RUSSELL v. DARR et al, No. 4:2015cv00098 - Document 35 (M.D. Ga. 2015)
Court Description: ORDER granting 31 Motion to Amend/Correct; granting 7 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; granting in part and denying in part 15 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Plaintiff shal l electronically file an amended complaint within seven (7) days. The stay is lifted and parties shall submit a joint proposed scheduling order within 21 days, consistent with the Rules 16/26 Order 22 previously filed in this case. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE CLAY D LAND on 12/4/2015 (esl)
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RUSSELL v. DARR et al Doc. 35 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA COLUMBUS DIVISION CHRISTOPHER RUSSELL, * Plaintiff, * vs. * SHERIFF JOHN DARR, et al., * Defendants. CASE NO. 4:15-CV-98 (CDL) * O R D E R Plaintiff Christopher Russell was previously in the custody of the Muscogee County Sheriff as a pretrial detainee at the Muscogee County Jail. Plaintiff claims that he was unlawfully detained and mistreated while in custody. against the Consolidated Government He brings this action of Columbus, Georgia (“CCG”), Muscogee County Sheriff John Darr, Deputy Anthony Ermi, and Deputy Juan A. Merritt, in their official and individual capacities. He asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 & 1988 for the violation of his rights under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. also asserts claims arising from violations of the He Georgia Constitution. CCG seeks dismissal of all of Plaintiff’s claims against it and against the Sheriff capacities (ECF No. 7). and his deputies in their official Sheriff Darr filed a motion to dismiss Dockets.Justia.com Plaintiff’s claims against him in his individual capacity (ECF All Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims No. 15). seeking a contempt order and injunction. For the reasons explained below, the Court grants CCG’s motion to dismiss. Court grants dismiss. in part and denies in Darr’s part motion The to Additionally, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims for a contempt order and an injunction relating to the Justice Department consent decree. In response to the motions to dismiss, Plaintiff referred to facts not included in his complaint and filed a motion for leave to amend his complaint (ECF No. 31). Curiously, some of the facts relied on in his briefs opposing Defendants’ motions to dismiss are still amended complaint. not included in Plaintiff’s proposed The Court grants Plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint, and for the sake of judicial economy, construes that motion amended to include complaint plus the the facts contained facts described opposing the pending motions to dismiss. pending motions to dismiss, the in Court the in proposed his briefs Thus in deciding the considers Plaintiff’s original complaint, Plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint, and the facts Defendants’ stated motions in to Plaintiff’s dismiss. briefs in Plaintiff opposition shall amended complaint within 7 days of today’s order. 2 file to his Any claims included in that amended complaint that are dismissed by today’s order shall be deemed dismissed. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true ‘to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The factual allegations must be sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. . . on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” U.S. at 555. Twombly, 550 Thus, “a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS Plaintiff (hereinafter “Russell”) alleges the following facts in support of his claims: I. Russell’s Arrest and First Appearance On County June 18, Sheriff’s robbery, criminal 2013 Russell Department damage to was on arrested charges property, 1 of and by the theft by simple Muscogee taking, battery.1 Russell initially alleged that he was arrested by the Columbus Police Department. Compl. ¶ 11, ECF No. 1. He seeks to correct this allegation to state that he was arrested by the Sheriff’s Department. Proposed First Am. Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 31-1. The entity that arrested Russell is immaterial to determine the present motions to dismiss. To 3 Compl. ¶ 11. Although Russell “was very adamant that he was not guilty of these charges,” he was taken to the Muscogee County Jail. Id. ¶ 12. Three days after his arrest, Russell had his first appearance in Recorder’s Court and all charges against him were dismissed. II. Id. ¶ 12. Russell’s Additional Ten-Day Incarceration After the dismissal, jail officials told Russell that he would not be released probation violation.” because Id. ¶ 13. he was “under a hold for a Russell responded that he was on unsupervised probation and that he intended to inform his probation officer that he had been arrested. Id. ¶ 14. demanded to see paperwork regarding the alleged violation and to speak with his probation officer. Russell probation Id. ¶ 15. Authorities at the jail never responded to either request. Id. Sheriff Darr knows Russell personally and came to Russell’s jail cell to inquire about Russell’s complaints that he was being held illegally. ECF No. 23. would be Pl.’s Resp. to Darr’s Mot. to Dismiss 2, Russell explained to Darr that “any probation hold improper.” Id. Darr said he would look into the matter, but Russell did not see Darr again until after he was released from the jail, at least ten days later. Id. the extent, however, that Russell believes this allegation is relevant to his remaining claims, the Court grants Russell leave to correct this allegation. 4 III. Incident with Deputy Ermi and Deputy Merritt During the altercation ten days, regarding Compl. ¶ 18. Russell Russell not and Ermi receiving had verbal “snack a a pack.” At the end of the argument, Ermi threatened to beat Russell. Id. Then, on July 1, 2013 around 11:30 a.m., Ermi was escorting Russell to another floor in the jail. In the elevator, Russell was alone with two deputies—Ermi and Merritt. Id. force Ermi threw a “snack pack” at Russell’s face “with such that it . . . caused [Russell] to flinch Id. ¶ 20; Proposed First Am. Compl. ¶ 2.2 and turn.” As soon as Russell turned back towards the deputies, they struck him in the head and face. Compl. ¶ 21. The deputies continued to attack him until he was pinned to the floor. Id. ¶¶ 21 & 22. Then, six to nine additional officers arrived and handcuffed Russell. ¶ 22. This series available on DVD.” of events Id. ¶ 23. was Russell’s Medical and Release Following the Examination, beating, staff at the jail clinic. on camera and is Ermi was suspended for three days as a result of the elevator incident. IV. “caught Id. Russell Id. ¶ 46. Id. ¶ 25. Disciplinary was examined Segregation, by medical Russell had “visual scars, scrapes, and bruises” on his face, a knot on his head, and 2 Russell seeks to amend his complaint to assert that Ermi, not Merritt was the individual who threw the snack pack. First Proposed Am. Compl. ¶ 2. This correction is immaterial to the present motions, but the Court grants Russell leave to correct the allegation because it is relevant to Russell’s remaining claims. 5 complained that he was in excruciating pain. Id. ¶ 47. Despite his complaints, Russell was given no medication or treatment. Id. As a result of the beating, serious and permanent injuries.” After the medical Russell suffered “several Id. ¶ 45. examination, Russell in disciplinary segregation. jail officials Id. ¶ 24. later, Russell was released from jail. Id. placed About two hours Russell was never told why he was held in jail for ten days after all charges against him were dismissed. Id. He never spoke to a judge or had any proceedings related to the “probation hold.” Id. ¶ 51. He alleges that no probation warrant or probation violation to justify the detention appear in his records. Id. ¶ 51. On his release, Russell went immediately to the emergency Pl.’s Resp. to CCG’s Mot. to Dismiss 4, ECF No. 24. room. x-ray revealed a chipped bone in Russell’s shoulder. V. An Id. Allegations about Defendants At all times relevant to Russell’s claims, Darr served as Sheriff of Muscogee County, Georgia and Ermi and Merritt were correctional officers at the jail. and Merritt were employed by CCG. Russell alleges that Ermi Compl. ¶¶ 8 & 9. also alleges that they were sheriff’s deputies dispute CCG’s employees. contention Id. ¶ 45. that they were But Russell and Sheriff’s does not Department Thus, the Court will analyze the motion 6 as if Ermi and Merritt were sheriff’s deputies. This fact does not change the outcome of the present motions to dismiss. VI. The 1999 Agreement Russell also makes allegations regarding a previous lawsuit by the United Muscogee County States Department Jail. Russell of Justice alleges that involving in 1999 the former Muscogee County Sheriff Ralph Johnson entered a memorandum of understanding and Joint Motion for Conditional Dismissal with the DOJ agreeing to improve conditions at the jail. Id. ¶ 27. According to Russell, Defendants are no longer subject to the 1999 Agreement, but are still subject to a Memorandum of Agreement, which calls for compliance with the 1999 Agreement. Id. ¶ 30. Russell alleges that Defendants have refused” to improve the conditions in the jail. “stubbornly Id. ¶ 32. As a result, there have been a number of deaths at the jail and complaints about conditions increased. and inadequate medical care have Id. ¶ 33. VII. Russell’s Claims Based on these factual allegations, Russell asserts the following claims for damages: (1) false arrest/unlawful arrest; (2) excessive/unreasonable use of force; (3) cruel and unusual punishment; (4) failure to secure medical care/negligent medical care; (5) violation of due process/false imprisonment; (6) violation of due process for his disciplinary segregation; 7 and (7) negligent hiring, training, and supervision. Russell also asks the Court to hold Defendants in contempt for violating the 1999 Agreement and grant an injunction preventing further violations of the Agreement. DISCUSSION I. Official Capacity Damages Claims CCG filed a motion to dismiss all claims against Darr, Ermi, and Merritt in their official capacities based on Eleventh Amendment immunity and a failure to allege a basis for municipal liability. For purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity, Russell’s official capacity claims against Ermi and Merritt are treated the same as official capacity claims against the sheriff. See Scruggs v. Lee, 256 F. App’x 229, 232 (11th Cir. 2007)(per curiam)(holding entitled to capacities). Eleventh that employees Amendment immunity of the in sheriff their were official Official capacity claims against the sheriff are suits “against the entity” for which the sheriff acted as an agent. McMillian v. Monroe Cty., 520 U.S. 781, 785 n.2 (1997). As explained in more detail below, the Court concludes that the sheriff acted as an “arm of the state” while performing all of the functions giving providing medical care. rise to Russell’s claims, except Thus, Defendants, in their official capacities, are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity on these counts. Regarding the medical care claim, Russell 8 fails to sufficiently allege municipal liability. grants CCG’s motion to dismiss Accordingly, the Court Russell’s official capacity claims arising from the medical care. A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity The Eleventh Amendment bars suits in federal court against the state or an “arm of the state.” 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003)(en Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d banc). “Whether a [Georgia sheriff] is an ‘arm of the State’ must be assessed in light of the particular function in which the defendant was engaged when taking the actions out of which liability is asserted to arise.” Id. at 1308. The Eleventh Circuit uses four factors to determine whether an entity acts as an “arm of the state” when performing a particular function: “(1) how state law defines the entity; (2) what degree of control the State maintains over the entity; (3) where the entity derives its funds; and (4) who is responsible for judgments against the entity.” Id. at 1309. Applying these factors, the Eleventh Circuit held that a Georgia sheriff acts as an “arm of the state” when he establishes the use of force policy at the jail and trains and disciplines his deputies in that regard. Id. at 1328-29. Following that reasoning, the sheriff also acts as an “arm of the state” when the sheriff or his deputies arrest citizens for violations of the law or administer the policy for placement and classification of jail inmates. 9 Mladek v. Day, 293 F. Supp. 2d 1297, 1304 (M.D. Ga. 2003)(“[T]he Eleventh Circuit made it clear that it found no distinction between [the use of force policy] function and the law enforcement function performed by sheriffs when they arrest citizens for violations of the law.”); accord Youngs v. Johnson, No. 4:06-CV-19(CDL), 2008 WL 4816731, at *6 (M.D. Ga. Oct. 30, 2008). Additionally, post-Manders Eleventh Circuit case law suggests that the sheriff acts as an “arm of the state” when performing most functions, especially operating the jail. law enforcement See Purcell ex rel Estate of Morgan v. Toombs Cty., 400 F.3d 1313, 1325 (11th Cir. 2005)(interpreting Manders broadly and holding that the sheriff acts as an “arm of the state” when promulgating policies and procedures Colquitt governing Cty., 177 conditions F. App’x 852, of confinement); 855 (11th Cir. Burgest 2005)(per curiam)(affirming the district court’s holding that the sheriff and sheriff deputies were entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity for claims based on plaintiff’s arrest). Here, all of Russell’s claims, except those for inadequate medical care, implicate law enforcement sheriff acts as an “arm of the state.” functions where the First, Russell claims that he was arrested unlawfully and that Ermi and Merritt used excessive force against him, both state functions under Mladek and Manders. Russell also claims a due process violation based on the failure to give him an administrative hearing before 10 imposing two hours of disciplinary segregation. The sheriff’s state for function classification to and determine placement the policies reasonably includes inmates’ determining policies regarding inmate placement in disciplinary segregation. Additionally, Russell claims that his due process right to not be falsely imprisoned was violated when he was held in jail for ten days after all charges against him were dismissed. The Court the concludes that determining the policies regarding release of inmates is part of the sheriff’s state function to operate the jail and arrest citizens who violate the law. Youngs, 2008 WL 4816731, at *6 (“In general, the See Eleventh Circuit has concluded that Georgia sheriffs are an ‘arm of the State’ in the operation of county jails and are therefore entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity for claims arising from jail operations.”). Finally, Russell’s claims for negligent hiring, supervision, and training with regard to any state function are also barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The sheriff acts as an “arm of the state” when he trains and supervises his employees to fulfill state functions. See Manders, 338 F.3d 1304, 1328 (holding that the sheriff acts as an arm of the state when training and disciplining deputies with regard to his use of force policy). when hiring and The sheriff also acts as an “arm of the state” firing the deputies 11 that carry out his law enforcement policies. 783 (11th Cir. See Pellitteri v. Prine, 776 F.3d 777, 2015)(holding that a Georgia sheriff enjoys Eleventh Amendment immunity from wrongful termination suits). Thus, based upon Eleventh Amendment immunity, the Court grants CCG’s motion to dismiss Russell’s official capacity claims as to counts I, II, III, V, VI, and VII. Russell’s Official Medical Care B. Capacity Claims for Inadequate Although a Georgia sheriff acts as an “arm of the state” when performing most law enforcement functions, the sheriff acts as a county agent when making decisions regarding the medical care provided to county inmates. at *6-*9 (finding policymaker inmate for medical the that the county care); see See Youngs, 2008 WL 4816731, sheriff in acted promulgating also Manders, as the 338 the final policies F.3d at on 1322 (distinguishing the sheriff’s function to carry out the county’s obligations clothing, “involving and enforcement medical functions). jail structure necessities” Thus, and from inmates’ the Russell’s food, sheriff’s official law capacity claims for inadequate medical care are claims against CCG and not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Youngs, 2008 WL 4816731, at *9 (finding that official capacity claims against the sheriff regarding medical care in the jail are the functional equivalent of claims against the county); see also 12 Lightfoot v. Henry Cty. Sch. Dist., 771 F.3d 764, 771 (11th Cir. 2014)(“[C]ounties . . . are clearly not immune under the Eleventh Amendment”). Russell’s federal law claims for inadequate medical care must be § 1983.3 allege asserted To facts claim to medical needs. a Fourteenth a show Amendment constitutional deliberate violations violation, indifference to under Russell his must serious Harper v. Lawrence Cty., 592 F.3d 1227, 1234 (11th Cir. 2010). state as Even if Russell alleges sufficient facts to constitutional violation, liable for this violation. CCG is not automatically Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295, 1307 (11th Cir. 2001)(citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978)). To state a claim for municipal liability under § 1983, Russell must allege that CCG’s policy or custom caused the deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403-04 (1997). Russell does not assert that CCG has a relevant official policy. Additionally, while the single decision of a final policymaker for CCG is sufficient for municipal liability, Scala v. City of Winter Park, 116 F.3d 1396, 1399-1400 (11th Cir. Russell’s claims must be asserted under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, not the Eighth Amendment because Russell was a pretrial detainee, not a prison inmate. Craig v. Floyd Cty., 643 F.3d 1306, 1310 (11th Cir. 2011). But the standard is the same under either provision. Id. 3 13 1997), Russell fails to allege that a final policymaker acted here. Under Georgia law, Darr is the final regarding inmate medical care at the jail. 4816731, at *9. policymaker Youngs, 2008 WL Here, Russell makes no allegations about Darr related to his medical care.4 With no alleged policy and no alleged involvement of the final decisionmaker, Russell’s only remaining avenue for liability against CCG is the existence of “a widespread practice that, although municipal not policy, is authorized so by permanent written and well law or express settled constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.” as to Young v. City of Augusta, 59 F.3d 1160, 1172 (11th Cir. 1995)(quoting Brown v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 923 F.2d 1474, 1481 (11th Cir. 1991)). Russell’s allegations fall short of alleging a Russell relies on CCG’s 1999 Agreement with the DOJ as widespread practice. evidence of a widespread practice of deliberate indifference to inmates’ serious medical needs. But an Agreement to settle potential litigation in 1999 does not establish a widespread In Russell’s proposed first amended complaint, Russell claims that he told Darr “of all matters listed in this Complaint” and that Darr “did not respond.” Proposed First Am. Compl. ¶ 3. But the Court construes this allegation as consistent with Russell’s allegation in response to Darr’s motion to dismiss, which suggests that Russell complained to Darr before he was injured and needed medical care. Pl.’s Resp. to Darr’s Mot. to Dismiss 2, ECF no. 23. Russell does not, therefore, plausibly allege that he complained to Darr about his medical treatment. 4 14 pattern of Agreement constitutional is not constitutional Agreement. Cir. violations violations at the 2013. evidence conclusive in that jail when First, there CCG entered the were the See Cagle v. Sutherland, 334 F.3d 980, 987 (11th 2003)(per curiam)(explaining that a voluntary consent decree to settle prior litigation does not expand an inmate’s constitutional rights). Second, even if there were constitutional violations in 1999, the medical care giving rise to Russell’s claim occurred in 2013. Russell alleges no facts giving rise to a reasonable inference that CCG was in violation of the Agreement in 2013. Russell summarily asserts that CCG has “stubbornly refused to improve the conditions of the Jail,” but he fails to allege facts to support this conclusion. Compl. ¶ 32. In his single factual allegation, Russell claims that since 1999, “there have been a number of deaths within the Muscogee County Jail and complaints regarding jail conditions and inadequate medical care has [sic] been on the increase.” Id. ¶ 33. Russell does not allege how many deaths occurred or whether any of the deaths were a result of deliberate indifference to inmates’ serious medical needs. circumstances Additionally, surrounding the Russell inmate whether any of the complaints had merit. 15 fails to complaints, allege the particularly Without any factual context regarding the circumstances of the alleged deaths and complaints at the jail, the Court cannot conclude that indifference CCG to has a inmates’ widespread medical practice needs. of See deliberate Williams v. Barrett, No. 1:05-CV-2569-TWT, 2008 WL 476122, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 13, 2008)(concluding that a list of inmate complaints without reference to whether any of the complaints had merit or the circumstances surrounding the complaints did not show the supervisors were violations). on notice of widespread constitutional Thus, CCG is not liable under § 1983. And to the extent that Russell asserts state law claims against Defendants in their official capacities for inadequate medical care, these claims are barred by state-law sovereign immunity. Tattnall Cty. v. Armstrong, 333 Ga. App. 46, 51-52, 775 S.E.2d 573, 57778 (2015)(holding that the General Assembly has not waived county’s sovereign immunity for claims by inmates for inadequate medical care). Accordingly, Russell fails to state an official capacity claim for inadequate medical care. II. Claims Against CCG CGG also seeks dismissal of all claims asserted directly against CCG. Russell’s federal constitutional claims against CCG are all asserted through § 1983. § 1983, Russell unofficial policy must or allege custom, that or 16 the To hold CCG liable under CCG’s single official act of policy, a final policymaker for CCG caused the alleged violations. Clayton Cty., 335 banc)(plurality showing that F.3d 1326, opinion). CCG has 1329 Russell authority (11th must and Grech v. Cir. also 2003)(en allege responsibility facts over the governmental function giving rise to each of Russell’s claims. Id. at (“Holding 1329-31 control . . . would respondeat explained impose superior above, counties even liability Russell fails liable in broader absence of than the liability rejected to the in allege municipal against CCG for his medical needs claim. As Monell.”). liability Regarding Russell’s remaining claims, Russell fails to allege that CCG has authority over the governmental functions giving rise to these claims. Russell alleges incarceration disciplinary of that inmates segregation Darr at the has jail, policies, and authority over the use of the the force and hiring, training, supervising and firing of deputies to carry out these policies. Compl. ¶ 7. As explained above in the Eleventh Amendment immunity discussion, the sheriff performs these functions as an “arm of the “[C]ounties state,” have no not a authority policymaker over what for the corrections county. duties sheriffs perform, or which state offenders serve time in county jails, or who is in charge of the inmates in the county jails.” Manders, 338 F.3d at 1318. Since the sheriff does not act as a policymaker for CCG when performing these functions and CCG has 17 no control over the sheriff’s performance, CCG cannot be held liable for the sheriff’s acts regarding these functions. See Grech, 335 F.3d at 1348 (concluding that a Georgia sheriff was “not a county policymaker under § 1983 for his law enforcement conduct”); see also McMillian, 520 U.S. at 793 (holding that the Alabama sheriff was a state policymaker when executing his law enforcement duties policymaker). and, therefore, Accordingly, Russell not cannot a county final maintain claims against CCG under § 1983.5 Regarding state law claims against CCG, the Court previously explained that Russell’s medical care claim is barred by state-law sovereign immunity. asserts any barred. other state law To the extent that Russell claims, these claims also Under Georgia law, “[a] county is not liable to suit for any cause of action unless made so by statute.” § 36-1-4. are In Georgia, “[s]overeign immunity is O.C.G.A not an affirmative defense . . . and the waiver must be established by the party seeking to benefit from the waiver.” Forsyth Cty. v. Greer, 211 Ga. App. 444, 446, 439 S.E.2d 679, 681 (1993)(quoting Ga. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Poss, 263 Ga. 347, 348, 434 S.E.2d 488, 489 (1993), overruled on other grounds, Hedquist v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 272 Ga. 209, 528 S.E.2d 508 5 To the extent that Russell alleges that Ermi and Merritt were CCG employees and not sheriff’s employees, that would not change the result of CCG’s motion to dismiss. Neither Ermi nor Merritt were final policymakers for municipal liability. 18 (2000)). Russell pointed to no authority demonstrating a waiver of CCG’s sovereign immunity. Thus, Russell may not maintain any state law claims against CCG. Accordingly, the Court grants CCG’s motion to dismiss. III. Individual Capacity Claims Against Darr Darr filed a motion to dismiss all claims against him in his individual capacity. The Court denies Darr’s motion to dismiss as to Russell’s false imprisonment claim, but grants Darr’s motion as to all other counts. A. Federal Law Individual Capacity Claims Against Darr Russell § 1983. asserts his federal claims against Darr under As a supervisor, Darr is only liable under § 1983 for the acts of his subordinates if he personally participated in the violation or there is a causal connection between Darr’s actions and the violation. Mathews v. Crosby, 480 F.3d 1265, 1270 (11th Cir. 2007). 1. Counts I, II, III, IV, and VI Are Dismissed Russell fails to state claims against Darr based on his arrest, Ermi’s and Merritt’s uses of force, his medical care, and his disciplinary segregation. Russell does not allege that Darr personally participated in the conduct giving rise to these claims. Russell Thus, must to show establish a Darr’s causal connection supervisory by liability, alleging: (1) a “history of widespread abuse” that put Darr “on notice of the 19 need to correct the alleged deprivation” and that Darr failed to do so; (2) that Darr’s “custom or policy results in deliberate indifference “directed to constitutional subordinates to act rights;” unlawfully or (3) or that knew Darr that the subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so.” Id. (quoting Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003)). Russell fails constitutional to allege violations in “a history arrests, inmate of uses medical care, or disciplinary segregation. widespread” of force, Cf. Keith v. DeKalb Cty., 749 F.3d 1034, 1048 (11th Cir. 2014)(“The deprivations that constitute widespread abuse sufficient to notify the supervising official must be obvious, flagrant, rampant, and of duration . . . .” continued (quoting F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th Cir. 1999))). Hartley v. Parnell, 193 Russell again relies on the 1999 Agreement to show that Darr was on notice of widespread constitutional violations. But the Agreement is insufficient to show supervisory liability for many of the same reasons it was insufficient to show municipal liability: (1) the Agreement does not conclusively violations fourteen at years the establish Jail before in the that 1999; conduct there (2) the giving were constitutional Agreement rise to occurred Russell’s claims; and (3) Russell fails to allege any specific facts to 20 support the conclusion that CCG has violated the Agreement. See supra § I.B. Russell policies also caused fails “perpetrated and/or guidelines allege deliberate constitutional rights. were to that Darr’s indifference customs to or inmates’ Russell’s assertion that all his claims in accordance of [CCG],” “carr[ies] no weight.” with Comp. the ¶ 38, policies, is customs conclusory and Franklin v. Curry, 738 F.3d 1246, 1251 Moreover, Russell’s allegation (11th Cir. 2013)(per curiam). that Ermi was suspended as a result of the elevator incident indicates that Ermi’s use of force violated Darr’s policies. Finally, Russell makes no allegation that Darr directed or knew of and failed to violations. Russell’s complaint—that he told stop third Darr “of the alleged proposed all constitutional amendment matters listed to his in this complaint” and Darr “did not respond . . . ” does not change this analysis. Proposed First Am. Compl. ¶ 3. As noted above, the Court construes this allegation as consistent with Russell’s more specific allegation in his response to Darr’s motion to dismiss. Russell’s response suggests that he complained to Darr once, shortly after his first appearance hearing about being held unlawfully and then did not see Darr again until after his 21 release.6 Thus, Russell does not plausibly allege that he told Darr about Ermi’s and Merritt’s uses of force, his medical care, and his disciplinary segregation. These events happened at least ten days after Russell’s first appearance hearing, just hours before he was released. Construing all of Russell’s additional allegations as consistent, Russell fails to allege a causal connection between Darr’s conduct and Ermi’s 6 and Although Russell does not expressly state in his response that the conversation with Darr took place shortly after his first appearance hearing, that is the only reasonable inference drawn from the context. After the heading “Complaint Will Be Amended to Show Defendant Darr Did Have Personal Contact with Plaintiff Which Constitute [sic] a Casual [sic] Connection,” Russell’s response reads: After the Plaintiff went before the Columbus Recorders [sic] Court and all charges against him had been dismissed, he was returned to a jail cell and informed that he would not be released due to a probation hold. Plaintiff had complained to several jail staff officials that he was on unsupervised probation and that he was instructed to report all incidents to his probation officer. Defendant DARR, who knows Plaintiff personally, came to Plaintiff’s jail cell and inquired about this matter. Plaintiff explained to Defendant DARR that he was being held illegally because any probation hold would be improper. Defendant DARR advised Plaintiff that he would look into the matter. Plaintiff did not speak with Defendant DARR again until he was released from jail and he walked to the Courthouse to make a report about the entire incident. As it turns out, Plaintiff was held in jail for at least ten (10) days with no type of hold of any kind on him. This personal communication with the Plaintiff would give rise to a casual [sic] connection on the claim of the Plaintiff’s due process violation and on Plaintiff’s claim for false imprisonment. Pl.’s Resp. to Darr’s Mot. to Dismiss 2, ECF No. 23. 22 Merritt’s uses of force, his medical care, and his disciplinary segregation. Regarding Russell’s claim based on his arrest, Russell conceivably could have complained to Darr that he was arrested unlawfully when hearing. conduct he spoke to him after his first appearance Even if he did, however, it is unclear how Darr’s after the fact could have arrested without probable cause. “caused” Russell to be See Cordova v. Aragon, 569 F.3d 1183, 1194 (10th Cir. 2009)(“[B]asic princip[les] of linear time prevent us from seeing how conduct that occurs after the alleged violation could have somehow caused the violation.”). Moreover, Russell fails to allege circumstances of his arrest. any facts Thus, the Court regarding grants the Darr’s motion to dismiss as to counts I, II, III, IV, and VI. 2. Count VII Supervision Negligent Hiring, Training and Russell also claims that Darr negligently hired, trained, and supervised his deputies. “[U]nder § 1983, a supervisor can be held liable for failing to train his or her employees ‘only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights contact.’” of persons with whom the [officers] come into Keith, 749 F.3d at 1052 (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)). Russell must allege that Darr had actual or constructive notice that a deficiency in his 23 training caused his employees to violate inmates’ constitutional rights. Id. Russell makes no such allegations. Russell argues that Ermi’s and Merritt’s uses of excessive force in the elevator are evidence that Darr failed to properly train and supervise them. one violation, however, Compl. ¶¶ 59-62. does not The allegation of sufficiently allege Darr’s See Keith, 749 F.3d at 1053 (“To establish that [a] liability. supervisor was on actual or constructive notice of a deficiency of training, ‘[a] pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is ordinarily necessary.’” (second alteration in original)(quoting Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011))). that Ermi was Additionally, Russell argues that the fact suspended and that Merritt was fired for an unrelated incident is evidence that Darr failed as a supervisor. But those facts standing alone establish no such thing. It could be argued that the fact that the deputies were disciplined for violations of Darr’s supervise his deputies. against Darr for a policies suggests that Darr did Thus, Russell fails to state a claim failure to properly hire, train, and supervise his deputies. 3. Although plausible Count V Due Process/False Imprisonment his claim imprisonment. other against claims Darr fail, for his Russell does state alleged ten-day a false “A § 1983 claim of false imprisonment requires a 24 showing of common law false imprisonment violation under the Fourteenth Amendment.” and imprisonment, Russell must due process Campbell v. Johnson, 586 F.3d 835, 840 (11th Cir. 2009)(per curiam). false a allege For common law (1) an intent to confine, (2) an act resulting in confinement that is not lawful, and (3) the victim’s awareness of the confinement. Id. “The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause includes the ‘right to be free from continued detention after it was or should have been known that the detainee was entitled to release.’” Id. (quoting Cannon v. Macon Cty., 1 F.3d 1558, 1563 (11th Cir. 1993)). To establish a due process violation, Russell must allege facts to show that Darr was deliberately indifferent to Russell’s Deliberate right to be indifference free from requires false that imprisonment. Darr “had Id. subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm and disregarded that risk by actions beyond mere negligence.” Even if Russell imprisonment, protection for states however, a Id. claim “[q]ualified government officials against immunity sued in Darr offers their for false complete individual capacities if their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Brown v. City of Huntsville, 608 F.3d 724, 733 (11th Cir. 2010)(quoting Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir. 2002)). To overcome Darr’s qualified immunity 25 defense, Russell must allege sufficient facts to establish (1) a constitutional violation and (2) that the established at the time of the violation. a. right was clearly Id. at 734. CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION Russell sufficiently alleges common law false imprisonment because he states that he was purposefully held at the jail for at least ten Additionally, days after Russell’s he continued was entitled detention to “after release. it was or should have been known that [he] was entitled to release” rises to the level of a due process violation. Campbell, 586 F.3d at 840 (quoting Cannon, 1 F.3d at 1563). Russell indifference also to sufficiently this alleges violation. Darr’s Russell deliberate alleges Darr’s subjective knowledge of a serious risk of harm to Russell by claiming that he complained to Darr that he was being detained without cause. see Darr again Additionally, Russell alleges that he did not until his release and never explanation for his ten-day incarceration. light most favorable to Russell, these received any Construed in the allegations plausibly show that Darr unreasonably took no action in the face of the known risk that Russell’s rights were being violated. See Cannon, 1 F.3d at 1564-65 (holding that the officer’s failure to take any steps to ensure the plaintiff was correctly arrested after the plaintiff repeatedly 26 claimed that she was misidentified was sufficient deliberate indifference). to sustain a jury finding of Thus, Russell sufficiently alleges that Darr was deliberately indifferent to the violation of his rights. b. CLEARLY ESTABLISHED The Court further finds that Russell’s right to be free from false imprisonment was clearly established in 2013. See Campbell, 586 F.3d at 840 (“The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause includes the ‘right to be free from continued detention after it was or should have been known that the detainee was entitled to release.’” (quoting Cannon, 1 F.3d at 1563)); see also Cannon, 1 F.3d at 1564-65 (holding that incarcerating the plaintiff for three days despite strong evidence that she had been misidentified violation). was a clearly established due process Thus, Russell sufficiently states a § 1983 claim against Darr for the ten-day false imprisonment and Darr is not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. Accordingly, the Court denies Darr’s motion to dismiss as to count V. B. State Law Individual Capacity Claims Against Darr Darr argues that he is entitled to official immunity for any state law claims sufficiently alleged in Russell’s complaint. “The doctrine of official immunity . . . protects individual public agents from personal liability for discretionary actions taken within the scope of their official 27 authority, and done without willfulness, malice, or corruption.” Nichols v. Prather, 286 Ga. App. 889, 896, 650 S.E.2d 380, 386 (2007)(quoting Standard v. Hobbs, 263 Ga. App. 873, 875, 589 S.E.2d 634, 636-37 (2003)); see also Ga. Const. Art. I, Sec. II, Par. IX(d). Thus, Darr “may be personally liable only for ministerial acts negligently performed or acts performed with malice or an intent to injure.” Id. Here, Russell fails to make any argument that Darr is not See generally Pl.’s Resp. to entitled to official immunity. Darr’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 23. seeks to hold Darr ministerial acts. personally And it appears that Russell liable for discretionary, not See Nichols, 286 Ga. App. at 896, 650 S.E.2d at 386 (“A discretionary act . . . calls for the exercise of personal deliberation and judgment” while “[a] ministerial act is commonly one that is simple, absolute, and definite.” (quoting Standard, 263 Ga. App. at 875, 589 S.E.2d at 636-37)); Harvey v. Nichols, 260 Ga. App. 187, 191, 581 S.E.2d 272, 276 (2003)(holding immunity “with that the respect sheriff to the was entitled operation of to the official jail, the supervision of its officers and employees, and the establishment of policies and procedures”).7 Accordingly, Darr cannot be held 7 The provision of medical care is sometimes a ministerial act. See Graham v. Cobb Cty., 316 Ga. App 738, 742-43, 730 S.E.2d 436, 443-44 (2012). But “[w]hether the acts upon which liability is predicated are ministerial or discretionary is determined by the facts of the particular case.” Nichols, 286 Ga. App. at 896, 650 S.E.2d at 387 28 liable for any of these claims unless he acted with malice or intent to injure. Russell fails to allege any facts to support an inference that Darr acted with malice or an intent to injure Russell. Thus, any state law claims against Darr individually are dismissed. CONTEMPT AND INJUNCTION CLAIMS To the extent that Russell asserts separate claims arising from Defendants’ alleged violation of the Muscogee County Jail Agreement with jurisdiction contempt the over order. Justice Department, Russell’s Russell claims seeks for an the an Court injunction injunction Defendants from violating the 1999 Agreement. lacks and preventing Because Russell is no longer an inmate at the Muscogee County Jail, however, his claim for injunctive relief is moot. See Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 399 (11th Cir. 1986)(per curiam)(dismissing the plaintiff’s plaintiff claim was for injunctive released from relief as incarceration). moot because This reasoning extends to Russell’s motion to hold Defendants in contempt. Long v. Barry, 149 F.3d 1187 (8th Cir. the See 1998)(per curaim)(unpublished)(holding that the plaintiff’s claim to hold defendants in contempt was moot because plaintiff was no longer (quoting Brown v. Taylor, 266 Ga. App. 176, 177, 596 S.E.2d 403, 405 (2004)). And Russell makes no argument that Darr failed to perform any “simple, absolute, and definite” duties here. 29 incarcerated). Accordingly, the Court dismisses Russell’s claims for an injunction and contempt order. CONCLUSION In conclusion, the Court grants CCG’s motion to dismiss The Court denies Darr’s motion to dismiss as to (ECF No. 7). Russell’s due process false imprisonment claim against him in his individual capacity, but grants Darr’s motion to dismiss as to all other claims (ECF No. 15). The Court dismisses Russell’s claims for an injunction and contempt as moot. In addition to the his false capacity, imprisonment claim the against claims against Ermi Darr in and Merritt individual in their individual capacities remain pending. Within 7 days of today’s order, Russell shall electronically file his amended complaint with regard to his remaining claims against Ermi and Merritt individually and his single remaining claim against Darr, but Russell may not attempt to revive claims that have been dismissed. The stay previously issued in this action is lifted, and within 21 days of today’s order, the parties shall submit a joint proposed scheduling order consistent with the requirements of Rule 16 and 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this Court’s previous Rules 16/26 order. 30 IT IS SO ORDERED, this 4th day of December, 2015. S/Clay D. Land CLAY D. LAND CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 31
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