Neville v. McCaghren, No. 6:2017cv00075 - Document 35 (S.D. Ga. 2018)
Court Description: ORDER granting 10 Motion to Dismiss due to lack of personal jurisdiction over Defendant. Signed by Chief Judge J. Randal Hall on 05/01/2018. (jlh)
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Neville v. McCaghren Doc. 35 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA STATESBORO DIVISION ROBERT NEVILLE, Plaintiff, CV 617-075 V. ELIZABETH McCAGHREN, Defendant. ORDER Before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 10.) For Dismiss the is reasons GRANTED for stated lack herein, of Defendant's personal (Doc. Motion jurisdiction to over Defendant. I. BACKGROUND Plaintiff and Defendant are half-siblings and the children of Jessica Stafford that, in 2006, Neville (''Decedent"). Plaintiff alleges Decedent executed a new will (the "Will") and trust agreement (the "Trust Agreement") that was "engineered" by Defendant to favor herself and which appointed her as personal representative successor (Doc. 1, of Decedent's trustee of at 2; see the estate (the trust created also Doc. 14-1, "Estate") and as thereby (the "Trust"). at 10-30 (the Trust Dockets.Justia.com Agreement).^) needs trust Trust"). The Trust Agreement also established a special for the benefit of Plaintiff (the ''Special Needs (Id. at 3.) On January 31, 2008, Decedent died in a house-fire at her residence 2.) in Gainesville, Though Plaintiff years," he alleges (Id.) Florida lived at (the "Residence"). the Residence "for (Id. at about 25 that he was not present during this fire. Defendant subsequently outbuildings thereon. razed (Id. at 2-3.) the Residence and two Plaintiff allegedly "had hundreds of thousands of dollars [sic] worth of property" in the Residence her own and use, Defendant outbuildings destroyed, allegedly that or Defendant otherwise refused to Plaintiff the Estate Plaintiff also and complains her alleges prior converted (Id. Plaintiff at for to 3.) this (Id.) about interactions that, disposed. compensate aforementioned personal property. either to Defendant's therewith. management For Decedent's death. of example, Defendant "looted" the Residence of "antique and rare furniture and other items" and "has failed to them to the [Elstate." "looted" Decedent's therein. (Id.) safe account (Id.) these items or restore Similarly, Defendant allegedly deposit Plaintiff for box further and took alleges all valuables that Defendant ^ The Court may consider the Trust Agreement without converting the instant motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment because the Trust Agreement is referenced in Plaintiff's complaint, is central to Plaintiff's claims, and its authenticity is undisputed. See Caver v. Cent. Alabama Elec. Coop., 845 F.3d 1135, 1141 n.4 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing Day v. Taylor, 400 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2005)). received a disproportionate Finally, Plaintiff also share alleges of that the Estate. Defendant (Id.) ''effected a 'straw sale' of" the Estate's interest in real property located in Bulloch County, Georgia (the "Bulloch Property"), Defendant "sold the [Bulloch P]roperty from whereby the [E]state to a third party and then bought it back to [sic] for herself . . . to deny property." [Plaintiff] his property interest in this real (Id.) On May 8, 2017, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and residing in Louisiana, filed the instant complaint against Defendant.^ (See Neville v. McCaghren, Case No. 6;17-mc-001 (S.D. Ga. filed May 8, 2017), state law Doc. 2.) claims of In "gross his complaint. Plaintiff asserts negligence," "breach of fiduciary ^ This is not the first time Plaintiff has sued Defendant regarding these same transactions or occurrences. Indeed, Plaintiff initiated an action against Defendant on April 29, 2013 alleging she "defrauded [Plaintiff] of his portion of the [E]state." (See Neville v. McCaghren, Case No. 6:13-cv-50 (S.D. Ga. dismissed Nov. 20, 2013) (the "2013 Action"), Doc. 1.) The 2013 Action was dismissed without prejudice for Plaintiff's failure to timely comply with the Court's Order directing Plaintiff to submit documentation in support of his request to proceed in forma pauperis in that action. (See 2013 Action, Docs. 9, 10, 12, 15.) On March 27, 2015, Plaintiff filed another action against Defendant based on facts and legal claims that were nigh-identical to those asserted in the instant action. (See Neville v. McCaghren, Case No. 6:15-cv-28 (S.D. Ga. dismissed May 20, 2016) (the ("2015 Action"), Doc. 1.) The 2015 Action was voluntarily dismissed by Plaintiff after Defendant asserted that subject-matter jurisdiction was lacking (arguing that both parties were residents of Florida at the time Plaintiff initiated the 2015 Action). (See 2015 Action, Docs. 37, 38; see also 2015 Action, Docs. 41, 52 (providing more detailed histories of the proceedings in the 2015 Action).) Because Plaintiff continued to file frivolous motions in the 2015 Action after its dismissal, the Court imposed filing restrictions of Plaintiff. (See 2015 Action, Doc. 52.) Accordingly, when Plaintiff filed his instant complaint, it was initially forwarded to the undersigned for a preliminary "arguable merit" screening. (See Neville v. McCaghren, Case No. 6:17-mc-l (S.D. Ga. filed May 8, 2017) (the "Misc. Action"), Docs. 1, 2, 3.) On May 17, 2017, after conducting the aforementioned preliminary screening, the Court allowed Plaintiff's claims to proceed and instructed the Clerk of this Court to file Plaintiff's instant complaint "under a new civil case number" (i.e., the instant case). (See Misc. Action, Doc. 3.) duty," ''simple negligence," "exploitation of the elderly/disabled," and "tolling of statutes of limitations," and seeks compensatory/punitive thereon. (See Doc. 1, at damages 4-6.) and injunctive Contemporaneously relief with the filing of his complaint. Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, (Doc. 2.) On August 23, 2017, the United States Magistrate Judge conducted an initial review of Plaintiff's pleadings and other filings and entered an Order wherein he granted Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and concluded that, at least "at the screening stage," Plaintiff had alleged "facts sufficient diversity [subject-matter] jurisdiction." to support (See Doc. 7, at 2-3, n.l.) On November 6, 2017, Defendant moved to dismiss this action for lack claim or, of in personal the jurisdiction alternative, to and/or failure transfer this to case Northern District of Florida (the "Motion to Dismiss"). 10, 11.) state to a the (Docs. Plaintiff subsequently filed a response in opposition - as well as several other papers ostensibly responsive - to the Motion to Dismiss. (See Docs. 12, 13, 20-2, 22, 31.) II. LEGAL STANDARD "In the context of a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction in which no evidentiary hearing is held, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of 4 jurisdiction over the movant, nonresident defendant." SSE, Inc.; 843 F.2d 489, 492 {11th Cir. 1988). Morris v. The plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by presenting ''enough evidence to withstand a motion for directed verdict." F.2d 1510, 1514 (11th Cir. 1990). A Madera v. Hall, 916 party presents enough evidence to withstand a motion or directed verdict by putting forth "substantial evidence . . . of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded persons in the exercise impartial judgment might reach different conclusions." of Walker V. Nations Bank of Florida, 53 F.3d 1548, 1554 (11th Cir. 1995). In assessing a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the facts presented in the plaintiff's complaint are taken as true to the extent they are uncontroverted. Cable/Home Commc'n Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 855 (11th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). If the defendant submits affidavits challenging the allegations in the complaint, however, the burden shifts back evidence supporting jurisdiction. V. Food 2010). the Movers If Intern., Inc., to the plaintiff to produce Diamond Crystal Brands, Inc. 593 F.3d 1249, 1257 (11th Cir. the plaintiff's supporting evidence conflicts with defendant's affidavits, the court must reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. construe all Id. (citing Meier v. Sun Int'l Hotels, Ltd., 288 F.3d 1264, 1269 (11th Cir. 2002)). III. DISCUSSION In his Complaint, Plaintiff acknowledges that Defendant is not a resident of Georgia.^ Nevertheless, in his response to the Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant is subject to personal massive jurisdiction fraud and in Georgia self-dealing in because secret in she '^committed Builoch County, Georgia concerning real property located immediately south Statesboro, Georgia" (i.e., 12, at 1-2.) nor the Bulloch Property). of (See Doc. Yet Plaintiff has not actually pled any facts - has he introduced any evidence - in support of his bald conclusion that Defendant's alleged tortious acts or omissions actually occurred in Georgia.^ (See Doc. 1.) Further, Defendant has filed affidavits and other evidence demonstrating that all relevant transactions with relation to Decedent, the Estate, and their respective occurred outside assets of Neville V. McCaghren, (including Georgia. Case No. (See the Doc. Bulloch 11, at Property) 2-9 (citing 6:15-cv-28 (S.D. Ga. dismissed May 20, 2016) (the («2015 Action"), Doc. 27-1); Doc. 14-1; 2015 Action, Doc. 27-1, at 1-6.) ^ (See Doc. diversity[.] Defendant and her sister, non-party 1, at 1 ("Jurisdiction by this court is based upon . [Defendant] says she is a resident of Florida. She actually resides in 'cabins' in a ski resort near Mars Hill, North Carolina . . . ." (emphasis omitted)).) Notably, the veracity of Defendant's claim that she is a resident of Florida was a hotly-contested issue in the 2015 Action; the Court allowed Plaintiff to conduct jurisdictional discovery on this issue but Plaintiff nevertheless failed therein to provide evidence in support of his assertions that Defendant was in fact 2015 Action, Docs. 33, 35, 41.) a resident of North Carolina. (See ^ Indeed, in asserting that the relevant statutes of limitations should be tolled. Plaintiff alleges that "many of [Defendant's] actions are unknown to [Plaintiff] or he only has a vague notion of them via rumor." (See Doc. 1, at 6.) Marguerite McMillan Jackson Dill, also attest that Defendant did not sell - and then repurchase - the Builoch Property to/from a third party, but rather that Defendant and Ms. Dill: (i) received interests in the Bulloch Property as distributions from the Estate Agreement; Agreement Property pursuant and to (ii) to exercised purchase that was the the explicit their Estate's terms rights under interest otherwise apportioned to Trust established on behalf of Plaintiff.^ of in the Trust the Trust the Bulloch the Special Needs (See Doc. 11, at 5 (citing 2015 Action, Doc. 27-1); Doc. 14-1, at 1-6; 2015 Action, ^ (See Doc. 14-1, at 17-18 (''At the date of the Grantor's [(i.e., Decedent's)] death, the Trustee of the Trust may hold title to certain real property in the State of Georgia which was inherited by the Grantor from her family. In the event the Trustee does hold title to such property, the Trustee shall have such property appraised. As provided in Article X above, an undivided one-third (1/3) interest in such property shall be distributed to each of Grantor's Daughters, [Ms. Dill] and [Defendant], per stirpes. Concerning the one-third (1/3) interest in the property corresponding to [Plaintiff], the Grantor's daughters, [Ms. Dill] and [Defendant], shall have the right of first refusal to purchase his interest at appraised value. If the Grantor's daughters fail to exercise their right of first refusal, the interest in the property shall be sold to a third party. In either event, whether the property is purchased by the Grantor's daughters or sold to a third party, the net proceeds from the sale of the one third (1/3) interest corresponding to Grantor's son, [Plaintiff], shall be distributed to the Special Needs Trust to be established for [Plaintiff] as provided in Article XIII of this Trust Agreement."); see also id. at 16-17 ("Upon the death of the Grantor, the Trustee, after the payment of any legal claims against the Grantor's estate and taxes, if any, in the manner as heretofore authorized, shall distribute the remainder of the trust estate to Grantor's three children, [Ms. Dill], [Defendant], and [Plaintiff], equally, share and share alike, under the terms and conditions hereinafter contained in this Trust Agreement. . . . No beneficiary created under this Article [X] shall have any right or power to anticipate, pledge, assign, sell, transfer, alienate or encumber his interest in the Trust in any way, nor shall any such interest in any manner be liable for or subject to the debts, liabilities or obligations of a Trust beneficiary or claims of any sort against a Trust beneficiary."); id. at 2022 ("The purpose of this Article [XIII] is to make provisions for distributions, if any, to [Plaintiff]. Notwithstanding Article X, or any other language in this Trust [Agreement] to the contrary, any distribution of principal or income to [Plaintiff] under the terms of this Trust [Agreement] shall not vest in [Plaintiff]. Rather, the distributions that would be distributed to [Plaintiff] shall be held by the Trustee in a separate trust for [Plaintiff] [(i.e., the Special Needs Trust)].").) Doc. 27-1; see also Doc. 14-1, at 10-30.) Defendant admits, however, that she does presently own an interest in the Bulloch Property. (See 2015 Action, Doc. 27-1, at 4.) Nevertheless, Defendant contends that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over her for any and all of Plaintiff's claims. To determine whether a nonresident defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction, analysis. Court must perform a two-part United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1274 (11th Cir. 2009). exercise the of First, the Court must determine whether the personal jurisdiction is proper under the forum state's long-arm statute as that statute would be interpreted by the state's Supreme Court. whether state Id. Next, the Court must determine there are sufficient ''minimum to satisfy Amendment. the Id.; Due Int'l Process Shoe contacts" with Clause Co. v. of the Washington the forum Fourteenth Office of Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). As this statute, analysis. arm Court O.C.G.A. § is located 9-10-91, in Georgia, controls the Georgia's first long-arm step of the The Eleventh Circuit has held that "the Georgia long- statute does not grant courts in Georgia personal jurisdiction that is coextensive with procedural due process," but instead "imposes independent obligations that a must establish jurisdiction are distinct for from the exercise the demands of of personal procedural Diamond Crystal Brands, Inc., 593 F.3d at 1259. 8 due plaintiff that process." "[C]ourts must apply the specific limitations and requirements of O.C.G.A. § 910-91 literally and must engage in a statutory examination that is independent analysis to of, and ensure distinct that from, both, separate jurisdictional inquiry are satisfied." As to the second-step in the the constitutional prongs of the Id. at 1263. analysis, ''the Due Process Clause requires that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State be such that being haled into court there." and citations omitted). nonresident defendant foriam that such the he should reasonably anticipate Id. at 1267 (internal quotations Due process therefore requires that a have "certain maintenance minimum of the contacts suit does with not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." (internal quotations and citations omitted). the Id. This requires a plaintiff to show that the nonresident defendant "purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities — that is, purposefully establishing contacts — in the forum state and there must be a sufficient nexus between those contacts and the litigation." Id. "The focus must always be on the nonresident defendant's conduct, that is, whether the defendant deliberately engaged in significant activities within a state or created continuing obligations with residents of the forum . . . [to] ensure[] that a defendant will not be subject to jurisdiction based solely on random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts." Id. at 1268 (emphasis original) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Here, the vast majority - if not all - of Plaintiff's claims fall clearly outside of the scope of Georgia's long-arm statute. facts^ For example, demonstrating Plaintiff that has Defendant: alleged no (i) well-pleaded [t]ransacts any business within" Georgia; (ii) "[c]ommit[ed] a tortious act or omission within" Georgia; or (iii) ''regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered tortious injury in Even if rebutted shown Plaintiff any such that all Georgia. of (See Therefore, the in" Georgia Georgia). (let alone See O.C.G.A. had pled such facts, allegations the Doc. burden that with §§ challenged conduct 14-1, at 1-6; 2015 was on Plaintiff a Defendant has evidence occurred Action, to caused 9-10-91(1)-(3). however. relevant supporting his claims of jurisdiction. she and outside Doc. produce has of 27-1.) evidence Diamond Crystal Brands, Inc., 593 F.3d at 1257, which he has failed to do. Further, concern the demonstrate with respect Bulloch that to Plaintiff's Property, these claims claims Plaintiff arise has from that do not failed to Defendant's ® See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) ("Although for the purposes of this motion to dismiss we must take all the factual allegations in the complaint as true, we are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation."). 10 [o]wn[ership], use[], or possess[ion] [of] real property- situated within" Georgia;^ rather, these causes of action arise out of Plaintiff's dealings in Florida with Decedent, Estate, and related assets located outside of Georgia. the See also Knieper v. Forest Grp. USA, Inc., 2016 WL 9450454, at *10 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 3, 2016) (''The mere fact of title ownership of realty in Georgia will jurisdiction. not support action § exercise of personal Jurisdiction must be predicated on the existence of ties among the defendants, O.C.G.A. the 9-10-91(4) arise out only of this state, and the litigation. applies the if Plaintiff's defendant's causes of use, or ownership, possession of real property located within the state." (internal quotations West, omitted) (citing 507 S.E.2d 545, Int'l 549 (Ga. Capital Realty and Decedent happened to of or v. Indeed, that a the dealings in Florida between Defendant her concern Co. Ct. App. 1998); and Murray v. Reese, 436 S.E.2d 79, 81 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993)). solitary portion Inv. Estate the that transfer of Plaintiff now ownership challenges rights to real property located in Georgia does not automatically lead to the conclusion that the of State anticipated ^ Defendant Georgia being had such haled into sufficient that she court O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(4). 11 in minimum should contacts have Georgia with reasonably regarding the validity of all of Defendant's dealings with Decedent or the Estate in Florida. Similarly, even Plaintiff's claims relating to the Bulloch Property do not actually arise out of Defendant's ownership, use, or possession of that property; rather, they arise out of Defendant's actions as personal representative of the Estate and Trustee of the Trust {i.e., the valuation and sale of a portion of the Estate's exercise of Defendant's her rights purchase Estate's interest occurred outside accurately interest of described the the a Bulloch the Property) Trust portion Property), Indeed, challenge these to the and Agreement aforementioned Bulloch Georgia. as the under of in in all (i.e.. of of claims the which are validity the of more the Will/Trust and Defendant's actions taken pursuant thereto, all of which occurred in Florida. Accordingly, that the challenged actions ultimately had an impact upon the ownership rights to the Bulloch Property does not necessarily mean that Plaintiff's claims challenging those actions as tortious somehow arose from Defendant's resulting ownership of the Bulloch Property. Even assuming arguendo that any of these claims do in fact arise out of Defendant's ownership of the Bulloch Property or that Georgia's long-arm statute is otherwise satisfied, however. Plaintiff has failed to carry his burden to demonstrate that Defendant deliberately engaged in significant activities within 12 Georgia, purposefully protections of availed Georgia's herself laws, or of the benefits otherwise and established sufficient minimum contacts with Georgia so as to satisfy the Constitutional due process inquiry. Indeed, in the context of the conduct challenged by Plaintiff, the in Bulloch Property Georgia the physical location of is a random, fortuitous circumstance rather than a deliberate, purposeful choice. is, the paramount conduct - all purpose of of which Defendant's occurred in alleged Florida That tortious - was the administration and distribution of the Estate's assets pursuant to the terms of the Will/Trust, rather than an intent to acquire property in Georgia Georgia residents. any additional Defendant has or otherwise direct activities towards Further, Plaintiff has failed to identify factors that deliberately would engaged compel in a finding significant that activities within Georgia or otherwise intentionally affiliated itself with Georgia or attempted sufficient contacts with Georgia to satisfy due process. See Diamond Crystal Brands, Inc., 593 F.3d at 1268-69 (listing "further contacts" that might be sufficient to connect a nonresident defendant to a forum). Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the quality and nature of Plaintiff's conduct in relation to the State of Georgia is not so random Defendant or should fortuitous have that it can reasonably 13 be fairly said anticipated being haled that into court there on Plaintiff's instant claims. Therefore, this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendant and Plaintiff's claims are due to be dismissed.® IV. CONCLUSION Upon foregoing, Dismiss due IT (doc. Defendant consideration IS HEREBY 10) is ORDERED GRANTED are DISMISSED over Defendant.® and due in accordance that Defendant's and to Plaintiff's lack of with Motion claims personal the to against jurisdiction The Clerk is directed to TERMINATE all motions and deadlines and CLOSE this case. ORDER ENTERED at Augusta, Georgia day this of ., 2018. J. RANDAfT HALL, THIEF JUDGE UNITEiySTATES DISTRICT JUDGE SOUTH^W DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ® Because Plaintiff has failed to make a showing that Defendant established minimum contacts with Georgia, the Court need not decide whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Defendant in this action ''would violate traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." See Diamond Crystal Brands, Inc., 593 F.3d at 1267 (citations omitted). "[a] court without personal jurisdiction is powerless Further, because to take further action," Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 1209, 1214 n.6 (11th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted), the Court does not reach Defendant's assertions that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted or that this action should be transferred to another forum. ' Because Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that Defendant's filings contain an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. Plaintiff's motions to strike (docs. 22, 31) are DENIED. Additionally, because Defendant has otherwise timely defended in this case and the entry of default would therefore be inappropriate. Plaintiff's motion for default judgment (doc. 27) is also DENIED. 14
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