-ESC Battle #220889 v. Brown et al, No. 1:2010cv00992 - Document 10 (W.D. Mich. 2010)

Court Description: OPINION; Judgment to issue; signed by Judge Janet T. Neff (Judge Janet T. Neff, clb)

Download PDF
-ESC Battle #220889 v. Brown et al Doc. 10 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION STANLEY BATTLE, Plaintiff, Case No. 1:10-cv-992 v. Honorable Janet T. Neff CHARLES BROWN et al., Defendants. ____________________________________/ OPINION This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and Plaintiff has paid the initial partial filing fee. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, PUB. L. NO. 104-134, 110 STAT. 1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A. The Court must read Plaintiff s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, Plaintiff s action will be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Dockets.Justia.com Discussion I. Factual allegations Plaintiff Stanley Battle presently is incarcerated at the Thumb Correctional Facility. Following a jury trial, Plaintiff was convicted of eleven counts of armed robbery, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.529. On May 3, 1994, Wayne County Circuit Court sentenced Plaintiff, as a thirdfelony offender, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 769.11, to eleven terms of life imprisonment. On June 10, 1996, Plaintiff went before the court on new charges of felony murder, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.316, assault with intent to commit armed robbery, MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 750.89, armed robbery, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.529, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.227b. He pleaded guilty to armed robbery in exchange for dismissal of the other charges. On June 26, 1996, he was sentenced to a prison term of 5 to 15 years. On November 22, 2005, Plaintiff was discharged from custody on the 1996 sentence because the term of sentence had expired. He remained in custody on the eleven life sentences imposed on May 3, 1994. On February 25, 2009, Plaintiff was interviewed by Michigan Parole Board member Defendant Charles Brown regarding possible parole. At the time of the interview, Brown noted that a victim had been shot during the robbery and asked Plaintiff if he knew anything about the shooting. Plaintiff does not indicate how he responded. The parole board denied parole on March 12, 2009, relying in part on the fact that a victim had been shot during the course of the robbery. The notice of parole denial scheduled the next parole interview for May 3, 2014. Plaintiff asserts that the parole board s decision was based on false information in the parole record. According to Plaintiff, the only victim who was shot during any of his armed -2- robbery offenses was shot during the course of the offense for which he was sentenced in 1996. Plaintiff claims that, since those offenses have since expired, the parole board improperly relied upon any injury to a victim when determining whether to release Plaintiff on parole for the eleven armed robberies for which he was sentenced on May 3, 1994. Plaintiff sues Michigan Parole Board member Charles Brown and Chairperson Barbara Sampson. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief barring Defendants from relying on the fact that a victim was shot or any other fact concerning his now-expired armed robbery conviction in determining whether to grant parole. II. Failure to state a claim A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) ( Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. ). The court must determine whether the complaint contains enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Ashcroft, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a probability requirement, . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Ashcroft, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). [W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the -3- court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged but it has not show[n] that the pleader is entitled to relief. Ashcroft, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Dominguez v. Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). A challenge to the fact or duration of confinement should be brought as a petition for habeas corpus and is not the proper subject of a civil rights action brought pursuant to § 1983. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484, 494 (1973) (the essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody and the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody). The Supreme Court has held that a state prisoner cannot make a cognizable claim under § 1983 for an alleged unconstitutional conviction or for harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid unless a prisoner shows that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus . . . . Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) (citation omitted); see also Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646-48 (1997). However, in Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005), the Supreme Court clarified the Heck rule, finding that a state prisoner s § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation) -4- no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner s suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings) if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration. ) (emphasis in original). Plaintiff does not seek release from prison; rather, he appears to request a new parole hearing at which only certain facts would be considered. As a consequence, under Wilkinson, his success in the action would not necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of his continued confinement, so his action does not appear to be Heck-barred. Nevertheless, assuming that Plaintiff s action is cognizable under § 1983, it fails to state a claim as set forth herein. Plaintiff claims that Defendant violated his due process rights by denying his parole. To establish a procedural due process violation, a plaintiff must prove that (1) he was deprived of a protected liberty or property interest, and (2) such deprivation occurred without the requisite due process of law. Club Italia Soccer & Sports Org., Inc. v. Charter Twp. of Shelby, 470 F.3d 286, 296 (6th Cir. 2006); see also Swihart v. Wilkinson, 209 F. App x 456, 458 (6th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff fails to raise a claim of constitutional magnitude because he has no liberty interest in being released on parole. There is no constitutional or inherent right to be conditionally released before the expiration of a prison sentence. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). Although a state may establish a parole system, it has no duty to do so; thus, the presence of a parole system by itself does not give rise to a constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole release. Id. at 7, 11; Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 373 (1987). Rather, a liberty interest is present only if state law entitles an inmate to release on parole. Inmates of Orient Corr. Inst. v. Ohio State Adult Parole Auth., 929 F.2d 233, 235 (6th Cir. 1991). -5- In Sweeton v. Brown, 27 F.3d 1162, 1164-165 (6th Cir. 1994) (en banc), the Sixth Circuit, noting the broad powers of the Michigan authorities to deny parole, held that the Michigan system does not create a liberty interest in parole. Subsequent to its 1994 decision, the Sixth Circuit has recognized the continuing validity of Sweeton and has continued to find that Michigan s parole scheme creates no liberty interest in being released on parole. See, e.g., Foster v. Booker, 595 F.3d 353, 368 (6th Cir. 2010); Ward v. Stegall, No. 03-1804, 2004 WL 614581, at *1 (6th Cir. Mar. 24, 2004); Martin v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., No. 03-3642, 2003 WL 22946604, at *1 (6th Cir. Dec. 8, 2003). Also, in unpublished decisions, the Sixth Circuit has held that particular parts of Michigan s statutory parole scheme do not create a liberty interest in parole. See, e.g., Fifer v. Mich. Dep t of Corr., No. 96-2322, 1997 WL 681518, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 30, 1997); Moran v. McGinnis, No. 95-1330, 1996 WL 304344, at *2 (6th Cir. June 5, 1996). In addition, the Michigan Supreme Court has recognized that there exists no liberty interest in parole under the Michigan system. Glover v. Mich. Parole Bd., 596 N.W.2d 598, 603-04 (Mich. 1999). Until Plaintiff has served his maximum sentence of life imprisonment, he has no reasonable expectation of liberty. In the absence of a liberty interest, even an allegation of arbitrary or capricious denial of release on parole states no federal claim. See Haynes, 1990 WL 41025, at *1. The discretionary parole system in Michigan holds out no more than a mere hope that the benefit will be obtained. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11. The Michigan Parole Board s failure or refusal to consider Plaintiff for parole, therefore, implicates no federal right. In the absence of a liberty interest, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for a violation of his procedural due process rights. Plaintiff s related allegation that Defendants relied on false information to deny his parole also fails to state a claim. Because Plaintiff has no liberty interest in being paroled, he cannot -6- show that the false information was relied upon to a constitutionally significant degree. See Caldwell v. McNutt, No. 04-2335, 2006 WL 45275, at *1 (6th Cir. Jan. 10, 2006) ( [E]ven if the Parole Board relied on inaccurate information to deny Caldwell parole, it did not violate any liberty interest protected by the United States Constitution. ); Echlin v. Boland, No. 03-2309, 2004 WL 2203550, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept. 17, 2004) (prisoner could not bring a § 1983 action to challenge the information considered by the parole board because he has no liberty interest in parole); see also Draughn v. Green, No. 97-1263, 1999 WL 164915, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar. 12, 1999) (in order for the Due Process Clause to be implicated, false information in a prisoner s file must be relied on to a constitutionally significant degree); Pukyrys v. Olson, No. 95-1778, 1996 WL 636140, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 30, 1996) (no constitutional violation by having false information placed in a prison file); Carson v. Little, No. 88-1505, 1989 WL 40171, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 18, 1989) (inaccurate information in an inmate s file does not amount to a constitutional violation). Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for a violation of his due process rights arising from the denial of his parole. Conclusion Having conducted the review now required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court determines that Plaintiff s action will be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no good-faith basis for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the $455.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless -7- Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the three-strikes rule of § 1915(g). If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $455.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum. This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). A Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered. Dated: November 10, 2010 /s/ Janet T. Neff Janet T. Neff United States District Judge -8-

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.