Hill v. Porter et al, No. 1:2018cv20412 - Document 65 (S.D. Fla. 2020)
Court Description: ORDER Granting 40 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Senior Judge James Lawrence King on 3/6/2020. See attached document for full details. (jw)
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Hill v. Porter et al Doc. 65 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SO U TH ER N D ISTRIC T O F FLO R ID A M IA M I DIV ISIO N CA SE N O .18.20412-CV .K lN G K1M H ILL, Plaintiff CITY O F H O M ESTEA D , D efendant. / O R DER G R ANTIN G D EFEN DA N T'S M O TIO N FO R SU M M AR Y JU D G M EN T THISMATTER isbeforetheCoul'tonDefendantCityofHomestead's(theG1City'')M otion forSummaryJudgment(theûdM otion'')(DE 40),filedonOctober7,2019.TheCourthascarefully *. . consideredtheM otion,Plaintiff'sResponse(DE 44),theCity'sReply(DE 56),andisotherwise fullyadvised.TheCoul' theldfulloralargumentonFebruary21,2020.(bb'eeDE 63). 1. IN TR O D U CTIO N Plaintiffbringstheabove-styledactionunder42U.S.C.j 1983,allegingviolationsofthe First,Fiûh,andFouleenthAmendmentstotheUnitedStatesConstitution.(SeegenerallyCompl., DE 1).PlaintiffallegesthattheCity ofHomestead used an unconstitutionally vagueEsdecorum policy''topreventhim from attendingandspeakingattheHomestead'cityCouncilmeetings.(See id.).Primarily,Plaintiffseeksto invalidateadecorum policy thatwasrepealed nearlytwo years before he filed this lawsuitand nearly fouryears before the presentdate.A s explained below ,the City's M otion for Sum m ary Judgm ent should be granted because Plaintiff's ch' allenge to the constitutionality ofthepolicy is m pot,and hisrem aining claim sfailas a m atteroflaw . Dockets.Justia.com I1. FA CTSI A . Background The City of Hom estead provides a (ûpublic com m ent''portion ofits city councilm eetings, allowingindividualstospeak on anytopicnotto exceedthreeminutesperspeaker.(P1.'sDep.at 29!! 1-25,DE 39-3).Plaintiffhasattendedatleast85% ofthecitycouncilmeetingsoveythelast fouryears,using thepubliècom mentportion ofthosem eetingsto advocate forpolice-worn body cameras.(DE 39! 12;Pl.'sDep.at26!!2-12).Plaintiffhasalwaysbeen affordedthefulltlaree minuteswheneverhehasspoken atthecitycouncilmeetings.(DE 39!32). B. D ecorum Policy G overning H om estead City CouncilM eetings On April20,2016,the City of H om estead passed Resolution N o.M 016-04-42,which replaced thethen-existingdecorum policy (the 1(Old Decorum Policy'')with arevised decorum policy (thelsNew Decorum Policy'')to govern Homestead City Councilmeetings.(DE 39! 1). Among otherthings,the New Decorum Policy created a CtsergeantatArms''(DE 39 ! 5)to maintain orderatcity councilmeetingsand enforcethenew policy.(Pl.'sDep.at45!! 19-22). TheNew Decorum Policy also eliminated ttmaking impertinent...remarks''and lsbecomgingq boisterous''asgroundsforbarring aspeakerfrom thecity councilmeetings.(DE 39-1at4-6). Further,iteliminated the requirem entthata barred speakerobtain dtperm ission ...granted by a majorityvoteofthecouncilmemberspresent''beforeaddressingthecouncilagain.(f#.). C. PlaintiffA ddresses the City Councilon A ugust24,2016 : Plaintiffattended the H om estead City Councilm eeting on August24,2016 and spoke for thefullthreeminutesduringthepubliccommentportion ofthemeeting.(DE 39! 15).Plaintiff lThe following facts are taken from the City's StatementofFacts in Supportof M otion for Summ ary Jùdgment(DE 39),Plaintiff'sResponsetoDefendant'sStatementofFacts(DE 46),andfactsgleanedfrom the parties'discovery documents,viewed in the lightmostfavorableto Plaintiffasthe nonm oving party. referred to Counoilman M aldonado as a (Cracist''and described the city council meeting as lsfasci' sm''(P1.'sDep.at49!! 14-24),butthereisnoevidenceintherecordthatPlaintiffspokein aloud voice,orthrough physicalgesture ordem eanor,W asotherw ise disruptive during hisspeech. A lthough the O 1d D ecorum Policy had been repealed in Aprilof2016,itw asprinted atthe top of theagendafortheAugust24,2016citycouncilm eeting,along' w ith them eetingsforthefollowing m onths:M ay 2016,June 2016,July 2016,Septem ber2016,October 2016,and D ecem ber 2016 (DE 46-4).TheCitycontendsthiswasa.mistakeorCCclericalmror''sincetheOldDecorum Policf hadbeenrevokedfourmonthsearlier.(DE 39! 11). Followinghispubliccomment,Plaintiffreturnedtohisseatandsatdown.(P1.'sDep.at50 !! 1-2).Atthatpoint,severalpoliceofficersapproachedhim.(1d.at52!!6-14).OfficerSincore j , ' toldPlaintifftogetupand(scomewith(himl.''(1d4.Plaintiffasked Sincorewhetherhewasunder arrest.(. ft; l at51!! 8-10).Sincore said Ctyes.''(f#.).Then,aboutfourpoliceofficersescorted Plaintiffoutofthe councilchambers and outside City Hall.(DE 39 ! 17).Plaintiffwas not physicallytouchedbyanypoliceofficeratanypointduringthisencounter.(Pl.'sDep.at52!20). D. Discussion O utside City H all SergeantJorge Cruz,w ho w as the Sergeant atA rm s during the A ugust24 m eeting,saw S'somesortofcommotionthatgcaughthis)eye,toghisjrightoutintheEqsçatingm' ea.''(CruzDep. at 16 !! 3-4 (DE 39-6 at 17)).Cruz obseryed Cdlplaintiffj walking out (ofthe city council chambersj,alongwithsomeofficers,''oneofwhichwasOfficerSincore.(1d !!6-7).Cruzthen leftthechambersandspokewith PlailttiffoutsideCîty Hall.(DE 39!! 17-21). Cruztestifiedthatduringthisconversation,Plaintiffwastlbeingveryloudandirate''(Cruz Dep.at18 !! 19-23),and hetsinstructed (Plaintiffjleveraltimesto calm down''butPlaintiff refusedto doso.(CruzDep.at19!! 2-22).Cruzaccordingly issued aCctrespass''orderagainst PlaintiffandinformedPlaintiffthatheCthadtoleave.''(Pl.'sDep.at59!2-60!1).Plaintiffwas notinformedofthereason thathe(Cwasbeingtrespassed,''(DE 39!24),nordidPlaintiffreceike acopyofanypaperwork documentingthetrespassorder.z(P1.'sDep.at62!! 1-2).Plaintiffwas neverphysically touched,handcuffed,arrested or charged w ith a crim e beçause ofthis çncounter. (DE 39!22).NoneofthewitnessesevertoldP1aintiffnottoreturn (orthatheneededpermission to retul'n)tothecity councilmeetings.(DE 39 !25).PlaintiffCtlef' t(thepremises)immediately'' afterbeingaskedtoleave.(P1.'sDep.at64!! 11-13). E. PlaintiffR eturns to C ity C ouncilM eetings Followingthisencounter,Plaintiffdidnotinitiallyreturn to CityH allorattem ptto address thecity council.Plaintiffdidnotat4end the September20t6,October2016,orNovember2016 citycouncilmeetings.(DE 46!30).PlaintifftestifiedhebelievedheCtwouldbetakentojail''ifhe l t returned to the city councilmeetlngs once he ttwas informed''thatanother individual (M r. M cDonough)wasarrestedforreturningtoCityHallafteratrespassorderwasissuedagainsthim. (P1.'sDep.at64-65).Plaintiffmadeno effortto return to themeetingsuntilafterhisattorney contacted theCity on October28,2016 (forthefirsttimesincethe encounter),asking whether Plaintiffcouldattendandspeakatthefuturemeetings.(DE 39!28).Respondingon(k.ovem yryy, 2016,the city attorney inform ed Plaintiff's counselthat there w ere no restrictions on Plaintiff's ability to attend and speak atcity councilm eetings ''otherthan those applicable to the geùeral public.''(DE 39-8 at3).Plaintiffreturned tothe city councilmeetingsbeginning in December 2016.(DE 46!30).Sincethen,Plaintiffhasneverbeen interrupted orprevented from speaking beforethecity council.(DE 39!32).Likewise,Plaintiffhasspoken atthecitycouncilmeetings 2Shortlyaftertheinciàent,Sg' t.CruzcompletedaCtFieldContactForm''whereheexplained' .C(Mr.Hill violated the decorum policy by becom ing im petinentand boisterouswhile addressing thecouncil.M r. Hillwasinformedthathewastrespassed.''(DE 46!21).Plaintiffdid notreceiveacopyofthisform. (P1.'sDep.at62!! 1-2). atleastsixteen timessince Decem ber20l6,and hasneverbeen arrested,trespassed,orotherwise threatenedfordoingso.(DE 39!!33-34). F. ProceduralH istory OnFebruary 1,2018,Plaintifftsledthisaction againsttheCity ofHom esteadanditsform er MayorJeffPorter.(SeeCompl.,DE 1).Pursuantto42U.S.C.j 1983,Plaiùtiffallegesviolations ofhis constitutionalrightsunderthe First,Fifth,afld Foul4eenth A m endm entsto the U nited States Constitution.(SeejJ).TheCity ofHomesteadnow movesforsummaryjudgment.(DE 40). 111. LEG A L STAN D AR D Summary judgmentisappropriate where (tthe movantshowsthatthere is no genuine disputeastoanytaterialfactandthemovantisentitledtojudgmentasamatteroflaw.''Fed.R. Civ.P.56(a).A tsgenuinedispute''meansSttheevidenceissuchthatareasonablejurycouldreturn averdictforthenonmoving party.''Anderson v.fibertyLobby,Inc.,477 U.S.242,248 (1986). A Scm aterialfact''meansafactCtthatm ightaffecttheoutcom eofthesuitunderthegoverning law .'' 1d In opposingsummaryjudgment,thenonmovingparty('mustsetforth specificf 'actsshowing thatthere is a genuine issue fortrial.'' Id.at250. (i-f'he m ere existence of a scintilla of evidence in supportofthe plaintiff'sposition w illbe insufficient.'' f#.at252. 1V . D ISCU SSIO N PlaintiffallegesthattheO1d Decorum Policy infringed upon hisrightto free speech under the First Amendment (Count1I) and deprived him of due process of 1aw under the Fif'th Amendment(Count111).Plaintiffalso allegesthatthe actionsofthe City police officerswho ûtremoved''andStdetained''him amountedtostatelaw falseimprisonment(CountIV).Counselfor Plaintiffand the City stipulated to dism issM ayorPorterasa defendanton September 11,2019, effectivelyeliminatingCountIfrom Plaintiff'sComplaint.3(DE 32).TheCitymovesforsummary $ ' judgmentontheremainingcounts. A.FreeSpeech Claims(CountII) ln CountI1,PlaintiffallegesthattheO1d Deconzm Policy violatedtheFirstandFourteenth Amendmentsby (1)imposinganunlawfulpriorrestrainion speechs4and (2)usingvaguecriteria to determ ine w hether to bar a speaker from the city council m eetings.s Count 11 requested a declaratory judgmentholding the O1d Decorum Policy unconstitutionalon its face,seeking com pensatory and punitive dam ages forM ayor Porter's alleged application ofthe O1d D ecorum Policy. 1. FacialChallenge U ndbr C ount11 Regarding the facialchallenge underCount11,the Courtfindsthatthe claim ism oot.The Supreme Courthas observed that a facialchallenge is tcthe mostdifficult challenge to m ount successfully,since the challengerm ust establish thatno set ofcircum stances exists underw hich the(lawjwouldbevalid.''UnitedStatesv.Salerno,481U.S.739,745(1987).lndeed,Stltjhefact thatga lawqmightoperate unconstitutionally under some conceivable setof circumstances is : v insufficiehtto renderitwholly invalid.''1d. f H ere,Count11ofthe Com plaintallegesthatthe O1d D ecorum Policy,on its face,violates a speaker's First A m endm ent right to address the city council by Ssexpressly conditioning the 3In Count'l,Plaintiffasserted a claim againstM ayorPol4erin his'individualca -pacity forsuppression of speechby retaliatoly arrest.(SeeCompl.at8). 4See,e.g.,United States v.Frandsen,212 F.3d 1231,1236-37 (11th Cir.2000)($$A priorrestrainton expression existswhen the governm entcan deny accessto a forum for expression before the expression occurs.''). 5See,e.g.,Farrellv.Burke,449 F.3d470,485(2dCir.2006)(((Thevaguenessdoctrineisacomponentof therightto dueprocess.But...vaguenessin the1aw ispal -ticularly troublingwhen FirstA mendmenfrights areinvolved.''). ' 6 exercise of those rights on the speaker meeting two behavioral criteria - (i) not Cmaking impertinent...remarks,'and(ii)notûbecomlingjboisterous'- gbothofwhichjarenotdefinedin thePolicy and are inherently vague.''(Compl.! 41(a)).Along with the vagueness allegations, Count11assel'tsthattheO1dDecorum Policy imposesan unconstitutionalpriorrestrainton speech by (Cimmedialely and prospectively dbarrlingj'any speakerdetermined by the M ayorto have violated the Policy Sfrom f'urther audience before the council' unless the speaker obtains a çmajorityvoteofthecouncilmemberspresent'grantinghim tpermissionto...again addressthe council'atsometi meinthefuture.''(1d.!41(b)).IntheMotionforSummaryJudgment,theCity . argues that the facial challenge to the O ld D ecorum Policy is m oot since the policy has been repealed.(SeeM ot.Summ.J.at4). The record reflects that on April 20,2016,the O 1d D ecorum Policy w as repealed and replacedwiththepassageofResolutionNo.1V 016-04-42.(DE 39! 1).Among otherthings,the resolution elim inated the challenged aspects ofthe O1d Dycorum Policy:namely,(1)ts making impertinentremarks''and tcbecomingboisterous''asjroundsforbarring aspeakerfrom thecity councilhleetings,and(2)requiringabarredspeakertoobtain approvalbythemajority ofthecity . ' councilmembersbeforereturningto futurecitycouncilmeetings.(DE 39-1at4-6).Becausethe challenged provisions have been eliminated underthe New Decorum Policy,Plaintiffs claim underthe FirstAm endm entism ootsince it(sno longerpresentsa live controversy w ith respectto which thecourtcan give meaningfulrelief.''Ethredge v.Hail,996 F.2d 1173,1175 (11th Cir. l993).SeealsoCoal.fortheAbolitionS-/-A/' Jrf /S/IZZ?JProhibitionv.City ofAtlanta,219F.3d 1301, 1310(11thCir.2000)(tkW heflasubsequent1aw bringstheexistingcontroversytoanendCthecase becomesmootand should betreated accordingly,''')(quoting Church ofscientology Flag Serv. Org.,Inc.v.City ofclearwater,777F.2d 598,605(11thCir.1985)). In rçsponse, Plaintiff relies on the ûsvoluntary cessation'' exception to the m ootness doctrine.SlGenerally,a challengeto the constitutionality ofa statute ism ooted by therepealofthe statutel,j...(butj(ajn important' exception to thisgeneralrule appliesifthereisasubstantial likelihoodthatthechallenged statutory languagewillbereenacted.''CoralSpringsSt.Sys.,Inc.v. . d City of Sunrise,371 F.3d 1320,1329 (11th Cir.2004).However,icgbqecause ofthe unique characteristicsofpublic defendants,(courtsjoften givegjgolernmentactorsmore leeway than private parties in the presum ption that they are unlikely to resum e illegal activities.'' D oe v. Wooten,747 F.3d 13i7,1322 (11th Cir.2014)(internalquotationsanzcitationsomitted).StThis presumption is pa/icularly warranted in cases where,''as here,Ctthe government repealed or am ended a challenged statute orpolicy often a clearindicatorofunam biguousterm ination.''1d. Thus,(tonce a governm entactorestablishesunam biguous term ination ofthe challenged conduct, thecontroversy willbem oot''unlesstheplaintiffdem onstratesûssome reasonable basisto believe thatthepolicywillbereinstatedifthesuitisterminated.''Id (quotationsomitted). A ccording to Eleventh Circuitprecedent,whetherthe governm ent is likely to reenactthe challenged policy dependson threeconsiderations.First,the courtconsidersllwhetherthechange inconductresultedfrom substantialdeliberationorismerelyanattempttomanipulategthecourt'sj jurisdiction.''Flanigan'5'Enters.,Inc.ofGa..v.City ofsandkSprings,Ga.,868F.3d 1248,1257 (11th Cir.2017).Second,thecourtanalyzesl'whetherthegovernment'sdecisiontoterminatethe challenged conductw as Gunam biguous.'''Id.Third,the courtasks tswhetherthe governm enthas consistentlymaintaineditscommitmenttothenetvpolicy orlegislativescheme.''1d. Notablyhere,theCityrepealedtheO1dDecorum Policythmughaformalresolution.(See DE 39-1).Thisprocedure reflectsthe considered judgmlntof a deliberative body.Compare Flanigan' s,868F.3dat1260(challengetoarepealedordinancewasmootwhereçttheCityCouncil 8 voted on ...theOrdinance'srepeal...in open session duringregularly scheduled meetings''), with Jagerp.Douglas C@.Sch.Dist.,862 F.2d 824,833 (11th Cir.1989)(case wasnotmoot ? wheretcthe SchoolDistrictvoluntarily ceasedthepracticeofhavingpregbm ereligiousinvocations , deliveredbyProtestantministers...gwhichjwasnotafornialpolicy'')Also,theresolutionwas passed on A pril20,2016:nearly tw o years before Plaintiff filed this law suitand m ore than four monthsbeforetheincidentgivingrisetothislawsuiteven occurred.(SeeDE 39 ! 1).TheCourt thereforefindstherepealoftheO1dDecorum Policytohaveresultedfrom substantialdeliberation, notmerelyanefforttomanipulatetheCourt'sjurisdiction.Forsimilarreasons,theCourtalsofinds therepealto beunambiguous;theCityrepealedthe OldDecorum Policy during apublicmeeting through a form alresolution,and thisresolution explicitly elim inated the challenged languagefrom theNew Decorum Policy.(SeeDE 39-1).Andfinally,theCourtfindsthattheCityhasmaintained itscomm itm entto theNew'Decorum Policy;sinceJanuary2017,theO1d DecorkmlPolicyhasnot appearedontheagendaforanycitycouncilmeeting.(DE 39!11),AlthoughPlaintiffemphasizes thatthe O1d D ecorum Policy rem ained printed atthe top of the agenda for the A ugust 24,2016 m eeting,thatdoes notestablish the City's intentto reenactthe o1d policy.Atbest,itam ounts to Ssm ere speculation thatthe City m ay return to its previous w ays.''Flanigan 'ç,868 F.3d at 1256 (quotationsomitted).Thataloneisinsuffcienttoavoidmootness.6 6WhilePlaintiffpointsoutthattheC' ityhasmadenopromisenottoreturntotheOldDecorum Policy(P1.'s Resp,at7),themootnessdoctrinehasneverrequiredsuchapromise.Instead,therelevantinquiryiswhether theplaintiffhasshown areasonable expectation thattheCity willreturn tothe challenged policy.Here, Plaintiffhasm ade no such show ing.ThefacialchallengeunderCount11istherefore m oot. 2. As-Applied ChallengeUnderCount11 To the extentthatPlaintiffasserts an as-applied challenge underCotm tII,thatclaim fails as a m atter of 1aw .7 $(An as-applied FirstA m endm ent challenge contends that a given statute or regulationisunconstitutionalasithasbeenappliedtoalitigant'sparticularspeech activity.''fegal Aidservs.ofor.v.LegalServs.Corp.,608F.3d1084,1096(9thCir.2010).AstheSupremeCoul't hasexplained,($a statute or anzle m ay be held conjtitutionally invalid asapplied when itoperates todepriveanindividualofaprotectedright.t,Boddiev.Conn.,401U.S.371,379(1971)(emphasis added). H ow ever,the record in this case does not establish the deprivation ofa Sûprotected right'' under the First A m endm ent.R ather, the record retlects that Plaintiff spoke for the full tllree minutesduringthepubliccommentpotionofthemeetingheldonAugust24,2016.(DE 39!15). Indeed,itwasonly afterPlaintifffinished speaking a 'nd returned to hisseatthathe wasrem oved from thecitycouncilmeeting.(fJ.! 16).Following abriefdiscussionoutsideCity Hall,Plaintiff wasthen informedthathedtwasbeingtrespassed.''(16L!24).ButPlaintiffneverreceivedacopy of this trespass order,and he w as never told that he needed perm ission to return to future city councilmeetings.(1d !!24-26;P1.'sDep.at62!! 1-23).Inshol't,Plaintiffwasneverprevented from speaking beforethe city council.(See,e.g.,DE 39 ! 12).The record instead showsthat Plaintiff voluntarily refrained from attending the subsequent city council m eetings because he merelyassumedthathewouldbearrested ifhereturned.(DE 46!25).That,withoutmore,does notestablish thedeprivationoftherighttofreespeech undertheFirstAmendment.C/ Pesekv. 7AsPlaintiffcorrectlynotes,tKltjheEleventhCircuithasconfirmedthatthetargetofaplaintiff'sclaim and the nature ofthe reliefsoughtisparalnount,notthe facialversusas-applied label.''Rubenstein v.Fla. Bar,72 F.Supp.3d 1298,1309(S.D.Fla.2014).Evenso,theCoullfindsthatPlaintiff'sallegationsfail asam atlerof1aw regardlessofw hethertheCourtcharacterizesthose allegationsasfacialoras-applied challenges. City ofBrunswick,794F.Supp.768,785(N.D.Ohio 1992)(Ctgllnasmuch as(Plaintiftlîoughtto expresshisviewson an agendaitem atan open City Councilmeeting,the courtfindsthathewas deprived ofhisfirstamendm entrightoffree speech when theBrunswick City Councilselectively denied him therightto expressthesevfcw.s -on April15,1991.'')(emphasisadded).TheCity is thereforeentitledtosummaryjudgmenton CountIl. B.DueProcessClaims(Count111) CountIIIallegesthatthe O1d D ecorum Policy violatesthe D ue ProcessClause ofthe Fifth . andFourteenth Amenctm entsbecauseittsauthorized theM ayorto deterlninethata speakershould be ûbarred from f'urtheraudience'w ithoutproviding any processforchallenging thatdeterm ination and/orforobtainingpermissiontoreappearbeforethatbodyinthefuture.''(Compl.!55(B)).To the extentthatCount1I1 alleges a facialchallenge underthe Fifth A m endm ent,thatclaim is m oot forthe reasons explained above.A nd to the extentthatCbunt111alleges an as-applied challenge underthe Fifth A m endm ent,thatclaim also failsas a m atter oflaw . To prove a procedural due process violation,as Plaintiff attem pts to do here,a plaintiff mustestablishthefollowingelements:($41)adeprivationofaconstitutionally-protectbdliberty or property interest; (2) state action;and (3) constitutionally-inadequate process.' 'Arrington'v. Hellns,438F.3d 1336,1347(11th Cir.2006)(citationomitted).lnthiscase,CountI1Iallegesthat % Plaintiff was deprived of :ûhis liberty interest in appearing before the H om èstead City Council meetings.''(Compl.!(48).Accordingto Plaintiff,thisdeprivatibn occurred when M ayorPorter appliedtheO1d Decorum Policyt6Isprospectively bar''Plaintifffrom fm urecity councilm eetings. (1d !52).Theundisputedrecordbeliesthisallegation. N othing in the record suggests that Plaintiff w as barred from attending the future city councilm eetings.To the contrary,Plaintiff sim ply assum ed thathe w asbarred from attending the futurem eetingsbased on hisinterpretation ofthe textofthe O1d Decorum Policy,along with his understanding oftherelated incidentinvolvingM r.M cDonough.(DE 46 !(25).Butatnopoint w as Plaintiff ever told that Sgt.Cruz's trespass order w as issued pursuant to the Old D econzm Policy,norwasPlaintiffevertoldthatheneededpermissiontoretulm.(DE 39!!25-26).Nordid theCityeverrefuseto1etPlaintiffattendacitycouncilmeeting.(Seegenerally id.!32). Instead,afterPlaintiffsattorney contacted theCity forthe firsttim etwo monthsafterthe encounter,she w asinform ed by thecity attorney thatthere w ereno restrictionson Plaintiff'sability toattendth' ecitycouncilmeetingslsotherthanthoseapplicabletothegeneralpublic.''(1d.!!2829).Absentthedeprivationofalibertyorpropertyinterest,aproceduraldueprocessclaim carmot stand.See#tf ofRegentsofstateColls.v.R0th,408U.S.564,569(1. 972)(1$Therequirementsof proceduraldueprocesjapply only to thedeprivation ofinterests encompassed by the Foul-teenth Amendment'sprotection oflibertyandproperty.'').Sotoohere.The City isthereforeentitledto summaryjudgmentonCount111. C.FalseImprisonment(CountlV) ' CountIV allegesfalse imprisonmentunderFlorida law forthe conductoftheHomestead police offcerswho removed Plaintifffrom City Hall,ltphysically restrained and detained''him , and surrounded him Cluntilhedeparted from (City Hallqin fearofbeing mn-ested fortrespass.'' (Compl.!59).islnFlorida,-thetortoffalseimprisonmentisdetinedas(theunlawfulrestraintofa person againsthis w ill,the gist ofw hich action is the unlawful detention ofthe plaintiff and the deprivation ofhisliberty.'''Johnson v.Barnes drNoble Booksellers,Inc.,437 F.3d 1112,1116 (11th Cif.2006)(quotingEscambia C@.Sch.Bd.v.Bragg,680 So.2d 571,572 (F1a.Dist.Ct. App. 1996)).'sf' he plaintiff must,however, show that the restraint was unreasonable and unw arranted undey the circum stances.'' Turner v. Charter Schs. USA, Inc.,N o. 18-24005-C1V , 12 2020W L 620392,at*9(S.D.Fla.Jan.14,2020)(quotationsomitted),reportandrecommendation adopted by2020W L 924253.Critically,Ctlalplaintiffisnotrestrainedwhenthereisareasonable meansofescape,which isapparentorl tnowntotheperson.''Aliv.MargqteSch.o/fecîf/y,Inc., No.11-60102-C1V,2011W L 4625372,at*5(S.D.Fla.Oct.3,2011). H ere,the record isclearthatPlaintiffw asneverhandcuffed,restrained,orarrested during the encounterwith the Homestead police officerson August24,2016.(DE 39 ! 22).ln fact, Plaintiffadmitshewasfreeto leaveCity Hallthatday.(1d !23);seeFed.R.Civ.1i.36(b)(CtA matteradmittedunderthisruleisconclusivelyestablishedunlessthecouit,onmotion,permitsthe admissiontobewithdrawnoramended.'').Thus,noreasonablejurycouldfindinfavorofPlaintiff onhisclaim forfalseimprisonment.TheCityisthereforeentitledtosummaryjudgmentonCount Accordingly,itisORDERED,ADJUDGED,and DECREED that: Defendant'sM otionforSummaryJudgment(DE 40)be,andthesameherebyis, ' 2; G R AN TE D ; 2. PursuanttoRule58(a)oftheFederalRulesofCivilProcedure,fiflaljudgmentinfavorof theCity ofHom estead willbesetoutin a separate order;and A11pendingm otionsare DENIED AS M O OT; DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers atthe James Lawrence King FederalJustice Building and United StatesCourthouse,M iam i,Florida, is 6th day M arch,2020. #m A M ES LA N CE K IN G > 1YED STATES DISTRICT J , E SOU TH ERN D ISTRICT OF FLO 1D A cc: AllC ounselofR ecord Clerk ofC ourt n 13
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