SIACI SAINT HONORE v. EXPEDITORS INTERNATIONAL OF WASHINGTON, INC. et al, No. 2:2021cv08570 - Document 57 (D.N.J. 2022)

Court Description: OPINION. Signed by Judge Evelyn Padin on 11/14/2022. (mxw)

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SIACI SAINT HONORE v. EXPEDITORS INTERNATIONAL OF WASHINGTON, INC. et al Doc. 57 Case 2:21-cv-08570-EP-JSA Document 57 Filed 11/14/22 Page 1 of 18 PageID: 353 NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY SIACI SAINT HONORE, Case No. 21cv08570 (EP) (JSA) Plaintiff, OPINION v. M/V NORTHERN JUBILEE, her engines, tackle, appurtenances, etc., in rem and EXPEDITORS INTERNATIONAL OF WASHINGTON, INC., MEDITERRANEAN SHIPPING COMPANY, S.A., and WEST END EXPRESS CO., INC., in personam, Defendants. PADIN, District Judge. Northern Jubilee in rem, in personam cosmetic product units that were allegedly thieved or pilfered. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), West End moves to dismiss three claims brought by Siaci in the Amended Verified Complaint in Admiralt mended Complaint crossclaims for contribution and indemnification brought by MSC. D.E. 34-1. The Court decides this motion on the papers pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78 and L.Civ.R.78.1(b). For the reasons set ll be GRANTED. Dockets.Justia.com Case 2:21-cv-08570-EP-JSA Document 57 Filed 11/14/22 Page 2 of 18 PageID: 354 BACKGROUND1 I. Siaci, a subrogee2 of Kendo Holdings, Inc., filed this action to recover the value of a shortage of 5,820 missing product units lost in a cosmetics shipment from Italy to New Jersey. See ¶ 19. Expeditors is a licensed Customs Broker that is typically hired to perform services for cargo importers and owners to facilitate cargo imports into the United States that comply with government import regulations. Id. ¶¶ 7-8. MSC is a vessel operating common carrier. Id. ¶ 9. West End is a motor carrier that operates trucking services for import shipments. Id. ¶ 10. Expeditors, MSC, and West End were all engaged to facilitate the transportation of the cosmetic shipment at issue here from Italy to New Jersey. On or about March 17, 2020, Expeditors issued or caused to be issued a sea waybill 3 numbered 6400180532 , which provided for the transport of 485 cartons of FCIU8974758. Id. ¶ 14. The Sea Waybill provided that the Cosmetics Shipment be loaded aboard the Ship in Genoa, Italy on that same date for transport to New York and subsequent discharge and delivery from the Port of New York & New Jersey. Id. On that same date, MSC also issued or caused to be issued a bill of lading 4 numbered MEDULN081160 1 The facts in this section are taken from the well-pled allegations in the Amended Complaint, which the Court presumes to be true for purposes of resolving the instant motion to dismiss. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 2 indemni Insurance Law, 147, 148 (2d ed. 1957). As subrogee, Siaci has the authority to act in the name of the subrogated insurer and interested cargo underwriters of the subject cargo and is entitled to maintain this action on behalf of the shipper, consignee and/or owner of the subject cargo. Amended Complaint ¶ 6. 3 destination, co Dictionary 1429 (5th ed. 1979). 4 -consignor and the carrier; S. Pacific Transp. Co. v. its terms and conditions bind the ship 2 Case 2:21-cv-08570-EP-JSA Document 57 Filed 11/14/22 Page 3 of 18 PageID: 355 transport of the Cosmetics Shipment. Id. ¶ 15. The Bill of Lading provided that the Cosmetics Shipment: was received in alleged good order, condition, and quantity in Genoa, Italy; was loaded aboard the Ship in Genoa, Italy; was transported on the Ship from Genoa, Italy to the Port of New York & New Jersey; arrived and was discharged at the Port of New York & New Jersey on April 5, 2020; and was delivered at Port Elizabeth, New Jersey on April 8, 2020. Id. For the Cosmetics Id. ¶ 17. This would allow for West End to receive and effect delivery of the Cosmetics Shipment. Id. On April 8, 2020, West End received the Cosmetics Shipment from Port Elizabeth, New Jersey by truck and subsequently delivered the same to the ultimate delivery location on April 9, 2020: XPO Logistics in Monroe Township, New Jersey. Id. insured, XPO Logistics unloaded and tallied the contents of the Cosmetics Shipment and identified a shortage of 5,820 missing product units from the Cosmetics Shipment. Id. ¶ 19. The value of the missing product units is estimated to be $27,884.54. Id. ¶ 23. The missing product units are alleged to have been thieved or pilfered at some point while in transit from Italy to New Jersey, but before receipt by XPO Logistics. Id. ¶ 19. Two Id. ¶¶ 21-35. Siaci seeks the value of the missing product units, $27,884.54, as relief. Id. ¶¶ 23, 27, 31, 35. Commercial Metals Co. [T]he bill of lading is a title document, while the waybill describes the freight, its route, and the carriers involved in its shipment. The waybill accompanies the freight throughout the shipment and into the hands of CSX Transp. Co. v. Novolog Bucks County, 502 F.3d 247, 251 n. 4 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 3 Case 2:21-cv-08570-EP-JSA Document 57 Filed 11/14/22 Page 4 of 18 PageID: 356 In its answer to the Amended Complaint, MSC brings crossclaims against Expeditors and West End seeking contribution and indemnification. D.E. 12 ¶ 27. Negligen Breach of Amended Complaint contribution and indemnification crossclaims. D.E. 34-1 -briefed, the Court decides this motion. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW to state a claim allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable readi Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (quotations omitted). Under this the Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009). A Rocks v. City of Philadelphia, 868 F.2d 644, 645 (3d Cir. 1989); In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1429-30 (3d Cir. 1997). In weighing a motion to dismiss, a court asks Twombly, 556 U.S. at 684. 4 Case 2:21-cv-08570-EP-JSA Document 57 Filed 11/14/22 Page 5 of 18 PageID: 357 The same analysis applies with respect to a motion to dismiss a crossclaim filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See Merchants Mut. Ins. Co. v. 215 14th St., LLC, Civ. No. 19-9206, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23664, 2020 WL 634149, at *1 (D.N.J. Feb. 10, 2020). III. DISCUSSION A. Scope of the To understand the scope of federal preemption of state law pursuant to the Federal Aviation -06, it is helpful to first understand how preemption functions. Generally, federal law preempts state law when either: (1) a congressional statute explicitly preempts state law; (2) state law actually conflicts with federal law; or (3) federal law occupies a legislative field to such an extent that one can reasonably conclude that Congress left no room for state regulation in that field. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 506 U.S. 504, 523 (1992). A presumption against preemption exists. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (holding that federal laws do not supersede traditional state police powers unless Congress clearly intends to do so). In 1980, Congress deregulated interstate trucking to encourage rates and services be set by the market rather than by government regulation. See Motor Carrier Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 793. Then, in 1994, Congress bolstered this effort by including a specific provision in the FAAAA that expressly provides for preemption of state regulation of the trucking industry, 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). That specific provision provides regulation, or other provision [] related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier [] with The overarching goal of preemption pursuant to the FAAAA is to avoid situations where -determining laws, rules and 5 Case 2:21-cv-08570-EP-JSA Document 57 Filed 11/14/22 Page 6 of 18 PageID: 358 , 552 U.S. 364, 373 (2008). The Supreme Court has outlined the following four guiding principles for applying preemption pursuant to the FAAAA: (1) state enforcement actions having a connection with, or reference to carrier rates, routes, or services are preempted; (2) preemption may occur effect on rates, routes, or services is only indirect; (3) with respect to preemption in this context, it makes no difference whether a state law is consistent or inconsistent with federal regulation; and (4) preemption occurs at least where state laws have a significant impact related -related objectives. Id. at 370 (quoting Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383-84 (1992)) (interpreting identical provision in Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C. § 1305(a)(1)) (quotation marks omitted). With these guiding principles in mind, the scope of federal preemption pursuant to the FAAAA is understood as broad and encompasses even state laws that only have an indirect effect on the price, route, or service of a motor carrier. Id. In , 569 of property. Taking one step further, courts have even found that the FAAAA preempts not only state statutes and administrative regulations, but also state law-based private claims, such as negligence, conversion, and breach of bailment, beca See, e.g., Alpine Fresh, Inc. v. Jala Trucking Corp., 181 F. Supp. 3d 250, 257 (D.N.J. 2016) (dismissing breach of bailment and negligence claims because the FAAAA expressly preempts these state common law claims); AMG Res. Corp. v. Wooster Motor Ways, Inc., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6747, 2019 WL 192900, at *4 (D.N.J. Jan. 4, 2019) (finding that state common law claims, including those for conversion and 6 Case 2:21-cv-08570-EP-JSA Document 57 Filed 11/14/22 Page 7 of 18 PageID: 359 negligence, are preempted by the FAAAA), Smith v. Comair, Inc., 134 F.3d 254 (4th Cir. 1998); Lopez v. Amazon Logistics, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 3d 505, 512 (N.D. Tex. 2020); Deerskin Trading Post, Inc. v. United Parcel Service of America, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 665, 672 (N.D. Ga. 1997). Rowe, 552 U.S. at 371. Additionally, the FAAA contains a few narrow statutory exceptions, where preemption will not occur. Lastly, courts have consistently found that the FAAAA does not tely -imposed laws, rules, or other provision having the effect of law. See American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 228-29, 233 (1995) (concluding that a breach of contract claim was not preempted, in the context of the Airline Deregulation Act see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Dynamic Worldwide Logistics, Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142926, at *6 (D.N.J. Sept. 5, 2017) (declining to dismiss breach of contract claim because the FAAA does not preempt routine breach of contract claims) (citations omitted). Here, West End asserts that the FAAAA preempts all but one claim 5 brought by Siaci: crossclaims for contribution and indemnification. Id. In light of the Court agrees with West End. 5 7 Case 2:21-cv-08570-EP-JSA Document 57 Filed 11/14/22 Page 8 of 18 PageID: 360 B. Counts Two, Three, and Four of the Amended Complaint are Preempted by the FAAAA law-based negligence, breach of bailment, and conversion claims. If those claims are preempted by the FAAAA, then they should be dismissed. For the reasons that follow, the Court agrees with West End. o courts concluded that the FAAAA preempts state law-based claims of, inter alia, negligence, breach of bailment, and conversion. In each case, one party brings claims arising from the transportation of goods against the motor carrier (e.g., truck) responsible for such transportation. See Assicurazioni Generali v. Harbor Freight Transp. Corp., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71935 (D.N.J. Apr. 14, 2021) (finding that the FAAAA preempted negligence and breach of contract claims brought by Italian-based seller of goods against trucking and warehouse company that was hired to transport aircraft parts from Port Elizabeth, New Jersey to a New Jersey warehouse for one leg of the aircraft parts eventual shipment to Canada, but where shipment was damaged); see , 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143255 (D.N.J. Sept. 5, 2017) (finding that the FAAAA preempted unjust enrichment claim brought against broker of motor carrier services that was hired to help coordinate the transport of products from Pennsylvania to California, but where shipment was damaged). In every case the courts found that the state law-based claims at issue sufficient state law-based claims were necessarily preempted. 8 Case 2:21-cv-08570-EP-JSA Document 57 Filed 11/14/22 Page 9 of 18 PageID: 361 In rebuttal, Siaci does not directly address whether the FAAAA preempts its state lawbased negligence, breach of bailment, and conversion claims against West End. Instead, Siaci raises two arguments that miss the point. First, Siaci asserts that the cases West End cites to are governed by the Carmack Amendment, rather than the FAAAA. But the Carmack Amendment is only implicated in - Certain Underwriters at Interest at Lloyds of London v. United Parcel Serv. Of Am., Inc., 762 F.3d 332, 336 (3d Cir. 2014). Here, West End was involved only in an intrastate shipment from Port 36 -5. West End asserts only that the FAAAA applies and the cases it cites to support that proposition. Analysis of just two cases, and Assicurazioni Generali With respect to , while it is true that the case involved an interstate shipment of food products from Pennsylvania to California and that the court dismissed inst the two motor carriers because the claims were preempted by the Carmack Amendment, Siaci omits a couple of important facts. First, the court sua sponte dismissed the breach of contract and negligence claims finding that they were preempted by the Carmack Amendment, but these claims were not raised in the pending motion before the court. See 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143255, at *12-13. Second, the actual pending motion was a motion to dismiss, brought by a broker, third-party defendant, asserting that the FAAAA and ICCTA preempted the thirdclaim, which the court did in fact grant. Id 9 Case 2:21-cv-08570-EP-JSA Document 57 Filed 11/14/22 Page 10 of 18 PageID: 362 not apply in , because the court sua sponte found that the Carmack Amendment also applied, is misplaced. With respect to Assicurazioni Generali, where the pending motion before the court was one brought by a motor carrier that was involved solely in the intrastate leg of an ultimately international shipment of goods, the court found that the FAAAA preempted the breach of bailment claim brought by an Italian-based seller of goods. See 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71935, at *2-5. Notably, like here, the motor carrier moved to dismiss a negligence claim, but the court did not ultimately need to address the argument that the negligence claim was also preempted by the FAAAA because the Italian-based seller of goods conceded as to that argument. Id. at *5. Siaci, again, mischaracterizes this case as being one governed by the Carmack Amendment, to the opinion immediately following that refer comprehensive federal legislation, the FAAAA, which also [like the Carmack Amendment] Id. at *4. In other words, the court mentioned the Carmack Amendment in support of its proposition that courts should be reluctant to supplement comprehensive federal legislation with common law, like the FAAAA, but not for the proposition that its ultimate decision was grounded in the Carmack Amendment.6 6 Siaci incorrectly states that the court in Assicurazioni Generali further explained its reference to the Carmack Amendment in a stay ordered later in the proceedings. See Siaci context of that stay involved a party seeking to intervene in the case, and in turn, if successful with its intervention, to stay the proceedings, because it was involved in liquidation proceedings in South Carolina. See Assicurazioni Generali v. Harbor Freight Transp. Corp., 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11225, at *4of facilitating a uniform and orderly liquidation process, the Court will stay the present action pendin 10 Case 2:21-cv-08570-EP-JSA Document 57 Filed 11/14/22 Page 11 of 18 PageID: 363 Additionally, the motor carrier moving to dismiss in Assicurazioni Generali was involved attempt to mischaracterize and distinguish this case as one involving only an interstate shipment is futile. Instead, the Court finds Next, Siaci argues that state law-based claims for injury to persons or property are not preempted because there is no federal legislation expressly authorizing such preemption in cases See id. at 6. West End responds that the question of whether the FAAAA preempts state law-based non-contractual claims against motor carriers and brokers involving both intrastate and interstate shipments is well-settled. D.E. 37 from sister courts reinforcing its proposition that the FAAAA preempts state law-based noncontractual claims in cases involving damage to goods that were shipped in intrastate and interstate shipping. See, e.g., Luccio v. UPS, Co., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13069, at *4-5 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 31, of cryopreserved embryos in intrastat statutory interpretation support the conclusion that the FAAAA was intended to apply to intrastate ourts, and thus, West End. Additionally, the Court finds it notable that the specific provision providing for preemption 14501(c)(1). The Court will not ignore such a clear expression by Congress to preempt certain state law-based claims. Thus, the Court concludes that the FAAAA applies to the intrastate 11 Case 2:21-cv-08570-EP-JSA Document 57 Filed 11/14/22 Page 12 of 18 PageID: 364 transportation of property by motor carriers, which is directly at issue with respect to West End here. Accord -based negligence, breach of bailment, and conversion claims against West End are preempted by the FAAAA. The Court notes that at least one of the nonmoving defendants is not a motor carrier or broker of motor carrier services within the meaning of the FAAAA. As such, the FAAAA does -based non-contractual claims against all defendants. But because the distinct counts alleged in the Amended Complaint do not differentiate between the motor carrier- and non-motor carrier-defendants, the Court will dismiss the state law-based negligence, breach of bailment, and conversion claims as to all defendants without prejudice. C. are Preempted by the FAAAA The Court next addresses West End law-based contribution and indemnification crossclaims, and as such those claims should be dismissed. MSC raises two primary arguments against FAAAA preemption of its contribution and indemnification crossclaims against West End. 7 For the reasons that follow, the Court agrees with West End. 1. First, MSC argues that its crossclaims are premised on federal maritime law rather than upholding the proposition that federal maritime claims apply against a motor carrier for alleged damages sustained to cargo during its transportation. Reply at 5-6. 7 MSC makes two additional passive arguments: additional discovery is needed to determine if there is a contractual contribution or indemnification claim; and references to the Carmack Amendment and other federal law preemption cases are irrelevant. See D.E. 35 8the federal maritime law and FAAAA preemption arguments, and does so without prejudice, then the Court need not reach these two additional arguments. 12 Case 2:21-cv-08570-EP-JSA Document 57 Filed 11/14/22 Page 13 of 18 PageID: 365 maritime jurisdiction. Maritime-based claims for contribution and indemnification may be grounded in either contract or tort law in limited circumstances. The Court ultimately concludes jurisdiction. itime one, and the dispute is not inherently local, federal Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. James N. Kirby, Pty Ltd., 543 U.S. 14, 22-23 (2004) (citing Kossick v. United Fruit Co. a bill of lading requires substantial carriage of goods by sea, its purpose is to effectuate maritime commerce Id. at 27. The specific federal law that then governs the contract interpretation is see also Norfolk S. Ry. Co., goods are loaded on oes in a maritime contract. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 543 U.S. at 29. Here, MSC issued or caused to be issued a bill of lading, which provided for the transported by sea from Genoa, Italy to the Port of New York and New Jersey, and later delivery to the Port of Elizabeth, New Jersey. See Amended Complaint ¶ 15. But because the last leg of the shipment was local, as it was confined to New Jersey, and did not involv involved the transportation of the Cosmetics Shipment via truck, federal maritime law presumably 13 Case 2:21-cv-08570-EP-JSA Document 57 Filed 11/14/22 Page 14 of 18 PageID: 366 does not apply to the crossclaims against West End, who was only involved in that last leg of the shipment. This presumption would be overcome and the relevant federal maritime law, COGSA, would apply to West End, if it was shown that the parties specifically stipulated to that in a maritime contract. Here, neither the Amended Complaint maritime cont portion of the ultimately international shipment. Additionally, there is no indication in the pleadings that MSC and West End had any sort of contractual relationship with each other, such But federal maritime law may apply and allow a noncontractual contribution or indemnification action to lie where parties do not have a contractual relationship if the action is derived from an underlying maritime tort. See, e.g., Tri-State Oil Tool Indus., Inc. v. Delta Marine Drilling Co., 410 F.2d 178, 186 (5th Cir. 1969) (finding that maritime law governed noncontractual indemnification claim because underlying tortious conduct occurred in navigable waters); White v. Johns-Manville Corp., 662 F.2d 243, 247 (4th Cir. 1981) (finding that tort occurring on ction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) over a tort claim must satisfy conditions both of location and of Neely v. Club Med Management Servs., 63 F.3d 166, 178-179 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 554 (3d Cir. 1995)). Id. (citation omitted). The maritime incident involved to determine whether the incident has a potentially disrupting impact on 14 Case 2:21-cv-08570-EP-JSA Document 57 Filed 11/14/22 Page 15 of 18 PageID: 367 o the incident Id. (citation omitted). that both cases MSC cites in support of its position involve torts that either occurred on navigable water or on land caused by a vessel on navigable water. See Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Kopke, 417 U.S. 106 (1974) (concluding that longshoreman injured on a ship at sea could recover from negligent stevedore in a direct action and shipowner and charterer were properly granted contribution from negligent stevedore as they were entitled to same right of recovery as longshoreman); see also Federal Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Burnside Shipping Co., 394 U.S. 404 (1969) (allowing maritime tort claim to lie where longshoreman fell into an unprotected deep tank opening and was killed while readying a vessel for its grain cargo). because at best the crossclaims have only a tenuous maritime connection: the Cosmetics Shipment was shipped overseas from Italy to the United States. Maybe the maritime connection would be less tenuous if the parties were certain that the cargo was lost at sea because the events giving rise to the tort claims would at least have occurred at sea, but the Court will not indulge such are not maritime torts falling within the scope of federal maritime law. 2. by the FAAAA Alternatively, MSC argues that even if its crossclaims were premised on state law that there 15 Case 2:21-cv-08570-EP-JSA Document 57 Filed 11/14/22 Page 16 of 18 PageID: 368 -based non-contractual claims against West End, supra crossclaims because they are also state law-based non-contractual claims, which are preempted by the FAAAA. See Peening Techs. Equip., LLC v. Northeast Riggers, Inc., 2022 Conn. Super. LEXIS 54, at *5-6 (Conn. Supp. Jan. 10, 2022) (concluding that the FAAA preempted indemnification claim seeking damages relating to transportation of machine to customer because see also Custom Stud, Inc. v. Meadow Lark Agency, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 3d 950, 954-956 (D. Minn. 2021) (finding that all counterclaims, including those for contribution and indemnification, derived from alleged actions leading up to or following the transportation of law, such that Congress intended their preemption pursuant to the FAAAA). 8 In Tokio Marine Am. Ins. Co. v. Jan Packaging, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 240798, at *3-4 (D.N.J. Dec. 18, 2020), multiple parties agreed to facilitate and transport the shipment of electronic equipment, by motor and sea carrier, from California to China. Some of the equipment was damaged upon arrival in New Jersey, which resulted in the filing of claims and crossclaims by different parties. Id. One of the motor carriers involved in the transport of the equipment from Massachusetts to New Jersey, Jan Packaging, filed crossclaims against the other motor carriers involved in that same leg of the shipment, including for contribution and indemnification. Id. One of the other motor carriers, MTS, moved to dismiss, inter alia, Jan Packa 8 The Court notes that further analysis would have been required here if MSC and West End had a direct contractual relationship because the FAAA does not preempt routine breach of contract do not allege a contractual relationship between MSC and West End, and therefore, the Court will not assume that its crossclaims arise out of a contract and fall outside the ambit of the FAAAA. 16 Case 2:21-cv-08570-EP-JSA Document 57 Filed 11/14/22 Page 17 of 18 PageID: 369 indemnification crossclaim. Id. MTS argued that the FAAAA expressly preempted that crossclaim. Id. at *14-15. The court agreed with MTS and concluded that the crossclaim (like the tor carrier services that gave rise to this action and Id. at *15-16. Specifically, the court reasoned that Jan becaus damage to the equipment, such liability was caused or brought about the acts or omissions of Id. at *16-17. It follows that because the contribution and indemnification crossclaim was premised on the acts or omissions giving rise to a state law-based claim, negligence, that was preempted by the FAAAA, then the crossclaim was also necessarily preempted by the same. See id. Thus, the court dismissed both the negligence and contribution and indemnification crossclaims brought against Jan Packaging. Id. at *17. The reasoning in Tokio Marine Am. Ins. Co. indemnification crossclaims against West End arise, not from a contractual relationship between of bailment, and conversion claims. Because those claims brought by Siaci are preempted by the FAAAA, as to West End, then the acts or omissions that gave rise to those claims also cannot serve and indemnification crossclaims attempt to do just that. See id. at *14-15 (citing Spring Hill Jersey Cheese, Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160888, at *5-8 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 29, any motor carrier 17 Case 2:21-cv-08570-EP-JSA Document 57 Filed 11/14/22 Page 18 of 18 PageID: 370 by the FAAAA. -based crossclaims will be dismissed without prejudice. IV. CONCLUSION GRANTED. As such, contained in the Amended Complaint, for contribution and indemnification will be DISMISSED without prejudice. An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion. Dated: November 14, 2022 _______________________ Hon. Evelyn Padin, U.S.D.J. 18

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