of the claimant’s past work. Third, the ALJ determines whether, given the claimant’s RFC, the claimant is capable of meeting those demands. A claimant who is capable of returning to past relevant work is not disabled. 3 “Substantial work activity is work activity that involves doing significant physical or mental activities.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1572(a), 416.972(a). The claimant’s “[w]ork may be substantial even if it is done on a part-time basis or if [she] doe[es] less, get[s] paid less, or ha[s] less responsibility than when [she] worked before.” Id. “Gainful work activity is work activity that [the claimant] do[es] for pay or profit.” Id. §§ 404.1572(b), 416.972(b). 2 (5) If the claimant does not have the RFC to perform her past relevant work, the Commissioner, at step five, must show that the claimant is able to perform other work in the national economy, considering the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience. If the Commissioner is unable to make that showing, the claimant is deemed disabled. If, however, the Commissioner is able to make the required showing, the claimant is deemed not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4) (disability insurance benefits); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4) (supplemental security income disability benefits); Fischer-Ross v. Barnhart, 431 F.3d 729, 731 (10th Cir. 2005); Grogan v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 1257, 1261 (10th Cir. 2005). The claimant has the initial burden of establishing a disability in the first four steps of this analysis. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987). The burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five to show that the claimant is capable of performing work in the national economy. Id. A finding that the claimant is disabled or not disabled at any point in the five-step review is conclusive and terminates the analysis. Casias v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 933 F.2d 799, 801 (10th Cir. 1991). B. Standard of Review The court must affirm the Commissioner’s denial of social security benefits unless (1) the decision is not supported by “substantial evidence” or (2) the ALJ did not apply the proper legal standards in reaching the decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Hamlin v. Barnhart, 365 F.3d 1208, 1214 (10th Cir. 2004); Langley v. Barnhart, 373 F.3d 1116, 1118 (10th Cir. 2004); Casias, 933 F.2d at 800-01. In making these determinations, the court “neither reweigh[s] the evidence nor substitute[s] [its] judgment for that of the agency.’” Bowman v. Astrue, 511 F.3d 1270, 1272 (10th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[W]hatever the meaning of ‘substantial’ in other contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (citations omitted). “Substantial evidence . . . is ‘more than a mere scintilla.’” Id. (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). “It means—and 3 means only—such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A decision “is not based on substantial evidence if it is overwhelmed by other evidence in the record,” Langley, 373 F.3d at 1118 (internal quotation marks omitted), or “constitutes mere conclusion,” Musgrave v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1371, 1374 (10th Cir. 1992). The agency decision must “provide this court with a sufficient basis to determine that appropriate legal principles have been followed.” Jensen v. Barnhart, 436 F.3d 1163, 1165 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, although an ALJ is not required to discuss every piece of evidence, “[t]he record must demonstrate that the ALJ considered all of the evidence” and “a minimal level of articulation of the ALJ’s assessment of the evidence is required in cases in which considerable evidence is presented to counter the agency’s position.” Clifton v. Chater, 79 F.3d 1007, 1009-10 (10th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). But where the reviewing court “can follow the adjudicator’s reasoning” in conducting its review, “and can determine that correct legal standards have been applied, merely technical omissions in the ALJ’s reasoning do not dictate reversal.” Keyes-Zachary v. Astrue, 695 F.3d 1156, 1166 (10th Cir. 2012). The court “should, indeed must, exercise common sense.” Id. “The more comprehensive the ALJ’s explanation, the easier [the] task; but [the court] cannot insist on technical perfection.” Id. ANALYSIS Plaintiff seeks remand without specifying any legal error in the ALJ’s decision. Doc. 23. Plaintiff states she was diagnosed with fibromyalgia and has been seeing Dr. Cheruvu for the past six years. Id. at 1. She also states she went to physical therapy and saw a chiropractor in 2022. Id. at 1-2. But she does not discuss the ALJ’s decision or point to any error in it. 4 Plaintiff’s date last insured for this Title II application was March 31, 2018. AR 13. The ALJ found she had a severe impairment of fibromyalgia, among other things, through the date last insured. AR 14. The ALJ discussed Dr. Cheruvu’s treatment records during and after the date last insured. AR 18-19. The ALJ partially adopted the medical opinions of the nonexamining state agency consultants but tempered them in the claimant’s favor and found she could perform light work with some caveats. AR 16, 19-20. There do not appear to be any other medical opinions in the record. To the extent Dr. Cheruvu made statements in treatment records that could be medical opinions relating to fibromyalgia, it appears the ALJ properly discussed them. AR 19. The evidence of medical treatment in 2022 mentioned in Plaintiff’s motion to remand does not appear to have been before the ALJ, whose decision issued on February 19, 2021, AR 8, or submitted to the Appeals Council, which issued June 10, 2021, AR 1. The failure to identify any factual or legal error in the Commissioner’s final decision is fatal to Plaintiff’s claim. See United States v. Rodriguez-Aguirre, 108 F.3d 1228, 127 n.8 (10th Cir. 1997) (“[I]t is the appellant’s responsibility to tie the salient facts, supported by specific record citation, to [her] legal contentions.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Gilbert v. Astrue, 231 F. App’x 778, 782, 785 & n.5 (10th Cir. 2007) (applying this rule in the Social Security context); Mays v. Colvin, 739 F.3d 569, 576 (10th Cir. 2014) (to meet her burden in court, the claimant must not only “point[] to evidence that he claims the ALJ failed to discuss,” but also “say why it was significantly probative”; the court will not do so for her). I have meticulously reviewed the record pursuant to Flaherty v. Astrue, 515 F.3d 1067, 1070 (10th Cir. 2007), and find that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. 5 CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand, Doc. 23, is DENIED. _____________________________________ STEVEN C. YARBROUGH United States Magistrate Judge Presiding by Consent 6
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