Brown v. Grubbs et al, No. 1:2011cv00135 - Document 5 (N.D. Ga. 2011)
Court Description: ORDER AND OPINION DISMISSING CASE AS FRIVOLOUS pursuant to 28 USC 1915A(b). Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr on 2/23/11. (dr)
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FIUiO IN OHAMBe S THOMA. W, Tf.lRA§ ,JR. U. S. O. ~.. Atl.1I . IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JAMES N HAmN. Of FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGfA ~". Cap ATLANTA DIVISION I PRISONER CIVIL RIGHTS 42 U.S.c. § 1983 DENNIS BROWN, Plaintiff, v. ALDELE GRUBBS, Cobb County Superior Court Judge; et al., Defendants. CIVIL ACTION NO. 1: ll-CV-0135-TWT ORDER AND OPINION Plaintiff, presently confined in the Elmira Correctional Facility in Elmira, New York, has filed this pro ~ civil rights action. (Doc. 1). On January 25, 2011, the Court granted Plaintitf leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 3). The matter is now before the court for a 28 U.S.c. § 1915A frivolity screening. I. The Standard of Review for Screening Prisoner Civil Rights Actions Pursuantto 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), a federal court is required to screen "as soon as practicable" a prisoner complaint "which seeks redress from a governmental entity II or officer or employee ofa governmental entity." Section 1915A(b) requires a federal II court to dismiss a prisoner complaint that either: (1) is "frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted"; or (2) "seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief." A072A (Rev 8182) To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that I an act or omission committed by a person acting under color ofstate law deprived him ! of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Hale v. Tallapoosa County. 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (lIth Cir. 1995). Ifa litigant ¢i cannot satisfy these requirements, or fails to provide factual allegations in support of the claims, then the complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly. 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (noting that "[fJactual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level," and complaint "must contain something more ... than ... a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [ofJ a legally cognizable right of action"); see also Ashcroft v. !! Iqbal, 129 U.S. 1937, _, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951-53 (2009) (holding that Twombly "expounded the pleading standard for all civil actions," to wit, conclusory allegations d that "amount to nothing more than a formulaic recitation of the elements of a i constitutional . . . claim" are "not entitled to be assumed true," and, to escape dismissal, complaint must allege facts sufficient to move claims "across the line from . conceivable to plausible"); Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) (the court :1 !' accepts as true the plaintiff's factual contentions, not his or her legal conclusions that Ii I. I Ii !i I A072A (Rev.8/82) II :1 I. 2 'I I are couched as factual allegations); Beck v. Interstate Brands Corp., 953 F.2d 1275, 1276 (II th Cir. 1992) (the court cannot read into a complaint non-alleged facts). II. Plaintiff's Allegations Plaintiff brings this action against Cobb County Superior Court Judge Aldele Grubbs, Assistant District Attorney ("ADA") Kevin Barger, and Probation Officer Ii Debra Williams. (Doc. I at 1,3). Plaintiff alleges that, on September 24,2008, he II was arrested and charged with theft by conversion and forgery. (Id. ~ IV). Plaintiff Ii complains that defendants violated his constitutional rights during the criminal II II proceeding that resulted in his convictions on those charges. (Id. ~ IV, Attach.; Doc. 4). Plaintiff seeks only monetary relief. (Doc. 1'\1 V). Judge Grubbs and ADA Barger are entitled to absolute immunity from this suit. il I, i See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9-12 (1991); Imblerv. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,430 II (1976); see also Rivera v. Leal, 359 F.3d 1350, 1353 (lith Cir. 2004)("[a] prosecutor n II !1 is entitled to absolute immunity for all actions he takes while performing his function as an advocate for the government," including "the initiation and pursuit of criminal , prosecution" (citing Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.s. 259,273 (1993), and Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 ». Moreover, to recover damages for Plaintiff's allegedly unconstitutional conviction, he must first demonstrate that his "conviction or sentence 3 AO 72A (Rev,8J82) has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254." Heck v. Humphrey. 512 U.S. 477, 486-487 (1994). Ifthis type ofaction is brought prior to the invalidation ofthe challenged conviction or sentence, it must, therefore, be dismissed as premature. Id. at 487. In this case, Plaintiff has not alleged that his conviction or sentence has been reversed or otherwise called into question. III. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this pro se civil rights action is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 19l5A(b). IT IS SO ORDERED, this 23 day of ~ ,2011. THOMAS W. THRASH, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 4 AO 72A (Rev.8/82)
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