Rice v. James, No. 1:2017cv00039 - Document 39 (S.D. Ga. 2018)
Court Description: ORDER granting in part and denying in part the City's 30 Motion to Dismiss. The City's motion to dismiss is granted with respect to Plaintiff's § 1983 claim; denying Judge James' 35 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Chief Judge J. Randal Hall on 05/10/2018. (jlh)
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Rice v. James Doc. 39 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA AUGUSTA DIVISION ANGELA RICE, * * Plaintiff, * * V. * CV 117-039 * HARRY B. JAMES III, * Individually and in his Official * Capacity as Judge of Richmond * County Probate Court, and * AUGUSTA, GEORGIA, * * Defendants. * ORDER Before the Court are Plaintiff's amended complaint. Defendants' motions (Docs. 30, 35.) a response in opposition to both motions. to dismiss Plaintiff filed (Docs. 33, 37.) Accordingly, Defendants' motions are fully briefed and ripe for review. I. This suit involves BACKGROUND Plaintiff's termination employment with the Richmond County Probate Court. from her Plaintiff claims that her firing was due to her race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (^^Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Fourteenth Amendment, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Dockets.Justia.com Plaintiff began her tenure at the Richmond County Probate Court as an administrative Director of Probate Court. assistant and eventually became (Am. Compl., Doc. 23, H 20.) On January 1, 2013, Defendant Judge Harry B. James III ("Judge James") was elected Chief Judge of the Richmond County Probate Court. Judge (Id. H 21.) James began Plaintiff claims that upon taking office, a Caucasian employees. pattern of discrimination against his (Id. H 33.) Plaintiff asserts that Judge James restructured his office to "implement his strongly held racist beliefs," and Defendant Augusta, Georgia (the "City"), facilitated this approving Judge James' "Budget Transfer Request." 40, 42.) Within five months of taking office. process by (Id. t 38, Judge James allegedly fired or forced two Caucasian employees to quit and subsequently employees. filled (Id. M both 33-34.) vacancies with African-American On July 31, 2013, Judge James announced that the Director of Probate Court position would be eliminated and replaced by a "Chief Clerk." (Id. K 46.) Judge James then selected Felecia Bray, an African-American employee who was allegedly less qualified than Plaintiff, to serve as Chief Clerk. (Id. HH 46, 51.) Consequently, Plaintiff was demoted to the level of administrative assistant. (Id. 1 47.) Judge James assured Plaintiff that her demotion was not due to her work performance and that she had ^^nothing to fear." (Id. K 55.) Judge James also created the position of ''Deputy Chief Clerk." (Id. H 44.) application On August 3, 2013, Plaintiff submitted an to serve as Deputy Chief Clerk. (Id. f 58.) However, Joy Daniels, an African-American employee with fewer years of position. had been experience than (Id. H 62.) passed over Plaintiff, was selected for the On August 22, after learning that she for the Deputy Chief Clerk position. Plaintiff met with the director of the City's Equal Employment Office ("EEO") to complain about Judge James' discriminatory conduct.^ (I^ H 76.) Plaintiff claims that Judge James learned about Plaintiff's EEO complaint on or before September 9, 2013, and sxibsequently began to engage in retaliatory conduct. (Id. H 92.) Despite Judge James' initial insistence that Plaintiff's demotion was not due to her work performance, on September 23, Judge James told the City's Director of Human Resources that Plaintiff was demoted due to her "inability to supervise other staff." 101.) (Id. H On another occasion. Judge James chastised Plaintiff for calling the I.T. Department, which presumably prevented Judge James from accessing the court's calendar. (Id. H 96.) He told ^ Although the Richmond County Probate Court and the City are separate entities. Judge James allegedly adopted the City's discrimination policy and agreed to be subject to its terms, (Id. H 75.) Plaintiff "*not to call the Information Technology Department, Human Resources, or anyone else again.'" Plaintiff defended her actions. (Id. H 96.) Judge James When sarcastically responded ''[yjeah, nothing makes me madder than to be accused of something not true." (Id. H 100.) Judge James also retaliated against Plaintiff by reducing her salary. Despite her demotion. Plaintiff did not see an immediate reduction in salary. (Id. about charge, Plaintiff's discrimination H 88.) After learning however. asked the City to reduce Plaintiff's pay. Judge James (Id. H 93.) On September 30, 2013, the City informed Plaintiff that her pay would be lowered by $15,000 per year. (Id. H 105.) Furthermore, allegedly at the behest of Judge James, Plaintiff's salary reduction was retroactively applied to begin on September 12, 2013. from (Id. H 106.) Plaintiff's salary. paycheck to offset the difference in (Id. H 105.) On James' next Accordingly, the City deducted $1,153 November Office, employee were 15, 2013, where present. Ms. Plaintiff Bray (Id. and was called another 108.) into Judge African-American Judge James scolded Plaintiff for not changing her voicemail to indicate that she was no longer Director of Probate Court. (Id.) In that vein. Judge James told Plaintiff ''[o]h, you're going to be a Director alright . . . the Director of Traffic!" (Id. ^ 109.) On January 14^ 2014, Judge James issued Plaintiff a written reprimand for not "being a team player," making improper gender references in court pleadings, demeanor" in the workplace. and not (Id. H 117.) having a "pleasant The next day, during Plaintiff's annual review. Judge James allegedly told Plaintiff she should quit because no one liked her. (Id. H 122.) Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination regarding Judge James' conduct with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on November 13, 2013. (Id. H 83.) On March 4, 2014, during a staff meeting v/ith Plaintiff in attendance. Judge James read aloud from Plaintiff's EEOC Charge in front of her colleagues. (Id. H 124.) Judge James then pointed his finger at Plaintiff and said "I don't trust you I" and that "change was going to come real soon." (Id. H 131, 133.) Judge James also announced that staff meetings would be suspended until his office became "more cohesive and trustworthy." Judge (Id. H 134.) After the meeting. James called Lacey Grantham, the only other Caucasian employee at the Richmond County Probate Court, into his office. (Id. H 135.) After speaking with Judge James, Ms. refused to have further communication' with Plaintiff. Gratham (Id. f 136.) Plaintiff was terminated on March 17, 2014. 138.) (Id. 137, Plaintiff alleges that she had not engaged in or been punished for any misconduct beyond the written reprimand she received in Plaintiff's notice. January. exit (Id. interview (Id. H 144.) f where 140.) she The received City her conducted termination Plaintiff's termination notice indicated that she was ineligible for rehire at any City department.^ (Id.) Plaintiff initiated this action on April 6, 2017. 1.) (Doc. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants engaged in intentional discrimination and retaliation, in violation of Title VII and § 1983. On October 5, 2017, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to amend her complaint over Judge James' objection.^ (Doc. 22.) Defendants now move to dismiss Plaintiff's amended complaint. II. LEGAL STANDARD Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to contain "a short plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," which gives a defendant notice of the claim and its grounds. Bell Atl. Corp. V. suirvive Twombly, 12(b)(6) 550 motion U.S. to 544, dismiss, 555 (2007). a complaint To must include a Rule enough facts that demonstrate the plaintiff's right to relief is more than speculative, and those facts must state a plausible claim to relief. Id. at 570. While a complaint does not need to be ^ Plaintiff's termination notice was later amended to reflect that she was eligible for rehire. (Am. Compl. H 146.) ^ Judge James moved to amend his response to Plaintiff's motion for leave to amend her complaint. (Doc. 20.) Because the Court has already granted Plaintiff leave to amend her complaint, Judge James' motion (doc. 20) is DENIED AS MOOT. bursting with factual allegations, there must be something more than a bare bone recital of the elements of a cause of action. Id. at 555. However, a complaint should not be denied "unless it appears beyond a doubt circumstances that that the would plaintiff entitle can him Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). to prove no relief." set of Conley v. The Court must accept all factual allegations as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Belanger v. Salvation Amy, 556 F.3d 1153, 1155 (11th Cir. 2009). III. As a preliminary DISCUSSION matter, the City moves to dismiss Plaintiff's amended complaint for failing to comply with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a) and 10(b). Complaints that violate Rules 8(a) or 10(b) are "often disparagingly referred to as shotgun pleadings." Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff's Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015). either rule is only appropriate where Dismissal under "it is virtually impossible to know which allegations of fact are intended to support which claim(s) for relief." (internal quotations omitted). Id. (emphasis in original) The Eleventh Circuit has identified four types of shotgun pleadings; (1) "a complaint containing multiple counts where each count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts, causing each successive count to carry all that came before and the last count to be a combination of the entire complaint"; (2) ''a complaint . replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of action"; (3) a complaint that fails to "separate[e] into a different count each cause of action or claim for relief"; and (4) a complaint that "assert[s] multiple claims against multiple defendants without specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions, brought against." or which of the Id. at 1321-23. defendants the claim is "The unifying characteristic of all types of shotgun pleadings is that they fail . . . to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them." Id. Plaintiff's amended complaint seems to fit under the first category of shotgun pleadings. Every count in the amended complaint adopts the allegations of the preceding counts. Am. Compl. HH 162, 197, 231, 244.) (See Yet Plaintiff provides a detailed factual basis for her claims and this is not a case where "failure to more precisely parcel out and identify the facts relevant to each claim materially increased the burden of understanding the factual allegations See Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1324. that it cannot understand the underlying each count." Moreover, the City's contention factual basis of Plaintiff's claims is belied by the accurate recitation of those facts in the City's motion to dismiss. not ''virtually impossible" (Doc. 30, at 4-5.) to know which Because it is allegations support which claim for relief, dismissal under Rules 8(a) or 10(b) is not appropriate. A. ''Employer" Under Title VII Both the City and Judge James move to dismiss Plaintiff's Title VII claims. The City argues that it was not Plaintiff's employer and therefore cannot be held liable under Title VII. Judge James similarly claims that he is not an employer under Title VII because the Richmond County Probate Court had fewer than fifteen employees. Plaintiff responds that the City and Judge James should be treated as single or joint employers for Title VII purposes. Title VII defines an employer as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year . . . ." 20002e(b). 42 U.S.C. § Although a plaintiff must show that the defendant had more than fifteen employees, the term "employer" should be construed liberally. 834 F.2d 930, construction, "look 933 the beyond the McKenzie v. Davenport-Harris Funeral Home, (11th Eleventh Cir. 1984). Circuit has nominal independence Consistent with instructed courts of an entity and that to ask whether two treated as or a more ostensibly single, separate integrated entities enterprise when should be determining whether a plaintiff's 'employer' comes within the coverage of Title VII." Lyes v. City of Riviera Beach, Fla., 166 F.3d 1332, 1340-41 (11th Cir. 1999). The Eleventh Circuit has identified three situations where it is appropriate to aggregate different entities and treat them as a single employer for the purposes of Title VII: (1) the single employer - where the two entities are highly integrated with respect to ownership and operations; (2) joint employers - where the two entities contract with each other and one entity has sufficient control over the terms and conditions of the other's employees; and (3) the agency test - where an employer delegates control over its employees third party. to a Id. at 1341. Where two entities have been declared separate under state law, however, there is a presumption separate for Title VII purposes. that the Id. at 1344. entities are To overcome the presumption of separateness, a plaintiff must establish that the purpose of maintaining separateness is to elude Title VII, or identify other circumstances entities are integrated. includes considering that clearly Id. at 1344-45. factors such 10 as: the indicate that the The latter method ability to hire, transfer, promote, or fire; authority to establish schedules or assignments; and the obligation to pay. Id. at 1345. Here, Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to show that the City and Judge James should be treated as a single employer. Plaintiff claims that the City was involved in many of Judge James' employment decisions. (Am. Compl. H 75, 101, 144, 146.) Additionally, Plaintiff claims that she was paid by the City and that Judge James needed the City's permission before changing Plaintiff's salary. (See Am. Compl. 94, 105.) While the Court recognizes that Plaintiff bears a heavy burden to prove that aggregation is appropriate, aggregation is a fact-specific inquiry that is often better left to summary judgment. See Williams v. Ga. Stevedore Ass'n, Inc., 2013 WL 1130741, at **5-6 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 18, 2013); Walker v. Sumter Cty. Comm'n, 2008 WL 11377746, at *14 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 2, 2008) (citing Mack v. Ala. Dept. of Human Resources, No. (M.D. Ala. Jul. 28, 2003)). CIV.A.OO-D-1435, Doc. 86, at 8 Accordingly, Plaintiff has stated a claim against the City and Judge James under Title VII. B. Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims Both Plaintiff's the § City 1983 and Judge claims. James Judge entitled to qualified immunity. also James move argues to that dismiss he is The City, on the other hand, argues that it had no control over Judge James and therefore cannot be held liable for his conduct under § 1983. 11 I. . Judge James' Qualified Immunity Judge James argues that Plaintiff's § 1983 claim is barred by qualified immunity. Qualified immunity protects government officials from suit so long as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights. Morris V. Town of Lexington; 748 F.3d 1316, 1321 n.l5 (11th Cir. 2014). To invoke the defense, the defendant must first establish that he was acting within his discretionary authority.^ Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1265 (11th Cir. 2004). The burden then shifts to the plaintiff qualified immunity is not appropriate. 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002). who must show that Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must (1) allege facts that establish a constitutional violation and (2) demonstrate that the right clearly established when the violation occurred. violated was Id. Plaintiff alleges that she was terminated from her job due to Judge James' racial animosity. The Eleventh Circuit has recognized that the right to be free from intentional racial discrimination extends to public employment. See Brown v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 923 F.2d 1474, 1478-79 (11th Cir. 1991). Furthermore, that right was clearly established when Plaintiff was terminated. See, e.g.. Boggle v. McClure, 332 F.3d 1347, 1355 (11th Cir. 2003); Yeldell v. Cooper Green Hosp., Inc., 956 ^ Plaintiff concedes that Judge James was acting within his discretionaryauthority. 12 F.2d 1056, 1064 {11th Cir. 1992); Brown, 923 F.2d at 1478-79. Taking the facts alleged by Plaintiff as true, the Court cannot conclude that Judge James is protected by qualified immunity. 2. The City's Control Over Judge James The City argues that it had no control over Judge James and therefore cannot be held liable for his actions pursuant to § 1983. A local government cannot be liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory. U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Monell v. Dep^t of Soc. Servs., 436 Instead, the plaintiff must establish that the constitutional deprivation she suffered resulted from an official policy, or an unofficial policy or custom shown through the repeated acts of a final policymaker. Plaintiff does not allege that Judge according to the City's official policy. show the City ''has constitutional practice is a custom violation] the moving or and force [the [behind] James was acting Thus, Plaintiff must practice that Id. of permitting City's] the custom [a or constitutional violation." Grech v. Clayton Cnty., 335 F.3d 1326, 1330 (11th Cir. 2003). This will in turn require showing that the City had authority over Judge James. Turquitt v. Jefferson Cnty., 137 F.3d 1285, 1292 (11th Cir. 1998). If, under Georgia law, the City had no control over Judge James' actions, the City cannot be held liable under § 1983. Id. 13 Here, Plaintiff claims that Judge James subjected himself to the City's authority by adopting its discrimination policy. Under Georgia law, however, the probate judge is an elected constitutional officer that is independent from a municipality. Ga. Const, art. IX, § I, para. III. The power to remove or discipline a probate judge is within the purview of the Judicial Qualification Commission, not the local governing authority. Const, art. VI, § I, para. VI. Ga. Additionally, Judge James could not give the City this power by contract because a probate judge is not the kind of entity that intergovernmental agreement. I. is allowed to execute an See Ga. Const, art. IX, § III, para. Accordingly, the City had no control over Judge James and therefore cannot be held liable for his actions under § 1983.^ IV. CONCLUSION Plaintiff's amended complaint complies with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a) and 10(b). Plaintiff has also alleged facts that support treating the City and Judge James as a single employer for Plaintiff's Title right VII to purposes. be free Additionally, from intentional because racial discrimination was clearly established when she was fired, the Court cannot conclude that Judge James is protected by qualified ^ This finding does not contradict the Court's single employer analysis under Title VII. Unlike § 1983, Title VII allows courts to look beyond state law to determine whether the two entities act as a single employer. 166 F.3d at 1345. See Lyes, Accordingly, the City may be liable for Judge James' conduct under Title VII even if the City is not liable under § 1983. 14 immunity. Plaintiff's § 1983 claim against the City, however, must be dismissed because the City had no control over Judge James' conduct. Upon due consideration, the City's motion to dismiss (doc. 30) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, and Judge James' motion to dismiss (doc. 35) is DENIED. The City's motion to dismiss is granted with respect to Plaintiff's § 1983 claim. ORDER ENTERED at Augusta, Georgia this day of . 2018 J. RAl^m HALL/ CHIEF JUDGE UNITED >BTATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 15
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