Mathews #222809 v. Gainer et al, No. 1:2019cv00493 - Document 8 (W.D. Mich. 2019)
Court Description: OPINION; signed by District Judge Paul L. Maloney (Judge Paul L. Maloney, cmc)
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Mathews &#035;222809 v. Gainer et al Doc. 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION ______ ANTONIO MATHEWS, Plaintiff, v. Case No. 1:19-cv-493 Honorable Paul L. Maloney UNKNOWN GAINER et al., Defendants. ____________________________/ OPINION This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim. Discussion I. Factual allegations Plaintiff Antonio Mathews is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Earnest C. Brooks Correctional Facility (LRF) in Muskegon Heights, Michigan. The events about which he complains, however, occurred at the Oaks Dockets.Justia.com Correctional Facility (ECF) in Manistee, Michigan. Plaintiff sues the following MDOC employees at ECF: Correctional Officer Unknown Gainer and Lieutenant Unknown Clifford. Plaintiff alleges he witnessed a fight between two prisoners in the ECF prison yard on October 2, 2018. During the fight, he was arrested and taken to segregation. Defendant Gainer allegedly charged Plaintiff with a major misconduct, falsely accusing Plaintiff of being involved in the fight. Defendant Clifford allegedly “re-reviewed” the misconduct report but “failed to do his job duty as a reviewing officer.” (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) As a result, Plaintiff was placed in segregation for 56 days, and placed on room restriction for 68 days. He lost his prison job, his phone privileges, his yard privileges, and the ability to participate in the “one day with God” program. (Id., PageID.4.) Plaintiff has attached a number of documents to the complaint that are related to his misconduct proceedings, including the following: the misconduct report, the misconduct hearing report, Plaintiff’s request for a rehearing, a response to Plaintiff’s request for a rehearing, and a misconduct hearing report following a rehearing. (See ECF No. 1-1, PageID.10-18.) According to these documents, Officer Gainer charged Plaintiff with assault and battery, and Sergeant Mackey reviewed the misconduct report with Plaintiff. (See id., PageID.10.) Lieutenant Clifford provided a statement to the hearing investigator. Hearing Officer Burke found Plaintiff guilty of the misconduct after a hearing, citing video of the incident and other evidence, but Plaintiff successfully appealed that decision. Hearings Administrator Russell ordered a rehearing. Officer Pallas held a rehearing on April 19, 2019, and dismissed the misconduct charge against Plaintiff because the video of the incident did not provide sufficient support for the charge. Plaintiff contends that Defendants deprived him of liberty interests without due process. He contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the misconduct charge, but 2 Defendants did not follow state law, prison policy directives, or prison handbooks regarding misconduct reports. If they had done so, they would not have instigated the misconduct report or allowed the misconduct charge to proceed based on insufficient evidence. Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages for the loss of money he has suffered due to the loss of his prison job, as well as punitive damages from each defendant. II. Failure to state a claim A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “‘to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the 3 Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). Plaintiff contends that Defendants deprived him of liberty interests without due process. The Fourteenth Amendment protects an individual from deprivation of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.” Bazetta v. McGinnis, 430 F.3d 795, 801 (6th Cir. 2005). To establish a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process violation, a plaintiff must show that one of these interests is at stake. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). Analysis of a procedural due process claim involves two steps: “[T]he first asks whether there exists a liberty or property interest which has been interfered with by the State; the second examines whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient.” Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989). The Supreme Court long has held that the Due Process Clause does not protect every change in the conditions of confinement having an impact on a prisoner. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976). In Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995), the Court set forth the standard for determining when a state-created right creates a federally cognizable liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. According to that Court, a prisoner is entitled to the 4 protections of due process only when the sanction “will inevitably affect the duration of his sentence” or when a deprivation imposes an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486-87; see also Jones v. Baker, 155 F.3d 810, 812 (6th Cir. 1998); Rimmer-Bey v. Brown, 62 F.3d 789, 790-91 (6th Cir. 1995). Plaintiff’s misconduct charge and conviction affected a number of Plaintiff’s interests, but none of them fall into either of the categories identified in Sandin as protected by due process, i.e., an inevitable effect on the duration of Plaintiff’s sentence or an atypical and significant hardship. As to the first category, Plaintiff has not alleged a deprivation that will inevitably affect the duration of his sentence. A prisoner like Plaintiff, who is serving an indeterminate sentence for an offense committed after 2000, can accumulate “disciplinary time” for a major misconduct conviction. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 800.34. Disciplinary time is considered by the Michigan Parole Board when it determines whether to grant parole. Id. § 800.34(2). It does not necessarily affect the length of a prisoner’s sentence because it is “simply a record that will be presented to the parole board to aid its [parole] determination.” Taylor v. Lantagne, 418 F. App’x 408, 412 (6th Cir. 2011). As to the second category, Plaintiff has not alleged that he suffered a “significant and atypical deprivation.” Plaintiff notes that he was placed in segregation for 56 days and put on room restriction for 68 days. Confinement in administrative segregation “is the sort of confinement that inmates should reasonably anticipate receiving at some point in their incarceration.” Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983). Thus, it is considered atypical and significant only in “extreme circumstances.” Joseph v. Curtin, 410 F. App’x 865, 868 (6th Cir. 2010). Generally, courts will consider the nature and duration of a stay in segregation to determine 5 whether it imposes an “atypical and significant hardship.” Harden-Bey v. Rutter, 524 F.3d 789, 794 (6th. Cir. 2008). In Sandin, the Supreme Court concluded that the segregation at issue in that case (disciplinary segregation for 30 days) did not impose an atypical and significant hardship. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. Similarly, the Sixth Circuit has held that placement in administrative segregation for two months does not require the protections of due process. See Joseph v. Curtin, 410 F. App’x 865, 868 (6th Cir. 2010) (61 days in segregation is not atypical and significant). It has also held, in specific circumstances, that confinement in segregation for a much longer period of time does not implicate a liberty interest. See, e.g., Baker, 155 F.3d at 812-23 (two years of segregation while the inmate was investigated for the murder of a prison guard in a riot); Mackey v. Dyke, 111 F.3d 460 (6th Cir. 1997) (one year of segregation following convictions for possession of illegal contraband and assault, including a 117-day delay in reclassification due to prison crowding). Generally, only periods of segregation lasting for several years or more have been found to be atypical and significant. See, e.g., Selby v. Caruso, 734 F.3d 554, 559 (6th Cir. 2013) (13 years of segregation implicates a liberty interest); Harris v. Caruso, 465 F. App’x 481, 484 (6th Cir. 2012) (eight years of segregation implicates a liberty interest); Harden-Bey, 524 F.3d at 795 (remanding to the district court to consider whether the plaintiff's allegedly “indefinite” period of segregation, i.e., three years without an explanation from prison officials, implicates a liberty interest). Plaintiff’s confinement in segregation for 56 days is less than the 60-day period in Joseph that the Sixth Circuit held was not atypical and significant. Even after adding 68 days of room restriction, the restrictions imposed on Plaintiff were far less significant than the lengthy periods of segregation in Mackey and Baker, which did not implicate a liberty interest. Thus, 6 Plaintiff’s confinement in segregation and placement on room restriction did not trigger a right to due process. The same is true for the loss of yard and phone privileges, the loss of prison employment, and the loss of ability to participate in a religious program, all of which are expected consequences of confinement in segregation. If Plaintiff’s confinement in segregation does not implicate a protected liberty interest, it follows that the loss of privileges stemming from that confinement do not implicate such an interest. Furthermore, federal courts consistently have found that prisoners have no constitutionally protected liberty interest in prison vocational, rehabilitation, and educational programs under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9 (1976) (Due Process Clause not implicated by prisoner classification and eligibility for rehabilitative programs, even where inmate suffers “grievous loss”); Argue v. Hofmeyer, 80 F. App’x 427, 429 (6th Cir. 2003) (prisoners have no constitutional right to rehabilitation, education or jobs); Canterino v. Wilson, 869 F.2d 948, 952-54 (6th Cir. 1989) (no constitutional right to rehabilitation); Newsom v. Norris, 888 F.2d 371, 374 (6th Cir. 1989) (no constitutional right to prison employment); Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 955 (6th Cir. 1987) (“[N]o prisoner has a constitutional right to a particular job or to any job”); Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1431 (7th Cir. 1996) (participation in a rehabilitative program is a privilege that the Due Process Clause does not guarantee); Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 531 (9th Cir. 1985) (no constitutional right to rehabilitative services). Moreover, “as the Constitution and federal law do not create a property right for inmates in a job, they likewise do not create a property right to wages for work performed by inmates.” Carter, 69 F. App’x at 680 (citing Williams v. Meese, 926 F.2d 994, 997 (10th Cir. 1991), and James v. Quinlan, 866 F.2d 627, 629-30 (3d Cir. 1989)). Consequently, Plaintiff’s loss of privileges and loss of wages associated with his prison job did not trigger a right to due process. 7 Plaintiff relies upon prison policies and prison manuals as the source of his right to due process. In other words, he contends that certain policies and prison manuals provide him with state-created rights by specifying requirements and procedures that prison officials must follow when charging a prisoner with misconduct or when investigating that misconduct. Plaintiff’s reliance is misplaced. As the Supreme Court stated in Sandin, using “mandatory language in prisoner regulations” as a source for interests protected by due process “stray[s] from the real concerns undergirding the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. Prison regulations are “primarily designed to guide correctional officials in the administration of a prison.” Id. at 482. They are not designed “to confer rights on inmates[.]” Id. Accordingly, the Court held that state-created interests “will generally be limited to freedom from restraint which . . . imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents or prison life.” Id. (citations omitted). Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendants imposed such a restraint on him. Thus, he does not state a due process claim. Furthermore, even if Plaintiff had alleged the loss of a protected liberty interest, he would not state a due process claim because it is clear that he received all the process due to him. In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), the Supreme Court held that prison disciplinary proceedings implicating a liberty interest must provide the following minimum process: (i) at least 24 hours of advance notice of the charges, (ii) the right to call witnesses and to present evidence in the inmate’s defense, (iii) an impartial tribunal, and (iv) a written statement of evidence relied on by the disciplinary board and the reasons for the disciplinary action. Id. at 563-69. Plaintiff’s allegations and the documents attached to his complaint indicate that he received all of the procedures specified in Wolff. He received notice of the charges in the misconduct report, which he reviewed with Officer Clifford on October 3, 2018. He received a 8 hearing and an opportunity to respond to the charges at a hearing before an impartial hearing officer on October 11, 2018. The hearing officer issued a written decision in the misconduct hearing report, identifying the evidence that he used to support his decision. And finally, Plaintiff was able to challenge that decision. Plaintiff does not allege any defects in the process he received. Instead, his claim is that the reviewing officers should not have allowed the charge to proceed because it was not supported by on the evidence. However, the right to due process protects Plaintiff’s ability to respond to spurious charges. It does not include the right to prevent them. Thus, for all the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff does not state a due process claim. To the extent Plaintiff relies solely upon Defendants’ alleged violation of state law or prison policies as the basis for his § 1983 claim, he does not state a viable claim. Section 1983 does not provide redress for a violation of a state law. Pyles v. Raisor, 60 F.3d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir. 1995); Sweeton v. Brown, 27 F.3d 1162, 1166 (6th Cir. 1994). Moreover, an alleged failure to comply with an administrative rule or policy does not itself rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Laney v. Farley, 501 F.3d 577, 581 n.2 (6th Cir. 2007); Brody v. City of Mason, 250 F.3d 432, 437 (6th Cir. 2001); Smith v. Freland, 954 F.2d 343, 347-48 (6th Cir. 1992); Barber v. City of Salem, 953 F.2d 232, 240 (6th Cir. 1992); McVeigh v. Bartlett, No. 94-23347, 1995 WL 236687, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 21, 1995) (failure to follow policy directive does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation because policy directive does not create a protectible liberty interest). In short, Plaintiff fails to state a viable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 9 Conclusion Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court determines that the complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997). The Court does not certify that an appeal would not be in good faith. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the $505.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g). If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $505.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum. This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). A judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered. Dated: August 6, 2019 /s/ Paul L. Maloney Paul L. Maloney United States District Judge 10
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