Tariq v. Chatman et al, No. 1:2011cv00159 - Document 31 (M.D. Ga. 2012)
Court Description: ORDER granting in part and denying in part 16 Motion to Dismiss Complaint; Plaintiff's claims for monetary damages and equitable relief against defendants Jackson & Simmons under the First Amendment, and his claims against Defendants Jackson & Simmons for equitable relief in their official capacities, under RLUIPA, are permitted to proceed; adopting 25 Report and Recommendations.Ordered by Judge W. Louis Sands on 8/22/12 (wks)
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Tariq v. Chatman et al Doc. 31 IN TH E U N ITED STATES D ISTRICT COU RT FOR TH E MID D LE D ISTRICT OF GEORGIA ALBAN Y D IVISION SH ARIF TARIQ, : : : : : : : : : : : Plain tiff, v. BRU CE CH ATMAN , et al., Defen dan ts. CASE NO.: 1:11-CV-159 ( W LS) ORD ER Before th e Court is a Recommen dation (Doc. 25) from Un ited States Magistrate J udge Thomas Q. Langstaff, filed J uly 18, 20 12. Th is Recommendation concerns th e First Am en dm en t claims an d claims un der the Religious Lan d Use an d In stitution alized Person s Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 20 0 0 cc et seq., J udge Langstaff recommended perm ittin g to proceed in his Novem ber 22, 20 11 Recom m en dation . (Doc. 7). Specifically, Langstaff in th e November 22, 20 11 Recommendation, J udge recommen ded th at Plain tiff’s Complain t be permitted to proceed as again st Defen dan ts Bruce Chatm an , J am es J ackson , an d Douglas T. Sim m on s. (Id. at 6). Subsequen t to th e November 22, 20 11 Order an d Recommen dation , but before th is Court en tered an order eith er adoptin g or declin in g to adopt J udge Lan gstaff’s Recom m endation, Defendan ts Chatm an, J ackson and Sim m ons m oved to dism iss Plain tiff’s Complain t. (Doc. 16-1). On J uly 18, 20 12, J udge Lan gstaff recommen ded th at Defen dan ts’ Motion to Dism iss be gran ted-in-part on the followin g: 1) as to the claim again st Defen dan t Ch atman ; 2) as to th e claim of mon etary damages un der th e RLUIPA; 1 Dockets.Justia.com 3) as to the RLUIPA claim again st Defen dan ts in their in dividual capacities; and 4) as to th e claim of in jun ctive relief for “oth er prison ers.” (See generally Doc. 25). J udge Lan gstaff did fin d, however, that Plain tiff has sufficien tly stated: 1) a claim for mon etary damages an d equitable relief again st Defen dan ts J ackson an d Simmons for a violation of h is First Am en dm en t rights an d 2) a claim again st Defen dan ts J ackson an d Simmons for equitable relief, in their official capacities, un der RLUIPA. (Id.) Thus, J udge Lan gstaff recommen ded th at th ese two claims be allowed to proceed. (Id.) On August 22, 20 12, th is Court en tered an order acceptin g an d adoptin g J udge Lan gstaff’s Novem ber 22, 20 11 Recom m en dation . (Doc. 30 ). For the followin g reason s, this Court ACCEPTS an d AD OPTS J udge Langstaff’s J uly 18, 20 12 Recom m endation as well.1 I. D e fe n d an ts ’ Obje ctio n s Defen dan ts filed written objections to J udge Lan gstaff’s J uly 18, 20 12 Recommen dation . (Doc. 26). Plain tiff did not, h owever, file a written objection to th e J uly 18, 20 12 Recom m en dation . (See generally Docket). In Defen dan ts’ Objection , Defen dan ts disagree with J udge Lan gstaff’s fin din g th at Plain tiff sufficien tly stated claims for violation of his First Am endm ent righ ts an d righ ts un der RLUIPA. (See generally Doc. 26). Accordin g to Defen dan ts, th ey sufficien tly met th e test outlin ed in Turn er v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), for showin g that they had a legitimate pen ological in terest in con fiscatin g Plain tiff’s Noble Qu’ran . (Doc. 26 at 2-4). Per Defen dan ts, they con fiscated the Noble Qu’ran because “[a]llowin g in mates to study materials that prom ote dissension is contrary to m aintaining institutional security.” (Id. at 3). Thus, 1 As Plaintiff’s concerns regarding Judge Langstaff’s November 22, 2011 Recommendation were amply addressed in this Court’s Order adopting said Recommendation, dated August 22, 2012, the undersigned limits the discussion in this Order to Defendants’ Objections to Judge Langstaff’s July 18, 2012 Recommendation. 2 Defen dan ts state th at: [A] neutral, ‘valid, ration al connection’ exists between th e confiscation of Plain tiff’s Noble Qu’ran an d ‘th e legitimate govern men tal in terest[s]’ of maintainin g a safe an d secure prison , while avoiding burdensome financial expen ditures, th ereby satisfyin g th e first Turner factor. (Id.) Defen dan ts then argue that Plain tiff failed to allege that h e h ad n o altern ative m ean s to exercise his religion absent his Qu’ran since he can still pray, read oth er religious books, attend religious services an d exercise other m ean s of religious practice. (Id. at 3-4). With regard to the third factor– the im pact that th e accommodation of the asserted con stitution al right would h ave on guards and other in mates– Defen dan ts argue that “allowin g Plain tiff to possess a Noble Qu’ran would h ave an adverse impact on institutional security because hate would be prom oted, wh ich im pacts prison security.” (Id. at 4). Fin ally, as to the fourth factor-whether there exists a ready altern ative “that fully accommodates the prison er’s righ ts at de min imis cost to valid pen ological in terests”-Defen dan ts argue th at even if their decision to con fiscate th e Qu’ran is an “exaggerated respon se,” th is does n ot mean th at the same is illegitimate. (Id.) Thus, Defen dan ts argue that “the challen ged regulation is reason able an d h as the legitimate pen ological objectives of main tain in g a safe an d secure prison .” (Id.) As to the J udge Lan gstaff’s con clusion that Defen dan ts are n ot en titled to qualified im munity at th is stage, Defendan ts disagree. (Id. at 5). Th ey, in fact, believe th at dismissal on qualified im munity grounds is noneth eless proper at this stage because th ey h ave committed n o con stitution al violation . (Id.) Addition ally, Defen dan ts argue that they sh ould be en titled to qualified im mun ity because “there is n o law clearly establish in g a violation on the well-pled ‘facts’ asserted h ere.” (Id.) 3 II. D is cu s s io n A. Fre e Exe rcis e Cla u s e an d th e Tu rn e r Bala n cin g Te s t Th is Court fin ds it n ecessary to overrule Defen dan ts’ objection s. First, with regard to wheth er the challen ged “regulation ,” meets the Turn er balan cin g test, th is Court n otes that there is n o eviden ce from either Defen dan ts’ Motion to Dism iss or th eir Objection to the Magistrate’s Report an d Recommen dation th at th ere is an actual “regulation ” at work here. Based on th e facts alleged in Plain tiff’s Complain t, h is Noble Qu’ran was con fiscated because prison officials stated th at it is “radical,” “teach es hate,” an d h as “the wron g kin d of stuff in it.” (Doc. 1 at 5). However, Defen dan ts h ave provided n o actual evidence of a written regulation or policy govern in g in m ates’ right of access to religious texts. Defen dan ts have simply stated that th ey should be allowed to regulate an inmate’s righ t to possess certain religious texts on an ad hoc basis as lon g as they can articulate a “reason able” basis for the con fiscation . With this argumen t, this Court disagrees. 2 In essen ce, Defen dan ts argue that they are en titled to a dismissal of Plain tiff’s claims because th ey con ten d that there was a “n eutral” con n ection between th e confiscation an d th e prison ’s interest in m aintaining a safe an d secure prison . However, at th is stage, th e Court can n ot assess whether the regulation was in deed “n eutral.” A review of the pleadin gs does n ot in dicate th at there is an y eviden ce regardin g wheth er there exists a formal policy regardin g certain kin ds of religious text, h ow the policy is 2 Though there is no need to make a finding as to the actual merits of Plaintiff’s claim at this stage, at first blush, this Court finds that it is no doubt likely a violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights to allow a prison official to decide on an ad hoc, unilateral basis, without any established procedure, policy or practice, whether an inmate should be permitted to possess a religious text. Such an ad hoc, unilateral determination without any reference to any objective criteria simply smacks of an arbitrary infringement of a fundam ental constitutional right. Defendant has indicated no principle of law suggesting that a prisoner m ay be deprived of a religious text without limitation. 4 applied, an d wh at religious texts, if an y, are ban n ed for all in m ates. In Turn er, th e Supreme Court stated that in assessin g whether a regulation meets the first factor of the balan cin g test, “the govern men tal objective must be a legitimate an d n eutral on e.” 482 U.S. at 90 . Thus, the Supreme Court n oted that courts sh ould “in quire wh eth er prison regulation s restrictin g in m ates’ First Am en dm en t righ ts operated in a n eutral fash ion , without regard to th e con ten t of the expression .” Id. In their Motion to Dism iss, Defen dan ts simply argue th at a con fiscation of a religious text on the grounds that certain iden tified prison officials fin d it 1) to be “radical”; 2) to h ave “the wron g kin d of stuff in it”; an d 3) to teach hate, comports with Turn er’s requiremen t of “n eutrality.” (Doc. 16-1 at 5-6). However, Supreme Court preceden t in dicates th at it is exactly this kind of “censorship” that is “decidedly n ot ‘n eutral.’” See Thorn burgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 40 1, 416 (1989) (n otin g th at regulation s barrin g writin gs that express “in flam m atory political, racial, religious, or oth er views” or are “oth erwise in appropriate,” are exactly the kin d of regulation s that “fairly in vite[] prison officials an d em ployees to apply their own person al prejudices an d opin ions as stan dards for prison er m ail censorsh ip”) (citin g Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 415 (1974), rev’d on other groun ds, Th orn burgh , 490 U.S. 40 1)).3 Therefore, con struin g th e complain t in favor of Plain tiff, it can n ot be said th at Plain tiff has failed to “state a claim to relief” th at is “plausible” based on the face of h is Com plaint. See Am erican Den tal Ass’n v. Cign a Corp., 60 5 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 20 10 ) (“[T]o survive a m otion to dism iss, a complain t must n ow con tain sufficien t factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief th at is plausible on its face.’”) (quoting Bell Atlan tic Corp. v. Twom bly, 550 U.S. 3 While this Court recognizes that both Thornburg and Martinez concern regulations applying to prisoner mail, these cases are cited for the general proposition that “neutrality” requires that the prison officials’ actions be related to the effect the publication may have on, i.e., security, and not on the content of the expression. 5 544, 570 (20 0 7))). Consequently, in addition to agreeing with J udge Langstaff’s finding that Defen dan ts have n ot provided an y eviden ce th at den yin g an in mate th e righ t to possess a Noble Qu’ran actually prom otes the pen ological in terest of in stitution al security, this Court fin ds th at Defen dan ts have failed to show the n eutrality of th e “regulation ” at issue at this stage of the litigation . In short, Defen dan ts argue a “purpose” with out poin tin g to an y actual “policy” or “regulation .” Furthermore, Defen dan ts offered n othin g to respon d to J udge Lan gstaff’s con cern th at th ere is n o eviden ce before th e Court to determ in e wh eth er allowin g prison ers to retain th eir Noble Qu’ran actually does th reaten th e safety of th e prison . Defen dan ts simply reiterated th eir bald assertion an d con clusion 1) th at a Noble Qu’ran is a religious text th at prom otes dissension that is contrary to m aintaining institutional security an d 2) th at if officials con fiscate a Noble Qu’ran , th is will further th e govern m ental interest of m aintaining a safe an d secure prison . (Doc. 26 at 3). Th is is tan tam oun t to arguin g: “because I said that it is so, this m akes it so.” Though the Turn er stan dard is a deferen tial on e, th is does n ot mean that th is Court is required to blin dly accept Defen dan ts’ conclusion s assertin g that th e ch osen action passes con stitution al muster. William s v. Pryor, 240 F.3d 944, 950 (11th Cir. 20 0 1) (“Alth ough sim ilar in part (and som etim es in description) to ordinary ration al basis review, th e Turn er standard requires a m ore searchin g, four-part in quiry” [based upon facts; n ot a defen dan t’s self-servin g con clusions offered in support of a motion for dism issal on th e pleadin gs].”); Fortn er v. Thom as, 983 F.2d 10 24, 10 29 (11th Cir. 1993) (“[E]ven th ough th is court en gages in a deferen tial review of th e admin istrative decision s of prison auth orities, the tradition al deferen ce does not mean that courts have abdicated their 6 duty to protect those con stitution al righ ts th at a prison er retain s.”) (addition al citation s om itted). With regard to Defen dan ts’ objection s un der the remain in g Turn er factors, th is Court fin ds th at Defen dan ts’ argumen ts fail to address J udge Lan gstaff’s con cern s an d, are as such , overruled as well. J udge Lan gstaff con cluded that, as to th e secon d factor, Plain tiff has asserted that th e Qu’ran is a “significan t” factor in the practice of his religion . (Doc. 25 at 5). Therefore, this case turns on Plain tiff’s righ t to retain access to a prim ary text n ecessary for the practice an d exercise of his religious righ ts. Nevertheless, Defen dan ts cite O’Lon e v. Estate of Sh abazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987), for th e proposition th at because Plain tiff can en gage in oth er religious observan ces, he h as n ot been deprived of the right to practice his religion . However, O’Lon e is distin guishable from the case at bar. In O’Lon e, th e Supreme Court found reason able a restriction on an in mate’s ability to atten d religious service, fin din g that in mates retain ed the right to participate in other Muslim religious cerem on ies. Id. at 351-52. On th e con trary, h ere, th e focus would be on wh ether there exists a reason able altern ative for Plain tiff to practice religious observan ce through the use of a prim ary text utilized by members of th e Muslim commun ity. The statemen ts-Plain tiff can “read other religious books” an d is m erely bein g deprived of “on e religious book”-leave question able wh ether an y serious con sideration was given to th e textual altern atives available to Plain tiff in th e practice of his Islamic faith . However, all of this is speculative because there are n o actual developed facts. Neverth eless, it is apparent that th e Supreme Court reviewed more 7 than the initial pleadings.4 In th at same vein , th e Court agrees th at Defen dan ts have n ot provided an y actual eviden ce to support th eir speculative assertion th at allowin g on e in mate to possess a Noble Qu’ran could lead to h eighten ed security an d fin an cial con cerns. Defen dan ts argue th at allowin g an in mate to possess a Noble Qu’ran may lead other in mates to follow suit, “thereby resultin g in greater security con cerns of in mates formin g ‘affin ity groups’ to practice th eir h ateful ideology.’” Thus, per Defen dan ts, the prison would h ave to h ire addition al prison guards to en sure that th ese “affin ity groups” were n ot in fact establish ed. (Doc. 16-1 at 7). J udge Lan gstaff foun d this assertion to be “speculative at th is stage.” (Doc. 25 at 6). This Court con curs. Defen dan ts are challen gin g Plain tiff’s Complain t, n ot because it is in adequate on its face, but upon con clusions an d speculation wh olly un supported by a developed record. Even so, in O’Lone, respon dents suggested several accom m odation s, which included placing all Muslim inm ates on th e sam e work detail or providing weeken d labor for Muslim in mates. 482 U.S. at 352. Thus, th e Supreme Court foun d reason able th e prison administrator’s concerns that phy sically placin g all Muslim in mates together could result in the creation of an organ ization al structure that could challen ge “institution al auth ority.” Id. at 353. In con trast, though th ey cite O’Lon e as bein g support for th eir action s, Defen dan ts have provided n o eviden ce that allowin g Plain tiff to possess his prim ary religious text could reason ably lead to the same, or even remotely 4 Indeed, in m ost, if not all, of the cases cited by Defendants in support of their actions, evidence was adduced at a trial or during a hearing to aid the courts in their constitutional determ ination. E.g., Turner, 482 U.S. 78 (trial); O’Lone, 482 U.S. 348 (hearing); McCorkle v. J ohnson, 881 F.2d 993 (11th Cir. 1989) (evidentiary hearing). Therefore, by putting at issue unsubstantiated factual argum ents as a defense to the alleged constitutional violation, Defendants’ are essentially admitting that, at a minimum, a further hearing, or development of the facts, is necessary. 8 sim ilar, result.5 Accordin gly, th is Court agrees th at Plain tiff has sufficien tly stated a claim un der the Free Exercise Clause of th e First Am en dm en t an d that dism issal is therefore n ot proper. B. Qu a lifie d Im m u n ity Regardin g the defen se of qualified im mun ity, J udge Lan gstaff foun d th at Plain tiff’s Complain t, as pled, does “allege a violation of a clearly establish ed con stitution al right,” construed as a right to exercise his religion . (See Doc. 25 at 8) (citin g Presley v. Edwards, No. 2:0 4-cv-729, 20 0 7 WL 174153, at *12 (M.D. Ala. J an . 19, 20 0 7)). Thus, J udge Lan gstaff foun d that Defen dan ts’ qualified im munity defen se can n ot be sustain ed on th e pleadin gs alon e at this stage. Defen dan ts objected to th is fin din g by relyin g on their prin cipal argumen t that they committed n o con stitution al violation . (Doc. 26 at 5). Nevertheless, per Defen dan ts, even if there was a con stitution al violation , Plain tiff can n ot show th at th e con stitution al right was clearly establish ed at th e time of the alleged violation . (Doc. 16-1 at 14; Doc. 26 at 5). Th e Court agrees with J udge Lan gstaff an d fin ds that Plain tiff h as pled sufficien t facts to show th at a fin din g of qualified im mun ity is n ot warran ted at this stage. First, the cases th at Defen dan ts poin t to in support of th e argumen t th at they h ave committed n o con stitution al violation on ly serve to support th e gen eral proposition th at prison officials are perm itted to in frin ge on a prison er’s con stitution al right to practice h is religion when it is “reason ably related to legitimate pen ological in terests” an d when th e rem aining Turn er factors are m et. E.g., Turn er, 482 U.S. 78; O’Lon e, 482 U.S. 342. 5 It must be noted that this Court does not purport to say that Defendants should be charged with the task of “disprov[ing] the availability of alternatives” for accom m odating Plaintiff’s right to practice his religion. See O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 353 (1987). However, based on the current record, it does not appear that Defendants have made any attempt to offer a reasonable accommodation to Plaintiff that does not sacrifice “valid legitim ate penological interests.” 9 Quite th e reverse, as applied to this case, these cases establish that Plain tiff might be able to sh ow that the law w as clearly established that Defen dan ts were n ot permitted to in terfere with h is righ t to exercise h is religion in th e m ann er in wh ich th ey so did. Defen dan ts were likely aware of the broad prin ciple that they “m ay n ot substan tially burden in mates’ right to th e free exercise of religion without some legitim ate pen ological justification .” (Doc. 25 at 9) (quotin g Presley v. Edwards, No. 2:0 4-cv-729, 20 0 7 WL 174153, at *12 (M.D. Ala. J an. 19, 20 0 8 )). Th e Eleven th Circuit has con cluded that “broad statemen ts of prin ciple in case law are n ot tied to particularized facts an d can clearly establish law applicable in the future to differen t sets of detailed facts.” Vin yard v. Wilson , 311 F.3d 1340 , 1351 (11th Cir. 20 0 2). Thus, the cases cited by Defen dan ts in n o way show that in this particular case, Defen dan ts have met their burden of demon stratin g that “there is n o law clearly establishin g a violation on the well-pled ‘facts’ asserted h ere” (see Doc. 26 at 5). Furtherm ore, as observed by the Suprem e Court, RLUIPA was en acted by Con gress to put govern men t officials on n otice that they can n ot burden an in mate’s righ t to practice his/ her religion arbitrarily or with out cause. See Cutter v. Wilkin son , 544 U.S. 70 9, 716 (20 0 5) (n otin g that before Con gress en acted RLUIPA to im pose restriction s on a federally funded program ’s righ t to im pose a “substan tial burden on religious exercise, . . . Congress documented, in h earings spanning three years, that ‘frivolous or arbitrary’ barriers im peded institutionalized person s’ religious exercise”). Here, as n oted previously, Defen dan ts have provided n o eviden ce that the action s taken were con sisten t with a form al policy, if an y, instituted by the prison . Even if Defen dan ts would like to argue th at they were n ot put on n otice th at they could n ot con fiscate a Noble Qu’ran , it would be disin genuous for them to argue th at they were n ot on n otice 10 th at an y in frin gemen t of an in mate’s righ t to practice his religion must be don e in some neutral fash ion, i.e., consistent with an objective policy. Moreover, Plain tiff has alleged in his Complain t that his Noble Qu’ran was taken because Defen dan t J ackson stated that it is “radical” and “has the wron g kin d of stuff in it” an d Defen dan t Simmon s stated that it “teaches hate.” (Doc. 1 at 5). By failin g to cite to an objective policy in place, or provide an y actual eviden ce of on e in a respon sive pleadin g, Defen dan ts h ave failed to demon strate that they were “actin g with in th e scope of [th eir] discretion ary authority when the allegedly wron gful acts occurred.” See Vin yard, 311 F.3d at 1346 (“To receive qualified im munity, the public official must first prove th at he was actin g within th e scope of his discretion ary authority wh en the allegedly wron gful acts occurred.”) (addition al citation s an d quotation s omitted). Th erefore, this Court h as n o eviden ce to determ in e whether th ese statem en ts were made in th e scope of Defen dan ts’ auth ority or based on their own person al views. Stated an oth er way, because at this stage the Court has n o in form ation to ascertain wheth er th e action taken can even be measured again st an y form al policy, this Court is un able to determ in e whether officials were aware that they were kn owin gly violatin g prison policy, let alon e wh ether Defen dan ts kn ew th at they were violatin g a con stitution al right. Accordin gly, th is Court adopts J udge Lan gstaff’s fin din gs on Defen dan ts’ qualified im munity defense. III. Co n clu s io n This Court h as fully reviewed and considered th e record. Despite Defen dan ts’ argumen ts to th e con trary, there are a n umber of question s of fact th at can n ot be resolved on the as yet to be developed record. See La Grasta v. First Un ion Securities, In c., 358 F.3d 840 , 848 (11th Cir. 20 0 4) (“question of fact . . . is often in appropriate for 11 resolution on a motion to dismiss un der Rule 12(b)(6)”) (addition al citations om itted); MTM Television Distribution Grp., Ltd. v. Public In terest Corp., No. 91-1519-CIV-T, 1992 WL 80 625, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 24, 1992) (“Question s of fact are n ot properly determin ed on a 12(b)(6) motion to dism iss.”) Therefore, Defen dan ts’ unsubstan tiated factual argumen ts have failed to demon strate th e in sufficiency of Plain tiff’s Complain t. See La Grasta, 358 F.3d at 845 (n otin g that in an alyzin g the sufficiency of a complain t, courts sh ould lim it their consideration to th e well-pleaded factual allegation s). Accordin gly, th is Court agrees th at dism issal is n ot appropriate wh en viewin g th e Complain t in th e ligh t most favorable to Plain tiff. Th erefore, h avin g foun d that Defen dan ts’ specific objections to the Magistrate’s findin gs are un tenable at this stage, an d neither Defendan ts nor Plaintiff h aving objected to th e remainin g findin gs in th e Magistrate’s J uly 18, 20 12 Recommen dation (Doc. 25), th is Court finds th at said Recommen dation should be, an d h ereby is, ACCEPTED, ADOPTED an d made th e Order of this Court, to the exten t the same is con sisten t with this Order, for reason of the fin din gs made an d conclusion s stated therein together with the findin gs made, reason s stated an d con clusions reached herein . Accordingly, Defendan ts’ Objections (Doc. 26) are OVERRU LED . Defen dan ts’ Motion to Dism iss is GRAN TED -IN -PART an d DEN IED -IN -PART w ith o u t p re ju d ice . For th at reason , Plain tiff’s followin g claims are dism issed: (1) as to th e claim again st Defen dan t Ch atman ; (2) as to th e claim of mon etary damages un der RLUIPA; (3) as to th e RLUIPA claim against Defen dan ts in their in dividual capacities; an d (4) as to th e claim of in jun ctive relief for “oth er prison ers.” Plain tiff’s claims for (1) mon etary damages an d equitable relief again st Defen dan ts J ackson and Simmon s un der th e First Am en dm en t an d (2) his claims again st Defen dan ts J ackson an d Simmon s for equitable 12 relief, in th eir official capacities, un der RLUIPA, are perm itted to proceed. SO ORD ERED , th is 22 n d day of August, 20 12. / s/ W. Louis Sands TH E H ON ORABLE W . LOU IS SAN D S, U N ITED STATES D ISTRICT COU RT 13
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