Del Valle v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security et al, No. 1:2018cv21230 - Document 34 (S.D. Fla. 2018)
Court Description: ORDER Denying 21 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Senior Judge James Lawrence King on 9/24/2018. See attached document for full details. (jw)
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Del Valle v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security et al Doc. 34 UN ITED STA TES D ISTR ICT C O URT SO U TH ER N D ISTR ICT OF FLO RIDA CA SE N O .1:18-CV -21230-CIV -JLK RAM ON DEL V ALLE, Plaintiff, KIR STJEN N IELSEN , Secretary ofHomelandSecurity eta1., Defendants. O R DER D EN YIN G D EFENDA NTS'M O TIO N TO DISM ISS TH IS M A TTER com es before the Courtupon D efendants'M otion to D ism iss (DE #21),tlled on June 4,2018,seeking to dismissPlaintiffs ComplaintforDe Novo Naturalization and/orDeclaratory Judgment (DE //1). Plaintiff filed his Response in Opposition (DE #22) on June18,2018,and Defendants fled theirReply (DE #25) on June 25,2018. On July 12,2018,Plaintifffiled an U nopposed M otion forSupplem ental Briefing (DE #27) regarding Pereira v.Sessions, 138 S.Ct.2105 (2018),a Supreme Courtopinion issued on June 21,2018. The Courtgranted the m otion on August9,2018 (DE //28). Plaintifffiled a SupplementalOpposition to Defendants'M otion to Dismiss (DE #29)on August9,2018;and Defendantsfiled a SupplementalBriefin Support(DE #30)onAugust17,2018.Accordingly,thismatterisripefordisposition. Dockets.Justia.com BA CK G R O UND PlaintiffemigratedtotheUnited Statesfrom Cubaattheageoffive(DE #1,! 16; DE #1-4),and hasbeen a lawfulpermanentresident($;LPR'')ofthe United Statessince January 11,1965(DE #1,! 17).OnJanuary 21,1981,Plaintiffwasconvictedin theUS District Court for the Southern D istrict of Florida for Gsknow ingly and intentionally importing into the United States a controlled substance,''specifically marijuana,in violationof21U.S.C.j952(a)and960(a)(1),and 18U.S.C j2(DE #1-4). On Septem ber 1,2016,Plaintiff filed an Application for N aturalization w ith the United StatesCitizenship and Immigration Services($iUSC1S'')under8 U.S.C.j 1427 (DE #1,! 21). He appeared forhisnaturalization interview and examination on January 9,2017 (DE #1,! 25). The USCIS is required to adjudicate or schedule a second interview for an Application forN aturalization within 120 days ofthe firstinterview . 8 C.F.R.j335.3(a).M oreover: dklfthereisafailuretomakeadeterminationunder(j)1446beforetheend ofthe 120-day period aherthe date on w hich the exam ination is conducted under such section,the applicant m ay apply to the United States district court for the district in w hich the applicant resides for a hearing on the matter. Such court has jurisdiction over the matter and may either determ ine the m atter orrem and the m atter,w ith appropriate instructions,to the Service to determ inethe m atter.'' 8U.S.C.j 1447(b). (ûon or aboutM arch 31,2018,'5DelV alle received in the m aila N otice to Appear (û$NTA'')in rem ovalproceedings from USCIS (DE #1,T 38). The NTA alleged asthe basis for removal Plaintifps criminalconviction from 1981 (DE #1-4). On April2, 2018--448 days afterhis interview fornaturalization- plaintiffhad received no response from the USCIS,and filed hisComplaintwith the Courtpursuantto 8 U.S.C.j 1447(b) (DE #1,! 36). A superseding NTA filed with the ExecutiveOffice forImmigration Review (d$EO1R'')on May 25,2018,chargedPlaintiffwith being removablepursuantto 8 U.S.C.237(a)(2)(A)(iii) as an aggravated felon, and 8 U.S.C.237(a)(2)(B)(i) as a controlledsubstanceviolator(DE //21,at2). LEGA L STA N DA RD Defendantsmoveto dismisspursuanttoFederalRulesofCivilProcedure12(b)(1) forlackofsubject-matterjurisdiction and 12(b)(6)forfailureto statea claim on which reliefcan begranted.A motion to dismissunderRule 12(b)(1)may attackjurisdiction facially orfactually. M orrison v.d/awtzp Corp.,323 F.3d 920,924 n.5 (11th Cir.2003). . Facial attacks direquire the courtm erely to look and see if the plaintiff has sufticiently alleged a basisofsubjectmatterjurisdiction ...and aplaintiffisafforded safeguards similarto those provided in opposing a Rule 12(b)(6)motion- the courtmustconsider the allegations ofthe com plaintto be true.'' Lawrence v.D unbar,919 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir.1990). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6)motion to dismiss,acomplaintmustinclude dienough facts to state a claim to reliefthat is plausible on its face.'' #e//W//.Corp.v.Twom bly, 550 U.S.544,570 (2007). ç$A claim has facialplausibility when the plaintiffpleads factualcontentthatallow sthe courtto draw the reasonable inference thatthe defendantis liable for the m isconduct alleged.'' Ashcro.ft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.662, 663 (2009). Allegations absentsupporting factsare notentitled to thispresum ption ofveracity. 1d.at 681. W hen evaluating a m otion to dism iss, the Courtm ust take a1l of the w ell-pled factualallegationsas true.1d.at664. How ever,'dthreadbare recitals ofthe elem ents of a cause of action, supported by m ere conclusory statem ents,do not suffice.''1d. at 663. The Courtm ustdism iss acom plaintthatdoes notpresenta plausible claim dem onstrating entitlem entto relief. D ISCU SSIO N Defendants argue that 8 U.S.C. j 1429 prohibits the Court from considering ' Plaintiffsnaturalization application under 8 U .S.C.j 1447(b). 1429 states that Sdno application for naturalization shall be considered by the A ttorney General if there is pending againstthe applicanta rem ovalproceeding pursuantto a w arrantofarrestissued undertheprovisionsofthischapteror any A ct.'' Federalcourtsthroughoutthe U .S.have ruled on the interaction betw een the tw o provisions,but there is no precedent on-point thatisbinding on the Court. The U .S.CourtofAppeals forthe Eleventh Circuithas stressed the im portance of looking to the plain m eaning of the text itself w hen interpreting statutes. See Silva- Hernandez v.USCIS,701F.3d 356,361(1lth Cir.2012).Courts'smustbegin,and often should end as well, with the language of the statute itself.''1d. (quoting Harry Marchant,291F.3d 767,770 (11th Cir.2002)(en bancj). M oreover,tsltlhose who ask courts to give effect to perceived legislative intent by intem reting statutory language contrary to its plain and unam biguous m eaning are in effect asking courts to alter that language,and courts have no authority to alter statutory language ...cannot add to the terms ofthe provision whatCongressleftout.'' 1d.(quoting CBS Inc.v.Primetime 24 JointVenture,245F.3d 1217,1228(11th Cir.2001)). Theplain m eaning ofthetextof8U.S.C.j 1429 isthattheprovision restrictsthe Attorney G eneral,but does nothing to restrict U .S.District Courts. For exam ple, the provision does not say, ççN o application for naturalization shall be considered,'' but speciically goes on to listthe Attorney G eneral. In contrast,the im m ediately preceding clause of j 1429 states that i$(N1o person shall be naturalized against whom there is outstanding a final Gnding of deportability''; it does not go on to list the A ttorney General, U .S.D istrictCourts,orany otherentity.1 The Courthasno authority to read the nextprovision of the statute,the one at issue here,in a w ay that disregards the direct qualiier,ûlby the A ttorney General.'' A rgum ents raised by D efendants againstthis basic pointare unpersuasive.2 Defendantsarguethelegislativehistory establishesthatj 1429 wasenacted to end theracethathistorically existed between naturalization and removal(DE //21,at3-4;DE lThefullprovision reads: $k(Nqo person shallbe naturalized againstwhom there isoutstanding a finalfinding of deportability pursuantto a warrantofarrestissued undertheprovisionsofthischapteror any other Act;and no application for naturalization shallbe considered by the Attorney General if there is pending against the applicant a removal proceeding pursuant to a warrantofarrestissuedundertheprovisionsofthischapterorany otherAct(.)'' 8LJ.S,C.j 1429. 2Plaintiff's SupplementalOpposition to Defendants'M otion to Dism iss argues thatPereira v.Sessions, l38S.Ct,2105 (2018),issuedonJune 21,dsclarifiesthatremovalproceedingshavenotbeen commenced against M r.DeIValle and thus robs Defendants' M otion to Dism iss of both a factualbasis and legal merit''(DE #29,atl).Pereira specificallyheldthataNoticetoAppearthatdoesnotspecifythetimeand placeofthe initialremovalproceeding,asrequired by 8 U.S.C.j l229(a)(1)(G)(i),doesnottriggerthe stop-timerule under8 U.S.C.j 1229b(d)(1),which referencesj 1229(a). However,the Courtneed not decide today whetherPereira's holding appliesto Noticesto Appearm ore broadly than with respectto the stop-tim erule. 5 * 1/25, at 4-5). Indeed, j 1429 prioritizes removal proceedings over naturalization proceedings,which are both now prim arily conducted within the executive branch. But, as clearly written, this priority does not encompass review by U .S. D istrict Courts. Instead,C'lwjhen Congressamended j 1429 (in 19902,itchose to replace Snaturalization court'with kAttorney General,'lmmigration Actof1990,j407(d)(3).'' Yith v.Nelson, 881F.3d 1155,1164-65(9thCir.2018).SsNothinginthe1990amendmentssuggeststhat Congress intended to preserve the 1952 act's bar on a district court naturalizing applicants while rem oval proceedings are pending,and Congress's decision to rem ove theprovision suggestsitw anted to end such a bar.''1d.at1162. Defendants also argue thatthe phrase çtfailure to make a determination''in j 1447(b)should only apply to casesofexecutivedelay,and notwhen removalispending (DE #21,at3-4;DE #25,at4). Plaintiffsrespond that'sltlhisconclusion defiescommon usage ofilfailure''and thus lacks persuasive value''(DE #22,at 14). Forexample,the plain language reading oftifailure''encom passessituations where ikthe failure w ascaused by the person's self-sabotage or other intentional efforts to m ake it im possible to accomplish the goal.'' Yith,881F.3d at 1162. Regardless,ifj 1429 only appliesto çlthe Attorney General,''as itplainly states,there is no need to parse the m eaning of dlfailure'' inj 1447(b). Finally,there is nothing in either statute that suggests that the D istrict Court's authority cannotbe greaterthan thatoftheAttorney General(DE //21,at5;DE #25,at34), lndeed,the textof j 1429 suggests the opposite,in that the Attorney General's authority is proscribed by nam e in the statute when a rem ovalproceeding is pending, whereas the DistrictCourt's authority is not. W e end where w e began,atthe statutory text.SeeH arry,29 1F.3d at770. CO NC LU SIO N As 8 U.S.C.j 1429 doesnotbarthe Courtfrom hearing this case,Plaintiffs Complaint should not be dism issed. Therefore,it is O RD ER ED, AD JU DG ED ,and DECREED that Defendants' M otion to Dismiss (DE #21) is hereby DENIED. Defendants SHALL file theirAnswer to the Complaintwithin twenty (20)days ofthe date ofthisorder. D O NE and O R DERED in Cham bersatthe Jam esLawrence K ing FederalJustice Building and United States Courthouse in M iam i,Florida,on this 21stday ofSeptem ber, 2018. * M ES LA W REN CE K IN G ITED STATES DISTRICT JU cc: A Ilcounselofrecord
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