Robinson v. Standard Mortgage Corporation et al, No. 2:2015cv04123 - Document 63 (E.D. La. 2016)
Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS that defendants' motion 58 to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is GRANTED. All remaining pending motions in this case are hereby DENIED AS MOOT.. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 8/24/16.(jjs)
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Robinson v. Standard Mortgage Corporation et al Doc. 63 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA J ORDELLA ROBINSON, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF A CLASS OF SIMILARLY SITUATED BORROWERS VERSUS CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-4123 STANDARD MORTGAGE CORPORATION and STANDARD MORTGAGE INSURANCE AGENCY, INC. SECTION “R” (2) ORD ER AN D REASON S Before the Court is defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) m otion to dism iss plaintiff J ordella Robinson’s state law claim s. Defendants request in the alternative that, if any of plaintiff’s state law claim s survive this 12(b)(6) m otion, this Court should dism iss the state law claim s due to lack of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). For the following reasons, the Court declines to exercise supplem ental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law claims and grants defendant’s m otion to dism iss for lack of jurisdiction. Because this Court no longer has jurisdiction over this case, all rem aining pending m otions are denied as m oot. Dockets.Justia.com I. BACKGROU N D In 20 0 4, plaintiff J ordella Robinson purchased a home in Harvey, Louisiana and m ortgaged it to her lender, Standard Mortgage Corporation. 1 The m ortgage agreem ent included a “force-placed”2 insurance clause, which required Robinson to obtain hazard insurance. 3 The agreem ent also authorized Standard to purchase hazard insurance on the property if Robinson failed to do so. 4 When Robinson’s insurance expired and she failed to obtain a new policy, Standard notified her that if she did not obtain new coverage, it would obtain the coverage for her at her expense. 5 Nearly four m onths later, Standard secured an insurance policy on the property at a cost of $ 8,845.20 . 6 In her putative class action com plaint, Robinson alleges that defendants colluded to m anipulate the force-placed insurance market by 1 R. Doc. 38 at 12 ¶ 53. “Force-placed” insurance refers to when m ortgage lenders require homeowners to m aintain hazard insurance on the m ortgaged property to protect the lender’s interest in the collateral. With a “forceplaced” insurance policy, if a hom eowner fails to obtain the required coverage, the lender can independently acquire the insurance and add the cost of the prem ium s to the principal due under the note. 3 R. Doc. 38 at 12 ¶ 54. 4 Id. 5 Id. at 13 ¶ 58. 6 Id. at 14 ¶ 63; R. Doc. 38-1 at 10 . 2 2 artificially inflating the am ounts that borrowers pay for coverage. 7 Robinson’s complaint alleged violations of the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (Count One); conspiracy to violate RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (Count Two); breach of the im plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (Count Three); and unjust enrichment (Counts Four and Five). On J une 7, 20 16, this Court dism issed Robinson’s RICO claim and RICO conspiracy claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 8 All that rem ains are plaintiff’s state law claim s for breach of the im plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment. II. D ISCU SSION Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), district courts have supplemental jurisdiction over “all other claim s that are so related to the claim s in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” However, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) provides that district courts m ay decline to exercise supplem ental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if “(1) the claim 7 R. Doc. 38 at 6 ¶ 27. For a m ore detailed explanation of the factual background of this case, see R. Doc. 55 at 2-8. 8 R. Doc. 55. 3 raises a novel or com plex issue of State law, (2) the claim substantially predom inates over the claim or claim s over which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dism issed all claim s over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other com pelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.” The language of section 1367(c) and case law m akes clear that this is not a balancing test, any one of the four factors is independently sufficient to justify declining supplemental jurisdiction. See 13D Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 3567.3 (3d ed.). The Supreme Court has given further guidance, instructing federal courts to consider and weigh the values of judicial econom y, convenience, fairness, and com ity in order to decide whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over pendent state law claim s. See Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988). The Fifth Circuit has m ade clear that the “‘general rule is to dism iss state claim s when the federal claims to which they are pendent are dism issed.’” Enochs v. Lam pasas County , 641 F.3d 155, 161 (5th Cir. 20 11) (quoting Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co. v. Dressler Indus., 972 F.2d 580 , 585 (5th Cir. 1992)). Though this rule is neither “mandatory nor absolute,” Batiste v. Island Records Inc., 179 F.3d 217, 227 (5th Cir. 1999), a district court has “wide discretion” to decline to exercise supplem ental jurisdiction 4 over state law claim s once all federal claim s have been dism issed. See Guzzino v. Felterm an, 191 F.3d 588, 595 (5th Cir. 1999). Additionally, the Suprem e Court has noted that when the federal claim s are elim inated before trial, the Carnegie-Mellon factors will norm ally “point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the rem aining state-law claims.” Carnegie-Mellon, 484 U.S. at 350 n. 7. Here, the section 1367(c) factors, the general rule, and the factors from Carnegie-Mellon weigh in favor of declining to exercise supplem ental jurisdiction. Robinson’s federal claim s have been dism issed, satisfying section 1367(c)(3). In term s of novelty and com plexity of state law, the parties have not cited any Louisiana case or statute governing the claims asserted on the specific facts at issue here, and the parties vigorously dispute the m erits of plaintiff’s claim s. Further, this Court has not invested substantial judicial resources in the supplem ental claim s, the trial date is not im m inent, 9 and any work the parties have already done can be utilized in state court. See Robinett v. State Farm Mut. Autom obile Ins. Co., No. 0 20 842, 20 0 2 WL 31498993, at *1 (E.D. La. Nov. 7, 20 0 2), aff’d 83 F. App’x 638 (5th Cir. 20 0 3). Finally, it cannot be said that requiring the parties, all 9 See R. Doc. 49 at 4 (“Trial will com m ence the week beginning, Monday, August 7, 20 17”). 5 Louisiana citizens, to litigate in Louisiana state court would be unfair or inconvenient. III. CON CLU SION IT IS ORDERED that defendants’ m otion to dism iss for lack of subject m atter jurisdiction is GRANTED. All rem aining pending m otions in this case are hereby DENIED AS MOOT. New Orleans, Louisiana, this _ 24th _ day of August, 20 16. ___ _____________________ SARAH S. VANCE UNITED STATES DISTRICT J UDGE 6
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