Power v. Office of Chatham County Public Defender et al, No. 4:2016cv00289 - Document 47 (S.D. Ga. 2018)
Court Description: ORDER granting 29 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge William T. Moore, Jr on 08/06/2018. (evs)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Power v. Office of Chatham County Public Defender et al Doc. 47 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA SAVANNAH DIVISION MELODY POWER, Plaintiff, CASE NO. CV416-289 V. OFFICE OF CHATHAM COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER; ROBERT PERSSE, in his capacity as Chief Circuit Public ro <=D Defender; MICHAEL EDWARDS, c: individually and in his capacity as Chief Circuit Public Defender; WILLIAM I LEWIS, individually and in his capacity as Assistant >on Chief Public Defender; and GEORGIA PUBLIC ro .ccr DEFENDER CD COUNCIL; Defendants. ORDER Before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 29.) For the following reasons. Defendants' motion is DISMISSED. GRANTED The and Clerk all of Court of is Plaintiff's DIRECTED to claims close are this case. BACKGROUND This case discrimination, freedom involves age-based of speech allegations retaliation, guaranteed by the and First of denial racial of Amendment. the In Dockets.Justia.com 2006, Plaintiff Melody Power,^ an African-American, began her employment with Defendant Office of Chatham County Public Defender^ {^^CCPD") and was eventually promoted to the position of administrative assistant, commonly referred to as an anchor and responsible for many aspects of routine case management for a specific trial team. (Doc. 38 at 2; Doc. the 29, Attach. Georgia Attach. 2 2 5 2.) Public at Defendant Defender 1), which CCPD Council is a division ("GPDC") Plaintiff (Doc. describes as of 29, ""an independent agency within the executive branch of the state government of Georgia" (Doc. 1 5 16). Defendant Edwards was the Chief Public Defender for the time Robert 13.) ^ of Persse the alleged currently Defendant CCPD at discrimination, holds that construes Plaintiff the is evidence the in non-moving the while position. Defendant William Lewis serves as the Because record Michael Defendant (Id. Chief Assistant party, the and 55 7, all Court reasonable factual inferences in Plaintiff's favor when ruling on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. See Eberhardt v. Waters, 901 F.2d 1578, 1580 (11th Cir. 1990). However, the Court is not required to assume the truth or accuracy of mere speculation or conjecture. See Cordoba v. Dillard's, Inc., 419 F.3d 1169, 1181 (11th Cir. 2005). ^ The official name for the Office of Chatham County Public Defender the is the Eastern Office Judicial of the Circuit Circuit of Public Georgia. Defender Because for there appears to be no confusion, the Court will also refer to it as Defendant CCPD. However, Plaintiff would be well served if she actually bothered spending determine the correct name of the violated her civil rights. a few entity minutes to she claims Public Defender, and it is mostly Plaintiff's interaction with Defendant Lewis that forms the basis for her claims. (Id. SI 8.) According to Plaintiff, Defendant Lewis's daughter wed her female partner during the fall of 2014. (Doc. 38 at 2.) Defendant ceremony, Lewis who informed responded Plaintiff that ^^the of Bible the does upcoming not condone same sex marriage and homosexuality." (Id.) Soon after the comment. Plaintiff was identified as an agenda item for a meeting of Defendant CCPD's management team. (Id. at 3.) Sometime after. Plaintiff's employment was terminated.^ (Id. at 4 .) For their part,^ Defendants claim that Plaintiff's work performance became increasingly problematic during the ^ The factual narrative contained in Plaintiff's response is sparse at best, leaving this Court to pick through various filings and cobble together Plaintiff's alleged facts that are supported by evidence in the record. In this Court's opinion, counsel's lack of effort in simply presenting a factual account at the beginning of the motion does her client a disservice in this case. Regardless, this Court has endeavored to provide Plaintiff the legal assistance lacking from her paid counsel in this case. ^ Not to be outdone. Defendants elected to simply omit any factual narrative incorporated their from their contemporaneously Material Facts into the Defendants claim this was redundancy." (Doc. motion. 29, Instead, filed Defendants Statement of Motion for Summary Judgment. done in an effort "[t]o avoid Attach. 1 at 3.) However, the inclusion in a motion for summary judgment of a factual narrative tailored to the specific arguments raised in that motion is anything but redundant. Similar to counsel for course of Concerns her employment. (Doc. about Plaintiff's work 29, Attach. performance 2 SI 7.) became a regular topic at Defendant CCPD's management team meetings. (Id. SI 7.) In addition, the anchors were repeatedly holding team meetings performance. complaints Edwards (Id. (Id. from and Plaintiff's with Based Lewis the due SISI 9-13.) and Lewis each SISI 13-18.) Edwards well purportedly After fellow Plaintiff's fielding anchors. poor several Defendants attended separate anchor meetings. on their concluded other to anchors that and observations. Plaintiff was often Defendants did the not work source of conflict during the anchor meetings. (Id.) On February 3, 2015, Defendant CCPD's management team decided to Defendants terminate Plaintiff's allege litany a of employment. reasons (Id. for SI 43.) Plaintiff's termination, mostly related to Plaintiff's work performance and her inability to work well with fellow anchors. (Id. Plaintiff, counsel for Defendants have also abrogated their responsibilities to both their clients and this Court, which must now sift through seventy-one separate factual statements to craft an overall narrative of factual allegations. Counsel for Plaintiff and Defendants' Defendants would all be wise to conduct an honest review of their best practices with respect to dispositive motions and assess whether they needlessly foisted on this Court a large portion of their responsibility for advocating their clients' cause in this case. SI 44.) Defendant CCPD replaced Plaintiff with another African-American. (Id. SI 4 6.) On February discrimination 19, with 2015, the Plaintiff Equal filed a Employment charge of Opportunity Commission (^^EEOC"). (Id. SI 47.) In the charge. Plaintiff alleged discrimination based on race, age, and religion. (Id., Ex. 46.) After receiving her Notice of Right to Sue, Plaintiff timely filed her complaint in this Court. (Doc. 1.) In her complaint. Plaintiff has brought claims against all Defendants for employment discrimination based on race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (Doc. 1 SISI 60-66), violation of her First SISI 67-72), Amendment retaliation Discrimination in right in to freedom violation Employment Act of speech of the ("ADEA"), 29 (id. Age U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (Doc. 1 SISI 73-77), and racial discrimination in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1981 (Doc. 1 SISI 78-83).^ ^ Plaintiff's complaint is yet another example of the poor drafting that is the hallmark of counsel's efforts in this case. Counsel did not even bother to state whether the claims were against any specific Defendant and in what capacity that Defendant was being sued. Instead, counsel just named every Defendant for every claim. In addition. Count III is entitled "Retaliation Under the ADEA," but appears to be alleging only that Defendants impermissibly terminated Plaintiff due to her age. To say that counsel did her client a disservice in this case would be a gross understatement. In their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants argue that Defendants GPDC, Persee, Edwards, and Lewis cannot be sued in their official capacity because they are not persons subject to liability under 18 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 29, Attach. Defendants official at GPDC, 4-5.) Persee, capacities, immunity, monetary rendering damages Defendants their 1 maintain individual Edwards, are entitled them under that Defendants also and to Lewis, from any § 1983. (Id. at capacities, are in Eleventh immune Defendants claim that their Amendment liability 5-6.) Edwards and entitled to for Lastly, Lewis, in qualified immunity because Plaintiff has not established that these Defendants violated a clearly established constitutional right. (Id. at 6-9.) With § 1981 respect to Plaintiff's Title claims. Defendants argue that Vll and 18 she has U.S.C. failed to establish even a prima facie case of racial discrimination because there differently a is no evidence similarly that situated any Defendant employee treated outside of Plaintiff's protected class. (Id. at 10-15.) In addition. Defendants contend that Plaintiff's termination is supported by legitimate non-discriminatory reasons, mainly Plaintiff's poor work performance. (Id. at 15-16.) Finally, Defendants maintain that Plaintiff 6 has not presented any evidence reason suggesting for that terminating Defendants' her non-discriminatory employment was pretext for intentional discrimination. (Id. at 16-18.) Defendants assert that they are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity discrimination with claims. respect (Id. at to Plaintiff's 18-20.) Also, age Defendants argue that these claims lack merit for the same reasons as Plaintiff's With race respect discrimination to claims. Plaintiff's First (Id. at Amendment 19-20.) claims. Defendants reason that the speech is unprotected because it was not public, but rather a private conversation between Plaintiff and Defendant Lewis. (Id. at 21-23.) Even assuming it was a public comment. Defendants still contend that that Plaintiff's her claims comment termination. fail played (Id. at because a there is substantial 23.) According no part to evidence in her Defendants, Defendant Lewis was the only member of the management team aware of Plaintiff's termination occurred suggesting that the comment. over (Id.) three comment Moreover, months and after Plaintiff's her termination comment, were not causally related. (Id. at 24.) Finally, Defendants maintain that Plaintiff have been has failed to terminated establish that she absent her comment because would not Defendants have articulated legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for her termination. (Id. at 24-25.) In response. Plaintiff argues that the Eleventh Amendment is inapplicable to Defendants, in their official capacity, because she seeks prospective injunctive relief to prevent a continuing violation of federal law. {Doc. 38 at 4.) Also, Plaintiff maintains that Defendants, in their official capacity, are not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity because they are not arms of the state, or acting as agents or instrumentalities of the state. (Id. at 5-8.) With respect contends to that commentary on the the a First speech matter substantial part in Amendment was of not public claims. private, concern, Plaintiff but and public played Defendants' decision to terminate a her employment. (Id. at 8-13.) Regarding Plaintiff's complaints pretext ''false termination. concerning for Plaintiff Defendants' claims that narrative" Plaintiff her Defendants' work reasons asserts performance discrimination. the when proffered management deciding (Id. team to that were at for the mere 14-24.) relied terminate on a her employment. (Id. at 14.) According to Plaintiff, there was no evidence performance that to be any individual deficient. 8 (Id. believed at her 14-15.) work While confusing, Plaintiff appears to contend that she was retaliated® against for complaining that she was the subject of discrimination nebulously based on the employees her treated in the workplace. way her fellow (Id. at 17-18.) Regardless, Plaintiff goes to great lengths in her attempt to rebut the litany of alleged instances of her poor performance in the workplace. (Id. at 19-24.) Seemingly addressing identifies two Miller Tiffany and her similarly Talley. Title situated (Id. at VII claims. Plaintiff comparators: 28-29.) Carrie Confusingly, Plaintiff then argues that her Title VII claims are valid because these individuals were white and under the age of forty, and were provided some sort of training that was not offered to Plaintiff. (Id. at 29.) Plaintiff identifies another white individual, Barbara Rogers, then whom Plaintiff asserts evinced an ''attitude," but was permitted to retire in lieu of termination. (Id.) Continuing her ever ® The inclusion of argument concerning Title VII retaliation is also confusing. Plaintiff's charge of discrimination, filed with the EEOC after she was terminated, fails to specify that she was the subject of unlawful retaliation in any form. (Doc. 29, Ex. 46.) While Plaintiff's complaint does mention retaliation, it is only in the context of protected speech and the ADEA. (Doc. 1.) However, Plaintiff entitles Count III as "Retaliation Under the ADEA," but only alleges discrimination due to her age and not any actual retaliation. Whether the result of some unlikely oversight or simply more evidence of counsel's poor drafting. Plaintiff's complaint clearly lacks any claim for retaliation under Title VII. shifting brief. Plaintiff then contends that a co-worker's statement concerning ''generational differences" should be imputed to the entire management team as direct evidence of age discrimination. (Id. at 29-30.) Moving and Lewis on. Plaintiff are not claims entitled to that Defendants qualified Edwards immunity with respect to her First Amendment claims because their conduct is obviously unconstitutional. (Id. at 30-31.) Finally, Plaintiff argues that the Eleventh Amendment does not grant Defendants, in her § 1981 § 1981 their claims. claims. establishing "a discrimination individual (Id. capacities, at 31-32.) Plaintiff titles circumstantial With and retaliation based respect her case immunity from argument evidence upon to the as [sic] of her race." (Id. at 32.) However, this section of Plaintiff's brief does not even mention racial discrimination. A generous^ reading of Plaintiff's meandering argument is that Defendants violated § 1981 by retaliating against her for expressing an opinion in opposition to gay marriage. (Id. at 32-33.) ^ Indeed, only a very generous reading could place Plaintiff's argument in the overall context of her claims. 10 ANALYSIS I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD According move for defense—or to Fed. summary the R. Civ. judgment, part of P. 56(a), party may identifying each claim of each claim defense—on or which summary judgment is sought." Such a motion must be granted ''if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. The "purpose of summary judgment is to 'pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.' " Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee notes). Summary "fails to judgment make a is appropriate showing when sufficient the to nonmovant establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The substantive law governing the action determines whether an element is essential. DeLong Equip. Co. v. Wash. Abrasive Co., 887 F.2d 1499, 1505 (11th Cir. 1989). As the Supreme Court explained: 11 Mills [A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The burden then shifts to the nonmovant to establish, by going beyond the pleadings, that there is a genuine issue as to facts that are material to the nonmovant's case. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). The Court factual must review inferences the arising evidence from it and in all the reasonable light most favorable to the nonmovant. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587-88. However, the nonmoving party ""must do more than simply show that there is some facts." Id. at metaphysical doubt as to the material 586. A mere '"scintilla" of evidence, or simply conclusory allegations, will not suffice. See, e.g., Tidwell 1998). "draw V. Prods., Nevertheless, more inference the Carter Barfield where than one creates a Court v. should 135 a inference genuine refuse Brierton, 883 F.3d reasonable from issue to 12 the 1425 (11th fact finder facts, and Cir. may that of material fact, then grant F.2d 1989). 1422, 923, summary 933-34 judgment." (11th Cir.
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
