Naylor v. Village of Ridgway et al, No. 3:2021cv00219 - Document 43 (S.D. Ill. 2022)
Court Description: ORDER granting 19 Motion to Dismiss. For the reasons stated in the attached Memorandum and Order, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 19) is GRANTED. Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED, without prejudice, for a failure to state a claim. Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint by March 21, 2022. (Amended Pleadings due by 3/21/2022). Signed by Judge David W. Dugan on 3/1/2022. (arm)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Naylor v. Village of Ridgway et al Doc. 43 Case 3:21-cv-00219-DWD Document 43 Filed 03/01/22 Page 1 of 12 Page ID #157 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS DAVID M. NAYLOR, Administrator of the Estate of Brooke S. Naylor, Deceased, Plaintiff, vs. VILLAGE OF RIDGWAY, TIMOTHY R CONDON, and TERESA A WHITE, Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. 21-cv-219-DWD MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DUGAN, District Judge: Plaintiff David M. Naylor, the Administrator of the Estate of Brooke S. Naylor, deceased, brings this civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants the Village of Ridgway, Timothy R. Condon, and Teresa A. White, for alleged Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (Doc. 19) and Memorandum in Support (Doc. 20), to which Plaintiff filed a response (Doc. 41). The Complaint Plaintiff alleges the following facts, which for the purposes of this motion are taken as true. Hishhon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). Plaintiff is the Administrator of the Estate of his deceased daughter, Brooke of Saline County, Illinois on or about March 4, 2019 (Doc. 1, ¶ 4). Brooke was 20 years 1 Dockets.Justia.com Case 3:21-cv-00219-DWD Document 43 Filed 03/01/22 Page 2 of 12 Page ID #158 old at the time of her death (Id.) Defendants Condon and White are police officers of the Ridgway Police Department and employed by the Village of Ridgway, Illinois (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 5-7). On the evening of March 3, 2019, Officer Co the roadway, driving in the wrong lane, and following 5-10 Officer Condon directed her to the Ridgway police station where Officer White was waiting with the off-duty officer (Doc. 1, ¶ 10). Brooke drove to the police station and photocopied (Doc. 1, ¶ 10). Officer Condon questioned Brooke in Officer the mistaken belief th boyfriend (Id.). Officers Condon and White knew that Brooke was under the influence of mindaltering drugs at the (Doc. 1, ¶ 11). Brooke also admi Id. vehicle for drugs (Doc. 1, ¶ 13). Despite knowin an immature age, was acting erratically, her judgment was impaired, and she was under the influence of cooperation, released Brooke from custody around midnight into 15-degree Fahrenheit weather with blowing winds (Id.). 2 Case 3:21-cv-00219-DWD Document 43 Filed 03/01/22 Page 3 of 12 Page ID #159 Brooke was not seen alive after being released from custody (Doc. 1, ¶ 15). Plaintiff believes that Brooke had driven her vehicle approximately 4.4 miles from the Ridgway police station, where she then pulled over, exited the vehicle, and began walking through fields in the cold (Id. vehicle and discovered a paper bag containing methamphetamine (Doc. 1, ¶ 16). On h by searchers (Doc. 1, ¶ 15). A forensic body and determined that she had died of hypothermia due to environmental exposure and had both methamphetamine and fentanyl in her body at the time of her death (Id.). Plaintiff brings five claims against Defendants. Counts 1 and 2 assert violations of Condon and White for failing to protect Brooke from harm (Count 1) and creating a danger by releasing Brooke from custody at night, in frigid conditions, while she was drug-impaired (Count 2). Counts 3 and 4 assert alternative claims against White for failing to intervene (Count 3) and failing to prevent (Count 4) Condon from releasing Brooke from custody. Count 5 asserts a claim against the Village of Ridgway, Illinois for failing to train its officers in how to take protective or preventive measures to assist individuals, like Brooke, who were under the influence of drugs and who could no longer safely operate their vehicles (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 77-78). Legal Standard s complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (Doc. 9, Doc. 10). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of the complaint. Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990). 3 Case 3:21-cv-00219-DWD Document 43 Filed 03/01/22 Page 4 of 12 Page ID #160 factual information to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face and raise a right to relief above the Haywood v. Massage Envy Franchising, LLC, 887 F.3d 329, 333 (7th Cir. 2018) (internal quotations and citation omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring a complaint to contain showing that the pleader iff need not plead detailed factual labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true, and Fortres Grand Corp. v. Warner Bros. Entm't Inc., 763 F.3d 696, 700 (7th Cir. 2014). Discussion To state a claim under § 1983, plaintiffs must allege that defendants deprived them of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that defendants acted under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Here, Plaintiff alleges due process rights by failing to protect her from harm and/or creating a danger by releasing her from custody into unsafe conditions knowing that she was under the influence of drugs. alleged a recognized legal duty, and that Condon and White cannot be held liable for failing to protect detain Brooke. Alternatively, Defendants argue that Condon and White are entitled to qualified immunity as the law is not clearly established on these issues that 4 Case 3:21-cv-00219-DWD Document 43 Filed 03/01/22 Page 5 of 12 Page ID #161 officers can be held liable. Finally, the Village of Ridgway argues that the facts do not support a Monell claim and therefore the claim against it should be dismissed. Plaintiff counters that the Complaint states a plausible claim that Defendants that she otherwise would have faced and then failing to protect her. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that Defendants did have a legal duty to protect Brooke because Defendants held her in custody within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and no reasonable person ve believed she was free to leave the police station after Condon requested that she drive to the police station, and once there, she was questioned extensively about potential criminal activity in the presence of two other police officers (See Doc. 1, ¶ 12). an individual against private violence DeShaney v. Winnebago , 489 U.S. 189, 197 (1989). Instead, the Clause is phrased as a limitation on guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security. It forbids the be fairly extended to impose an affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that those interests do not come to harm through other means. First Midwest Bank Guardian of Estate of LaPorta v. City of Chicago, 988 F.3d 978, 98788 (7th Cir. 2021), cert. denied sub nom, 142 S.Ct. 389 (2021) (citing Deshaney, 489 U.S. at 195)). There are two limited exceptions to this general rule: First, the state has an affirmative duty to provide for the safety of a person it has taken into its custody involuntarily. This is often referred to as the 5 Case 3:21-cv-00219-DWD Document 43 Filed 03/01/22 Page 6 of 12 Page ID #162 en a state takes a person into its custody and renders him involuntarily unab ... particular individual in a position of danger the individual would not Id. at 988 (internal citations omitted). not apply to the facts as alleged here. rson, that is, if the state has custody of a person, thus cutti See Monfils v. theory in this case is that Defendants Taylor failed to protect Brooke by releasing her to drive late at night, while drug-impaired, into dangerous weather conditions. Although Plaintiff alleges that Brooke was in custody within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment for some time on the night of March 3rd, Plaintiff does not allege that the tragedy custody. Nor does the complaint allege facts to infer that Brooke had a serious medical condition which required care that De See Ortiz v. Chicago, 656 F.3d 523 (7th Cir. 2011) (discussing the duty to provide care for the serious medical conditions of persons in custody even if the custody is expected to be short). from custody without taking preventive actions, such as confining her to a cell, driving her home, contacting a third party to take her home, or requiring her to stay at the police 6 Case 3:21-cv-00219-DWD Document 43 Filed 03/01/22 Page 7 of 12 Page ID #163 no constitutional right to be deprived of Wilson v. Formigoni, 42 F.3d 1060, 1066 (7th Cir. 1994); Paine v. Cason, 678 F.3d 500 (7th Cir. 2012) (there is no right to be detained). Therefore, the complaint does not allege a exception. The Complaint does, however, raise a po creation of a dangerous situation. See Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122, 1125 (7th Cir. 1993) (DeShaney ations where the state creates a dangerous situation or renders citizens more vulnerable s three elements: First, in order for the Due Process Clause to impose upon a state the duty to protect its citizens, the state, by its affirmative acts, must create or increase a danger faced by an individual. Second, the failure on the part of the state to protect an individual from such a danger must be the proximate cause of the injury to the individual. Third, because the right to protection against state-created dangers is derived from the substantive component of the Due Process Clause, the state's failure to protect the individual must shock the conscience. King ex rel. King v. East St. Louis Sch. Dist. 189, citations omitted and paragraph breaks added). The scenarios where the Se Estate of Allen v. City of Rockford, 349 F.3d 1015, 1022 (7th Cir. 2003). The state-created danger doctrine covers situations where the state Stevens v. Umsted, 131 F.3d 7 Case 3:21-cv-00219-DWD Document 43 Filed 03/01/22 Page 8 of 12 Page ID #164 697, 705 (7th Cir. 1997); see also Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122, 1125 (7th Cir. 1993) (a state renders citizens more vulnerable to a danger than they ot Defendants argue that they did not create a danger here because there was no requirement that they detain Brooke. See Paine v. Cason, 678 F.3d 500 (7th Cir. 2012). They therefore maintain, that, at worst, by not detaining her, they merely put Brooke back into the same situation, and weather conditions, she had been in before interacting with them See Doc. 20, p. 4). The duration of Brooke is not precisely stated in the Complaint but is alleged to have been for more than See Doc. 1, ¶¶ 8, 13) (alleging that the interaction entitled to look beyond the pleadings at this stage. See Reed, 986 F.2d at 1124 (faulting district court for going outside the pleadings to dismiss state-created danger claim). Accordingly, construing the allegations in the Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, it is plausible at this stage that Brooke was safer continuing her drive without g stopped. This marginal increase in risk is sufficient at this stage to infer that that Defendants created a danger, satisfying the first element of a state-created danger claim. However, the Complaint fails to satisfy the second element of a state-created danger claim: proximate causation. For Plaintiff to meet this prong, the Complaint must Buchanan-Moore v. Cty. of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 828 (7th Cir. 2009). Foreseeability 8 Case 3:21-cv-00219-DWD Document 43 Filed 03/01/22 Page 9 of 12 Page ID #165 hinges on a number of limiting factors, in See id., at 828-29; Brown v. Reyes, 815 F.Supp.2d 1018, 1024 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (citing Reed, 986 F.2d at 1127)). Another limiting factor of the proximate cause analysis is whether the victim is within a definable group Id. at 828. In sum, involving a consideration of time, geography, range of potential victims, and the Id. at 829. For example, in Reed, a drunk driver struck Reed's car after crossing the center line of the highway. Earlier that day, the drunk driver had been a drunk passenger in the vehicle, however, the police left him behind after arresting the original driver of the vehicle. The Seventh Circuit found that the dangers presented by drunk drivers were familiar and specific and that the plaintiffs were foreseeable victims because the drunk driver posed a danger to only motorists driving on the same highway. See Reed, 968 F.2d at 1127. Further, the dangers to other motorists were limited in both time and scope because the threat would be dispelled once the drunk driver sobered up. See id. Thus, the plaintiffs sufficiently stated a claim that the state affirmatively created a danger for motorists on the roadway. Id. In contrast to the circumstances in Reed, in the plaintiffs claimed that the County was responsible for the death to death by a mentally ill ma shortly after he was released from the County jail following a seventy-two-hour confinement. See 9 Case 3:21-cv-00219-DWD Document 43 Filed 03/01/22 Page 10 of 12 Page ID #166 administer psychiatric medications to Gray. Id. The Seventh Circuit found that the propensity toward homicide, were specific dangers that were familiar to the Id. at 828. Moreover, the decedent was generalized, amorphous zone of danger is insufficient to trigger a state duty to Id. Finally, the danger posed by Gray wa and propensity for criminal Id. at 829. The case at bar appears to fall somewhere between Reed and Buchanan-Moore. Like in Reed ired driving, it was of fairly limited danger to any individuals, it could be said that the most likely victims would be her, as the impaired driver, and those coming within the vicinity of her driving, including motorists near the police station. iving, proximate cause may be more easily inferred. See Reed, 986 F.2d at 1127 (it can be expected that an intoxicated driver may cause a motor vehicle accident); Buchanan-Moore, 570 F.3d at 828 (police can be expected to know that an intoxicated man they placed behind the wheel suffered from impaired judgment and diminished motor skills). However, here, unlike the foreseeable dangers caused by intoxicated drivers, the impaired driving. Instead, Plaintiff alleges that after leaving the police station, Brooke 10 Case 3:21-cv-00219-DWD Document 43 Filed 03/01/22 Page 11 of 12 Page ID #167 drove 4 miles, and then parked her car on the side of the road and walked off into nearby othermia due to environmental would sustain injuries and die because of her impaired driving in suboptimal weather conditions, the factual allegations here do not support an inference in abandoning her vehicle and wondering into frozen fields were foreseeable risks known to Defendants. This risk is more akin Buchanan- Moore, and as plead, the unfortunate events a Buchanan-Moore, 570 F.3d at 828. In short, the Complaint does not injuries and death were proximately caused e, and subsequent release from the police station. Having found that allegations of proximate cause is lacking, the Court need not explore the remaining componen Id. at 828 (failure to allege facts to establish any one of these elements dooms a substantive due process claim). Moreover, as the Complaint fails to allege proximate cause to sustain liability against Defendants Condon Monell claim against Rideway is e case is that Ridgway failed to appropriately train its officers to respond to impaired and mentally unstable drivers, like Brooke (Doc. 1). However, the Seventh Circuit has squarely rejected this type of independent claim. Sallenger v. City of Springfield, Ill., 630 F.3d 499, 504 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing King, 496 F.3d at 817, Jenkins v. Bartlett under Monell when there is no underlying constitutional violation by a municipal 11 Case 3:21-cv-00219-DWD Document 43 Filed 03/01/22 Page 12 of 12 Page ID #168 ils to state a claim for individual liability against Condon and White, it also fails to state a claim against Ridgway. Conclusion For the above stated reasons, Defendan DISMISSED, without prejudice, for a GRANTED failure to state a claim. Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint by March 21, 2022. SO ORDERED. Dated: March 1, 2022 _____________________________ DAVID W. DUGAN United States District Judge 12
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
