SIACI SAINT HONORE v. EXPEDITORS INTERNATIONAL OF WASHINGTON, INC. et al, No. 2:2021cv04301 - Document 63 (D.N.J. 2022)

Court Description: OPINION. Signed by Judge Evelyn Padin on 11/14/2022. (sm)

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SIACI SAINT HONORE v. EXPEDITORS INTERNATIONAL OF WASHINGTON, INC. et al Doc. 63 Case 2:21-cv-04301-EP-JSA Document 63 Filed 11/14/22 Page 1 of 24 PageID: 397 NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY SIACI SAINT HONORE, Case No. 21cv04301 (EP) (JSA) Plaintiff, OPINION v. M/V GSL KALLIOPI, her engines, tackle, appurtenances, etc., in rem and EXPEDITORS INTERNATIONAL OF WASHINGTON, INC., MEDITERRANEAN SHIPPING COMPANY, S.A., and WEST END EXPRESS CO., INC., in personam, Defendants. PADIN, District Judge. in rem, in personam thieved or pilfered. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), West End moves to dismiss ten claims brought by Siaci in the Second Amended Verified Complain crossclaims for contribution and indemnification brought by MSC. D.E. 39-1. The Court decides this motion on the papers pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78 and L.Civ.R.78.1(b). For the reasons set l be GRANTED. Dockets.Justia.com Case 2:21-cv-04301-EP-JSA Document 63 Filed 11/14/22 Page 2 of 24 PageID: 398 BACKGROUND1 I. Siaci, a subrogee2 of Kendo Holdings, Inc., filed this action to recover for the value of a shortage of 8,038 missing product units in a cosmetics shipment from Italy to New Jersey. D.E. 22. Expeditors is a licensed Customs Broker that is typically hired to perform services for cargo importers and owners to facilitate cargo imports into the United States that comply with government import regulations. Id. ¶¶ 7-8. MSC is a vessel operating common carrier. Id. ¶ 9. West End is a motor carrier that operates trucking services for import shipments. Id. ¶ 10. Expeditors, MSC, and West End were all engaged to facilitate the transportation of the cosmetic shipment at issue here from Italy to New Jersey. On or about February 22, 2020, Expeditors issued or caused to be issued a sea waybill 3 CAXU6984600. Id. ¶ 14. The Sea Waybill provided that the Cosmetics Shipment be loaded aboard the Ship in Genoa, Italy on that same date for transport to New York and subsequent discharge and delivery from the Port of New York & New Jersey. Id. On that same date, MSC also issued or caused to be issued a bill of lading 4 1 The facts in this section are taken from the well-pled allegations in the SAC, which the Court presumes to be true for purposes of resolving the instant motion to dismiss. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 2 ion of the insurer in place of the insured for the purpose of claiming Insurance Law, 147, 148 (2d ed. 1957). As subrogee, Siaci has the authority to act in the name of the subrogated insurer(s) and interested cargo underwriters of the subject cargo and is entitled to maintain this action on behalf of the shipper, consignee and/or owner of the subject cargo. SAC ¶ 6. 3 de out by [the] carrier listing point of origin and Dictionary 1429 (5th ed. 1979). 4 r-consignor and the carrier; S. Pacific Transp. Co. v. 2 Case 2:21-cv-04301-EP-JSA Document 63 Filed 11/14/22 Page 3 of 24 PageID: 399 for the transport of the Cosmetics Shipment. Id. ¶ 15. The Bill of Lading provided that the Cosmetics Shipment: was received in alleged good order, condition, and quantity in Genoa, Italy; was loaded aboard the Ship in Genoa, Italy; was transported on the Ship from Genoa, Italy to the Port of New York & New Jersey; arrived and was discharged at the Port of New York & New Jersey on March 9, 2020; and was delivered to Port Elizabeth, New Jersey on March 11, 2020. Id. Id. ¶ 17. This would allow for West End to receive and effect delivery of the Cosmetics Shipment. Id. On March 11, 2020, West End received the Cosmetics Shipment from Port Elizabeth, New Jersey by truck, but did not deliver the same to its ultimate delivery location, XPO Logistics in Monroe Township, New Jersey, until March 23, 2020. Id. ¶¶ 18-21. Between the time West End received and delivered the Cosmetics Shipment, West End allegedly unloaded the shipping container and stored the cosmetic product units at an unspecified location until finally delivering the Cosmetics Shipment to XPO Logistics days later. Id. ¶¶ 19-20. insured, XPO Logistics unloaded and tallied the contents of the Cosmetics Shipment and identified a shortage of 8,038 missing product units from the Cosmetics Shipment. Id. ¶ 22. The value of the missing product units is estimated to be $53,924.59. Id. ¶ 30. The missing product units are alleged to have been thieved or pilfered at some point while in transit from Italy to New Jersey, but before receipt by XPO Logistics. Id. ¶ 22. Commercial Metals Co. [T]he bill of lading is a title document, while the waybill describes the freight, its route, and the carriers involved in its shipment. The waybill accompanies the freight throughout the shipment and into the hands of CSX Transp. Co. v. Novolog Bucks County, 502 F.3d 247, 251 n. 4 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 3 Case 2:21-cv-04301-EP-JSA Document 63 Filed 11/14/22 Page 4 of 24 PageID: 400 Siaci brings: four claims against Defendants as carriers Conversion, id. ¶¶ 24-38; two claims against West End as a carrier Material & Unreasonable id. ¶¶ 39-48; and five claims against West End as a warehousema id. ¶¶ 4965. Siaci also seeks the value of the missing product units, $53,924.59, as relief for all claims, as well as punitive damages for the gross negligence claims. Id. ¶¶ 26, 65. In its answer to the SAC, MSC brings crossclaims against Expeditors and West End seeking contribution and indemnification. D.E. 16 ¶ 41. West End now moves to dismiss brought against it in the SAC. D.E. 39- s to dismiss contribution and indemnification crossclaims. Id. Being fully-briefed, the Court decides this motion. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (quotations omitted). Under this Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly 4 Case 2:21-cv-04301-EP-JSA Document 63 Filed 11/14/22 Page 5 of 24 PageID: 401 Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009). A Rocks v. City of Philadelphia, 868 F.2d 644, 645 (3d Cir. 1989); In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1429-30 (3d Cir. 1997). In weighing a motion to dismiss, a court asks Twombly, 556 U.S. at 684. The same analysis applies with respect to a motion to dismiss a crossclaim filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See Merchants Mut. Ins. Co. v. 215 14th St., LLC, Civ. No. 19-9206, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23664, 2020 WL 634149, at *1 (D.N.J. Feb. 10, 2020). III. DISCUSSION A. To understand the scope of federal preemption of state law pursuant to the Federal Aviation -06, it is helpful to first understand how preemption functions. Generally, federal law preempts state law when either: (1) a congressional statute explicitly preempts state law; (2) state law actually conflicts with federal law; or (3) federal law occupies a legislative field to such an extent that one can reasonably conclude that Congress left no room for state regulation in that field. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 506 U.S. 504, 523 (1992). A presumption against preemption exists. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (holding that federal laws do not supersede traditional state police powers unless Congress clearly intends to do so). In 1980, Congress deregulated interstate trucking to encourage rates and services be set by the market rather than by government regulation. See Motor Carrier Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 793. Then, in 1994, Congress bolstered this effort by including a specific provision in the FAAAA that 5 Case 2:21-cv-04301-EP-JSA Document 63 Filed 11/14/22 Page 6 of 24 PageID: 402 expressly provides for preemption of state regulation of the trucking industry, 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). That specific p regulation, or other provision [] related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier [] with The overarching goal of preemption pursuant to the FAAAA is to avoid situations where -determining laws, rules and , 552 U.S. 364, 373 (2008). The Supreme Court has outlined the following four guiding principles for applying preemption pursuant to the FAAAA: (1) state enforcement actions having a connection with, or reference to carrier rates, routes, or services are preempted; (2) preemption may occur even if a with respect to preemption in this context, it makes no difference whether a state law is consistent or inconsistent with federal regulation; and (4) preemption occurs at least where state laws have a significant impact related -related objectives. Id. at 370 (quoting Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383-84 (1992)) (interpreting identical provision in Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C. § 1305(a)(1)) (quotation marks omitted). With these guiding principles in mind, the scope of federal preemption pursuant to the FAAAA is understood as broad and encompasses even state laws that only have an indirect effect on the price, route, or service of a motor carrier. Id. In , 569 of property. Taking one step further, courts have even found that the FAAAA preempts not only state statutes and administrative regulations, but also state law-based private claims, such as 6 Case 2:21-cv-04301-EP-JSA Document 63 Filed 11/14/22 Page 7 of 24 PageID: 403 negligence, conversion, and breach of ba See, e.g., Alpine Fresh, Inc. v. Jala Trucking Corp., 181 F. Supp. 3d 250, 257 (D.N.J. 2016) (dismissing breach of bailment and negligence claims because the FAAAA expressly preempts these state common law claims); AMG Res. Corp. v. Wooster Motor Ways, Inc., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6747, 2019 WL 192900, at *4 (D.N.J. Jan. 4, 2019) (finding that state common law claims, including those for conversion and negligence, are preempted by the FAAAA), Smith v. Comair, Inc., 134 F.3d 254 (4th Cir. 1998); Lopez v. Amazon Logistics, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 3d 505, 512 (N.D. Tex. 2020); Deerskin Trading Post, Inc. v. United Parcel Service of America, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 665, 672 (N.D. Ga. 1997). Rowe, 552 U.S. at 371. Additionally, the FAAA contains a few narrow statutory exceptions, where preemption will not occur. Lastly, courts have consistently found that the FAAAA does not preempt routine breach of contract claims because they only seek enforceme -imposed laws, rules, or other provision having the effect of law. See American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 228-29, 233 (1995) (concluding that a breach of contract claim was not preempted, in the context of the Airline Deregulation Act see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Dynamic Worldwide Logistics, Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142926, at *6 (D.N.J. Sept. 5, 2017) (declining to dismiss breach of contract claim because the FAAA does not preempt routine breach of contract claims) (citations omitted). 7 Case 2:21-cv-04301-EP-JSA Document 63 Filed 11/14/22 Page 8 of 24 PageID: 404 Here, West End asserts that the FAAAA preempts all but one claim 5 brought by Siaci: Count Six a Breach of Breach of as a warehouseman. crossclaims for contribution and indemnification. Id. Court agrees with West End. B. 1. Counts Two, Three, Four, Five, and Six, and Prayer for Punitive Damages of the SAC are Preempted by the FAAAA : law-based negligence, breach of bailment, and conversion claims brought against Defendants as carriers state law-based material and unreasonable deviation and gross negligence If those claims are preempted by the FAAAA, then they should be dismissed. For the reasons that follow, the Court agrees with West End. encompass these claims, West End cites to a series of persuasive cases in which courts concluded that the FAAAA preempts state law-based claims of, inter alia, negligence, breach of bailment, and conversion. The Court notes that the reasoning in these cases also applies to claims for gross negligence and material and unreasonable deviation, as well as for the recovery of punitive 5 8 Case 2:21-cv-04301-EP-JSA Document 63 Filed 11/14/22 Page 9 of 24 PageID: 405 damages. In each case, one party brings claims arising from the transportation of goods against the motor carrier (e.g., truck) responsible for such transportation. See Assicurazioni Generali v. Harbor Freight Transp. Corp., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71935 (D.N.J. Apr. 14, 2021) (finding that the FAAAA preempted negligence and breach of contract claims brought by Italian-based seller of goods against trucking and warehouse company that was hired to transport aircraft parts from Port Elizabeth, New Jersey to a New Jersey warehouse for one leg of the aircraft parts eventual shipment to Canada, but where shipment was damaged); KZY Logistics, LLC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143255 (D.N.J. Sept. 5, 2017) (finding that the FAAAA preempted unjust enrichment claim brought against broker of motor carrier services that was hired to help coordinate the transport of products from Pennsylvania to California, but where shipment was damaged). In every case the courts found that the state law-based claims at issue -based claims were necessarily preempted. In rebuttal, Siaci does not directly address whether the FAAAA preempts its state lawbased negligence, gross negligence, breach of bailment, and conversion claims, as well as its prayer for punitive damages, against West End. Instead, Siaci raises two arguments that miss the point. First, Siaci asserts that the cases West End cites to are governed by the Carmack Amendment, rather than the FAAAA. But the Carmack Amendment is only implicated in -shipping contract [and tort] claims alleging loss or da Certain Underwriters at Interest at Lloyds of London v. United Parcel Serv. Of Am., Inc., 762 F.3d 332, 336 (3d Cir. 2014). Here, West End was involved only in an intrastate shipment from Port arehouse in Monroe Township, New Jersey. D.E. 41 9 Case 2:21-cv-04301-EP-JSA Document 63 Filed 11/14/22 Page 10 of 24 PageID: 406 -5. West End asserts only that the FAAAA applies and the cases it cites to support that proposition. Analysis of just two cases, and Assicurazioni Generali, ma With respect to , while it is true that the case involved an interstate shipment of food products from Pennsylvania to California and that the court dismissed because the claims were preempted by the Carmack Amendment, Siaci conveniently omits a couple of important facts. First, the court sua sponte dismissed the breach of contract and negligence claims finding that they were preempted by the Carmack Amendment, but these claims were not raised in the pending motion before the court. See 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143255, at *12-13. Second, the actual pending motion was a motion to dismiss, brought by a broker, thirdparty defendant, asserting that the FAAAA and ICCTA preempted the thirdenrichment claim, which the court did in fact grant. Id FAAAA did not apply in e , because the court sua sponte found that the Carmack Amendment also applied, is misplaced. With respect to Assicurazioni Generali, where the pending motion before the court was one brought by a motor carrier that was involved solely in the intrastate leg of an ultimately international shipment of goods, the court found that the FAAAA preempted the breach of bailment claim brought by an Italian-based seller of goods. See 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71935, at *2-5. Notably, like here, the motor carrier moved to dismiss a negligence claim, but the court did not ultimately need to address the argument that the negligence claim was also preempted by the FAAAA because the Italian-based seller of goods conceded as to that argument. Id. at *5. Siaci, again, mischaracterizes this case as being one governed by the Carmack Amendment, to the 10 Case 2:21-cv-04301-EP-JSA Document 63 Filed 11/14/22 Page 11 of 24 PageID: 407 concerning the Carmack Amendment. Bu comprehensive federal legislation, the FAAAA, which also [like the Carmack Amendment] directly addresses the Id. at *4. In other words, the court mentioned the Carmack Amendment in support of its proposition that courts should be reluctant to supplement comprehensive federal legislation with common law, like the FAAAA, but not for the proposition that its ultimate decision was grounded in the Carmack Amendment.6 Additionally, the motor carrier moving to dismiss in Assicurazioni Generali was involved distinguish this case as one involving only an interstate shipment is futile. Instead, the Court finds tion. Next, Siaci argues that state law-based claims for injury to persons or property are not preempted because there is no federal legislation expressly authorizing such preemption in cases t 5-6. Specifically, Siaci questions See id. at 6. West End responds that the question of whether the FAAAA preempts state law-based non-contractual claims against motor carriers and brokers involving both intrastate and interstate 6 Siaci incorrectly states that the court in Assicurazioni Generali further explained its reference to the Carmack Amendment in a stay ordered later in the proceedings. See context of that stay involved a party seeking to intervene in the case, and in turn, if successful with its intervention, to stay the proceedings, because it was involved in liquidation proceedings in South Carolina. See Assicurazioni Generali v. Harbor Freight Transp. Corp., 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11225, at *4of facilitating a uniform and orderly liquidation process, the Court will stay the present action 11 Case 2:21-cv-04301-EP-JSA Document 63 Filed 11/14/22 Page 12 of 24 PageID: 408 shipments is wellfrom sister courts reinforcing its proposition that the FAAAA preempts state law-based noncontractual claims in cases involving damage to goods that were shipped in intrastate and interstate shipping. See, e.g., Luccio v. UPS, Co., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13069, at *4-5 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 31, negligence claim against UPS for mishandling statutory interpretation support the conclusion that the FAAAA was intended to apply to intrastate as well as inters ourts, and thus, West End. Additionally, the Court finds it notable that the specific provision providing for preemption 14501(c)(1). The Court will not ignore such a clear expression by Congress to preempt certain state law-based claims. Thus, the Court concludes that the FAAAA applies to the intrastate transportation of property by motor carriers, which is directly at issue with respect to West End -based negligence, gross negligence, breach of bailment, conversion, and punitive damages claims against West End are preempted by the FAAAA. Furth contractual claims, its prayer for punitive damages seeks to enlarge or enhance the existing bargain between Siaci and West End, such that FAAAA preemption is implicated. See Travel All Over the World, Inc. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 73 F.3d 1423, 1432 n.8 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that FAAAA preempts state law punitive damages because they represent an enlargement or Deerskin Trading Post v. UPS of Am., 972 F. Supp. 665, 673 12 Case 2:21-cv-04301-EP-JSA Document 63 Filed 11/14/22 Page 13 of 24 PageID: 409 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (finding that FAAAA preempted, inter alia gross negligence, and punitive damages). Thus, the Court concludes that Siaci may not recover punitive damages from West End, a motor carrier, as it would be an enlargement or enhancement of Finally, the Court notes that at least one of the nonmoving defendants is not a motor carrier or broker of motor carrier services within the meaning of the FAAAA. As such, the FAAAA does -based non-contractual claims against all defendants. But because the first four counts alleged in the SAC do not differentiate between the motor carrierand non-motor carrier-defendants, the Court will dismiss these state law-based non-contractual claims. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the negligence, breach of bailment, and conversion claims brought against Defendants as carriers, the material and unreasonable deviation and gross negligence claims brought against West End as a carrier, and the prayer for punitive damages from West End without prejudice. 2. West End was not a warehouseman Siaci brings five additional claims solely against West End as a warehouseman: breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, breach of bailment, and gross negligence. SAC ¶¶ 4965. With respect to the gross negligence claim, Siaci seeks punitive damages from West End. Id. ¶ 65. Whether these claims and the prayer for punitive damages may proceed turns on whether t for twelve (12) days, before making final delivery to XPO Logistics, made For the reasons that follow, the breach of warranty, negligence, breach of bailment, and gross 13 Case 2:21-cv-04301-EP-JSA Document 63 Filed 11/14/22 Page 14 of 24 PageID: 410 negligence claims, as well as its prayer for punitive damages, because West End was a motor carrier and not a warehouseman. First, the Court must answer whether if by holding the Cosmetics Shipment for 12 days prior to final delivery West End lost its status as a motor carrier and became a warehouseman. If the answer is yes, then the FAAAA would not preempt claims and prayer for punitive damages against West End because the FAAAA applies only to motor carriers, brokers of motor carrier services, and freight forwarders. See 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). If the answer is no, then the laims and prayer for punitive damages against West End because from Port Elizabeth, New Jersey to the time it delivered the same to XPO Logistics. The Court concludes that the answer is no. West End claims that its status never changed to that of a warehouseman because its duty as a motor carrier continued until it made final delivery to XPO Logistics. Mot. at 8-9. While not directly on point, West End cites to a series of persuasive duty continues until final delivery. See Mot. at 8-10 (citing, e.g., Estherville Product Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co., 57 F.2d 50, 52-53 (8th Cir. 1932); M.C. Mach Sys. v. Maher Terminals, 164 N.J. 192, 211 (2000); Johnson & Dealaman, Inc. v. Wm. F. Hegarty, Inc., 93 N.J. Super. 14, 224 A.2d 510, 513 (App. Div. 1966)). motor carrier to warehouseman because the Cosmetics Shipment was West End allegedly held the goods for 12 days at its own warehouse prior to final delivery. Siaci The Court persuasive. A general comparison of who is a carrier and his duty versus who is a warehouseman and his duty is instructive. 14 Case 2:21-cv-04301-EP-JSA Document 63 Filed 11/14/22 Page 15 of 24 PageID: 411 See ., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13464, at *11 (D.N.J. Jan. 25, 2021). See Burr v. Adams Exp. Co., 71 N.J.L. 263, 268 (1904) (citations omitted). Whereas, a warehouseman is someone See Dearborn Chem. Co. v. Div. of Tax Appeals, Etc, 135 N.J.L. 580, 582-83 (1947) (citing 1910 N.J. Comp. Stat. § 58). The 1907 N.J. Laws 133, § 21. But a held to be a warehous See Maritime Petroleum Corp. v. Jersey City, 1 N.J. 287, 293 (1949) (citing Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Erie R.R. Co., 103 N.J.L. 579 (1927). Here, based on this general comparison of a carrier versus a warehouseman, it is clear that West End was a carrier because it was engaged to transport the Cosmetics Shipment from the Ship at Port Elizabeth, New Jersey to Monroe Township, New Jersey, where it had a duty to make delivery to XPO Logistics. Specifically, West End was a motor carrier because it was engaged to fulfill its duty as carrier via truck. It is also clear that West End was not a warehouseman because nothing in the SAC reasonably leads to the conclusion that West End was in the business of storing goods for profit. Additionally, while it is possible for a carrier to also be a warehouseman, the facts in the SAC do not support that conclusion either because West End was not storing the that West End was not a warehouseman. 15 Case 2:21-cv-04301-EP-JSA Document 63 Filed 11/14/22 Page 16 of 24 PageID: 412 Furthermore, the Court notes tha at all times between the time West End first picked up and finally delivered the same is ultimately irrelevant. Siaci cites two cases that it claims support its position that because the Cosmetics Shipment was not in transit for 12 days atus changed from motor carrier to warehouseman. his proposition. The Court cases to underscore this point. First, Boonton Handbag Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 125 N.J. Super. 287, 288-89 (App. Div. 1973), is a case about the scope of a motor carrier policy only covered the an insurance policy, where the loaded for shipment and in transi Boonton Handbag Co., the goods had already arrived at their final destination and were merely being stored prior to unloading when they were stolen. Id. at 289. The court found that the loss of the goods at the time of the theft. Id. at 289-90. Second, like in Boonton Handbag Co. but unlike here, Den Gre Plastics Co., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 107 N.J. Super. 535, 537 (Law Div. 1969), is also a case about the scope of Den Gre Plastics Co., Inc. employee load employees for delivery days later. Id. at 537-38. The court found that the loss of the goods in the stolen truck was not covered by the insurance policy because the goods were never actually in 16 Case 2:21-cv-04301-EP-JSA Document 63 Filed 11/14/22 Page 17 of 24 PageID: 413 transit, as the 10destination[.] Id. at 542-43. The Court does not find Boonton Handbag Co. nor Den Gre Plastics Co., Inc. persuasive for at least a couple of reasons. First, this is not a case about the interpretation of an insurance policy. Second, nowhere do the courts in Boonton Handbag Co. or Den Gre Plastics Co., Inc. outline: what a carrier is or its duty; what a warehouseman is or its duty; nor what bearing the Thus, S Cosmetics Shipment for 12 days prior to final delivery to XPO Logistics did not make West End a warehouseman. As such, for the reasons expressed in supra Section III.B.I., non- contractual claims for breach of warranty, negligence, breach of bailment, and gross negligence, as well as its prayer for punitive damages, brought against West End as a warehouseman are preempted by the FAAAA because West End was not a warehouseman. Additionally, because the Court concludes that West End was not a warehouseman, it dismissed as duplicative of Accordingly brought against West End as a warehouseman, as well as C. are Preempted by the FAAAA law-based contribution and indemnification crossclaims, and as such those claims should be dismissed. MSC raises two primary arguments against FAAAA preemption of its contribution 17 Case 2:21-cv-04301-EP-JSA Document 63 Filed 11/14/22 Page 18 of 24 PageID: 414 and indemnification crossclaims against West End. 7 For the reasons that follow, the Court agrees with West End. 1. First, MSC argues that its crossclaims are premised on federal maritime law rather than upholding the proposition that federal maritime claims apply against a motor carrier for alleged damages sustained to cargo during its transportation. Reply at 5-6. maritime jurisdiction. Maritime-based claims for contribution and indemnification may be grounded in either contract or tort law in limited circumstances. The Court ultimately concludes jurisdiction. y local, federal Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. James N. Kirby, Pty Ltd., 543 U.S. 14, 22-23 (2004) (citing Kossick v. United Fruit Co. bill of lading requires substantial carriage of goods by sea, its purpose is to effectuate maritime commerce Id. at 27. The specific federal law that then governs the contract interpretation is see also Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 7 MSC makes two additional passive arguments: additional discovery is needed to determine if there is a contractual contribution or indemnification claim; and references to the Carmack Amendment and other federal law preemption cases are irrelevant. See 8FAAAA preemption arguments, and does so without prejudice, then the Court need not reach these two additional arguments. 18 Case 2:21-cv-04301-EP-JSA Document 63 Filed 11/14/22 Page 19 of 24 PageID: 415 goods are loaded on to the time when they are discharged from maritime contract. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 543 U.S. at 29. Here, MSC issued or caused to be issued a bill of lading, which provided for the transported by sea from Genoa, Italy to the Port of New York and New Jersey, and later delivery to the Port of Elizabeth, New Jersey. See SAC ¶ 15. But because the last leg of the shipment was transportation of the Cosmetics Shipment via truck, federal maritime law presumably does not apply to the crossclaims against West End, who was only involved in that last leg of the shipment. This presumption would be overcome and the relevant federal maritime law, COGSA, would apply to West End, if it was shown that the parties specifically stipulated to that in a maritime contract. specifically extended the scope of the COGSA to West international shipment. Additionally, there is no indication in the pleadings that MSC and West West End would fall within the scope of federal maritime law. But federal maritime law may apply and allow a noncontractual contribution or indemnification action to lie where parties do not have a contractual relationship if the action is derived from an underlying maritime tort. See, e.g., Tri-State Oil Tool Indus., Inc. v. Delta Marine Drilling Co., 410 F.2d 178, 186 (5th Cir. 1969) (finding that maritime law governed noncontractual indemnification claim because underlying tortious conduct occurred in navigable waters); White 19 Case 2:21-cv-04301-EP-JSA Document 63 Filed 11/14/22 Page 20 of 24 PageID: 416 v. Johns-Manville Corp., 662 F.2d 243, 247 (4th Cir. 1981) (finding that tort occurring on pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) over a tort claim must satisfy conditions both of location and of Neely v. Club Med Management Servs., 63 F.3d 166, 178-179 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 554 (3d Cir. 1995)). Id. (citation omitted). the type of incident involved to determine whether the incident has a potentially disrupting impact on shows a substantial relationship to traditional maritime Id. (citation omitted). and as such cannot satisfy the l that both cases MSC cites in support of its position involve torts that either occurred on navigable water or on land caused by a vessel on navigable water. See Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Kopke, 417 U.S. 106 (1974) (concluding that longshoreman injured on a ship at sea could recover from negligent stevedore in a direct action and shipowner and charterer were properly granted contribution from negligent stevedore as they were entitled to same right of recovery as longshoreman); see also Federal Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Burnside Shipping Co., 394 U.S. 404 (1969) (allowing maritime tort claim to lie where longshoreman fell into an unprotected deep tank opening and was killed while readying a vessel for its grain cargo). 20 Case 2:21-cv-04301-EP-JSA Document 63 Filed 11/14/22 Page 21 of 24 PageID: 417 because at best the crossclaims have only a tenuous maritime connection: the Cosmetics Shipment was shipped overseas from Italy to the United States. Maybe the maritime connection would be less tenuous if the parties were certain that the cargo was lost at sea because the events giving rise to the tort claims would at least have occurred at sea, but the Court will not indulge such speculation. are not maritime torts falling within the scope of federal maritime law. 2. Alternatively, MSC argues that even if its crossclaims were premised on state law that there -based non-contractual claims against West End, supra Section III.B., also appli crossclaims because they are also state law-based non-contractual claims, which are preempted by the FAAAA. See Peening Techs. Equip., LLC v. Northeast Riggers, Inc., 2022 Conn. Super. LEXIS 54, at *5-6 (Conn. Supp. Jan. 10, 2022) (concluding that the FAAA preempted indemnification claim seeking damages relating to transportation of machine to customer because the see also Custom Stud, Inc. v. Meadow Lark Agency, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 3d 950, 954-956 (D. Minn. 2021) (finding that all counterclaims, including those for contribution and indemnification, derived from alleged actions leading up to or following the transportation of law, such that Congress intended their preemption pursuant to the FAAAA). 8 8 The Court notes that further analysis would have been required here if MSC and West End had a direct contractual relationship because the FAAA does not preempt routine breach of contract 21 Case 2:21-cv-04301-EP-JSA Document 63 Filed 11/14/22 Page 22 of 24 PageID: 418 In Tokio Marine Am. Ins. Co. v. Jan Packaging, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 240798, at *3-4 (D.N.J. Dec. 18, 2020), multiple parties agreed to facilitate and transport the shipment of electronic equipment, by motor and sea carrier, from California to China. Some of the equipment was damaged upon arrival in New Jersey, which resulted in the filing of claims and crossclaims by different parties. Id. One of the motor carriers involved in the transport of the equipment from Massachusetts to New Jersey, Jan Packaging, filed crossclaims against the other motor carriers involved in that same leg of the shipment, including for contribution and indemnification. Id. One of the other motor carriers, MTS, moved to dismiss, inter alia indemnification crossclaim. Id. MTS argued that the FAAAA expressly preempted that crossclaim. Id. at *14-15. The court agreed with MTS and concluded that the crossclaim (like the [is] therefore p Id. at *15-16. Specifically, the court reasoned that Jan laintiff] for any loss or damage to the equipment, such liability was caused or brought about the acts or omissions of Id. at *16-17. It follows that because the contribution and indemnification crossclaim was premised on the acts or omissions giving rise to a state law-based claim, negligence, that was preempted by the FAAAA, then the crossclaim was also necessarily preempted by the same. See id. Thus, the court dismissed both the negligence and contribution and indemnification crossclaims brought against Jan Packaging. Id. at *17. claims do not allege a contractual relationship between MSC and West End, and therefore, the Court will not assume that its crossclaims arise out of a contract and fall outside the ambit of the FAAAA. 22 Case 2:21-cv-04301-EP-JSA Document 63 Filed 11/14/22 Page 23 of 24 PageID: 419 The reasoning in Tokio Marine Am. Ins. Co. indemnification crossclaims against West End arise, not from a contractual relationship between the two parties, but rather from acts of bailment, and conversion claims. Because those claims brought by Siaci are preempted by the FAAAA, as to West End, then the acts or omissions that gave rise to those claims also cannot serve indemnification crossclaims attempt to do just that. See id. at *14-15 (citing Spring Hill Jersey Cheese, Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160888, at *5-8 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 29, any motor carrier by the FAAAA. -based crossclaims will be dismissed without prejudice. 23 Case 2:21-cv-04301-EP-JSA Document 63 Filed 11/14/22 Page 24 of 24 PageID: 420 IV. CONCLUSION GRANTED. As such, Two Three Four brought against Defendants, , crossclaims for contribution and indemnification will be DISMISSED without prejudice. An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion. Dated: November 14, 2022 _______________________ Hon. Evelyn Padin, U.S.D.J. 24

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