Tershakovec et al v. Ford Motor Company, No. 1:2017cv21087 - Document 66 (S.D. Fla. 2018)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART AND DENYING-IN-PART FORD'S MOTION TO DISMISS Ford's Answer Deadline: August 10, 2018 Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 7/12/2018. See attached document for full details. (lfs)
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Tershakovec et al v. Ford Motor Company Doc. 66 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOU THERN D ISTRICT O F FLO RID A M iamiDivision C aseN um ber:17-21087-ClV -M O R EN O GEOR GE TERSHA K OV EC,D IAN A TERSHAKOVEC,JACQUESRIM OKH, HERBERT ALLEY ,M ICH A EL DELAGARZA,ATTILA GONDAN ,ERIC KA M PERM A N ,G REG RO BERTS, RICHARD KOW ALCHIL TRAVIS MCRAE, M ICHA EL M CCURR Y ,M AR K H OCH SPRU N G ,JO HN A UBREY ,JO SE CRUZ,ERICEVANY BYRON HARPER,and TODD NEW TON,individuallyand onIIe//J// ofallotherssimilarlysituated, Plaintiffs, VS. FO RD M O TOR COM PAN Y , D efendant. ORDER GM NTING-IN-PART AND DENYING-IN-PART FORD 'S M OTION TO DISM ISS B ackzround Plaintiffs,seeking to representa class of purchasers of DefendantFord's 2016 Shelby M ustang GT350,are dktrack enthusiasts.''Each suggests they purchased their Shelby for use on public roads and on specialized closed tracks.PlaintiffsallegethatFord marketed and sold their vehicles for use on racetracks- as evidenced by Ford's information kits and brochures,the vehicles' track-focused features,prom otion by Ford executives,press kits,and Ford-sponsored track events and that Plaintiffs relied on this m arketing in purchasing their vehicles. Dockets.Justia.com lmportantly,the only m odels atissue here are the 2016 Shelby G7-350 Base and Technology Packages.1 The 2016 Ford M ustang Brochure,forinstance,assertsthatthe Shelby 6-1-350 isdtrace- tuned''andScpoweredbya5.21.Ti-VCT V8...topropelyouintothewinner'scircle.''D.E.43! 316.Ford'sm edia publication statesthattheçsAll-new Shelby 67-350 M ustang isa thoroughbred capableoftacklingtheworld'smostchallengingroadsandracetracks.''f#.at!318.Ford'spress kiton islrmovative Engineering''featuresthe 's-rransm ission forShelby M ustang developed with all-daytrackcapabilityandhigh-rpm capabilityattheforefront.''1d.at!320. According to the Second Amended Complaint,the vehicles sufferfrom manufacturing and design defectsthatmake them unsuitable and unsafe fortrack driving.Plaintiffs allege that the Sk-rrack-lkeady''powertrain system is designed defectively in that it overheats prematurely and entersSktyimp M ode''withoutproviding any warning or comm unication to the driver.W hen the vehicles enterLimp M ode,they rapidly decelerate,and a drivercan becom e disoriented and lose control, thereby increasing the risk of an accident. Unlike m odels from other years, Plaintiffs allege the 2016 B ase and Technology Package vehicles are not equipped w ith differentials2 or transm ission3 coolers that can resolve the overheating issue.ln addition,they lack temperature sensors on the dashboard to monitor or adjust the temperatures of the transmission and differentials.Plaintiffs furtherallege thatthe Track-Ready powertrain system also contains a manufacturing defect because the extreme transm ission and differential temperatures that the vehicles experience can cause other parts i.e., the transm ission and lFord soldthe2016 Shelby with threetrim levels:Base,Track Package,andTechnology Package.D .E.43 jg332. 2A reardifferentialisacomponentinallvehiclesdesigned tocompensateforthedifference in distancethe innerwheelsandouterwheelstravelasavehiclegoesaroundacorner.Id at!314. 3A transm ission system takesthepowergeneratedby avehicle'sengineand appliesthepow ertocalibrate thespeedandtorqueofthewheels.Thisisaccomplishedby shifting through gears.Highergearsincreasetheoutput speedanddecreasetorqueandviceversa.Id.at! 3l2. clutch to degrade prematurely.These defects allegedly impairthe vehicles'safety,reliability, and operability.Plaintiffsarguethatthese defectsare inherently dangerous- ataracetrack oron apublicroad becausethe sudden decelerationincreasestherisk ofcollision. Plaintiffs subm itthatFord wasaware ofthe defectswhile they continued to prom ote the vehicles asi'Track-lkeady.''ln addition,Plaintiffs subm itthatFord admitsthatthe 2016 models were notTrack-Ready because subsequentm odels,regardless oftrim level,a11included a rear differentialcooler and a transmission cooler.Plaintiffs'vehiclesare covered by Ford's express limited warranty,which in relevant partprovides Scthat it would repair or replace defects in m aterialorworkm anship free ofchargeifthey became apparentduring the warranty period.''1d. at! 355.'iFord alsowarranted thatitwould remedyany defectsinthedesign andmanufacturing processes thatresultin vehicle pa14 m alfunction or failure during the warranty period.''Id In correspondence to existing ownersofShelby M ustangs,Ford recomm ended thatforcustomers withtkBaseorTeclmology Packagemodels...transmissionand differentialcoolersgbe)added.'' Id at! 359.However,Plaintiffssuggestthatrequiring them to installaftermarkettransmission and differentialcoolersmay void theirwarrantieswhich state,ltAfterm arketpartsorcomponents, sometimes installed by Ford M otor Company or an authorized Ford dealership,may not be coveredbytheNew VehicleLimitedW arranty.''f#.at!!370-72. Twenty-two named Plaintiffs,covering eleven states,4 filed this suit,seeking to represent anationwideclassand num erousstatewideclassesofpurchasersofthe2016 Shelby 6-1-350 Base and Technology Packages.Al1Plaintiffs allege individualclaim s for state law breach ofexpress and im plied w arranty,and individualclaim s under the M agnuson M oss W arranty A ct based on the sam e alleged breaches.A 11 Plaintiffs also allege individual claim s based on the consum er 4Florida,Texas,W ashington,Tennessee,lllinois,Califom ia,M issouri,New Jersey,Oregon,Pennsylvania, and Ncw York.SeeD.E.43 !!6,20,26,33,36,39,42,45,48,52,66. protection statutes of the states which they reside, grounded on Ford's alleged m isrepresentationsregarding the track eapabilitiesofthe G1-350 Base and Technology m odels, and on Ford's alleged failure to disclose infonnation aboutLimp M ode.Plaintiffs also allege individualclaimsoffraudulentconcealmentand unjustenrichmentbased on the same alleged misrepresentations and om issions.Ford moves to dism iss the Second Am ended Complaint pursuantto FederalRule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim .For the following reasons,Ford'sM otion isGR ANTED-IN -PART and DENIED-IN-PART. l1. LezalStandard i$A pleading thatstatesa claim forreliefmustcontain ...a shortand plain statem entof theclaim showingthatthepleaderisentitledtorelief.''Fed.R.Civ.P.8(a)(2).W hen rulingon a motion to dism iss,a courtm ustview thecom plaintinthelightm ostfavorableto theplaintiffand acceptthe plaintiffswell-pleaded factsastrue.SeeSt.Joseph'sHosp.,Inc.v.Hosp.Corp.of Am.,795 F.2d 948,954 (11th Cir.1986).To survive a motion to dismiss,aStcomplaintmust contain sufficientfactualmatter,accepted astnle,to Cstate aclaim to reliefthatisplausible on its face.'''Ashcroh v.lqbal,556U.S.662,678(2009)(quotingBellAtl.Corp.v.Twombly,550U.S. 544,570 (2007)).Detailed factualallegationsare notrequired,butapleading mustoffermore than iklabels and conclusions''or1ia formulaic recitation ofthe elementsofthe cause ofaction.'' Twombly,550 U.S.at555, .Jackson v.Bellsouth Telecomm.,372 F.3d 1250,1263 (11th Cir. 2004) (ki' ro survive a motion to dismiss,plaintiffs must do more than merely state legal conclusions' ,they are required to allege some specitic factualbasesforthose conclusionsorface dismissaloftheirclaims.'').lnshort,thecomplaintmustnotmerely allegemisconduct,butmust dem onstrate thatthe pleaderis C'entitled to relief.'' Iqbal,556 U .S.at677-78. 111. Analvsis Thefifty-nineclaimsfallintotwomalorcategories:warrantyclaimsand fraud claims. As an altemative to the contract-based warranty claims, Plaintiffs bring claims of unjust enrichment.TheCourtwilladdresseach in turn. A. Fraud C laim s Ford submitsthatPlaintiffs'com mon 1aw and statutory Skfraud-based''claim ssbased on m isrepresentation should be dism issed asPlaintiffs neveridentify the alleged m isrepresentations to which they were exposed.Ford relies on the prem ise thatthe Second Amended Com plaint doesnotallege thatany ofthe Plaintiffs saw the representationsmade in Ford'spublications.ln Ford's estim ation,the press releases and kits Stwere directed to m embers of the automotive media,notconsum ers.''D .E.50 at 10.Ford positsthatonly documents intended forconsumers were(i)thebrochureforthe 2016 Mustang and (ii)the one-page documentdescribingthefive distinctGT350models.SeeD.E.43!!4,331.BecausenoneofthePlaintiffsallegetohaveseen thosedocuments,Ford subm itsthey cannotrely on them fortheirfraud-based claim s. Furthermore,Ford subm its that the fraud-based claim s relying on an omission theory mustbedismissed becausetherewasno om ission.ln essence,Ford arguesthatthe allegation that it failed to disclose the infonnation about Limp M ode does nothold water because Plaintiffs simultaneously allege that inform ation was disclosed. For example, Plaintiffs allege that ilnowheredoesFord disclose ...an explanation ofwhatLimp M ode isorhow itwould m anifest while driving.''1d. at ! 330. Yet,in the same paragraph, Ford suggests that Plaintiffs' contradictorily allege thatFord apprised consum ersthatShelbys are Csequipped with electronic controlsthat,ifrequired,reducespowerand limitsglkevolutionsperM inute)in ordertocontrol powertrain temperatures.''1d. 5FordconcedesthattheFloridaDeceptiveandUnfairTradePracticesActclaim (Count2)isnotsubjectto dismissalbasedonthistheol' y.D.E.50 at10. 5 Plaintiffscounter forboth theoriesofm isrepresentation and omission thatthey satisfy FederalRuleofCivilProcedure9(b)'spleading requirement.Indeed,claimsthatsound in fraud must satisfy Rule 9(b), which requires that t$a party must state with particularity the circum stances constituting fraud or mistake.''ln re Takata Airbag Prods.Liab.Litig., 193 F. Supp.3d 1324,1331 (S.D.Fla.2016).Theparticularity requirementikalertlsqdefendantstothe precise misconductwith which they are charged and protectgsq defendants againstspurious chargesofimmoraland fraudulentbehavior.''1d.(quoting IFICoastRoojlng drWaterproohng, lnc.v.JohnsManville,lnc.,287 F.App'x 81,86 (11th Cir.2008)).ln the Second Amended Complaint,Plaintiffs referto a myriad ofalleged misrepresentations.See,e.g.,D.E.43 ! 4 (notingthattheG7-350iststrack-ready''anddttrack-capable'');id.at! 318(notingthattheG7-350 is(kcapableoftacklingtheworld'smostchallenging roadsand racetracks''l;id at! 320 (noting thattheTrem ecTR-3160 six-speed manualtransmission in theG-1-350 ûshasbeen heavily revised . to cope with high engine speeds and the rigors oftrack duty,and to provide the kind of precision engagement,sm oothness,and reduction in weightand rotating inertia dem anded by FordPerformance''). Additionally, Plaintiffs indeed allege that they saw and relied upon the purportedly misrepresented marketing materialswhen purchasing theirvehicles.See,e.g.,id.at! l6 (it-f' he TershakovecPlaintiffsselected and ultimately purchased theirShelby,in part,because gitlwas represented to be Track-Ready ...During their Shelby research,the Tershakovec Plaintiffs reviewed printand online advertisements...gthat)statedhow variouscomponentsin a1120l6 Shelbyswere Track-Ready ...'');id.at! 18 (noting thattheTershakovec Plaintiffsallegedly review ed the Ford w ebsite and spoke w ith Ford salespeople about their intent to use their Technology M odel2016 Shelby fortrack use and were notinformed they would notbe able to 6 do sol;id.at! 32 (notingthatPlaintiffAubreyreviewedprintandonlineadvertisementssimilar to those in the Second Am ended Complaintand Skselected and ultim ately purchased his Shelby, inpart,because gitlwasrepresentedtobeTrack-Ready ...'');id.at! 34 (allegingthatPlaintiff Aubrey reviewed Ford's website and spoke with Ford salespeople about his intentto use his Base M odel2016 Shelby foroccasionaltrack use and wasnotinformed thathe wasunableto do so), 'id.at!!50,52 (sameforPlaintiffHarper);id.at!! 65,67 (sameforPlaintiffKowalchik); id.at!!80,82(samefortheLariosPlaintiffsl;id.at!!97,99(sameforPlaintiffRimokhl;id.at !! 113,115 (sameforPlaintiffHochsprung);id.at!! 127,129 (sameforPlaintiffPorter);id at !! 141,143 (sameforPlaintiffRoberts);id at!! 156,158 (same forPlaintiffLinnl;id at!! l70,172 (samefortheKelly Plaintiffs);id.at!! 185,187 (sameforPlaintiffLongl;id.at!! 200,202(sameforPlaintiffCruzl;id.at!! 216,218(same forPlaintiffGondan);id.at!!232, 234(sameforPlaintiffAlley);id.at!!247,249 (sameforPlaintiffKamperman);id.at!!262, 264(sameforPlaintiffM clkae);id.at!!278,280(sameforPlaintiffNewtonl;id.at!!295,297 (sameforPlaintiffEvans).PlaintiffsalsoallegethatFord'somissions- namelythattheBaseand Teclmology M odelsenterLimp M odewithoutwam ing thedriver- should havebeen revealed in Ford's disclosures and marketing m aterials rather than m arketing those m odels as ks-l-rack- Ready.''Seeid at!!316-330.W hetherFord'snoticethatShelbysareequipped with electronic controls that, if required, reduces pow er and lim its speed in order to control pow ertrain tem peratures,w as sufficiently descriptive to give notice to prospective purchasers of Base and Technology M odelShelbys,and cure the alleged omission thatLim p M ode could occur,is an issueforalaterstageinthislitigation.Fornow,PlaintiffshavesatisfiedRule12(b)(6). V iewing the factsalleged in the Second Amended Complaintin the lightm ostfavorable to Plaintiffs,asthe Courtmustatthisstage,Plaintiffshave sufûciently satisfied Rule 9(b)'s 7 particularity requirem ent for the fraud-based claim s because the Second Am ended Complaint - alleges thata1lnamed Plaintiffs,priorto purchasing their vehicles,reviewed printand online advertisements sim ilarto those included in the Second Amended Com plaint thatassertthe 2016 Shelbys were Track-Ready.M oreover,the marketing m aterials included in the Second Am ended Complaintalso contained photographsthatdepicted the 2016 Shelbys on racetracks. Plaintiffsfurtherallegethatthey reliedsin part,on Ford'srepresentationsthatthe 2016 Shelbys w ere Track-Ready,in purchasing their vehicles.Thus,accepting the well-pleaded facts as true, Plaintiffssatisfy Rule 12(b)(6)because they have sufficiently alleged aplausible entitlementto reliefon thefraud-based claim s.Accordingly,Ford'sM otion isDENIED asto the comm on law and statutory fraud-based claim s.Next,Ford argues,on a state-by-state basis,thatsome ofthe claim sshould bedism issed. C ount2 - Florida D eceptive and U nfair Trade PracticesA ct Ford argues that Count 2 under Florida's D eceptive and U nfair Trade Practices A ct should be dism issed because Plaintiffsdo notplausibly allege factsestablishing thatthey paid a price prem ium as a result of any m isrepresentation.R ecovery under Florida's Deceptive and UnfairTradePracticesActçidependson whetherplaintiffspaid a pricepremium ,noton whether plaintiffs actually relied on the illegalm isrepresentation.''Carriuolo v.Gen.M otors Co.,823 F.3d 977,986 (11th Cir.2016).Plaintiffs counterthatthey sufficiently pled apricepremium because they allege thatthe i'track-ready dream ''Ford prom ised Cçcam e at a prem ium price''as Csshelbys were sold tens ofthousands of dollars above the listprice- and double ortriple the priceofaregularM ustang GT.''D.E.43!(3.Plaintiffsfurthersubmittheykswerewillingto pay the prem ium to ow n such a distinct piece of autom otive history and to realize their dream of ow ning a high-perform ance vehicle.''1d.To boot, Ssplaintiffs and Florida Class m em bers who purchased Shelbys either w ould have paid less for their Shelbys or w ould have not purchased them atal1butforFord'sviolationsofgFlorida'sDeceptiveandUnfairTradePracticesAct).''1d. at!411. Thus,view ing the w ell-pleaded facts in the Second A m ended Com plaintin the lightm ost favorable to Plaintiffs,as the Courtm ust atthis stage,Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that they paid a price prem ium asaresultofthe alleged m isrepresentations,and thatthey would have paid less or not purchased their vehicles at a11 had they been aware of the alleged m isrepresentations.A ccordingly,Ford's M otion isD ENIED as to Count2. 2. C ounts25 and 26 - N ew Jersey Statutorv and Com m on Law Fraud Ford submits thatPlaintiff Lizm 's comm on 1aw and statutory fraud claims underN ew Jersey 1aw should bedism issed becausethey are subsumedby,and precluded by,theN ew Jersey ProductsLiability Act.Lilm countersthatthe New Jersey ProductsLiability Actisinapplicable here because the Actprovides relieffor çsany claim oraction broughtby a claim antforhann caused by a product,irrespective of the theory underlying the claim ,except actions for harm causedby breach ofan expresswarranty.''N.J.Stat.j 2A:58C-l(b)(3).Asdetined in theAct, i'il-larm'means (a) physicaldamage to property,other than the product itself;(b) personal physicalillness,injury ordeath' ,(c)pain and suffering,mentalanguish oremotionalharm;and (d)any lossofconsortium orservicesorotherlossderivingfrom gthese)typegs)ofhann.''1d.at j2A:58C(1)(b)(2).Linn doesnotallegefactsthatwouldincludeanydefinitionofhann in(a)-(d) above. Rather,Linn claim seconom ic damagesrelating to thepurchase ofa Shelby thatdid not live up to the hype.SeeD.E.43 ! 159.ln interpreting theNew Jersey ProductsLiability Act, federalcourtshaveexcluded economicdamagesfrom thedefinitionofharm.See,e.g.,Estateof Knoster v.Ford Motor Co.,200 F.App'x 106,116 (31-d Cir.2006)(stgcllaimsfor Sphysical damagc . to the productitself are not Cproductliability actiongsl'because the gproducts LiabilityAct)specificallyexcludessuch damage from itsdefinitionofiharm'...Thegproducts Liability Actjcannotsubsume thatwhich itexplicitly excludes from coverage.''l;FrancisE. ParkerMem '1Home,Inc.v.Georgia-pac.LLC,945F.Supp.2d543,552 (D.N.J.2013)(ksW hile economiclossesdue to harm to the productitselfare recoverable underthe (ConsumerFraud Actj,the gproducts Liability Actjexplicitly exempts such losses in its definition ofharm.''). Because Lilm seeks to recover econom ic dam ages for allegedly overpaying for a defective Shelby, the statutory and com mon law fraud claims are not subsum ed by the N ew Jersey ProductsLiability Act.Accordingly,Ford'sM otion isDENIED asto Counts25 and 26. 3. C ount55 - W ashington C onsum er Protection A ct Next, Ford argues that Plaintiff Evans's claim under the W ashington Consum er Protection Actisbarred because Ford's alleged failure to disclose safety defectsisregulated by federal law. The W ashington Consum er Protection Act expressly exem pts isactions or transactionsotherwise perm itted,prohibited orregulated underthe lawsadm inistered ...under statutory authority of...the United States.''W ash.Code j 19.86.170.Thus,Ford arguesthat disclosure ofsafety defects is expressly regulated by the N ationalHighway Traffic Safety Act, 49 U.S.C.j 30118(c), '49 C.F.R.j573.6.However,49U.S.C.j 30103(d)statesthataremedy undersection 301l8 thesection Ford suggestspreemptssafety defects diisin addition to other rights and rem edies under other law s of the U nited States or a State,'' effectively pennitting W ashington's regulation that provides potential rem edies to Evans.In fact,federalcourts have sustained claims under W ashington's Consumer Protections Act in the automotive safety context.SeeInrePorscheCarsN Am.,Inc.,880F.Supp.2(1801(S.D.Ohio2012)(tindingthat allegations that an automotive m anufacturer knowingly failed to revealto consum ers thatthe vehicle's coolant system w as notof a particular standard,quality or grade was deceptive under W ashington'sConsumerProtectionsAct), 'Zwickerv.Gen.MotorsCorp.,2007 W L 5309204,at l0 +5(W .D.W ash.July26,2007)(finding thatallegation thatGeneralM otorswasallegedlyaware of and concealed the Cssystem atic failure''of installing faulty speedom eters could sustain the requisite unfairordeceptive actunderW ashington's ConsumerProtection Act).Accordingly, Ford'sM otion isD EN IED asto Count55. B. Express W arranw and M aanusson-M oss C laim s6 Ford arguesthatPlaintiffs'expresswarranty claim sm ustbe dismissed because they do not allege a failure or m alfunction in norm al use caused by a m anufacturing defect.Plaintiffs identify Ford's New Vehicle Limited W arranty as the basis fortheir express warranty claim s. TheNew VehicleLimited W anunty provides: YourNEW VEHICLE LIM ITED W ARRANTY givesyou specific legal rights. Y ou m ay have other rights that vary from state to state.UnderyourNew Vehicle Limited W arranty if...yourFord Shelby isproperly operated and m aintained,and ...wastaken to a Ford dealership fora warranted repairduring the warranty period, then authorized Ford M otorCompany dealerswill,withoutcharge, repair,replace,oradjustallpartson yourShelby thatmalfunction orfailduring norm aluse duringthe applicablecoverageperiod due to a m anufacturing defect in factory-supplied m aterials or factory w orkm anship. Thiswarranty doesnotm ean thateach Ford vehicle isdefectfree. Defectsmay be unintentionally introduced into vehicles during the design and manufacturingprocesses and such defects could resultin the needforrepairs.Forthisreason,Ford providesthe New Vehicle Lim ited W arranty in order to rem edy and such defectsthatresultin vehicle partm alfunction orfailure during the w arranty period. D.E.43!355(emphasisinoriginal). Specifically, Ford subm its thatten1ofthetwenty-two nam ed Plaintiffsdo notallegethat they experienced a failure orm alfunction of any kind,on oroffthe track,and thus,they have no 6éç(AjMagnusson-MossWarrantyActclaim onlyexistsifavalidbreachofwarrantyclaim isalsostated.'' Meltonv.CentulyArms,lnc.,243F.Supp.3d1290,1304(S.D.Fla.2017)(Moreno,J.)(citingBaileyv.Monaco CoachCorp.,168F.App'x893,894n.l(1lthCir.2006)).Consequently,theCourtwillnotaddressPlaintiffs' Magnusson-Mossclaim (Count1)separately. express warranty claim . SevenFPlaintiffs allege thatthattheir vehicles wentinto Limp M ode while they were using their vehicles on the track. The rem aining five9 plaintiffs allege they experienced Limp M ode on public highways,butbecause they do notallege thatthisoccurred during nonualuse ofthe vehicles,Ford subm itsthatthe expresswarranty claim sofallPlaintiffs m ust be dismissed because the New Vehicle Limited W arranty promises thatm alfunctioning partswillberepaired orreplacedifthey failduringiçnormaluse.''D.E.43!355.Ford suggests thatLimp M ode is nota malfunction or failure,butis,in effect,a safety feature operating as intended,asthe67-350modelsarespecifically designedtoenterLimp M ode(i.e.,reducepower and speed) when necessary to controlheatand prevent damage from excessive heat.Even assuming thatsom e Plaintiffsexperienced a failure orm alfunction in nonualuse,Ford further arguesthatthe warranty requires thatthe failure orm alfunction be caused by a Skmanufacturing defect,''and even ifLimp M odeisa tcdefect,''itisa design defect,and theexpresswarranty does notapply to design defects. A tthisstage,the Courtis notprepared to differentiate between m anufacturing and design defects.Thus,the Courtwilllook to each Plaintiffs'expresswarranty claim to determine ifthey adequately state a claim for breach of said warranty.Ford's first contention that all express warranty claim smustbe dismissed because Plaintiffs do notallege thatthey used theirvehicles during itnonnaluse''hasno merit.Expecting each Plaintiffto regurgitatethatheorsheused their vehicle underçinorm al''conditionswould ostensibly seem conclusory and devoid ofany factual underpinning.The issue thatfollowsiswhetheram anifestation ofthealleged breach oftheNew V ehicle Lim ited W arranty isnecessary to state a claim . ?PlaintiffsGeorgeTershakovec,D ianaTershakovec,Harper,Kowalchik,A lley,Kam perm an,Evans, Hochsprung,Roberts,andLinn.D.E.43IT 13-28,47-76,110-123,138-166,229-258,292-306. 8PlaintiffsAubrey, Newton,Gondan,Port er,StephenKelly,JillKelly,andRimokh.D.E.43j; !36,10l, 13l,174:,220,283. >PlaintiffsErnesto Larios,ShauntiYanik-laarios,McRae,Cruz,and Long.D.E.43 !!, (85,l89,204,266. Twelve oftwenty-two Plaintiffsallege thattheirvehicleswentinto Limp M ode on either atrack orapublic roadway,thus,thosetwelve Plaintiffsplausibly allege an entitlem entto relief, because the alleged breach m anifested itself when the car entered Limp M ode.As to the ten Plaintiffsthatdo notallegethey experienced afailureormalfunction ofany kind---on oroffthe track- the Court must determine whether each state requires a m anifestation of the alleged defect,or whether the knowledge that their vehicles would enter Lim p M ode is sufficientto sustain a claim forbreach ofexpressw arranty. 1. Count4 - Florida Law (FIa.Stat.k 672.313) Plaintiffs George and D iana Tershakovec,Byron H arper,and Richard K owalchik allege breach ofexpresswarranty under Florida law .To state a claim forbreach ofexpress warranty underFlorida law,acomplaintmustallege:(1)the saleofgoods;(2)theexpresswarranty;(3) breach ofthatwarranty;(4)noticeto sellerofthebreach;and (5)theinjuriessustained by the buyerasaresultofthebreachoftheexpresswarranty.Felicev.Invicta Watch Co.ofAm.,Inc., No.16-CV-62772-RLR,2017 W L 3336715,at*5 (S.D.Fla.Aug.4,2017).lmportantly,Florida law isnotclearwhetherthealleged defectism anifested when the ownerencountersLimp M ode or when the vehicle comes offthe assembly line.See James v. Yamaha M otor Corp.,N o.15- 23750-C1V,2016 W L 3083378,at*9 (S.D.Fla.M ay 31,2016)(finding thaticthepossibility of futureinjuryisnotmerelyhypothetical...gtlothecontrary ...thepossibilityoffutureinjuryis avirtualcertainty,astheengineswillhavetoberepairedagainandagain.''), 'Sanchez-Knutsonv. FordM otorCo.,310 F.R.D.529,535(S.D.Fla.2015)(i;g11fajurybelievesPlaintiffsevidence, itcould tind thatthealleged defectwasmanifested when the gvehicle)cameofftheassembly line, regardless of whether gl evel'y putative class member has (experienced the alleged defectq.'').lndeed,thisCourthasruled thatitispremature to dismissclaimsatthe motion to dism iss stage because ofa plaintiff'sfailure to encounterthe alleged defect.ln re Takata,193 F. Supp.3dat1335(($IfTakatahad installedgrenadesin itsairbagsthatmayormaynotexplodeon impacta courtwould notrequire an explosion to demonstrate manifestation of a defect.''). A ccordingly, the Court tinds that, at this stage, even though these Florida Plaintiffs did not experience Lim p M ode, the alleged breach of express w arranty could have m anifested itself w hen their vehicles w ere assem bled. Indeed,the possibility of encountering Lim p M ode as alleged wasnothypothetical,buta virtualcertainty. Ford also claim s that Plaintiffs failed to give adequate notice as required by Florida Statute672.607(3)(a),whichrequiresthatdkgtlhethebuyermustwithinareasonabletimeafterhe orshe discoversor should have discovered any breach notify the sellerofbreach or be barred from any rem edy.''Plaintiffsclaim they notified Ford oftheirintentto pursuestatutory fraud and breach ofwarranty claimsin alettersentby theircounselon M arch 21,2017.See D.E.43 !! 615,676,1011.Florida coul' tsrecognize Stthatnotice isrequired to be given to the seller,notthe manufacturer,underFlorida law.''PB Prop.Mgmt.,Inc.v.Goodman Mfg.Co.,L.P.,CaseNo. 3:12-CV-1366-HES-JBT,2014 W L 12640371,at*l(M .D.Fla.Aug.14,2014);seealso Fed Ins.Ca v.fazzara Yachtsof N Am.,Inc.,Case No.8:09-cv-607,2010 W L 1223126,at*5 (M .D.Fla.M ar.25,2010)(holding thatdtthe plain language ofthe statute therefore does not requirenoticetoamanufacturer'). The Tershakovecs,H arper,and Kowalchik subm itthatthey provided Ford w ith notice of their intent to pursue breach of w arranty claim s.Their notice,how ever,is unreasonably tardy and does notcom ply with Florida law ,because itw as given on M arch 2 1,2017- the eve ofthe original Com plaint's Eling on M arch 22,2017.See Lam b v. Graco Children ' s Prod.Inc.,N o. 4:11CV477-RH/W CS,2012W L 128719633,at*2 (N.D.Fla.Jan.24,2012)('dg-l-lhepointofthe notice requirem ent is to allow the warrantor an opportunity to clzre the problem rather than defendalawsuit.'').Oneday'snoticedoesnotprovideFordwiththeopportunitytoanalyzeand cure the defect.Here, as required by statute,two Plaintiffs com plied with Florida 1aw by notifyingFord- notwithstandingwhetheritwastothedealerormanufacturer.SeeD.E.43!21 ('k-rershakovecPlaintiffscontacted Ford to expresstheirconcernsand seek reliep');id.at! 55 ('iln thesummerof2016,Mr.HarpercalledFord severaltimesandexchangedemailsto express hisconcernsand seek relief').However,lkeach putativeclassmemberwouldhaveto show that he or she gave the defendant notice w ithin a reasonable tim e.''Cohen v.ImplantInnovations, Inc.,259F.R.D.617,642 (S.D.Fla.2008)(applyingFloridalaw toabreach ofexpresswarranty claim).Thus,theTershakovecsand Harperseeminglycompliedwiththenoticerequirement.On the otherhand,Kowalchik doesnotallege thathe notitied Ford ofhisintentto sue.TheParties did notaddress whetherKowalchik's failureto allege notice,asrequired by Florida law,would requiredism issalofCount4 in itsentirety.Atthisstage,Ford'sM otion isDENIED asto Count 4 butnotesthatdtgtlhedetermination ofwhetherornotasellerofgoodshasreceived adequate noticeofan alleged defectisahighly individualized inquiry''thatmay impactclasscertification. Hummelv.TamkoBldg.Prods.,Inc.,303F.Supp.3d 1288 (M .D.Fla.2017), .seealsoBrown v. ElectroluxHomeProds.,Inc.,817F.3d 1225,1238(11th Cir.2015)(reversingadistrictcourt's grant of class certification for classifying the issue ofnotice in a breach ofw arranty claim as a tdcommonquestion'') 2. Count52 - TexasLaw (Tex.Bus.& Com .Code 12.313) Plaintiffs HerbertAlley and Eric Kam perm an allege breach of express warranty under Texas law . Ford claim s that their notice is insufficient because it m ust be given to the m anufacturer and the Second A m ended Com plaintalleges thatit was given to the dealer.See, e.g.,D.E.43!J252(iW pproximately twomonthsafterpurchase,M r.Kampermanreturnedto the dealertoraisehisconcernsand seekrelief.'').Toestablish abreach ofexpresswarranty,abuyer l5 must show:(1) an affirmation or promise made by the seller to the buyer; 2) that such aftinnation orprom ise waspartofthe basis forthe bargain,e.g.,thatthe buyerrelied on such aftinnation orpromise in making the purchase;3) thatthe goods failed to comply with the affinnationorpromise;4)thattherewasfinancialinjury;and 5)thatthefailure to comply was theproximatecauseofthefinancialinjurytothebuyer.Barraganv.Gen.MotorsLLC,No.4:14CV-93-DAE,2015 W L 5734842,at*9 (W .D.Tex.Sept.30,2015)(quoting findemann v.Eli Lilly & Co.,816F.2d 199,202(5thCir.1987));seealsoTex.Bus.& Com.Codej2.313. Section2.607(c)(1)oftheTexasBusinessand CommerceCodeprovidesthatCçgwlherea tender hasbeen accepted .. .the buyer mustwithin a reasonable time afterhe discovers or should havediscovered anybreachnotify the sellerofbreach orbe barredfrom anyremedyl.l'' ktl-he purpose of this requirem ent is to give the seller an opportunity to inspect the product to detennine w hether itw as defective and to allow the seller an opportunity to cure the breach,if any.''Elmazouniv.Mylan,Inc.,220 F.Supp.3d 736,746 (N.D.Tex.2016).W hethernotice m ustbe given to the m anufactureror a sellerisa question thatdivides Texas courts.Compare Wilcox v.HillcrestMem 1Park of Dallas,696 S.W .2d 423,424-25 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1988) (holding thatsection 2.607(c)(1)required a buyerto notify aremotemanufacturerorbebarred from recovery);with VintageHomes,Inc.v.Coldiron,585S.W .2d886,888(Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1979)(holding thatçithe notice requirementofsection 2.607 appliesonly asbetween a buyerand hisimmediateseller.'');accord US.Tire-Tech,Inc.v.Boeran,B.P:,ll0 S.W .3d 194 (Tex.App.2003)(noting thatthe TexasSupremeCourthasyetto decidethesplitamongstthe lowercourts).Here,Kamperman çsreturned to the dealerto raise hisconcernsand seek relief' aboutkitwo monthsafterpurchase.''D.E.43!252.PlaintiffM cRaeSkcontacted Ken StopelFord to expresshisconcernsandrequestrelief.''Id at!267.BecauseTexaslaw doesnotrequirethat 16 the buycrnotify thtm anufacturerofthe alleged defectto satisfy thepre-suitnoticerequirem ent, Kamperm an and M cRae's notice to their respective dealers is sufficient to survive Ford's M otion. W ith regard to the lack ofLimp M ode m anifestation,in Texas,itmustbe Skinevitable'' thatthe alleged defectwillmanifestitself.Everett v.Tlc-ln aito,L.L.C ,178 S.W .3d 844,855 (Tex.App.2005) (CtTo cause redressable injuries in the breach ofthe implied warranty of merchantability context,a ldefect'musteitherhave m anifested during the product'snormaluse orsuch manifestation mustbeinevitablewhenthedefectivefeatureoftheproductisused ...''). Kam perman and Alley- the only Texas Plaintiffs who did notexperience Limp M ode- would inevitably have encountered Limp M ode had they attem pted to use theirvehicles on a track as intended todoupon purchase.SeeD.E.43 !(236 (kiAfterlearning aboutthesafety implications inherentwith a Shelby going into Lim p M ode,M r.Alley decided notto takehis Shelby to the track.''l' ,id.at!251(CiAflerleanzingaboutthesafety implicationsinherentwitha Shelby going into Lim p M ode,M r.Kam perm an cancelled his pre-existing reservation to participate in a track day...'').Accordingly,Ford'sM otionisDENIED astoCount52. 3. Count57 - W ashinzton Law (RCW k62A .2-313) Plaintiff Evans alleges breach of express warranty under W ashington law.An express warranty isany affirmation offactorprom isem adebythe sellerto the buyerrelating to thegood and becomingthebasisofthebargain.Cox v.fewiston Grain Growers,lnc.,86 W ash.App.357, 370,936 P.2d 1191,1198 (1997).Ford does notargue- and citesto no authority- for the proposition thatCount57 shouldbedism issedbecause W ashington law requiresthatLimp M ode manifested itself to Evans before he filed suit. lndeed,Evans alleges- and Ford does not dispute- thatFord'sN ew Vehicle Lim ited W arranty was warranted for hisparticular vehicle. Thus,the question isonly whetherthe warranty applies and to whatextent.Accordingly,Ford's M otion isDENIED asto Count57becauseEvanssufficiently statesaclaim . 4. Count17- lllinoisLaw (810 ILCS 5/2-313) PlaintiffHochsprung allegesbreach ofexpresswarranty tmderlllinois law.Ford citesno authority fortheproposition thatlllinoislaw requiresthatan alleged defectm anifestitselfbefore aPlaintiffcan seek reliefforbreach ofwarranty.ln any event,theCourtfindsthatthepossibility of encountering Limp M ode- as alleged- was nothypothetical,but a virtual certainty.This, however,may bean issuebetteraddressed atclasscertification.SeePella Corp.v.Saltzman,606 F.3d 39l (7th Cir.2010);In reFluidmaster,lnc.,WaterConnector ComponentsProds.Liab. Litig.,No.14-CV-5696,2017W L 1196990at*63(N.D.111.M ar.31,2017).Accordingly,Ford's M otion is DEN IED asto Count 17. 5. Count22 - M issouriLaw (M o.Stat.k 400.2-313.1) PlaintiffRoberts alleges breach ofexpress warranty underM issourilaw .Ford cites no authority for the proposition that M issouri 1aw requires that an alleged defect manifestitself before a Plaintiff can seek relief for breach of w arranty.N onetheless,M issouri law appears to require thata plaintiffexperiencethe defectto certify a classundera breach ofexpresswarranty theory.SccHopev.NissanAèAm.,Inc.,353S.W .3d 68,87(M o.Ct.App.2011)(reversingtrial court'sclasscertification wherektgreatmajorityoftheputativeclassmembershavenotactually experienced gthedefectj').The Hope courtrelied heavily on decisionsfrom the Eighth Circuit CourtofAppeals. See O' Neilv.Simplicity Inc.,574 F.3d 501,503 (8th Cir.2009)(C$1tiswell established thatpurchasers ofan allegedly defective producthave no legally recognizable claim wherethe allegeddefecthasnotmanifesteditselfin theproductthey own.'') (quotingBriehlv. GeneralMotors Corp.,172 F.3d 623,628 (8th Cir.1999)). tdW here ...aproductperforms 18 satisfactorily and neverexhibits an alleged defect,no cause ofaction lies.''Briehl,172 F.3d at 628,Because neither O 'Neil nor Briehlwere decisions based on M issouri law ,the Courtis unpersuaded thatthe clearw eight ofauthority in M issourirequires a m anifestation ofthe defect before aplaintiffcan statea claim .Hope wasnotgrounded on failureto statea claim ,butrather on class certitication.Accordingly,Ford's M otion is DENIED as to Count22.The Courtwill revisitthis issue ata laterstage. 6. Count27- New Jersey Law (N.J.Stat.k 12A :2-313) Plaintiff Linn alleges breach of express w arranty under N ew Jersey law .A gain, Ford citesno authority fortheproposition thatNew Jersey 1aw requiresthatan alleged defectm anifest itselfbeforea Plaintiffcan seek reliefforbreach ofwarranty.New Jersey law isunclearwhether a manifestation ofthe defectbefore aplaintiffcan state a claim .See Yostv.Gen.M otors.Corp., 651F.Supp.656 (D.N.J.1986)(holdingthatdesign defectSklikely to cause''majordamagedid notstate aclaim).Thus,becauseNew Jersey courts- theexpertsofNew Jersey law- have not addressedtheissue,Ford'sM otion isDENIED asto Count27. lm plied W arrantv C laim s To state aclaim forbreach oftheimplied warranty ofm erchantability,a consum erm ust demonstrate that a good sold by a merchant is Séfit forthe ordinary purposes forwhich such goodsareused.''U.C.C.j2-314(2)(c).PlaintiffsallegethatFordbreachedthiswarrantybecause their vehicles are Ciunfit for their ordinary purpose of driving on public roadways''as they Ssunexpectedly ggo)into Limp M ode.''See e.g.,D.E.43 ! 460.Ford arguesthatmostPlaintiffs have driven and continue to drive their vehicles on public roadw ays w ith no issues, and therefore,there is no claim for breach of im plied warranty of m erchantability.As an initial m atter,other than in theirdiscussion of privity,the Parties do notexpressly analyze the im plied warranty ofm erchantability claim underthe substantive 1aw ofeach ofthe relevantstates,but ratherengage in a generaldiscussion ofthe 1aw ofthe implied warranty ofmerchantability and the U nifonu Com m ercial Code. Thus, the Court w ill tailor its discussion to the law of the U niform Com m ercial Code. Here,the gravam en of the allegations in the Second Am ended ComplaintisthatFord falsely m arketed Plaintiffs'vehicles as Track-Ready and lcnew aboutthe alleged Lim p M odedefect,despitecontinuing topromotetheirvehiclesascapable ofbeing used or raced on a racetrack.Thus,the question is whether this class of vehicles was ikfit for the ordinarypurpose''ofusingthem on aracetrack,asadvertisedbyFord.U.C.C.j2-3l4(2)(c).The answersurely mustbe no,because the CourtmustacceptPlaintiffs'well-pleaded allegationsas tnle,and draw a11reasonableinferencestherefrom .Ford relieson authority thatisdistinguishable here.See,e.g.,Chiarelliv.Nissan A(Am,Inc.,No.14-CV-4327N GG,VVP,2015 W L 5686507, at*8(E.D.N.Y.Sept.25,2015)(findingnobreachofimpliedwarrantyforanallegedlydefective timing chain system where vehicleswere used fortens ofthousandsofmiles withoutissue); Szymczak v.Nissan N Am.,Inc.,No.10-CV-7493 (VB),2011W L 7095432,at*11(S.D.N.Y. Dec.16,2011)(dismissing breachofimplied wanuntyclaim foran allegedlydefectiveradiator where vehiclesdid notmake itto the 100,000 milemark withoutmanifestation ofthedefect); Sherisv.NissanN Am.,Inc.,No.07-CV-2516 (W HW ),2008 W L 2354908,at*6(D.N.J.June 3,2008)(dismissing implied warranty ofmerchantability claim forallegedly defective brake pads because the vehicle was fit for its dkordinary purpose of providing transportation for its OWner''). In the cases cited by Ford, the plaintiffs did not experience a m anifestation of the purported defectduring the warranty period.Furthennore,the alleged defectdid nothinderthe allegedly prim ary purpose the plaintiffs purchased their vehicles.For instance,the plaintiffs did notallege thatthey purchased their vehicles because ofthe tim ing chain system,radiator,or brake pads.W hereas here,Plaintiffs are a group of self-proclaimed dftrack enthusiasts,''that maintain the Limp M ode defectinterferes with the prim ary purpose of purchasing their 2016 Shelby M ustang GT350s.Indeed,Plaintiffs allege that Lim p M ode occurs not only in a track environment,D.E.43 ! 337,butalso on a busy,public roadway,id.at!! 86,189,204,266. According to Plaintiffs,this presents safety concerns due to the m aterialdifferences in speed, vehicle type,and the skillsetofdriverson public roadways,ascompared to driverson closed racetracks.1d.at!340.PlaintiffsfurtherallegethatwhenLimp M odeoccurs,they areforcedto pulltheirvehiclesoverto the sideofthe road orhighway and waitforthe vehicle to cooldown, which hampers the reliability and operability of the vehicles,and m akes them unfit fortheir ordinary purposeofdriving on public roadways.Thus,becausethe Second Amended Complaint plausibly allegesthatthevehicleswere notfitforthe ordinary purposeofbeing used on a public roadway oraracetrack,Ford'sM otion isDENIED asto the implied warranty ofmerchantability claim s generally.N onetheless,the Courtw illrevisitthis issue at a later stage w ith the benefitof a m ore robustrecord. Ford also argues,on a state-by-state basissthatthe im plied warranty claim s ofthe Florida (Count5),California(Count11),lllinois(Count18),New York (Count33),Oregon (Count38), Tennessee(Count48),andW ashington (Count58)Plaintiffsmustbedismissedbecausetheydo not allege vertical privity w ith Ford as required by each states' law s.10 plaintiffs withdraw Counts 1811and 48 underIllinois and Tennessee law ,respectively,butargue thatprivity,oran 10Thisargum entappliesto theUniform Com m ercialCodeim plied warranty claim sofPlaintiffsG eorge and DianaTershakovec,Aubrey,Harper,Kowalchik,Evans,Gondan,Hochsprung,Porter,StephenandJillKelly, Long,Larios,Yanik-Larios,and Rim okh.However,Fordconcedesitdoesnotapplyto the Califom iaSong-Beverly Actimpliedwarrantyclaim (Count13)assertedbyPlaintiffsLarios,Yanik-laarios,andRimokh,becauseprivityis notarequirem entforthatclaim . :1IntheirResponseinOpposition(D.E.55)toFord'sMotiontoDismiss,Plaintiffstiwithdraw Counts5 and 48underIllinoisandTennesseelaw.''SeeD .E.55at2ln.l5.ltappearsasifPlaintiffsintended to w ithdraw exception to the privity requirem ent,is adequately pled under the laws of Florida,Califom ia, N ew York,O regon,and W ashington. Count5 - Florida Law (Fla.Stat.k672.313) ln Count5,the Florida PlaintiffsallegethatFord impliedly warranted thatthe subject vehicles were merchantable,fit forthe ordinary purposes forwhich they were intended to be used,andwerenototherwiseinjuriousto customers.Specifically,theFloridaPlaintiffsmaintain thattheirvehiclesare defective in thattheirTrack-Ready powertrain system soverheatand cause their vehicles to unexpectedly enter Limp M ode,which im pairs the safety,reliability, and operability ofthevehicles.Ford arguesthatthe Courtmustdismissthisclaim on the ground that the Florida Plaintiffs cannotrecoveron a breach ofimplied warranty claim underFlorida law, becausethey were notin privitywith Ford,asthey purchased theirvehiclesfrom authorized Ford dealerships,not from Ford directly. The Florida Plaintiffs rely on Sanchez-Knutson v.Ford M otorCo.,52F.Supp.3d 1223,1233 (S.D.Fla.2014)(Dimitrouleas,J.),to arguethatthethirdparty beneficiary exception applies in thiscase.ln Sanchez,Judge D im itrouleasfound thatthirdparty beneficiary status applied because the plaintiffpled thatshe purchased a Ford vehicle from a dealer who was an agent of Ford,and thatthe plaintiff was the intended consum er of the vehicle.1d.at1234.û'Thedealerswerenotintendedtobetheultimateconsumersofthe subject vehicles,and haveno rightsunderthe warranty agreem entsprovided by Ford.Ford'swarranties were designed forand intended to benefitthe consumersonly.''Sanchez,52 F.Supp.3d at1234 (quotingthecomplaint). Count18insteadofCount5,becausePlaintiffsdonotmakeanyargumentinoppositionunderlllinoislaw (Count 18),butinsteadarguethatanexceptiontotheprivityrequirementismetunderFloridaIaw (Count5).Accordingly, theCourtwillconstruePlaintiffs'concession aswithdraw ingCountsl8 and48. 22 Here, the Florida Plaintiffs claim that the third-party beneficiary exception applies because they purchased their vehicles from authorized Ford dealers.See,e.g.,D.E.43 ! 14 (k$(Tqhe Tershakovec Plaintiffs purchased a 2016 Shelby M ustang with Technology Package from M axwellFord,an authorized Ford dealerlocatedin Austin,Texas.'');id at! 30(samefor PlaintiffAubrey).C/ Leon v.Cont1AG,301F.Supp.3d 1203 (S.D.Fla.2014)(W illiams,J.) (refusingto apply thethird-party beneficiary exception wheredilpjlaintiffsofferno factsabout the persons or entities from whom they obtained their M ercedes Benz vehicles').Plaintiffs furthersubmitthatthedealerswerenotintended to be theultimateconsumers.See D.E.43 ! 392.The Courtnotes,however,thatitpreviously dismissed a Florida implied warranty claim againstan autom akerdefendant.Seeln re Takata,193 F.Supp.3d at1346.Thus,consistentwith its prior ruling in Takata,the Court finds that Florida 1aw requires privity for an implied warranty claim .Ford isan automotive distributor,nota dealer.The Florida Plaintiffs could not have purchased their vehicles from Ford.Thus,the Florida Plaintiffs lack privity with Ford and theimplied warranty claim mustfail.SeeMesa v.BM W ofN Am.,LLC,904 So.2d 450,458 (F1a.3d DCA 2005)(idunderFlorida law,aplaintiffcannotrecovereconomiclossesforbreach ofimpliedwarranty in theabsenceofprivity.''l;Davidv.Am.SuzukiMotorCa Wrr.,629 F.Supp. 2d 1309,1321(S.D.Fla.2009)(kiFloridalaw requiresprivity ofcontractto sustain abreach of impliedwarrantyclaim .'').Accordingly,Ford'sMotionisGRANTED astoCount5. 2. Count11- CaliforniaLaw (Cal.Com m .Code k 2314) Ford arguesthatthe Courtm ustdism iss Count 11because the California Plaintiffscannot recoveron a breach ofim plied w arranty claim underCalifornia law due to a lack of privity w ith Ford,as they purchased their vehicles from authorized Ford dealerships,notfrom Ford directly. 'kA lthough courts applying California 1aw regarding the third-party beneficiary exception to the verticalprivity requirem entofimplied warranty claim shave come to differing conclusions,the clear w eight of authority com pels a conclusion that w here plaintiffs successfully plead thirdparty beneficiary status, they successfully plead a breach of im plied w arranty claim .'' In re Toyota M otor Corp. Unintended A cceleration M ktg.,Sales,Practices, and Prods.L iab.Litig., 754F.Supp.2d 1145,l184(C.D.Cal.2010).Here,theCaliforniaPlaintiffshavepledthatthey purchasedvehiclesfrom anetworkofdealersauthorizedbyFord.SeeD.E.43!!78and 95.Like the Plaintiffs in In re Toyota,the California Plaintiffsallege they were the intended consum ers and the dealershave no rightsunderthewarranty agreements.See1d.at!392.Therefore,the California Plaintiffs'breach of implied warranty claim is notprecluded by a lack of vertical privity and Ford'sM otion isDENIED asto Count11. 3. Count33 - New York Law (N.Y.U.C.C.Law j 2-315) Ford argues that the Courtm ust dismiss Count 33 because the New York Plaintiffs cannotrecover on a breach ofimplied warranty claim under New York 1aw due to a lack of privity w ith Ford,as they purchased their vehicles from authorized Ford dealerships,not from Ford directly.Plaintiffs rely on Hubbard v.Gen.M otors Corp.,where the courtpennitted a plaintiffto proceed atthe motion to dismissstage withoutverticalprivity cm an im plied warranty claim for economic damages because an allegedly defective braking system was a tssource of danger.''1996 W L 274018,at*5 (S.D.N.Y.1996)(citing Goldberg t,.Kollsmanm Instrument Corp.,12N.Y.2d432,436-37(1963))(finding an exception tothegeneralrulethatapurchaser cannotrecover m ere econom ic loss against a m anufacturer under a theol'y of breach of im plied w arranty where an article is of such a character thatw hen used for the purpose for w hich itis m ade tûit is likely to be a source of danger . if not properly designed and fashioned,the manufactureraswellas thevendorisliable ...to thepersonswhoseuseiscontemplated.''ll; seealsoDollv.FordM otorCo.,814F.Supp.2d526,541(D.M d.2011)(applyingtheçsthingof danger'' exception under New York 1aw where Ford vehicles allegedly suddenly, without warning,lostthe ability to maintain speed oraccelerate).Ford aptly notesthat,Ctglln the more than 50 years since Goldberg ...no New York state coul'thas adopted Hubbard' s ithing of danger'exception orfollowed a sim ilarapproach in purely economic losscases.''Dixon v.Ford Motor Co.,No,14-CV-6135 JMA ARL,2015 W L 6437612,at*5 (E.D. N .Y.Sept.30,2015). Indeed,New York statecourtshaverejected economiclossclaimsbased on alack ofprivityin situationsw here the productatissue was clearly dangerous.See Adirondack Com bustion Techs., Inc. v. Unicontrol, Inc., (dismissing cause ofaction forbreach ofimplied warranty againstmanufacturer ofa boiler wheretherewasno claim forpersonalinjuriesl;Ofvowitzv.GeorgieBoyMfg,lnc.,231A.D.2d 858,647N.Y.S.Zd887(N.Y.APP.Div.4thDep't1996)(dismissingcauseofactionforbreachof im plied w arranty against a m anufacturer of a m otor hom e after m otor hom e caught fire when there were no allegations ofpersonalinjury).The Courtis unpersuaded thatNew York 1aw perm its the isthing of danger'' exception in econom ic loss cases.In fact, the clear w eight of authority from N ew York state courts- which this Court gives great w eight and credence as experts of N ew Y ork law- com pels the conclusion that the exception does not apply in econom iclosscases.Accordingly,Ford'sM otion isGR ANTED asto Count33. 4. Count38- Orezon Law (Or.Stat.1 72.3140) Ford arguesthatthe Courtm ust dism issC ount 38 because Plaintiff Long calm otrecover on a breach ofim plied w arranty claim under Oregon 1aw due to a lack ofprivity w ith Ford,as he purchased the vehicles from an authorized Ford dealership,notfrom Ford directly.See D avis v. HomasoteCo.,281Or.383,574P.2d 1116,1117-18(1978)(holdingthatprivity ofcontractwas lacking, and therefore no implied warranty existed, where the consumer plaintiff sued the manufacturerforeconomicloss)(en bancl;seealso Hupp Corp.v.M etered WasherServ.,256 Or.245,247472P.2d 816(1970)(statingthattherequirementofprivity ofcontractisisthe1aw ofthisstate,''in economic losscases).Longrelieson Oregon Statute 72.8020 thatstatesevery m anufacturerof consum er goods gives an im plied w arranty ofm erchantability forany good sold atretailin the state.Ford argues that because Count38 is based on Oregon's version ofthe Unifonn CommercialCode- section 72.3140- n0t Oregon's Consumer W arranty Act,section 72.8010,et seq.,reliance on the protections provided in section 72.8020 is foreclosed.For the follow ing reasons,the Courtfinds thatdism issalofCount38 isw arranted. ln Clarkv.FordM otorCo.,46Or.App.521,524,612 P.2d 316,319(1980),theOregon Courtof Appeals explained thatStgtlhe ConsumerW arranty Act,ORS 72.8010 cfseq.,.. provides additional protection for purchasers of consum er goods bem nd that provided by the Uniform CommercialCode as enacted in this state.''(Italicsadded).The ConsumerW arranty A ct specifically includes new m otor vehicles kiused or bought for use prim arily for personal familyorhouseholdpurposes.''Id at319n.8(citing Or.Stat.j 72.801041)).However,Clarkis not dispositive,m uch less particularly helpful in this context, because it only speaks to the overlap between Oregon's version of the Unifonn Comm ercial Code and the Consumer W arranty Act.Thus,the question iswhetherOregon courts require privity ofcontractbetween consumers like Long and manufacturers like Ford.Several Oregon courts and courts applying O regon 1aw have decided sim ilar issues.Forinstance,in Price v.Gatlin,241 Or.315,405 P.2d 502 (1965),theOregonSupremeCourtheldthatapurchaserofadefectivetractorcouldnothold the wholesaler(notthe manufacturer)strictly liable foreconomic losses,because the plaintiff had no contractw ith the w holesaler.ln State ex re. W estern Seed Prod.Corp.v.Campbell,250 Or.262,265,442 P.2d 215,217 (1968),theplaintiffssoughttorecoverlostprofitsforaseedcaused crop loss from the producer of the seed,who sold to the plaintiff's local supplier,based on abreach ofim plied warranty.The Oregon Supreme Court,in dismissing the plaintiffs'claim for lack of privity,held that the dam age was itessentially the sam e'' as in Price because 'sthe ilplaintiffs lostthe protks they expected to derive from the normal sugar-beet crop.See also Simonsen v.Ford M otor Co.,l96 Or.App.460,479,102 P.3d 710,721 (2004)(dismissing im plied warranty claim w here the plaintiff w as not in privity w ith Ford because she purchased the vehicle from the originalowner).Thus,taken together,Davis,Price, Western Seeti and H upp, suggest that there is no exception to the privity requirem ent under Oregon law . Accordingly,Ford'sM otion isG R ANT ED asto Count38. Count58- W ashinzton Law (W ash.Code1 62A-314) Ford arguesthatthe Courtm ustdism issCount58 because PlaintiffEvanscarmotrecover on abreach ofim plied warranty claim underW ashington law due to a lack ofprivity with Ford, as he purchased his vehicle from authorized Ford dealership,not from Ford directly.Evans maintains that W ashington 1aw provides a third-party beneficiary exception to the privity requirement.Indeed,W ashington law recognizessuch an exception.See Tex Enterprises,Inc.v. Brockway StandarJ Inc.,149 W ash.2d 204,210,66 P.3d 625,628 (2003) (noting thatin Touchet Valley Grain Growers,lnc.v. Opp & Seibold G en. Constn, Inc., 119 W ash.2d 334, 344,83lP.2d 724 (1992),the Supreme CourtofW ashington çicarved a third-party beneficiary exception outofthe generalrule thata verticalnon-privity plaintiffcalm otrecover from a rem ote manufacturerforbreach ofimplied warranty.''l.However,aplaintiffSscan demonstratethatghe orsheisajthird-partybeneficiargyqwhereamanufacturerknew apurchaser'sidentity,knew the purchaser'spurpose forpurchasing the m anufacturer's product,knew a purchaser'srequirem ents fortheproduct,delivered the product,and/orattempted repairson theproductin question.''fohr Nissan N.Am.,Inc.,No.C16-1023RSM ,2017 W L 1037555,at*7 (W .D.W ash.M ar.17, 2017)(citing TouchetValley,831P.2d at730)).Thisis generally known asthe ûisum ofthe interaction'' test, to Stdeterm ine whether the m anufacturer was suficiently involved in the transaction with the remote purchaser to warrant enforcem ent of an im plied warranty.''Id (quoting Babb v.RegalMarineIndus.,Inc.,2015 W L 786857,at*3,186 W ash.App.1003 (W ash.App.Feb.24,2015)). Here,Evanspled thathe was the intended third-party beneficiary ofthe contractbetw een Ford andthedealerwho sold him thevehicle,D.E.43! ll09,butdidnotadequatelyallegethat he was the intended third-party beneficiary ofimplied wanuntiesFord made to said dealership. Evans does notsupporthis allegation with facts abouthis directinteractionswith Ford,m uch lessthatFordkmew ofhisidentity orhispurposeofpurchasing thevehicle.Thus,because Evans hasfailed to allege sufficientfactualm atterto allow the courtto draw the reasonable inference thatheisa third-pal'ty beneficiary oftheim plied wanunty Ford allegedly m adeto thedealerwho sold him hisvehicle,Ford'sM otion isGR ANTED asto Count58. 6. Count13 - Sone-Beverlv Act(Cal.Civ.Codekk 1791.1& 1792) Ford argues thatPlaintiffRim olth's Song-Beverly Consum er W arranty Actand related M agnusson M oss W arranty Actclaim s m ustbe dism issed because hisvehicle w asnotpurchased in California. Plaintiffs concede that Count 13 should be dism issed.12 Accordingly, Ford,s M otion isGIG NTED and Count13isdism issed asto PlaintiffRimokh only. 12InhisResponseinOpposition(D.E.55)toFord'sMotiontoDismiss,çtplaintiffRimokhwithdraws Countl2,hisSong-Beverlyclaim forim plied warranty.''D .E.55at23n.16.ltappearsasifPlaintiffRimokh intendedto withdraw CountI3,ratherthanCount12,becauseCount12 isthe Song-Beverly claim forbreach of express warranty and Ford clearly m oved to dism iss Count 13,the im plied w arranty claim .A ccordingly,the CourtwillconstruePlaintiffs'concessionasw ithdrawingCountl3. D. UniustEnrichm entClaim s Finally,Fordmovestodismisstheunjustenrichmentclaims.Fordargues,interalia,that a11ofthe unjustenrichmentclaimsshould be dismissed because a cause ofaction forunjust erlrichmentcazmotexistwhere the parties'relationship isgoverned by an express contractand where Plaintiffshave an adequate legalremedy.In Florida,the elementsofaclaim forunjust emichmentare:(l)abenefitconferred upon the defendantby theplaintiff;(2)the appreciation by the defendantof such benefit;and (3) acceptance and retention of such benefitby the defendant under such circum stances that it would be inequitable for him to retain it without payingthevaluethereof.Aceto Corp v.TherapeuticsM D,Inc.,953F.Supp.2d 1269,1287(S.D. Fla.2013).lntheotherstates,theelementsaresimilar.l3 13InIllinois,Eû tostateacauseofactionbasedonatheoryofunjustenrichment,aplaintiffmustallegethat thedefendanthasunjustlyretainedabenefittotheplaintiffsdetriment,andthatdefendant'sretentionofthebenetk violatesthefundamentalprinciplesofjustice,equity,andgoodconscience.''HPlHealthCareSenw,lnc.v.Mt. VernonHosp.,Jna,13l111.2d145,137111.Dec.19,545N. E.2d672,679(1989).lnTexas: A person isunjustlyenrichedwhen heobtainsabenefitfrom anotherbyfrauds duress,orthetakingofan undueadvantage.Unjustenrichmentisan equitable principleholdingthatonewhoreceivesbenefitsunjustlyshouldmakerestitution forthose benefits.Unjustenrichmentoccurs when the person soughtto be charged haswrongfully secured abenestorhaspassively received onewhich it wouldbeunconscionabletoretain.Unjustenrichmentcharacterizestheresultor failure to make restitution ofbenefitsreceived undersuch circumstances asto giveriseto implied orquasi-contracttorepay.Ithasalso been saidthatrecovery under unjustenrichment is an equitable rightand is notdependent on the existence ofa wrong. Villareal v. Grant Geophysical, . f?7c., 136 S.W .3d 265,270 (Tex. App.-san Antonio2004,pet.denied)(internalcitations,quotes,andbracketsremoved). lnWashington,i:lulnjustenrichmentisamethodofrecoveryforthevalueof(a1benefitretained,absentany contractualrelationship,becausenotionsoffairnessandjusticerequireit.''Youngv.Young,164Wash.2d477,l91 P.3d 1258,1262(2008).lnMissouri,tostateaclaim forunjustenrichment,thepetitionmustsetforthfacts demonstrating:(1)thatthedefendantwasenrichedbythereceiptofabenefit;(2)thattheenrichmentwasatthe expenseoftheplaintiff;(3)thatitwouldbeunjusttoallow thedefendanttoretainthebenefit.Gerkev.Cit y of KansasCf/ y,493S.W .3d433,438(Mo.Ct.App.2016)(quotationsomitted).UnderNew Jersey law,tostateaclaim forunjustenrichment,aplaintiffmustallegethat(1)atplaintiffsexpense(2)defendantreceived abenefit(3)undercircumstancesthatwouldmakeitunjustfordefendanttoretainbenefitwithoutpayingforit. Dzielakv.WhirlpoolCorp.,26F.Supp.3d304,330(D.N.J.20l4)(quotationsandcitationsomitted).lnCalifornia, tostateaclaim forunjustenrichment,Plaintiffmustallegereceiptofabenefitandunjustretentionofthebenetk at theexpenseofanother.Pirozziv.Applelnc.,913F.Supp.2d840,852(N.D.Cal.2012)(quotationsandcitation omitted).Tostateaclaim forunjustemichmentunderNew Yorklaw,aplaintiffmustshow that(i)thedefendant Ford argues that an express contract and adequate legalremedy,in the form oftheir expresswarranty,existscovering thesamematterastheunjustenrichmentclaim:thepurported defects in Plaintiffs' vehicles,and neitherparty disputes the existence ofthe w arranty contract. SeeIn re Takata,193 F.Supp.3d at1344 (S.D.Fla.2016)(i$An unjustenrichmentclaim can existonly ifthesubjectmatterofthatclaim isnotcovered by avalidandenforceablecontract.'' (internalquotationsandcitationsomittedl).However,Ford'sprimaryargument,supra,isthatthe expressw arranty does notapply in this case.To boot,Plaintiffs allege thatthe çdcontractrem edy isinsufticientto makePlaintiffs...whole.''D.E.43 !T446.Thus,atthisstage,Plaintiffsmay maintain an unjusterlrichmentclaim in thealternativetotheirbreachofexpresswarrantyclaim. See,e.g.,Martorella v.DeutscheBankNat.Tr.Co.,931F.Supp.2d 1218,1227-28 (S.D.Fla. 2013);FederalRulesofCivilProcedure8(a)and 8(d)(2)(permittingpleadinginthealtemative). M oreover,the Second Amended Complaintincludesa11the elementsofunjustenrichmentby claim ing thatthe vehicles have a dim inished value,and thus Ford has reaped profitsin excessof whatshould have been eanwd forthe sale of itsallegedly defective 2016 Shelby 61-350 Base and Technology Packages.Because unjust enrichment is available only when there is no adequate remedy atlaw ,and the Courthasdeclined to dism issthe expresswarranty claim satthe motion to dism iss stage,the Courtwilldeterm ine ata later time whether Plaintiffs'rem edy at wasenriched,(ii)attheplaintiffsexpense,and(iii)thatitisagainstequityandgoodconsciencetopermitthe defendanttoretain whatissoughttoberecovered.M andarin TradingL/t@ v.W ildenstein,16N .Y .3d l73,182,919 N.Y.S.Zd465,944N.E.2d1104(2011)(citationomitted).lnOregon,tostateaclaim forunjustenrichment,aparty mustestablish:(1)abenefitconferred,(2)awarenessbytherecipientthatheorshehasreceivedthebenefit,and(3) thatitwouldbeunjusttoallow therecipienttoretainthebenefitwithoutrequiringhertopayforit.Unigestion Holding,S.A.v.UPM Tech.,Inc.,160F.Supp.3d1214,1230(D.Or.2016)(quotationsandcitationsomitted).ln Pennsylvania,tostateaclaim forunjustenrichmentunderPennsylvanialaw,theplaintiffmustallegethat(1)he conferredabenefitonthedefendant,(2)thedefendantknew ofthebenefitandacceptedorretainedit,and(3)it wouldbeinequitabletoallow thedefendanttokeepthebenefkwithoutpayingforit.Whitakerv.HerrFoods,Inc., 198F.Supp.3d476,492(E.D.Pa.2016)(citationomitted).Tostateaclalm forunjustenrichmentunderTennessee law,aplaintiffmustestablish(1)abenestconferreduponthedefendantbytheplaintiff;(2)appreciationbythe defendantofsuchbenefit;and(3)acceptanceofsuchbenefitundercircumstancesthatitwouldbeinequitablefor him toretainthebenefitwithoutpaymentofthevaluethereof.CityofGoodlettsville,TN v.Priceline.com,lnc.,605 F.Supp.2d982,998(M.D.Tenn.2009)(quotationsandcitationomitted). 30 law is adequate.Accordingly,because the issue ofwhetherthe expresswarranty appliesin this caseisstillindispute,Ford'sMotionisDENIED astotheunjustenrichmentclaims. C O N CLU SIO N Forthe foregoing reasons,itishereby ADJUDGED thalFord'sM otion to Dismiss(D.E.50)isGRANTED-IN-PART and DEN IED -IN -PA R T asfollow s: * Count13 isDISM ISSED asto PlaintiffRimokh only; * Counts18 and 48 areDISM ISSED aswithdrawn; * Counts5,33,38,and 58areDISM ISSED W ITH PREJUDICE in 1 11;and * Ford'sM otion to D ism isstherem aining countsisD ENIED . Itis further A DJU D G ED thatFord shallEle an answ erno laterthan Fridav.Auaust 10.2018. r ' DONE AND ORDERED in ChambersatM iam i,Florida,this ' Copiesfurnishedto: CounselofRecord ofJuly2018. EDE O A .M OR EN O UN ITED STATES D ISTRICT JU DG E
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