Hill v. Unknown, No. 1:2008cv03715 - Document 2 (N.D. Ga. 2008)
Court Description: ORDER AND OPINION for the purpose of dismissal, granting in forma pauperis status; this case is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr on 12/18/08. (dr)
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FILED 1 N q THOMAS W. THRASH jFj . U. S. D. C, qty cm I & JAMES N_ HATTEN, Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COiWT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA TLANTA DIVISION PRISONER CIVIL RIGHTS 42 U. S .C. § 1983 SEAN R. FULL, Plaintiff, V. CIVIL ACTION NO . 1 :08-CV-3715-TWT UNKNOWN, Defendant. ORDER and OPINION Plaintiff, Sean R . Hill, an inmate at the Fulton County Jail in Atlanta, submitted a letter complaint, without prepayment of the $350 .00 filing fee, that the Clerk of Court filed a s a prisoner ci vil rights action . (Doc. No. 1 .) For the purpose of dismissal , Plaintiff is GRANTED in forma as uperis status , and the matter i s now before the Court for screening under 28 U.S . C. § 19 1 5A. I. 28 U .S.C . § 1915A Standard Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, a federal court is required to conduct an initial screening of a prisoner complaint against a governmental entity, employee, or official to determine whether the action : (1) is frivolous or malicious, (2) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or (3) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who i s immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)( 1) & (2). A claim is frivolous when it appears from the face of the complaint that the plaintiff "has little or no AO 72A (Rev 81 82) chance of success," i.e., "the factual allegations are clearly baseless ," "the legal theories are indisputably meritless," or immunity bars relief. Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993) (internal quotations omitted) . A complaint fails to state a claim when it does not include "enough factual matter (taken as true)" to "give the defendant fair not ice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it re sts." Bell At l antic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U. S . 544, _, 127 S. Ct. 1955 , 1964-65 (2007) (noting that "EfJactual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level," and complaint "must contain something more . . . than . . . statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action") . In reviewing whether a plaintiff has stated a claim, the court presumes the truth of a plaintiff's non-frivolous factual allegations, construing them favorably to the plaintiff. See Hunnings v . Texaco, Inc ., 29 F.3d 14$0 , 1484 (11th Cir . 1994) . Further , the court holds afro se pleadings to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers . Haines v. Kerner, 404 U .S . 519, 520-21 (1972). The plaintiff, however, must allege facts sufficient to show a recognized legal claim, and the court cannot read into a complaint non-alleged facts . Beck v . Interstate Brands Corp., 953 F.2d 1275, 1276 (11th Cir. 1992). See also Oxford Asset M t. v . Jaharis, 297 F .3d 11$2,11872 AO 72A (Rev 8/82) 88 (11th Cir . 2002) (stating that "conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts[,] or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal") . In order to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S .C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that an act or omission (1) deprived him of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or a statute of the United States and (2) was committed by a person acting under color of state law . West v . Atkins, 487 U .S. 42, 48 (1988) . If a litigant cannot satisfy these requirements, or fails to provide factual allegations in support of his claim or claims, then the complaint is subject to dismissal . See Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1282-84 (11th Cir. 2003) (affirming the district court's dismissal of a § 1 983 complaint because the plaintiffs factual allegations were insufficient to support the alleged constitutional violation) . See also 28 U .S .C. § 1915A(b) (dictating that a complaint, or any portion thereof, that does not pass the standard in § 1915A "shall" be dismissed on preliminary review) . II. Discussion In his letter complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following . Plaintiff was charged with four counts of aggravated assault and, in approximately February of 2008, was placed in pre-trial detention in the Fulton County Jail . (Doc . No. 1 at 1 , 9.) Plaintiff and his public defender, Ms . Carey, believe that he is entitled to a delusional compulsion 3 AO 72A (Rev 8 182) defense .' (Id . at 1 .) The court ordered a psychiatric evaluation,2 which was performed I by a psychiatrist who is known for his partiality and bias in making findings that suit the prosecution's objectives . (Id. at 2-3 .) The evaluation contained numerous errors land false statements, contained no reference to Plaintiffs decades of mental-health Imedical records or his twenty years of state and federally certified disability, and l concluded that Plaintiff wa s criminally responsible for his acts . (Id. at 2, 4-5 .) Plaintiffs public defender, Ms . Carey, was concerned that the psychiatrist may be biased and obtained Plaintiff' s permission to request a second opinion. (Id. at 3 .) The Circuit Defender, however, denied the request . (Id. ) Plaintiff remains in pre-trial I detention because he has been denied the right to bail, and his detention is approaching Under a delusional compulsion defense, "[a] person shall not be found guilty of a crime when, at the time of the act . . . constituting the crime, the person, because of mental disease, injury, or congenital deficiency, acted as he did because of a delusional compulsion as to such act which overmastered his will to resist committing the crime ." O.C.G.A . § 16-3-3 . "[T]here must be evidence that the defendant was laboring under a delusion, that the act itself was connected with the delusion and furthermore that the delusion would, if true, justify the act ." Bailey v . State, 249 Ga . 535, 537, 291 S .E .2d 704, 706 (1982) (internal quotations omitted). 2 Plaintiff complains that the evaluation was conducted approximately six months after the order was entered, in violation of the Consent Order at pages 24-25 in H=er v. Fulton County Jail, No . 1 :04-CV- 1416-MHS (N.D . Ga. Feb . 7, 2006) . The Consent Order states that mentally ill patients shall be screened and provided their medication upon intake to the jail ; it does not govern psychiatric evaluations for trial . 4 AO 72A (Rev 8182) the year mark because Ms . Carey has not moved for a speedy trial - to which Plaintiff queries, "as is my right?" (Id .) Plaintiff asserts that his constitutional rights are being violated to save State expenses and he is receiving ineffective assistance of counsel during this pre-trial period. (Id. at 5, 8 .) Plaintiff states that he has exhausted all "internal" remedies and seeks injunctive relief and to be made whole from the stagnation of his case . (Id. at 10.) When a plaintiff's state criminal proceedings are still in progress, the abstention principle in Younger generally prohibits the granting of federal court relief that interferes with a pending state criminal prosecution . Younger v. Harris, 401 U .S . 37, 41(1971) . Under Yom, federal interference with a state criminal prosecution is not warranted unless the state defendant has alleged (1) great, immediate, and irreparable injury that cannot be addressed by a defense to a single criminal prosecution, (2) repetitive and abusive prosecution, or (3) prosecution under a statute that flagrantly violates the Constitution . Id at 46, 53-54 . . Plaintiff's claims regarding the insufficiency of state funds and the effectiveness of his pre-trial counsel in obtaining an additional psychiatric report are the type of issues that can be addressed during his criminal prosecution and are subject to 5 AO 72A (Rev 8/82 ) Younger abstention . Further, any claim regarding the denial of release on bail cannot be raised in a civil rights complaint , but must be raised in a federal habeas corpus petition , after exhaustion of state remedies. See 28 U. S .C. § 2241 ;3 Preiser v. 411 U.S . 475, 487-90 (1973) (holding that habeas corpus is the exclusive Iremedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks release) . Similarly , a claim regarding Plaintiff's speedy trial rights also should The raised in a habeas corpus petition, after exhaustion of state remedies . See Braden I v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U .S . 484,488-90 (1973) (holding that petitioner could bring pre-trial habeas challenge to the violation of his right to a speedy trial and "demand enforcement of the Commonwealth's affirmative constitutional obligation to bring him promptly to trial"); Brown v . Estelle, 530 F .2d 1280, 1282-83 (5th Cir . 1976) . Thus, Plaintiff fails to state a cause of action under § 1983, and, for the reasons discussed below, this Court declines construing this letter complaint as a 3 Under the general habeas statute, a state pre-trial detainee is entitled to habeas relief if "[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws . . . of the United States." 28 U .S.C . § 2241(c)(3) ; Hughes v. Attorney Gen. of Florida, 377 F .3d 1258, 1261 (11th Cir . 2004) (stating that pre-trial habeas challenge to state custody is properly brought under § 2241) . A federal habeas petitioner, however, first must exhaust his available state-court remedies . See 28 U .S .C . § 2254(b)(1) ; Fain v. Duff, 488 F.2d 218, 223 (5th Cir . 1973) (holding that the exhaustion requirement applies to all habeas corpus actions) . 6 AO 72A (Rev 8182) federal habeas corpus petition . Although Plaintiff has alleged that he has exhausted his "internal" remedies, there is no indication that he otherwise has exhausted available state remedies, as he must in order to bring a federal habeas corpus petition . See 28 U.S .C . § 2254(b)(1) (dictating that a federal court may not grant a petition for a writ of habeas corpus unless the petitioner has exhausted available state remedies or circumstances exist that render the state process ineffective) .' Further, sua svonte recharacterization of a filing as a habeas corpus petition is disfavored . See Castro v. United States, 540 U. S . 375, 377-78 (2003) . Accordingly , this action shall be dismissed. 4 In a Georgia criminal action, a defendant may move to reduce bail and pursue a pre-trial interlocutory appeal of the bail decision . See Howard v. State, 197 Ga . App. 693, 399 S .E.2d 283 (Ct. App. 1990) . Further, after indictment, a defendant can file in his criminal case a statutory speedy-trial demand, O .C.G.A. § 17-7-170, and may directly appeal the denial thereof. Clark v . State, 259 Ga. App . 573, 574-75, 578 S.E.2d 184, 186-88 (Ct. App. 2003) . A defendant also can file a motion in his criminal case to "bar [his] trial on the ground that his constitutional right to a speedy trial [has] been violated" and directly appeal the denial thereof . Hardeman v . State, 280 Ga. App . 168, 633 S .E.2d 595 (Ct . App. 2006) . Georgia law also provides for pre-trial habeas corpus and mandamus petitions . O.C .G.A . § 9-14-1(a) (habeas corpus) ; O.C.G.A. § 9- b-20 (mandamus) . 7 AO 7Za (Rev 818 2) III. Conclusion For the reasons discussed above, IT IS ORDERED that the instant civil action is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Because Plaintiff did not refer to the statute under which he filed his complaint and it could , arguably, have been construed as a federal habeas corpus petition, this dismissal does not count for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) . See Anderson v . Sin a etarX, 111 F .3d 801, 805 (11th Cir .1997) . In the event that Plaintiff wishes to file a federal habeas corpus petition, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to forward Plaintiff a form habeas corpus petition . IT IS SO ORDERED this rS day of. &4~4e-t -, 2008 . THOMAS W . THRASH, JR . UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 8 AO 72A ( Rev 8/82)
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