Toth v. Rich Township High School District 227 et al, No. 1:2017cv06186 - Document 126 (N.D. Ill. 2021)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 12/3/2021: For the reasons stated, plaintiff's motion for summary judgment 111 is granted, and plaintiff's motion to strike 122 is denied. Due to the ongoin g COVID-19 pandemic, and the consequent backlog of criminal and civil cases, the court is unable to set a trial date in this case at this time. The parties are directed to file a final pretrial order using this court's form on or before April 8 , 2022. Answers to any motions in limine are to be filed on or before April 22, 2022. The court will set a pretrial conference after review of these filings. The status hearing previously set for December 10, 2021 is stricken. Mailed notice (cn).
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Toth v. Rich Township High School District 227 et al Doc. 126 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION TRACI TOTH, ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Plainti , v. RICH TOWNSHIP HIGH SCHOOL 227, et al., Case No. 17 CV 6186 Judge Robert W. Gettleman ) ) ) Defendants. MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER Plainti Traci Toth brought a three-count complaint against defendants Rich Township High School District 227 (“District”) and Board of Education (“Board”) members Antoine Bass, Randy Alexander, Shannon Ross-Smith, and Dr. Delores Woods, all in their individual capacities (collectively “defendants”), alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Count I), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Counts II and III), and the Fourteenth Amendment (Count III). e parties cross-moved for summary judgment, and the court denied both motions, holding that there were genuine disputes of material fact. (Doc. 98). Plainti now brings a second motion for summary judgment on the sole issue of whether the Board’s Resolution provided adequate notice that plainti was entitled to a private or public hearing. For the reasons discussed below, plainti ’s motion (Doc. 111) is granted, and plainti ’s motion to strike (Doc. 122) is denied. BACKGROUND On September 25, 2020, the court denied the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment. e background facts are described in detail in that opinion and need not be repeated 1 Dockets.Justia.com here. Toth v. Rich Township High School Dist. 227, 2020 WL 5751187 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 25, 2020). During the rst round of summary judgment brie ng, plainti and defendants crossmoved for summary judgement on plainti ’s procedural due process claim. e elements of a procedural due process claim are “(1) deprivation of a protected interest and (2) insu cient procedural protections surrounding that deprivation.” Michalowicz v. Vill. of Bedford Park, 528 F.3d 530, 534 (7th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). e court denied both motions, holding that there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether plainti had a protected interest in her early retirement bene ts and whether there was a deprivation of that interest. e court similarly held that there was a genuine dispute of material fact for the second element of plainti ’s due process claim, stating: Plainti argues that she received no noti cation that her bene ts or salary would be reduced. e letter informing her of her demotion says nothing about salary or bene ts. In fact, the record indicates that o cials repeatedly promised her that her bene ts and salary would not change. e parties agree that plainti did not receive any sort of hearing prior to, or after, termination. Defendants counter that a reclassi cation hearing was available after plainti ’s demotion under either the collective bargaining agreement or the school code, and that plainti failed to utilize the procedures available to her. Additionally, in response to plainti ’s Local Rule 56.1 statement of facts, defendants attach a Board resolution authorizing reclassi cation of several administrators, including plainti . at resolution states that reclassi ed employees may seek a private or public hearing regarding their reclassi cation. Defendants further argue that it was “not incumbent on the District to request that Plainti le a grievance. It is her obligation to assert her own rights.” (Doc. 93, 10). Defendants’ arguments are unpersuasive and do little more than demonstrate questions of material fact. First, a hearing after termination is insu cient process; a plainti is entitled to a pre-termination hearing. Simmons v. Gillespie, 712 F.3d 1041, 1044 (7th Cir. 2013) (“ e due process clause of the fourteenth amendment does require a state to a ord an opportunity for a hearing before depriving someone of a property right created by state law.”) (emphasis added). Second, it is unreasonable for defendants to fault plainti for failing to request a reclassi cation hearing when defendants provided repeated assurances that her salary and bene ts would remain unchanged in her teaching role (and ignoring her counsel’s requests for an explanation once it was clear the District reneged on its promise). ird, it is unclear from the record whether plainti had any notice of the available 2 reclassi cation hearing. A question of fact remains regarding whether the resolution itself is su cient notice of plainti ’s procedural rights, and whether the Board provided the resolution to plainti . See Dunesbery v. U.S., 534 U.S. 161, 168 (2002) (governmental entity bears the burden of showing that the procedures used were “reasonably calculated under all the circumstances” to apprise the party of the pendency of the action). Finally, it is incumbent on the Board to provide plainti with su cient process, and that includes reasonable notice regarding the available grievance procedures. A reasonable jury could nd the Board’s process inadequate. Given the material questions of fact, summary judgment is inappropriate. e court denies both plainti ’s and defendants’ motions. (Doc. 98, 10-11) (emphasis added). Several months after the court’s ruling, on January 8, 2021, the parties led a joint status report in which plainti stated that she had identi ed Lora Sheehy as a witness who could provide evidence on whether the Board sent plainti the Resolution before her demotion. e parties asked for permission to depose the witness, as discovery had already closed. e court granted the request, and the parties deposed Lora Sheehy on March 3, 2021. At her deposition, Ms. Sheehy testi ed that she was the Executive Assistant to the Director of Human Resources for the District. It was her responsibility to handle all personnel matters for the District’s administrative employees, including plainti . In March 2016, the Board issued the relevant Resolution, which listed eight administrators, including plainti , whose contracts would not be renewed. Two letters were attached to the Resolution: (1) Statement of Facts Concerning Reclassi cation of [Employee Name] Notice of Non-Reclassi cation; and (2) Statement of Facts Reclassi cation letters. Both letters were hand-delivered to each a ected employee, informing them that their contracts would not be renewed and that they would be reassigned to a teaching position. e Resolution stated that employees could seek a private hearing before the Board to address their reclassi cation, and if they were unsatis ed with the results of that hearing, they had 3 a right to a public hearing. Neither the Resolution nor the letters mention the termination of any bene ts. Ms. Sheehy testi ed that it was her responsibility to send the letters to the administrators. She read the contents of the letters into the record and stated that these were the only documents sent to plainti and the other administrators. She did not send the Resolution to plainti or any of the reclassi ed administrators. Ms. Sheehy further testi ed that it was the District’s policy to not send the Resolution to protect the other employees’ privacy, and that in her nearly sixteen years on the job, she never sent the Resolution to an employee who had a dispute over their retirement bene ts. Plainti brings a second motion for summary judgment on the issue of whether plainti received the Resolution apprising her of her right to a hearing, and whether the Resolution constitutes su cient notice of plainti ’s right to a hearing. DISCUSSION Summary judgment is proper where there is “no dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). e party seeking summary judgment has the burden of establishing that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court must construe all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See CTL ex rel. Trebatosky v. Ashland Sch. Dist., 743 F.3d 524, 528 (7th Cir. 2014). But the nonmovant “is only entitled to 4 the bene t of inferences supported by admissible evidence, not those ‘supported only by speculation or conjecture.’” Grant v. Trus. of Ind. Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 2017). As noted above, the elements of a procedural due process claim are “(1) deprivation of a protected interest and (2) insu cient procedural protections surrounding that deprivation.” Michalowicz v. Vill. of Bedford Park, 528 F.3d 530, 534 (7th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). Plainti ’s second motion for summary judgment addresses whether the Resolution satis es the second element of a procedural due process claim. Speci cally, plainti argues that she never received the Resolution, and that the Resolution does not constitute su cient notice of plainti ’s right to a hearing. Plainti has provided the testimony of Lora Sheehy, which states that Ms. Sheehy did not send the Resolution to plainti , and that it was the District’s practice to not send the Resolution in order to protect the other administrators’ privacy. Plainti further argues that defendants have not provided any evidence indicating that plainti received the Resolution. Even if plainti received the Resolution, plainti argues that it would not have su ciently apprised plainti of her rights because it did not mention the early retirement program or that her retirement bene ts would be terminated or altered as a result of her reclassi cation. Defendants’ response brief is impressively unresponsive. Defendants spend the rst half of their brief arguing that plainti does not have a property interest in her employment—an issue on which the court has already ruled and which no party has currently contested. Defendants have also switched their position on the issue of the Resolution. In the rst round of summary judgment brie ng, it was defendants who identi ed the Resolution and argued that the Resolution provided notice to plainti of her right to a reclassi cation hearing. Plainti has led the instant motion in response to defendants’ argument, claiming that it is uncontested that 5 defendants never sent the Resolution and that in any event it would constitute inadequate notice. But now defendants argue that the Resolution is completely irrelevant because it involves plainti ’s employment agreement and accuse plainti of attempting to “misguide” the court. Defendants proceed to make arguments regarding the collective bargaining agreement, and claim that Count III “is nothing more than a state law claim for breach of contract.” e court addressed these arguments both in its ruling on defendants’ motion to dismiss and the rst motions for summary judgment. It need not address them for the third time, especially when they do not resolve the instant motion. Ultimately, the court agrees with plainti . ere is no dispute that the Board did not send the Resolution to plainti , and that plainti never received the Resolution. Indeed, defendants concede that it was the District’s practice to not send the Resolution to the a ected employees. Further, even if plainti had received the Resolution, it would not constitute adequate notice because it did not inform plainti that her retirement bene ts would be terminated or otherwise altered. e court grants plainti ’s summary judgment motion. 1 To be clear, summary judgment is granted only to the extent that the court nds that the resolution constitutes inadequate notice under the second element. e court’s earlier ruling on the rst element—that there are disputed issues of fact regarding whether there was a deprivation of a protected interest—still stands. Plainti has additionally moved to strike defendants’ response to her Rule 56.1 statement of facts (Doc. 122). She objects that defendants’ responses are inappropriately argumentative and too long. She also moves to strike defendants’ Exhibit F, which is a copy of an employment 1 Although partial motions for summary judgment are permitted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), they are generally disfavored as they result in piecemeal litigation and a waste of judicial resources. is is especially so when the partial summary judgment motion does not resolve an entire claim, but rather addresses only a single element. Plainti ’s current motion is more like a pretrial motion in limine, seeking a ruling on the particular issue discussed above. Nevertheless, because the parties have briefed the issue as a request for partial summary judgment, the court will treat it as such. 6 agreement that plainti did not sign. Plainti claims that Exhibit F was not produced to her during discovery. Defendants respond that they in fact produced this document, and attach the produced version with the Bates stamp to their response brief. e court declines to strike this exhibit because it appears that defendants produced it to plainti , and because the Exhibit has little bearing on the outcome of the instant motion. As for defendants’ responses to plainti ’s statement of facts, the court agrees that the responses are excessively lengthy and inappropriately argumentative. However, the court declines to strike these paragraphs, and will consider each party’s statement of facts to the extent they are supported by the record. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, plainti ’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 111) is granted, and plainti ’s motion to strike (Doc. 122) is denied. Due to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, and the consequent backlog of criminal and civil cases, the court is unable to set a trial date in this case at this time. e parties are directed to le a nal pretrial order using this court’s form on or before April 8, 2022. Answers to any motions in limine are to be led on or before April 22, 2022. e court will set a pretrial conference after review of these lings. e status hearing previously set for December 10, 2021 is stricken. ENTER: __________________________________________ Robert W. Gettleman United States District Judge DATE: December 3, 2021 7
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