Dunn et al v. Takata Corporation et al [Economic Loss Class Actions], No. 1:2014cv24009 - Document 1329 (S.D. Fla. 2019)

Court Description: ORDER Granting in Part and Denying in Part 2981 Motion to Dismiss; Granting in Part and Denying in Part 2982 Motion to Dismiss; Granting in Part and Denying in Part 2983 Motion to Dismiss; Granting in Part and Denying in Part 2988 Motion to Dismiss in case 1:15-md-02599-FAM. Granting in Part and Denying in Part 1022 Motion to Dismiss; Granting in Part Denied 1023 Motion to Dismiss; Granting in Part and Denying in Part 1029 Motion to Dismiss in case 1:14-cv-24009-FAM. Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 6/21/2019. See attached document for full details. Associated Cases: 1:15-md-02599-FAM, 1:14-cv-24009-FAM (ra)

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Dunn et al v. Takata Corporation et al [Economic Loss Class Actions] Doc. 1329 UN ITED STA TES D ISTRICT COU RT SOU TH ERN D ISTR ICT O F FLO RIDA M iam iD ivision M DL N o.2599 M aster File N o.15-02599-M D-M O R EN O Econom ic LossN o.14-24009-C V -M O R EN O IN RE: TA K ATA A IR BA G PR O DU C TS LIA BIL ITY LITIG ATIO N TH IS DO CU M EN T RELA TES TO A LL ECON OM IC LO SS TRA CK CA SES O RD ER G IG N TIN G IN PA R T A N D D EN YIN G IN PA RT M O TIO N S T O D ISM ISS BY D EFEND AN T S FC AN G EN EM L M O TO R S, M ER C EDE S.A UD I.AN D V O LK SW A G EN - Dockets.Justia.com 2 idCtttern ()17 ëtc eteerirléj ctl -vl -ty'' E;ectl -()rl16)t;;!(c)....................................................57t; $k ()rlsIl1 -rCtc),ttl 1 -()late I '' E;ectl -orl16)t5:!( )..........................................................85 lV . REM A IN IN G CLA IM S IN D 1 C T-FILE A CTIO N S - PEND EN T PER SO NA L 7C Y6113111CII1(IIICI***********************:**********************:**************************************:*************************4**6111 *11 IN TR O D UC TIO N This m ultidistrict litigation (4C M DL'') consolidates allegations of economic loss and personalinjury related to airbags manufactured by defendants Takata Corporation and TK Holdings(collectively,Cl-l-akata''landequippedin vehiclesmanufacturedbyDefendantsFCA US LLC (1$FCA''),GeneralM otorsCompany,GeneralM otorsHoldingsLLC,GeneralM otorsLLC (collectively, Cdfleneral M otors'), Daimler AG, M ercedes-Benz USA, LLC (collectively, çdM ercedes''),AudiAktiengesellschaft,AudiofAmerica,LLC (collectively,($Audi''),Volkswagen Aktiengesellschafl, and Volkswagen Group of America, lnc. (collectively, with Audi, itvolkswagen'') (a11automotive manufacturers collectively,ksDefendants'). W hile the Court divided theM DL'Scomponentcasesinto two tracks---economiclossforplaintiffsallegingpurely 3 economicdamagesand personalinjury forplaintiffsalleging damagesto aperson- thisOrder pertains only to econom ic loss cases. TH IS CA U SE com es before the Court upon D efendant FCA 'S M otion to D ism iss (D.E.2983),DefendantGeneralM otors'sMoticm toDismiss(D.E.2981),DefendantsMercedes's andVolkswagen'sM otiontoDismiss(D.E.2988),andDefendantM ercedes'sSeparateM otionto DismissforLack ofStanding (D.E.2982). lndividually,theM otionsseek to dismissallclaims alleged in threeseparate Am ended Consolidated ClassAction Complaints:Boyd v.FCA US LLC (id#t?y2')(D.E.2758);Whitakerv.GeneralMotorsCompany,etal.tcErF' /k/fclrr''l(D.E.2759);and Puhalla v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschajt,etal.1 (içpuhalla'') (D.E.2762) (collectively,the l'AmendedConsolidatedClassActionComplaints''). THE COURT has thoroughly reviewed the Amended Consolidated Class Action Com plaints,theD efendants'M otionsto Dism iss,the Plaintiffs'O m nibusResponse in O pposition (D.E.3034)(theitomnibusResponse''ortdopposition''),andtheDefendants'Reply memoranda (D.E.3094,3098,3103).TheCourtalsoheard oralargumentfrom thepartieson certain issues raised in the moving papers. (SeeD.E.3139). This Orderpertainsonly to standing,personal jurisdiction,and the sufficiency ofPlaintiffs'claimsunderthe Racketeering Influenced and CorruptOrganizationsActC(R1CO'').TheCourtreservesrulingona11otherclaimsnotdiscussed (includingallclaimsadvancedbytheAutomotiveRecyclerPlaintiffs).Forthereasonsdiscussed below ,the Court G R AN TS IN PA R T A N D D EN IES IN PA RT the D efendants' M otions to Ilisrniss. BA CK GR O U N D 1 The Puhalla Complaint asserts claims against Volkswagen Aktiengesellschafl, Volkswagen Group ofAm erica,lnc.,AudiAktiengesellschafl,AudiofAm erica,LLC,M ercedesB enz U SA ,LLC,and D aim lerA G . 4 Plaintiffs are consumers ofDefendants'vehicles thatare equipped with Takata airbags containing the propellant am m onium nitrate. Plaintiffs allege am m onium nitrate is an innately volatileand unstablepropellantthatimposesan unreasonablerisk ofseriousforeseeableharm or death upon driversofDefendants'vehicles.Thecrux ofPlaintiffs'legalclaim sisthatDefendants knew orshouldhaveknown ofthesedefectspriorto installingtheTakataairbagsintheirvehicles, and thatD efendantsconcealed from ,orfailed to notify,the Plaintiffs and the generalpublic ofthe fulland complete nature ofthe defect,despite being awareofproblem sarising during thedesign andtestingprocess,and through variousnlptureincidentsand recalls. TheDefendantsvigorously contestboththeconstitutionalbasesforthisCourttoexercisejurisdiction,andthesufficiencyof the allegations supporting Plaintiffs'substantive legalclaim s. LEG A L STAN D AR D i$A pleading thatstates a claim forreliefm ustcontain ...a shortand plain statem entof theclaim showing thatthe pleaderisentitled to relief.'' Fed.R.Civ.P.8(a)(2). To survivea m otion to dism iss,a çscom plaintm ustcontain sufficientfactualm atter,accepted as true,to çstate a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'''Ashcroh v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (quotingBellAtl.Corp.v.Twombly,550 U.S.544 (2007:. Detailedfactualallegationsarenot required,buta pleading mustoffermore than S%labelsand conclusions''orçda fonuulaicrecitation oftheelem entsofthecauseofaction.'' Twombly,550U .S.at555. W hereacauseofaction soundsin fraud,however,FederalRuleofCivilProcedure9(b) mustbe satisfied in addition to themorerelaxed standard ofRule8. UnderRule9(b),$çaparty m uststate w ith particularity the circum stancesconstituting fraud orm istake,''although ldconditions person's m ind,'' such as m alice, intent, and know ledge m ay be alleged generally. Fed.R.Civ.P.9(b).Slf' hetparticularity'requirementservesanimportantpurposeinfraudactions 5 by alerting defendants to the Cprecise m isconductwith which they are charged'and protecting defendantsSagainstspuriouschargesofimmoralandfraudulentbehavior.''' r' frCoastRoohng d: Waterproohng, Inc. Johns M anville, Inc., 287 App'x 81, 86 2008) (quotingZiembav.CascadeIntern.,Inc.,256F.3d 1194,1202(11thCir.2001)). AN A LYSIS D efendants m ove to dism iss the Am ended Consolidated ClassA ction Com plaints in their entirety on severaljusticiability grounds,and on groundsthatPlaintiffsfailto adequately plead theirsubstantive legalclaims. ThisOrderaddresses:(1)the standing challenges broughtby M ercedes,Volkswagen,andGeneralM otors;(2)alltheDefendants'personaljurisdictionattacks; and (3)a11theDefendants'objectionsto thesufticiency ofPlaintiffs'RICO claims. TheCourt will also address preemption and primary jurisdiction challenges made by Mercedes and Volkswagen,andthebackground issueofpendentpersonaljurisdiction.TheCourtwillbeginby dccidingtheextensivelybriefedstandingandpersonaljurisdictionissues,andthenproceedtorule on the sufticiency ofPlaintiffs'RICO allegations. Then the Courtw illconclude by resolving the parties'pendentpersonaljurisdictiondispute. 1. STA N DIN G M ercedes and Volkswagen,and separately GeneralM otors,m ove to dismiss in fullon standing grounds the Puhalla and ïkhitaker Com plaints. M ercedes and Volkswagen argue Plaintiffs failto sufficiently plead the diinjury in fact''and Sifairly traceable''elementsofthe standingtestestablishedby theUnited StatesSupreme Courtinfujan v.Defendersof Wildlfe, 504U.S.555(1992).GeneralM otorslimitsitsstandingchallengetothedsinjuryinfact''element. TheseDefendantsalsoasktheCourttojudiciallynoticeseveralpiecesofextrinsicevidence.For instance,M ercedes asks the Courtto judicially notice the Takata Plea Agreement,and then 6 concludethePlaintiffs'alleged injuriesarenotStfairlytraceable''toM ercedes'sconductbecause Takatapleaded guilty to defrauding severalauto m anufacturers. GeneralM otors asksthe Courtto judicially notice three çspetitions for Inconsequentiality''thatGeneralM otors filed with the NationalHighway Trafsc and Safety Administration ((kNHTSA''),and then conclude Plaintiffs havenotsufferedandûinjuryinfact''becausetheallegedairbaginflatordefectshavenotmanifested in certain m odels of GeneralM otors vehicles. ln their Om nibus Response,Plaintiffs assertthey havem orethan adequately alleged standing,and characterize Defendants'M otionsasan attempt to relitigate priorrulingsbased upon selectively chosen,and heavily disputed,extrinsic evidence. A. LEG A L STAN D A RD Article111oftheUnited StatesConstitutionlimitsfederalcourtjurisdictiontoactualcases and controversies.SeeU.S.Const.art.111,j2,cl.1.çs-l-hestandingdoctrineisanaspectofthis case orcontroversy requirem ent,and has itsorigins in dboth constitutionallim itations on federal- coul' tjurisdictionandpnzdentiallimitationsonitsexercise.'''ConeCorp.v.Fla.Dep 'tofln rans., 921 F.2d 1190,1204 (11th Cir.1991) (citing Flastv.Cohen,392 U.S.83,94-101 (1968); quoting Warthv.Seldin,422U.S.490,498(1975:.Standingisjurisdictional,andthusamotion todismissforlackofstandingistreatedasamotionforlackofsubject-matterjurisdiction under FederalRuleofCivilProcedure12(b)(1).Stalleyexrel.Unitedstatesr.OrlandoReg11Healthcare Sys.,Inc.,524 F.3d 1229,1232 (11th Cir.2008)+ercuriam)(citing Cone Corp.,921F.2d at 1232). The party invoking federaljurisdiction bears the burden of establishing standing. SeeLujan,504U.S.at561. Each elem entofstanding Slmustbesupported inthesam eway asanyotherm atteron which the plaintiffbearsthe burden ofproof.'' 1d. ln am otion to dism iss,tsgeneralfactualallegationsof injuryresulting from thedefendant'sconduct''maybesufficientto allegestandingbecauseona m otion to dism iss courts presum e that generalallegations em brace those specitic facts that are 7 necessary to supportthe claim, Id (quotingfujan v.Nat1 Wildl# Fed'n,497 U.S.871,889 (1990)). ToestablishArticlcI11standing,aplaintifftsmustallegepersonalinjuryfairlytraceableto the defendant's allegedly unlawfulconductand likely to be redressed by the requested relief'' DaimlerchryslerCorp.r.Cuno,547U.S.332,342(2006)(quotingAllenv.Wright,468U.S.737, 751(1984)).Morespecifically,constitutionalstandingrequires:(1)thattheplaintiffsufferedan injuryinfact aninvasionofalegallyprotectedinterest,whichis(a)concreteandparticularized, and (b)actualorimminent,notconjecturalorhypothetical;(2)theremustbeacausalconnection between theinjury and the conductcomplained of- theinjury hasto be fairlytraceableto the challengedactionofthedefendant;and(3)itmustbelikely,asopposedtomerelyspeculative,that theinjurywillberedressedbyafavorabledecision.SeeLujan,504U.S.at560(citationsomitted). B. SCIN JU RY IN FA CT '' 1. M ercedcsand Volksw azen M ercedes and V olksw agenz argue thatthe Plaintiffs have notestablished they suffered an çdinjul'yinfact''becausethePlaintiffsonlyallegettpossiblyfutureinjury,''whichisnotaSlcertainly impending''injury.(D.E.2988at65-66.)M ercedesandVolkswagenfurtherarguethatPlaintiffs failtoestablishaneconomicinjuryinfactbecauseilallPlaintiffswillreceiveareplacementinflator assoon aspartsare available,atno costto them .'' ld at65. a) M anifestation ofDefect 2 The Puhalla Com plaintm akesclear that(ktvolksw agen'and (V olksw agen Defendants' referstoVW AG,VW America,AudiAG,andAudiAmerica.''(D,E.2762at!30.)Accordingly, throughoutthis Order,allreferences to Volkswagen necessarily encompassAudiAG (sûAudi Aktiengesellschaff')andAudiAmerica(iiAudiofAmerica,LLC''),unlessandtotheextentthat the Audientitiesarespecifically discussed. 8 M ercedesand Volkswagen assertthatthereisno injuryin factbecausePlaintiffsdo not allege thatçsany Takata intlatoratissue in thiscase ruptured in any vehicle sold by Defendants,'' and thus,Plaintiffs 'khave alleged only non-actionable hypotheticalharm.'' (D.E.2988 at65 (emphasisin originall.) U pon close review of the Puhalla Com plaint,the Courtfinds that Plaintiffs sufficiently allegean injuryinfact.PlaintiffsallegethattsgalllTakataairbagsatissueinthislitigation sharea com mon, uniform defect:the use of amm onium nitrate, a notoriously volatile and unstable compound,asthepropellantin Defendants'defectively designed intlators.'' (D.E.2762 at!4.) Plaintiffs then plead several issues w ith Takata airbags that w ere installed in M ercedes's and V olksw agen's vehicles, stem m ing from the use of am m onium nitrate. For exam ple,Plaintiffs allege that:M ercedes had concerns about itm odule cover tearing,''idcushion tearingr''and Stthe m odule having integrity during and post-deploym enf';M ercedes w as aw are Takata airbags had Ssperform ance problem s plaguing the inflators''and had tkdifficulty m eeting U SCAR standards''; and M ercedes forwent tskey performance variables'' in order to approve Takata airbags. Id at!! 182-84,186. Asto Volkswagen,PlaintiffsallegeVolkswagen ç'hadrepeated quality issueswith Takata,'' includingt'failedairbagmodulesduringtesting''andSsairbagtearing.''Id at!!163-64.Plaintiffs then plead thatVolkswagen latertsreported gthejtorn airbag to Takata''and expressed concern (soveraflamethatoccurredduringtesting,andapparentcushionruptures.''Id at! 164.Plaintiffs also allege incidents ofTakata airbag issues during testing conducted by Volkswagen,such as ddammonium-nitrateinflatorsgcomingjapartduringbonfiretesting''and çtan inflatorruptureglin Brazil during testing.'' Id at !!165-66. Plaintiffs further allege ts-l-akata also informed V olkswagen thata greaterpropellantsurface area ...could significantly increase theburn rate and 9 inflator pressurization, to the point of nlpture,'' and thus V olksw agen knew that Takata's ammonium-nitrate propellanttscould be susceptibleto long-term aging and degradation.'' Id at ! 167. Notwithstanding Plaintiffs'allegaticms- that M ercedes and Volkswagen expcrienced a seriesofperformanceissueswith Takata airbagsinstalled in theirvehicles,which were defective becausethey contained innately unstable am m onium nitrate- M ercedesand V olksw ageù contend thatthe Plaintiffs merely allege dûnon-actionable hypotheticalharm ''because they do notallege that Sçany Takata inflator at issue in this case ruptured in any vehicle sold by D efendants.'' (D.E.2988 at 65 (emphasis in originall.) This argument attempts to relitigate the same manifestation ofdefectargumenttheCourtalreadyrejectedearlierin thislitigation.Previously, M azdam ovedto dismissccrtain claim sarguingtheplaintiffsdid notallegethatisany otherM azda m odel,orany M azda vehicle form odelyears 2003-2007 ...everm anifested the alleged defect.'' (See D.E.608 at210.) The Courtrejected thisargumentand explained thatSililfTakatahad installed grenadesin itsairbagsthatm ay ormaynotexplodeon impact,a coul'twould notrequire an explosion to demonstrate manifestation ofa defect.'' In re Takata Airbag Prod.Liab.Litig., 193 F.Supp.3c11324,1335 (S.D.Fla.2016). The point,the Courtemphasized,wasthatthe defective airbagsmightprotectvehicle occupants,ormay notprotectvehicle occupantsatall,or the airbags may create a m ore dangerous situation than having no airbag ata11by expelling m etal shrapnel. 1d. ln Tershakovec v,Ford M otor Co.,the Courtfollowed its ruling in In re Takata and declined to dism iss breach of express w anunty claim s atthe m otion to dism iss stage. 2018 W L 3405245,at*6(S.D.Fla.July 12,2018). TheCourtexplainedthatitwasSsprematuretodismiss claim s at the m otion to dism iss stage because of a plaintiff's failure to encounter the alleged 10 defect,''becausetseventhoughthellFloridaPlaintiffsdidnotexperience (thedefect),thealleged breach ofexpresswarranty couldhavemanifested itselfwhen theirvehicleswereassembled.''f#. Thus,tsthepossibilityofencountering (thedefectj asalleged wasnothypothetical,butavirtual certainty,''ld H ere,Plaintiffs allege the airbags installed in M ercedes's and Volksagen's vehicles are defective because they contain innately unstable am m onium nitrate, and thus create an unreasonableandimminentriskofinjurytovehicleoccupants.ConsistentwiththisCourt'sprior rulingsinInreTakata andTershakovec,theCourtfindstheseallegationssufficientlypleadinjury in fact, b) EconomicIniurv M ercedes and V olksw agen also argue that Plaintiffs fail to allege any econom ic injuryin fact. Specifcally,M ercedesandVolkswagen arguePlaintiffscannothave suffered an economicinjury becausetherecallnoticesmakeclearthatPlaintiffsçswillrecciveareplacement intlatorassoonaspartsareavailable,atnocosttothem.''(D.E.2988at65.) lntheEleventhCircuit,çsgelconomicharm andphysicalinjuryarewell-establishedinjuriesin-factunderfederalstandingjurispnzdence.'' Adinolfev.United Techs.Corp.,768 F.3d 1161, 1172 (11th Cir.2014). FollowingAdinolfe,theCourtin Melton v.CenturyArms,Inc.denieda m otion to dism issforlack ofstanding where theplaintiffsalleged they suffered dieconom icharm such as overpaym ent,loss ofvalue,or loss ofusefulness em anating from the loss oftheirbenefit ofthe bargain''stem m ing from an alleged m anufacturing defect. 243 F.Supp.3d 1290,1298-99 (S.D.Fla.2017).Andearlierinthislitigation,theCourtrejectedtheveryargumentadvancedby M ercedes and Volkswagen here, ruling that the plaintiffs adequately pleaded an eccmom ic injuryin fact. Previously,Takatamoved to dismissRICO claimsarguing thattheplaintiffsdid notallegeiéanyspecificloss,''andthatçdanylossrelatedtotheintlatordefectgcouldlbealleviated ifa consumeravailged)himselfofa free replacementairbag offered aspartof...gthe)recall arrangement.''InreTakataAirbagProd Liab.Litig.,2015W L 9987659,at*2(S.D.Fla.Dec.2, 2015). The Courtdenied Takata's motion to dismiss on this ground,finding sufficientthe plaintiffs'allegationsthatthey overpaid forvehicles based on m isinformation regarding vehicle safety,they overpaid for airbags w ithin the vehicles,and the vehicles they purchased dim inished in valueafterthepublic learned abouttheairbag defect.1d. Liketheirpredecessors,thePlaintiffshereassertthey suffered economicinjuriesandare entitled to dam agescom prising the valuethey overpaid fortheirvehiclesbased on m isinform ation about vehicle safety, and for the dim inution in value of the vehicles follow ing the negative publicityaboutvehiclesafety.(D.E.2762 at!! 18,20.) Plaintiffsfurtherallegetheysuffered a variety ofothereconomic injuriesincluding out-of-pocketexpensesand costsassociated with taking tim eofffrom work,paying forrcntalcarsorothertransportation arrangem ents,and child care. Id at!36. Finally,each Plaintiffindividuallyallegesthey would nothavepurchased or leasedaclassvehicleiftheyknew abouttheairbagdefect.Seeid at!!39-127. ln short,Plaintiffs'allegationsareidenticalto thosetheCourtpreviously found sufficient. Accordingly,the CourttindsthatPlaintiffs sufficiently allegean economic injuryinfactasto M ercedesand Volkswagen. 2. G eneralM otors GeneralM otors argues Plaintiffs have notestablished they suffered an injury in fact becausethey ûddonot(andcannot)allegeamanifestdefect.'' (D.E.2981at54.) GeneralM otors furtherarguesPlaintiffscannotestablishaneconomicinjuryinfactbecausethePlaintiffsCtwhose vehiclesdid notmanifestadefectgcannotlhavecognizableclaimsbased on allegationsthatthe 12 vehicleshaveadiminished resalevalue.''Id at53. a) M anifestation ofDefect D espite acknow ledging that the Court çspreviously deferred ruling on m anifest defect argumentsuntilthesummaryjudgmentstage,''GeneralMotorsmaintainsthatPlaintiffsiddo not (andcannot)allegeamanifestdefect''andthustseachandeveryplaintiffshouldbedismissed.''1d. at50,54-55. Plaintiffs allege that GeneralM otors çdbegan equipping its vehicles w ith Takata's airbags intheearly2000s''andthat$çga1llTakataairbagsatissueinthislitigationshareacommon,uniform defect: the use of am m onium nitrate, a notoriously volatile and unstable com pound, as the propellantin theirdefectively designed intlators.'' (D.E.2759 at!!6,105.) Plaintiffsfurther allege Takata airbags m ade for G eneralM otors's vehicles nlptured during testing on num erous occasions,seeid.at!!110-11,115-17,andthatGeneralMotorsalso experienced atleastthree tleld ruptures, w hich on one occasion lefl the driver û'com pletely blind in one eye,'' id at!! 119,121. Plaintiffs allege these ruptures,or Esenergetic disassemblies,''involve (dan explosion ofthe inflatorthatcausesthe inflatorto break apartand fire m etalparticulate outofthe airbag.''fJ.at! 110.AflerreviewingtheWhitakerComplaint,theCourtfinds- asitdidwiththe allegationsagainstM ercedesand Volkswagen thatPlaintiffssufficiently allegeinjury in fact w ith respectto GeneralM otors. G eneralM otors m aintains the allegations leveled againstitStare different''from M ercedes and Volkswagen because,assetforth in GeneralM otors'sStpetitionsforlnconsequentiality''filed 13 with NHTSA,S Ssthe Takata airbags in GM T900 vehicles have never nlptured and there is no indication any everwill.'' (D.E.2981at51(emphasisinoriginall.) TheGM T900 Slisaspecific vehicleplatform thatform sthe stnlcturalfoundation fora variety ofGM trucksand sportutility vehicles, including the Chevrolet Silverado 1500, GM C Sierra 1500, Chevrolet Silverado 2500/3500,GM C Sierra2500/3500,ChevroletTahoe,ChevroletSuburban,ChevroletAvalanche, G M C Y ukon,GM C Yukon X L,Cadillac Escalade,Cadillac Escalade ESV ,and CadillacEscalade EX T.''4 G eneralM otors does not,how ever,extend this argum entto the Takata airbags installed in non-GM T900 vehicles such as the ChevroletCruze,a vehicle the Plaintiffs allege suffered at least tw o field intlator ruptures, and w hich left one driver Stcom pletely blind in one eye.'' (D.E.2759at! 121).AndPlaintiffsalsoallegetheChevroletCruzeiskésubjecttocurrentorfuture recalls due to the lnflator D efect,''along w ith several other vehicles m anufactured by G eneral M otors that extend beyond the GM T900 platform ,such as the Buick Lacrosse,Cadillac X TS, G M C Terrain, Saab 9-3, Saturn A stra, and the Chevrolet Cam aro, Equinox, and M alibu. ld at!77. Again,GeneralM otors'sargumentisessentiallythesam em anifestationofdefectargum ent advanced by M azdaearlierin thislitigation. In m oving to dismissa11damagesclaimsforfailure 3 General Motors asks the Court to judicially notice the three Petitions for lnconsequentiality that it fled with NHTSA. For the sam e reasons stated below regarding M ercedes'srequestforjudicialnoticeoftheTakataPleaAgreement,seeinh.a Section I.C.2.a.1, the Courttakesjudicialnotice ofthe factGeneralM otorsfiled PetitionsforInconsequentiality withNHTSA andthatthecontentssay whatthey say;buttheCourtcannotjudiciallynoticethe contentsofthePetitionsfortheirtruth- asto do so would Ssbypassglthesafeguardswhich are involved w ith the usual process of proving facts by com petent evidence in district court,'' Shaharv.Bowers,120F.3d211,214(11th Cir.1997). 4See GeneralM otorsLLC ' sPetitionforInconsequentiality and RequestforDeferralof D eterm ination Regarding Certain Gltff' ppp Vehicles Equipped w ith Takata ''SPI YP ''and ''PSPI- L YD ''PassengerInjlatorsat2,availableathttps://2016-0124-0002(lastvisitedJune20,2019). 14 .regulations.gov/document?D=NHTsA- to allege m anifestation of a defect, M azda em phasized that the plaintiffs alleged isonly one m anifestation ofan InflatorDefectin aM azdavehicle- aDecember31,2014 incidentin a2008 M azda6- and thatvehicleowner(wasjnotanamedplaintiff.''(D.E.608at10.) M azdafurther em phasized thattheplaintiffsfailed to allegeçithatany otherM azdamodel,orany M azdavehicle form odelyears2003-2007 ...everm anifested thealleged defect.''Id The Courtdeclined to dism iss allclaim s fordam ages againstM azda because- regardless of whether ruptures occurred in certain vehicles- plaintiffs' allegations w ere that am m onium nitrate wasinnately unstable' ,so (tlbly definition''thisalleged instability would mean thatthe defective airbags m ightprotectvehicle occupants,orm ay notprotectvehicle occupants atall,or the airbags m ay even create a m ore dangerous situation than having no airbag atal1by expelling m etalshrapnel.In re Takata Airbag Prod.Liab.L itig.,193 F.Supp.3d at 1335. A ssuch,because there w as Sçno w ay to know w hether the airbags at issue w ould perform satisfactorily in an accident,''the Courtrefused to tsrequire an explosion to dem onstrate m anifestation ofa defect.'' Id ;see also Tershakovec,2018 W L 3405245,at*6 (denying motion to dismissbecause dtthe alleged breach of express warranty could have manifested itself when thegl vehicles were assembled,'' and thus Ssthe possibility of encountering (the defectl- as alleged- was not hypothetical,butavirtualcertaintf'l;Inre GeneralMotorsLLC Ignition Switch Litig.,257 F. Supp.3d 372,458 n.30 (S.D.N.Y.2017)(idglltwould be perverse to require gplaintiffjto be involved in an accidentto provethathercarmanifested the defect....'')(citing ln re FJ/CJ/J AirbagProd Liab.Litig.,193F.Supp.34at1335:. Throughoutthis case,the Courthas reapplied this rationale to other defendants seeking dism issalon sim ilar grounds.See,e.g.,In re FJO /J Airbag Prod Liab.Litig.,255 F.Supp.3d 1241,1258 (S.D.Fla.2017)(rejecting Honda'smanifestation ofdefectargumentidgclonsistent 15 withtheCourt'sMazdaOrder'');InreTakataAirbagProd Liab.Litig.,2017W L2406711,at*10 (S.D.Fla.June 1,2017)(same asto Takata);Inre TakataAirbag Prod.Liab.Litig.,2017 W L 775811,at*4 (S.D.Fla.Feb.27,2017)(sameastoFord);InreTakataAirbag Prod.Liab.Litig., 2016W L5848843,at*5(S.D.Fla.Sept.21,2016)(sameastoToyota);InreTakataAirbagprod Liab.Litig,2016W L 6072406,at#10(S.D.Fla.Oct.14,2016)(sameastoBM W ).Andlikea11 the previousplaintiffs,the Plaintiffshere allege thatTakata airbags installed in GeneralM otors's vehicles contain innately unstable am m onium nitrate, and thus create an unreasonable and imminentrisk ofinjury tovehicleoccupants.Seesupra.Accepting theseallegationsastrue,the CourttqndsthatPlaintiffsadequatelypleadinjuryinfact. HoldingasidetheCourt'spriorrulings,thesignificanceofapetition forinconsequentiality that, once granted, a m anufacturer's vehicles and replacem ent equipm ent are Ctexemptgedj...from the F ationalTraffic and M otorVehicleSafetyAct'sjnotice andremedy requirements.''49C.F.R.j556.1.Butfiling apetitiondoesnottsconstituteaconcessionbythe m anufacturer of,nor w illitbe considered relevant to,the existence of a defectrelated to m otor vehiclesafetyoranonconfonnity.''49 C.F.R.j556.44*.Andtodate,theCourtisnotawareof any finalruling by N H TSA on GeneralM otors'sPetitions.So,G eneralM otorsattem ptsto dism iss itselffrom thislitigation on the basisthatoneplaform ofitsvehiclesmightbe clearofrecall obligationsimposedby NHTSA. TheCourtdeclinesto departfrom itspriorrulingson thisbasis. b) Economiclniurv GeneralMotorsalsoassertsthatPlaintiffsfailtoallegeanyeconomicinjuryinfact.Unlike M ercedesandVolkswagen,GeneralM otorsarguesthatthereisnoeconomicinjuryinfactbecause theldplaintiffswhosevehiclesdidnotmanifestadefectgcannotlhavecognizableclaimsbasedon allegationsthatthevehicleshaveadiminishedresalevalue.''(D.E.2981at53.) 16 In support,GeneralM otorsrelieson Cahen v.Toyota M otorCorp.,aNorthern Districtof California case where the plaintiffs soughtdamagesbased on isthe risk offuture harm from the alleged productdefect(thatdefendants'cars gwerel susceptible to hacking by third partiesl.'' 147F.Supp.3d955,966(N.D.Cal.2015).GeneralM otorscorrectlynotesthatCahenfoundthe risk thatSçvehiclesm ightbehacked atsom epointinthefuture''insufficienttoconstitutea(icredible risk of hacking.'' 1d. at 969. But G eneralM otors fails to note that Cahen m ade clear that its analysiswasçknottosaythatafutureriskofharm canneversatisfyinjuryinfactanalysis,''because (sgallthough a speculative futurerisk willnotsuffice,ia credible threatofharm issufficientto constituteactualinjuryforstandingpurposes.''' 1d.at968 (quotingRiva v.Pepsico,Inc.,82 F. Supp.3d 1045,1052 (N.D.Cal.2015)). In findingthattheplaintiffs'risk ofharm allegations lacked credibility,Cahen em phasized thatthe plaintiffs did notallege ûlthatanybody outside ofa controlledenvironmentghadjeverbeenhacked.''ld at969.5 H ere,unlike the alleged risk of future harm in Cahen,the Whitaker Com plaint sets forth numerous allegations ofa universalvehicle defect(Le.the airbags are inherently dangerous because they contain innately unstable ammonium nitrate),which are further supported by numerous alleged instances of GeneralM otors's vehicles experiencing airbag ruptures during testing and in the field. (See D.E.2759 at!!6,110-11,115-17,119, Taking these allegations astrue,the Courtfinds Plaintiffs credibly allege a risk offuture harm sufficientto establishstanding.SeelnreChrysler-Dodge-leep EcodieselM ktg,SalesPractices,tfrProd Liab. 5EventhoughtheplaintiffsinCahen abandonedtheirçsinjuriesfrom therisk ofhacking'' argum enton appeal,theN inth C ircuitstillaffirm ed the districtcourton thispoint,noting thatthe plaintiffs did notallege thatSlany oftheirvehicles (hadj actually been hacked''and thatthe plaintiffsdidnotallegeCsthattheygwerelawareofany vehiclesthatghadjbeen hacked outsideof controlled environm ents.'' Cahen v. Toyota M otor Corp., 717 F. App'x 720, 723 & n.1 (9th Cir.2017). 17 Litig.,295F.Supp.3d 927,950 (N.D.Cal.2018)(noting thatin contrastto the allegationsin Cahens idwhen a complaint includes concrete allegations of a current universal vehicle defect...thoseallegationsplausibly andspecificallysupportanoverpaymenttheory ofinjury'') (emphasisinoriginal).AndasexplainedaboveregardingMercedesandVolkswagen,Plaintiffs' claims foreconom ic dam ages resulting from the dim inution ofvalue caused by the allegedly defective Takata airbags installed in their vehicles,constitute an economic injuryinfact for purposesofstanding.See supra;In re TakataAirbag Prod Liab.Litig.,2015 W L 9987659,at*2; M elton,243 F.Supp.3d at1298-99. Therefore,GeneralM otors'sM otion to Dism issthe Krhitaker Com plaintforlack ofstanding isD EN IED . C. (SFA IRLY TR ACEA BLE'' N ext,M ercedes and V olksw agen advance several argum ents thatthe Plaintiffs have not pleaded thattheirinjuriesareçsfairly traceable''toM ercedes'sand Volkswagen'sactions. Each argum entisaddressed in turn. 1. V olksw aeen Sub-c lass C laim s and A udiSub-class C laim s First, V olkswagen argues the Court should dism iss any claim s asserted against Volkswagen by purchasersorlesseesofAudivehicles,and any claimsasserted againstAudiby purchasers orlessees ofVolkswagen vehicles,on grounds these Plaintiffscazmotestablish their allegedinjuriesareitfairlytraceable''tomanufacturersthattheydidnotpurchaseorleasevehicles from. (D.E.2988 at67-68.) In theirOpposition,Plaintiffsarguetheirallegations thatSCVW America,AudiAG,andAudiAmericaareçwhollyownedsubsidiargiesl'ofVolkswagenAG''and thatVolkswagen and Auditttogetherûengineered,designed,developed,m anufactured orinstalled theDefectiveAirbagsintheVolkswagen-andAudi-branded ClassVehiclesg1andapprovedthe DefectiveAirbagsforuseinthosevehicles''' aresufficienttoconferstanding.(SeeD.E.3034 at93(quotingD.E.2762 at!!26-30).) 18 ln the Eleventh Circuit,'kitiswell-settled thatpriorto the certification ofa class...the districtcourtmustdetenninethatatleastonenam ed classrepresentative hasArticle l1lstanding to raise each class subclaim .'' Prado-steiman ex rel.Prado v.Bush,221 F.3d 1266, 1279 (11th Cir.2000). Thismeanstieach claim mustbe analyzed separately,and aclaim calmotbe assertedon behalfofaclassunlessatleastonenamedplaintiffhassuffered theinjurythatgives risetothatclaim.''Id at1280(quotingGrffinv.Dugger,823F.2d 1476,1483(11th Cir.1987)). Following Prado-steiman,courtsrepeatedly dism iss claims underthe rule thata nam ed plaintiffin aconsum erclassaction ûicannotraiseclaim srelating to thoseotherproductswhich he did notpurchase.'' Tobackv.GNC Holdings,Inc.,2013W L 5206103,at*5(S.D.Fla.Sept.13, 2013)(citing Prado-steiman,221 F.3d at1279-80);see also,e.g.,Garcia v.KashiCo.,43 F. Supp.3d 1359,1394 (S.D.Fla.2014)(same);Holliday v.AlbionLabs.,lnc.,2015W L 10857479, at*5(S.D.Fla.June9,2015)tsamel;Barronv.Snyder' s-Lance,Inc.,2015W L 11182066,at*17 (S.D.Fla.M ar.20,2015)(same);Bohlkev.Shearer' s Foods,LLC,2015 W L 249418,at*3-4 (S.D.Fla.Jan.20,2015)(same). Anothercase,feon r.Cont1AG,301F.Supp.3d 1203 (S,D.Fla.2017),isdirectly on point. ln Leon,the courtdism issed consum erclassaction claim srelating to M ercedes-Benz G LK Classvehiclesthatwerebroughtby plaintiffswho only purchased M ercedes-Benz C Classm odel vehicles even though theplaintiffsallegedboth classesofvehiclesi'contained the samedefect.'' Id at1221-22(skplaintiffshaveArticle1l1standingtobringtheirclaimsagainstM BUSA,withthe exception tp/those claimsadvanced on behalfofowners ofvehiclemodelsthey do notown.'') (emphasisadded). N otably, Leon dism issed claim s against a single defendant concerning products the plaintiffsdid notpurchase,butwhich theplaintiffstried to coupletogetherwith claim slinked to 19 productsthey did purchase. f#. The standing analysishere is lessrigorousbecause standing is defendantspecific.SeeDaimlerchryslerCorp.,547U.S.at342 (notingthattoestablishArticle I11standing,aplaintiffSçmustallegepersonalinjury fairlytraceableto thede# ndant' sallegedly unlawfulconduct....'')(emphasisadded). And here,thePlaintiffsattemptto couple together claimsrelated to productspurchased from fwt?dfferentmanufacturers' ,no lessasserting these claim s against m anufacturers from which they never purchased or leased their vehicle. For exam ple, despite none of the A labam a sub-class Plaintiffs having purchased or leased Volkswagen vehicle (see D.E.2762 at!!55,79,111),this sub-class asserts claims against VolkswagenunderAlabamastatuteandcommon-law,seeid at!!353,376,411.TheCourtfinds the A labam a sub-class Plaintiffs,and the sub-classes that repeat this pleading pattern,Sdcannot conceivably allegeany injuriesfrom productsthat(theylneverpurchased orused.'' Dapeerv. NeutrogenaCorp.,95F.Supp.3d1366,1373(S.D.Fla.2015)(dismissingitallofPlaintiff'sclaims related to unpurchasedproducts''). Therefore,the Audisub-classeslack Article 1IIstanding to bring claim sagainstV olksw agen,and vice versa. W hile Plaintiffsargue there are Stno m aterialdifferencesbetw een the D efective Inflators in AudiClassVehicles and VW Class Vehicles''(D.E.3034 at93),this Slsufficientsimilarity'' argument(thoughrecognized by someout-of-circuitauthority)hasbeenrejectedtimeand again by courts in thisdistrictthathave followed theEleventh Circuit'sruling in Prado-steiman. See OhioStateTroopersAss'n,Inc.r.PointBlankEnterprises,Inc.,347F.Supp.3d 1207,1222(S.D. Fla.2018) (dismissing claims on standing grounds and rejecting plaintiffs' argum ents that defendant's products $da11 contain identical SSB S system s w ith the sam e defect'' because klsimilaritybetweenproductsdoesnotconferstandingintheEleventhCircuit'l;feon,301F.Supp. 3d at 1221-22 (dismissing claims on standing groundsand noting the Sfssufficientsimilarity' 20 argumenthas not been adopted in the Eleventh Circuit');Garcia,43 F.Supp.3d at 1393 (dismissingclaimson standinggroundsandnotingt(anamedplaintiffinaconsumerclassaction lacksstandingtochallengeanon-purchasedproductbecausethereisno injury-in-factasto that product,even ifhepurchasedasubstantiallysimilarproduct.'')(citingToback,2013W L 5206103 at*4-5). ,Bohlke,2015 W L 249418,at*4 (dismissing claimson standing groundsand noting ktsouthern District of Florida courts have declined to apply the dsufficiently sim ilar'test,citing Prado-steiman,andthisCoul'tagreeswiththosewell-reasonedopinions.'')(citationsomitted). Plaintiffsalso argue thatcourtshave ttconsistently certified classesagainstV W represented byclassrepresentativeswithanAudivehicleandviceversa.''(D.E.3034at93.)Butthisargument relies exclusively on non-binding out-of-circuit authority, which is far outweighed by the consensus of authority in the Eleventh Circuit that a nam ed plaintiff in a consum er class action cannotraise claim s relating to products thathe or she did not purchase. See supra. The Court findsno basis to break away from the weightof authority that has rejected the Stsufticient sim ilarity''approach. Finally, because Article 111 standing m ust be established on a claim -by-claim basis, Sldeferring the standing determ ination to the classcertification stage w illyield no differentresult.'' Toback,2013 W L 5206103,at*4. Thus,the CourtdeclinesPlaintiffs'invitation to deferruling onthisstandingobjection. Forthesereasons,M ercedes'sand Volkswagen'sM otion to Dism isstheclaim sbroughtby the purportcd Audisub-classes againstVolkswagen,and the claims brought by the purported Volkswagen sub-classesagainstAudi,is GR ANTED. Accordingly,a11claim sasserted by the Alabam a,M ichigan,and Virginiasub-classesagainstVolkswagen' ,and al1claim sasserted by the 21 Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colmecticut, lndiana, Kentucky, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,and W isconsin sub-classesagainstAudi,areDISM ISSED.6 2. R em aininz ddFairlv Traceable''A rzum ents Next,M ercedesand Volkswagen argue allclaim sshould be dism issed becausePlaintiffs havetsmerely pleadgedlthattheyhavebeen harmed by theriskofrupture''andthatsuch risk is supported only by allegationsrelating i*solely to incidentsin othervehiclesm anufactured by other parties.'' (D.E.2988 at66 (emphasisin originall.) ln supportofthisargument,Mercedesand Volkswagen asktheCourttotakejudicialnoticeoftheTakataPleaAgreement,7whichtheyclaim tddem onstrates that any fraudulent conductpurportedly experienced by Plaintiffs stem m ed from Takata's actions,not Defendants.'' Id A dditionally,M ercedes separately m oves to dism iss a1l claim s against them on grounds they are ûtuniquely situated because Takata sentm ultiple letters providing specific reassurances'' that the Takata inflators in M ercedes's vehicles Sçw ere not defective,''and thus Plaintiffs cannotplead the isfairly traceable''element. (D.E.2982 at4 (emphasisinoriginall.) TheCourtwillfirstaddressM ercedes'sandVolkswagen'srequestforjudicialnotice,and then decide w hetherPlaintiffs sufficiently allege the çsfairly traceable''elem ent. a) TheTakataPleaAzreem ent 6 A s discussed above,supra atn.2,Plaintiffs m ake clear that in the Puhalla Com plaint, Sttvolkswagen'and Svolkswagen Defendants'refersto VW AG,VW Am erica,AudiAG,and AudiAmerica,''(D.E.2762 at!30).Thus,whiletheallegationswithin each countonly referto V olksw agen,the Courtinterprets the Puhalla Com plaint as asserting these counts againstA udi A G and AudiAm erica asw ell. 7SeeRule 11PleaAgreementin Unitedstatesv.TakataCorp.,Case.No.16-20810(E.D. M ich.Jan.13,2018),availableathttps://- . justice.gov/usao-edmi/page/flc/g3o8zl/download (lastvisitedJune20,2019). 22 (1)RequestforJudicialNotice8 M ercedesandVolkswagencontendtheTakataPleaAgreementshouldbcjudiciallynoticed asa publicrecord because Sçasan agreem entbetween thegovenzmentand certain Defendants,the accuracy of such mattercannotbe questioned.'' (D.E.2977 at6-7.) ln theirOpposition to Autom otiveDefendants'RequestforJudicialN otice,Plaintiffsassertitwould bediinappropriate'' totakejudicialnoticeoftheTakataPleaAgreement'scontentsbecause,interalia,thecontentsare heavilydisputedandareunclearasto speciscautomanufacturers'conduct.(D.E.3031at9-12.) MercedesandVolkswagenreplythattheTakataPleaAgreementcontainsûdadjudicativefacts''that relate to the im m ediate parties,w hich cannotbe reasonably disputed because the statem entsw ere madeSiunderoath in acourt-approved documentin supportofga1criminalguilty plea,''and its sourceasacourt-approvedpublicrecordcannotbereasonablyquestioned.(D.E.3099at5-7.) Takingjudicialnoticeoffactsis'kamatterofevidencelaw''andç$ahighlylimitedprocess.'' Shahar,120F.3dat214.çs-lhereasonforthiscautionisthatthetakingofjudicialnoticebypasses the safeguardsw hich are involved w ith the usualprocess ofproving factsby com petentevidence indistrictcourt.''1d UnderFederalRuleofEvidence201(b),theCourtmaytakejudicialnotice of certain factswithoutformalproof,butonly where the factin question is Cénotsubjectto reasonabledispute''becauseitisSsgenerallyknownwithinthetrialcourt'stenitorialjurisdiction,'' or because it (scan be accurately and readily determ ined from sources w hose accuracy cannot reasonablybequestioned.''Fed.R.Evid.201(b). dtlndisputability isaprerequisite''tojudicial 8M ercedes'sand Volkswagen'srequestforjudicialnoticeoftheTakataPleaAgreement appears to com e from the Request for JudicialN otice in Supportof A utom otive D efendants' M otion to D ism iss Recyclers' First A m ended Com plaint, w hich M ercedes and V olksw agen joined.(< %eeD.E.2977at2.) BecauseM ercedesandVolkswagennoteintheirmovingpaperson multipleoccasionsthattheTakataPleaAgreementissubjecttoarequestforjudicialnotice(see D.E.2982at9n.3;D.E.2988at30n.7),theCourtinterpretsthesecitationsasincorporatingby referencetheargumentsin theAutom otiveDefendants'RequestforJudicialNotice. 23 notice. Grayson v.Warden,Comm 'r,Alabama Doc,869 F.3d 1204,1225 (11th Cir.2017) (quoting UnitedStatesv.Jones,29F.3d 1549,1553(11thCir.1994)).iûlfitwerepermissiblefor acourttotakejudicialnoticeofafactmerelybecauseithasbeen foundtobetruein someother action,thedoctrineof(issuepreclusionlwould besuperfluous.'' J#.(quotingJones,29F.3d at 1553)(alterationinoriginal). H ere,the parties heavily dispute the veracity and m eaning ofthe statem ents in the Takata Plea Agreem ent. M ercedes and Volkswagen vigorously argue that Takata's admissions dem onstrate that M ercedes and V olksw agen tiw ere fraudulently induced to purchase allegedly defective airbag intlators from Takata,''because Takata adm itted thatthroughoutthe course ofits business dealingsitSssprovided the (OriginalEquipmentManufacturersjwith materially false, fraudulent, and m isleading test inform ation and data' relating to the airbag intlators.'' (D.E.2982at9(quotingTakataPlcaAgreementatpp.49-50!22;p.53!32).) Plaintiffs strenuously dispute the notion that Takata's adm issions absolve M ercedes and Volksw agen ofany liability. For instance,Plaintiffs focus on the use ofthe tso riginalEquipm ent M anufacturer''language in theTakata Plea A greem entto em phasize thatthe plea agreem entnever mentionsikany oftheDefendantsby namer''and thus'dliltispurespeculation,especially atthis stage,to assumethatM ercedes,VW ,orAudi,orany particularDefendantispartofthisundefined groupofgoriginalEquipmentM anufacturersl.''(D.E.3034at70-71.)Plaintiffscontendthelack ofspecifcityisparticularly troublingbecausetheevidencecollectedto supportthepleaagreem ent is dkunknow n,''and therefore the governm ent çscould have been relying on evidence relating to Takata's dealings w ith otherautom akers.'' 1d.at71. Plaintiffs furtherargue Takata's adm issions in the plea agreementcannotStgo to Defendants'state ofm ind and knowledge,''and accordingly constitute isunreliable hearsay upon hearsay.'' Id 24 No m atterhow reliable the adm issions in the Takata Plea Agreem entare,or whatthe contents mean,prove,ordo notprove,itis clearthe partiesheavily dispute the contents. And because Slgijndisputability is a prerequisite''to judicially noticing facts under Rule 201(b), Grayson,869F.3dat1225(quotingJones,29F.3dat1553),theCourtcannotjudiciallynoticethe TakataPleaAgreement'scontentsfortheirtrtlth.TodosowouldSsbypassllthesafeguardswhich are involved w ith the usual process of proving facts by com petent evidence in district court.'' Shahar, 120 F.3d at214. Consequently,M ercedes's and Volkswagen'sM otion to Dismiss for lackofstanding based on thecontentsoftheTakataPleaAgreem entisDENIED.9 The Courtmay,however,judicially notice apublic record becausea documentfiled in anothercourtistscapable ofaccurate and ready determ ination by resortto sourceswhoseaccuracy cannotreasonablybequestioned.''Navarrov.City ofRivieraBeach,192F.Supp.3d 1353,1364 (S.D.Fla.2016)(quotingBryantv.AvadoBrands,Inc.,187F.3d 1271,1278(11th Cir.1999)). Theeffectofsuchjudicialnoticeislimited,however,andistakençsnotforthetruthofthematters asserted in the otherlitigation,butratherto establish the factofsuch litigation and related filings.'' Jones,29 F.3d at1553 (quoting Lf#erl.pMut.Ins.Co.v.RotchesPorkPackers,Inc.,969 F.2d 1384,1388-89(2dCir.1992)).Followingthisguide,theCourtjudiciallynoticesthefactTakata entered into acourt-approved crim inalplea agreementand thatthecontentssay whatthey say. (2)Plaintiffs'déFairlyTraceable''Allegations Even withoutthe Takata PleaAgreement,M ercedes and Volkswagen m aintain Plaintiffs have notpleaded theirinjuriesareidfairly traceable''to M ercedes'sand Volkswagen'sconduct becausethe PlaintiffsSûm erely plead thatthey have been harm ed by therisk ofrupture''and that 9 M ercedes's Separate M otion to D ism iss reasserts the sam e argum ent concem ing the TakataPleaAgreement.(SeeD.E.2982 at8-10.) TheCourt'srulingapplieswithequalforceto this separate M otion,w hich isthusalso D EN IED on thispoint. 25 such risk is supported only by allegations relating Gçsolely to incidents in other vehicles manufacturedbyotherparties.''(D.E.2988at66(emphasisin originall.) Reviewing the Puhalla Complaint, the Court finds Plaintiffs sufticiently allege their injuriesare difairly traceable''to M ercedes'sand Volkswagen'sconduct. Plaintiffsallege that M ercedesand Volkswagen t'wereintim ately involved in thedesign and testing ofthe airbagsthat containedtheInflatorDefect,''andthattsgpjriortoinstallingtheDefectiveAirbagsintheirvehicles, (Mercedesand Volkswagenjknew orshouldhaveknown ofthelnflatorDefect,becauseTakata inform ed them thattheDefectiveAirbagscontained thevolatile and unstableamm onium nitrate.'' (D.E.2762at!!7,238.) PlaintiffsfurtherallegeMercedesandVolkswagendsconcealedfrom,or failed to notify,Plaintiffs,Class m em bers,and the public ofthe full and com plete nature ofthe lnflator Defect''even though M ercedes and Volkswagen Siwere m ade aware through problem s arising during the design process,testing, ruptures and other adverse events,public reports of rupturesandadverseevents,andregularrecallsstartingnolaterthan2008.''Id at!238. Specific to M ercedes,Plaintiffs allege,inter alia,that M ercedes:ûsregularly audited and reviewedTakata'sm anufacturingprocesses,includingvisitsto,andchecksof,Takata'sfacilities,'' id at! 175, .tkclosely reviewed proposed airbag designsfrom Takata,and employed extensive design and productvalidation processes,''id ;and dEwas aware of Takata's use of am monium nitrate,including allteclmicaldetails ofallegedly phase stabilized amm onium -nitrate inflators, priorto itsapprovaloftheDefective Airbagsforusein MercedesClassVehicles,''id.at! 180. Plaintiffs further allege M ercedes had çlspecific ûconcerns' regarding the perform ance of the D efective Inflatorsprior to approving them foruse in the Class V ehicles,''which included issues w ith tûm odule covertearing,''çtcushion tearing,''and ttthem odule having integrity during and post- deployment.''ld at!!182-83.PlaintiffsalsoallegedtthedefectiveTakataAirbagsfailedtomeet 26 M ercedes'sownrequirementsforapproval,''and allegeseveralinstancesofperform anceissuesto supportthisclaim.Seeid.at!! 183-87.Finally,Plaintiffsallegethatûsgnlotwithstandingrecalls and notices by other manufacturers, and M ercedes's awareness of the risks and/or dangers presented by amm onium -nitrate dependent inflators, M ercedes buried its head in the sand, claimingitdid notbecom eawareoftheissuesrequiringrecallsoftheClassVehicles''until2016. 1d.at! 192. Specific to Volksw agen,Plaintiffs allege Volksw agen Slapproved the airbags for use in its vehicles''even though it isknew not only thatthe airbags used am m onium nitrate propellant,but thatpropellantdegradation could causea lossoftheinflator'sstructuralintegrity.'' 1d.at!8. PlaintiffsfurtherallegeS%gpjersistentqualityproblemsanddisturbingtestresultsprovided further warningto Volkswagen,includinga num berofinflatorscom ing apartduringtesting in 2004,and ruptures during testing in February 2009,''w hich wasSlpunctuated by a rupture in April2009 that led Volksw agen and Takata to directly discuss precisely the failure m echanism s and risks.'' Id at!9.Andasdiscussedabove,PlaintiffsallegeVolkswagenhadidrepeatedqualityissueswith Takata'' including: failed airbag m odules during testing' , reporting a torn airbag to Takata' , experiencing airbag tearing; expressing concern over a flam e that occurred during testing, and apparent cushion nlptures. See supra Section l.B .1.a. Plaintiffs also allege V olksw agen experienced incidents of amm onium -nitrate intlators com ing apart during bonfire testing conducted by Volkswagen,andan inflatorruptureinBrazilduring testingby Volkswagen.Seeid. Finally,Plaintiffs allege St-l-akata also infonned Volkswagen that a greater propellant surface area ...could significantly increase the burn rate and intlator pressurization,to the point of rupture,''and therefore dçvolkswagen ...knew in 2009 and earlier- thatTakata's amm onium - nitratepropellantcouldbesusceptibletolong-term aginganddegradation.''Id at! 167. 27 Theseallegationssuffcientlypleadthattheallegedinjuriesinfact(i.e.theriskofphysical injury,and actualeconomic injuries) are dkfairly traceable''to M ercedes's and Volkswagen's conduct,because M ercedes and Volkswagen knew orshould have known ofthe alleged intlator defect. Even when considering the factTakata pleaded guilty to çtprovidginglthe (Original EquipmentM anufacturersqwithmateriallyfalse,fraudulent,andmisleadingtestinformation and data''relatingtotheairbagintlators(D.E.2982at9(quotingTakataPleaAgreementatpp.49-50 !22;p.53!32)),Plaintiffshavesufficiently allegedM ercedesandVolkswagenhadindependent knowledgeoftherisksposed byinstalling Takataairbagsin theirvehicles.Therefore,M ercedes's and V olksw agen's M otion to Dism iss allclaim s againstthem ,on grounds thatPlaintiffs failto allegethek'fairly traceable''elem entofthefujan standingtest,isDENIED. b) TheTakataLetters Finally,M ercedesseparately m ovesto dism iss a11claim s againstthem on groundsthey are Séuniquely situated because Takata sentm ultiple letters providing specific reassurances''thatthe Takata inflators in M ercedes'svehicles Stw ere notdefective,''and thusPlaintiffscannotplead the Sçfairlytraceable''element.(D.E.2982at4(emphasisinoriginall.) M ercedesfactuallyattacksthe basis for standing by presenting the Courtw ith three letters from Takata. A motiontodismissforlack ofstanding istreated asamotion forlack ofsubject-matter jurisdiction underFederalRuleofCivilProcedure 12(b)(1).Stalley,524F.3d at1232.W herea litigant factually attacks subject-matterjurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1),they challenge dithe existenceofsubjectmatterjurisdictioninfact,irrespectiveofthepleadings.''fawrencev.Dunbar, 919F.2d 1525,1529(11thCir.1990)(quotingMenchacav.ChryslerCreditCorp.,613F.2d507, 511(5th Cir.1980)). In such instances,S'mattersoutside thepleadings,such astestimony and affidavits,areconsidered.''Id Butwhen afactualjurisdictionalchallengeimplicatesthemerits 28 oftheunderlying claim ,then itthe propercourse ofaction forthe districtcourt...isto find that jurisdiction existsand dealwith theobjection asa directattack on themeritsofthe plaintifps case....'' M orrison v.Wwwtzy Corp.,323 F.3d 920,925 (11th Cir.2003)(quoting Garcia r. Copenhaver,Bellt: çrAssocs.,M D.' s,P.A.,104F.3d 1256,1261(11th Cir.1997)). Here,the thrustof M ercedes's standing challenge is thatthey did not installdefective airbags in any oftheir vehicles,w hich is contsrm ed by Takata's correspondence w ith them ,and thus M ercedes did notdefraud any consum ers. ln order words,any purported hanu Plaintiffs suffered iican be traced only to Takata's fraudulent conductr'' and not M ercedes's conduct. (D.E.2982at3.)M ercedes'schallengedirectlyimplicatesthemeritsofthecasebecauseitattacks the Plaintiffs'theory offraud:thatM ercedesw asdtintim ately involved in the design and testing of theairbags''and sothey Slknew ,and certainly shouldhaveknown,thattheTakataairbagsinstalled in millionsofvehiclesweredefective,''andthusMercedesisliableforhavingçsconcealledqtheir know ledge of the nature and cxtentof the defect from the public,w hile continuing to advertise theirproductsassafeandreliable.''(D.E.2762at!!7,17.) Because M ercedes'sSeparate M otion to Dism issimplicatesthe m eritsofPlaintiffs'case, theCourtmusttstreatglthemotionasamotionforsummaryjudgmentunderRule56andrefraingl from deciding disputed factualissues.''M orrison,323 F.3d at925.Defendantsmaintain thethree Takata letters absolve them ofliability. Plaintiffs argue these lettersl'are clearly notthe entire universe ofcommunicationsbetween Takataand M ercedes,''and m aintain thatM ercedesisliable forahostofviolationsoffederalandstatelaw.(D.E.3034at76.) lnamultidistrictlitigationcase spanning severalyearsand entailing volum inousrecords,the Courtfindsitpremature to decide factual issues and dismiss the entire lawsuit against M ercedes on the basis of three letters containing unsworn hearsay statem ents,withoutthe benefitofa fully developed factualrecord. 29 Once that record is developed, the Courtwill entertain the expected m otions fOr Sum m ary judgment. Atthisstage,however,M ercedes'sSeparateM otionto Dismissforlack ofstanding based ontheseTakatalettersisDENIED asprem ature. D. CO N C LU SIO N The CourtfindsPlaintiffs'allegationsestablish Article l1lstanding- exceptwith respect to the claim s brought by the purported A udi sub-classes against V olkswagen, and the claim s broughtby thepurported Volkswagen sub-classesagainstAudi. To beclear,the Court'sanalysis and ntling are limited to the nature ofthe m otion to dism iss stage,where the Courtmusttake Plaintiffs'allegations astrue. M ercedes,Volkswagen,and GeneralM otorswillsurely have the opportunityatsummaryjudgmentortrialtopresentevidenceconcerningtheirknowledgeof,and other causes and factors contributing to, the alleged inflator defects. For now , Plaintiffs sufticiently allege Article 111standing. l1. JUR ISDIC TIO N Recently,the Courtruled theTransferorPlaintiffs'legalactionsCdTransferorActions'') wereSiseparatelegalactions''from theDirect-FilePlaintiffs'legalactions(slDirect-FileActions'). (SeeD.E.3394 at16-19.) TheCourtfurtherexplainedthatfswhen pretrialproceedingsend,the Courtwillsevertorrecommend thatthe gludicialPanelon M ultidistrictLitigationlsever)any remaining claimsasserted by theTransferorPlaintiffs including any claim samended directly in this M D L proceeding.'' Id at19. The Courtfurtherexplained thatthese çilegalactionsw illthen çresumetheirseparateidentities'uponremandtotheappropriatetransferorcourt.''1d.(citingIn reReh-igerantCompressorsAntitrustLitig.,731F.3d 586,592 (6th Cir.2013)). ln thisOrder, then,the Courtwillresolvethepersonaljurisdiction issuesraised by Defendantsby analyzing personaljurisdictionovertheclaimsadvancedintheTransferorActionsseparatelyfrom theclaims advanced in the D irect-File A ctions. 30 The presence of foreign-based defendants adds additionallayersto the Court'spersonal jurisdiction analysis. M ercedes,Volkswagen,and Audi contend the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the foreign-based parent comorations: Daimler Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, and Audi Aktiengesellschaft (collectively, the ksForeign Defendants'). Accordingly,the Courtwilldivide itsanalysisagain,thistim e between the Foreign Defendants, and their dom estic-based subsidiary corporations:FCA ,G eneralM otors,M ercedes-Benz U SA , LLC,Volkswagen Group of America,Inc., and Audi of America, (collectively,the CiDomesticDefendants'').Finally,withintheconfinesofthe TransferorActionsand theDirectFile Actions,the Coul' tm ustalso address- asto both theDomestic Defendantsand the Foreign Defendants two types of personaljurisdiction:iççgeneral' (sometimes called dall-purpose') jurisdiction and Sspecific'(sometimescalled tcase-linked')jurisdiction.'' Bristol-MyersSquibb Co.v.SuperiorCourtofcallornia,SanFranciscoC/y.,137S.Ct.1773,1779-80(2017)(citing GoodyearDunlop TiresOperations,S.A.v.Brown,564U.S.915,919 (2011)). M oving separately, each Defendant seeks to dismiss with prejudice the Amended ConsolidatedClassActionComplaintsunderFederalRuleofCivilProceduze 12(b)(2)forlackof personaljurisdiction.DefendantsarguethattheCourtentirelylacksgeneraljurisdictionunderthe multidistrictlitigation transferprovision,28 U .S.C.Section 1407,because the Plaintiffs directflled the complaints in this m ultidistrict litigation transferee court,and because none of the DefendantsarejurisdictionallyStathome''in Florida.Defendantsthenprofferseveralreasonsthat theCourtentirelylacksspecificjurisdictionoveranyoftheDefendants.First,Defendantsargue thatthe Florida long-arm statute,Fla.Stat.Section48.193,doesnotprovide a basisforspecific jurisdiction over any Defendant because Plaintiffs failto allege sufficientfactualmatter to establish Florida directed conduct by Defendants. Second,Defendants add that because the 31 PlaintiffsfailtostateplausibleRICO claims,thereisnobasistoexercisespecificjurisdictionover the Dom estic D efendants pursuantto the RICO statute'snationw ide service ofprocess provision, 18 U.S.C.Section 1965(d),by way of Federal Rule of CivilProcedure 4(k)(1)(c). Third, Defendantsfurtherarguethatthereisno basisto exercisespecificjurisdiction overtheForeign Defendantspursuantto FederalRule ofCivilProcedure4(k)(2),the federallong-arm statute. Finally,Defendants contend that the Suprem e Court's ruling in Bristol-Myers requires that the Courtdismissa11claim sadvanced by thenon-Floridaputativeclassmem bersforlack ofspecific ' Jurisdiction. In their Om nibus Response,Plaintiffs articulate severalbases for the Courtto exercise personaljurisdiction overDefendants. Specifically,PlaintiffsarguetheCourtcan exercise:(1) generaljurisdiction overthe Domestic Defendantsand specific jurisdiction overthe Foreign DefendantspursuanttotheCourt'sauthorityasan MDL transfereecourtunderSection 1407;(2) specific jurisdiction over al1 Defendants under the Florida long-ann statute; (3) specific jurisdictionovertheRICO claimsassertedagainsttheDomesticDefendantspursuanttotheRICO statute's nationwide service of process provision;(4)specific jurisdiction over the Foreign DefendantspursuanttoFederalRuleofCivilProcedure4(k)(2),thenationallong-arm statute' ,and (5) pendent personaljurisdiction over a1lremaining federal,state,and common-law claims. Plaintiffs also assertthe Court'sexercise ofspecificjurisdiction overany ofthe non-Florida putativeclassmem bers'claim sagainstanyoftheDefendantsisnotprecluded byBristol-Myers. Before diving into the thorny long-arm statute analyses,the Courtw ill quickly resolve M ercedes'sandVolkswagen'ssubject-matterjurisdictionchallenge,andtheparties'disputeover the role ofBristol-M yers. PRIM A R Y JUR ISD ICTIO N A ND PR EEM PTIO N 32 M ercedes and Volkswagen argue the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs'requestsforinjunctivereliefon groundsthisreliefshouldbedeniedaspreempted by the NationalTraffic and MotorVehicle Safety Act,oraltematively,subject to the primary jurisdiction of the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration's (CCNHTSA'') authoritytoapprove,administer,andsuperviserecalls.(D.E.2988at85-87.) Plaintiffsrespond thatthey çtagree notto seek recall-related injunctive reliefthatwould interferewith NHTSA'S rcoordinatedRemedyOrder.l''(D.E.3034 at179.) Accordingly,M ercedes'sandVolkswagen's contention ismoot.SeeInreTakataAirbag Prod Liab.Litig.,2015W L 12641693,at*3 (S.D. Fla.Sept.21,2015)(denyingmotiontostaythecasebasedontheprimaryjurisdictionofNHTSA wheretheplaintiffsagreednotto seek recall-related injunctiverelieg. Notwithstanding,tothe extentPlaintiffsseekinjunctivereliefgoingforwardthatwillCtundulyanddirectlyinterferewith N H TSA 'S investigatory and regulatory functions,'' or interfere w ith N H TSA 'S Coordinated Rem edy Order,theCourtcan addressthisissueatthattime.See JJ Accordingly,M ercedes'sand V olksw agen'sM otion to D ism isson these groundsisD ENIED . B. R O LE O F BRISTOL-M YERS D efendants argue thatthe Suprem e Court'sdecision in Bristol-M yers requiresthe Courtto dism iss a1lclaim s advanced by the non-Floridalo putative class m em bers. In Bristol-M yers,a group ofplaintiffs consisting of86Californiaresidentsand592 residentsfrom 33 otherStates 10The Coul' tnotesthatwhile Defendants'Bristol-Myers contentionsare lim ited to nonFloridaputativeclassmem bers,theseargumentstargetedthecomplaintsthatweredirect-filedhere in Florida. Furtherm ore,Defendants'argum ents were advanced before the Courtclarified the relationship betweentheDirect-FileComplaintsandtheTransferorCom plaints.SincetheCourt's priororderestablishedthatthere are separatelegalactions(Le.theDirect-FileActionsand the TransferorActions),theCourt'sanalysiswillconstruetheDefendants'Bristol-Myersarguments asalso precluding theexerciseofspecificjurisdiction by thetransferorcourtsoverthe claims advanced by the TransferorPlaintiffswho are notresidentsofthe statesw here those actionsw ere filed. 33 filedeightseparatesuitsasamass-tortactioninCaliforniastatecourt,alleginginjuriescausedby the pharmaceutical drug Plavix, which was manufactured by Bristol-M yers Squibb,a nonCalifornia resident. 137 S.Ct.at1777-78,TheSupremc Coul'truledthatforthe Californiastate courttoexercisepersonaljurisdictionoverthenonresidentdefendant,idtheremustbean (affliation betweentheforum andtheunderlyingcontroversy,principally,ganlactivityoranoccurrencethat takesplacein theforum State.''' Id at1780 (quoting Goodyear,564 U.S.at919)(alterationin original). The SupremeCourtfurtherexplained thatSsltlhemere factthatotherplaintiffswere prescribed,obtained,and ingested gthe drug)in California and allegedly sustained the same injuriesasdidthenonresidents doesnotallow the Stateto assertspecificjurisdictionoverthe nonresidents'claims.''1d.at1781(emphasisin original;alterationadded). A pplying Bristol-M yers,D efendantsargue the non-lzloridaputative classm em bers'claim s mustbe dismissed because they are premised on alleged injuriessustained entirely outside of Florida,andarebasedonallegedconductthatdidnottakeplaceinFlorida.(SeeD.E.2981at29- 32;D.E.2983at34-35;D.E.2988at44-46.) Plaintiffsdisagreeand arguethatçinotonesource of this Court's authority to exercise personaljurisdiction over Defendants is affected by the Supreme Court'sdecision in Bristol-Myers.'' (D.E.3034 at63.) Specifically,Plaintiffsargue Bristol-Myers is limited to state courtlitigation,does notapply in the contextof the (sunique jurisdiction ofa federalgmultidistrictlitigation transfereej courq''and in any event,doesnot precludeexercisingpendentpersonaljurisdiction.161at63-65. The Courtagreeswith Plaintiffs,and isttpersuaded by the growing body of1aw am ongst district courts in this Circuit holding that Bristol-Myers does not bar claim s of non-resident mem bersofaputative classfrom asserting claimsin federalcourt....'' Lee v.Branch Banking (f'Fr.Co.,2018W L 5633995,at*6(S.D.Fla.Oct.31,2018)(denyingmotiontodismissclaims 34 bynortresidentputativeclassmembersunderBristol-Myers4;seealsoBeckerv.HBN Media,Inc., 314F.Supp.3d 1342,1345(S.D.Fla.2018)(same);Feldmanv.BRP US,Inc.,2018W L 8300534, at*5-6 (S.D.Fla.M ar.28,2018)(same);seealso Goodman v.Sun Tan Cf/z,LLC.,2018 W L 6978695,at*4-5(S.D.Fla.Dec.14,2018)(recommending same),reportand recommendation adopted,2019W L 1112258(S.D.Fla.Jan.8,2019). A s Plaintiffs pointout,the Suprem e Courtm ade clearthatBristol-M yers applied Eûsettled principles gofl specific jurisdictionr''and critically was limited to state courts exercising personaljurisdictionovernonresidentdefendants:Stgolurdecisionconcernsthedueprocesslimits on the exerciseofspecificjurisdiction bya State,weleaveopen the question whethertheFifth Amendmentimposesthe same restrictionson theexercise ofpersonaljurisdiction by a federal court.''Id at1781,83-84 (citing OmniCapital1nt'l,Ltd v.RudolfI' Fb/f/'' Co.,Ltd,484 U.S. 97,102,n.5(1987)).lndeed,severalcourtsinthisdistricthavereliedonthisexplicitlimitationin decliningtoapplyBristol-Myerstofederalcourtsexercisingjurisdictionoverclaimsadvancedby non-Florida residents. See,e.g.,Becker,314 F.Supp.3d at 1345;fee,2018 W L 5633995,at*6; Goodm an,2018 W L 6978695,at *4,report and recom mendation adopteds2019 W L 1112258. The Court agrees w ith these w ell-reasoned opinions, and finds that because the federalism concerns thatdrove the Bristol-Myers decision are notpresentin this case,there is no basis to dism issanyclaimsadvanced by thenon-Floridaputativeclassmem bers. There are additional reasons that Bristol-M yers does not require dismissal of claim s advanced by thenon-Floridaputative classm embers. Bristol-Myerswasam assaction products liabilitycase notaclassaction case which isadçmeaningfuldifferencegl''thathasttpersuaded otherdistrictcourtsto rejecteffortsto expand ïBristol-Myersjtothecontextofnationwideclass actions,''Feldman,2018W L 8300534,at*5 (citationsomitted). GeneralM otorsmaintainsthat 35 Bristol-Myersappliesequally tomassaction and putativeclassactions. (D.E.2981at30.) But thisargumenthasbeen soundlyrejectedbyaplethoraoffederaldistrictcourts,whichhaveruled thatBristol-M yersdoesnotapply in theclassaction context. See,e.g.,Sanchezv.Launch Tech. WorkforceSols.,LLC,297F.Supp.3d 1360,1369 (N.D.Ga.2018)Ckln sum,theundersigned concludesthat...Bristol-M yers sim ply reaffirm scontrolling due-process 1aw and doesnotapply to federalclassactions....'');Molock v.Whole Foods al#/c/.,Inc.,297 F.Supp.3d 114,127 (D.D.C.2018)(stg-flhecourtjoinstheothercourtsthathaveconcludedthatBristol-Myersdoesnot require a coul'tto assess personaljurisdiction with regard to a11non-residentputative class members.');TicklingKeys,Inc.v.TransamericaFin.Advisors,Inc.,305F.Supp.3d 1342,1351 (M .D.Fla.2018)($1gT)heCourtdeclinestoextendBristol-Myerstotheclassactioncontext.');In reChinese-M anufacturedDryvvallProd.Liab.Litig.,2017W L 5971622,at*16(E.D.La.Nov. 30,2017)(Clgfrg/tp/-M yers)doesnotspeak to oralterclassactionjurisprudence.'');FitzhenryRussellv.Dr.PepperSnapple Grp.,lnc.,2017 W L 4224723,at*5 (N.D.Cal.Sept.22,2017) ($$gT)heCourtisnotpersuadedtoextendBristol-Myerstotheclassactioncontextonthesefacts.''); see also Becker,314 F.Supp.3d at 1345;fee,2018 W L 5633995,at*6;Feldman,2018 W L 8300534,at*5-6;Goodm an,2018 W L 6978695,at*5,reportandrecomm endation adopted,2019 W L 1l12258. These district courts have explained that in contrast to m ass-tort actions- where iseach plaintiffisarealparty in interestto the complaints,m eaningthatthey werenamed asplaintiffsin the com plaints'' in putative classactions,Stone orm ore plaintiffsseek to representthe restofthe sim ilarly situated plaintiffs,andtheSnamedplaintiffs'aretheonly plaintiffsactually nam ed in the complaint.''Becker,314 F.Supp.3dat1345(quotingFitzhenry-Russell,2017 W L 4224723,at *5). lndeed,çigtjheclassaction is tan exception totheusualrulethatlitigation isconductedby 36 and on behalfofthe individualnamed parties only.''' Wal-M artStores,Inc.v.Dukes,564 U .S. 338,348 (2011)(quoting Calfano v.Yamasaki,442 U.S.682,700--01(1979)). Consequently, unlike in am ass-tortaction,lifora caseto qualify forclassaction treatm ent,itneedsto meetthe additionaldueprocessstandardsforclasscertification underRulez3- num erosity,comm onality, typicality,adequacy ofrepresentation,predom inanceand superiority.'' M olock,297 F.Supp.3d at126-27(quotingInreChinese-ManufacturedDrywall,2017W L 5971622,at*14).lnlightof these'dadditionalelementsofaclassaction gwhichlsupplydueprocesssafeguardsnotapplicable in the m asstol'tcontext,''severalfederaldistrictcourts have held thatBristol-Myers çsdoes not require a courtto assess personaljurisdiction with regard to a1lnon-residentputative class m em bers.'' Id ;see also supra. A s a corollary,then,Bristol-M yers does not require federal courts to analyze personal jurisdictionastotheclaimsadvancedbya11thenon-Floridaputativeclassmembersthathavebeen consolidated in M DL proceedings.SeelnreChinese-Manufactured DrywallProd Liab.Litig, 2017 W L 5971622,at*20(i*LBristol-Myersjisaboutlimitingastatecourt'sjurisdictionwhen it tried to reachout-of-statedefendantson behalfofout-of-stateplaintiffsin amassaction suit.That scenario is inapplicable to nationw ide class actions in federalcourt,such asthe cases before this M DL Court.''). And imposing such a requirementwould turn-upside down the multidistrict litigationstatute'sgoalofpromotingtheEiconvenienceofpartiesandwitnesses''andtheSjustand efficientconduct''ofconsolidatedactions.28U.S.C.j1407(a). M ercedes and Volkswagen argue Bristol-Myers precludes the Courtfrom exercising pendentpersonaljurisdictionoverthenon-Floridaputativeclassmembers'claims.(D.E.2988at 45n.19.) ButthisargumenttliesinthefaceofseveralrulingsthatBristol-Myersdoesnotpcrse preclude federalcourtsfrom exercising pendentpersonaljurisdiction Overclaimsadvanced by 37 nonresidentplaintiffs.See,e.g.,Sloan v.GeneralMotorsLLC,287F.Supp.3d 840,862 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (exercising pendent personaljurisdiction over claims advanced by nomesident plaintiffsin lightoftheisabsenceofinterstatesovereigntyconcernspresentinBristol-Myerstt);In re Packaged Seafood Prod AntitrustLitig.,338 F.Supp.3d 1118,1172-73 (S.D.Cal.2018) (rejecting argumentthatpendentpersonaljurisdiction doctrine did notsurvive Bristol-Myersl; Allen v.ConAgra Foods,lnc.,2018 W L 6460451,at*4 (N.D.Cal.Dec.10,2018)(exercising pendentpersonaljurisdiction overclaimsbroughtby nonresidentplaintiffsand noting BristolMyers did notapply becauseççthe Suprem eCourtcouldnothaveintended to severely narrow the forum choicesavailabletoclassactionplaintiffswhen itdecidedacaseinvolvingamassaction'') (emphasisin original).And theonly authority M ercedesandVolkswagenrely on in supportof their argument- Greerlc v.M izuho Bank Ltd ,289 F.Supp.3d 870,875 (N.D.111.2017) is inappositc because the plaintiffs there brought iéonly state law claims,''id at 871,and thus, importantly,therewereno federalclaimsprovidingabasisforpersonaljurisdictionpursuanttoa nationw ide service ofprocessprovision,see Azalp LLC v.Silverstein,2015 W L 12711232,at*5 (S.D.Fla.Aug.17,2015)(noting the doctrineofpendentpersonaljurisdiction arisesSswhere a federalstatute authorizesnationwide service ofprocess and the federaland state claim s dderive from acommonnucleusofoperativefacts'....'')(quotingKochv.RoyalWineMerchants,Ltd., 847F.Supp.2d 1370,1374(S.D.Fla.2012)). In short,Bristol-M yers does notper se preclude this Court,orthe transferor courts,from exercising specificjurisdiction orpendentpersonaljurisdiction overclaims advanced by the nonresidentputativeclassmembers. Therefore,Defendants'M otionsto Dismissclaim sasserted by the nonresidentputative classm em bersunderBristol-M yers are DEN IED . 38 TheCourtwillnow turntothecorejurisdictionissuesin dispute theexerciseofgeneral and specificjurisdiction overtheForeignand DomesticDefendantsastotheclaimsadvanced in thc Transferorand Direct-FileActions. GEN EM L PER SO NA L JUR ISDICT IO N 1. D om estic D efendants For dom estic based corporations, the dsparadigm forum '' for the exercise of general jurisdiction isSsonein whichthecorporaticm isfairlyregardedasathome.''Bristol-Myers,137S. Ct.at 1780 (quoting Goodyear,564 U.S.at924). This includes dtthe corporation'splace of incom oration and itsprincipalplace ofbusiness.'' BNSF Ry.Co.v.Tyrrell,137 S.Ct.1549,1558 (2017)(citingDaimlerAG v.Bauman,571U.S.l17,137(2014);Goodyear,564U.S.at924). Generally,once a com plaintis filed,the Courtdeterm inesw hetheritcan exercise general jurisdictionovertheassertedclaims.Butinmultidistrictlitigationcases,itiswellestablishedthat çûltlransfersunderSection 1407 are simply notencumbered by considerationsofin personam jurisdictionandvenue.''InreAgentOrangeProd.Liab.Litig.,818F.2d 145,163(2dCir.1987) (quoting In re FMC Corp.PatentLitig.,422 F.Supp.1163,1165 (J.P.M .L.1976:. lnstead, following transferunderSection 1407,Slthetransfereejudgehasa11thejurisdiction and powers overpretrialproceedingsintheactionstransferredtohim thatthetransferorjudgewouldhavehad in theabsenceoftransfer.'' 1d.;seealso InreAuto.Rehnishing PaintAntitrustLitig.,358F.3d 288,297 n.11(3d Cir.2004)(i1Ascorrectlyconcluded bytheDistrictCourt,thetransfereecourt can exercise personal jurisdiction to the same extent that thc transferor court cou1d.''). Accordingly,forthe TransferorActions,the Courtm ustdeterm inewhetherthetransferordistrict courtshadgeneraljurisdiction overthecorresponding DomesticDefendants;and fortheDirectFile Actions,the Courtmustdeterminc whethcr itcan cxercise gcncraljurisdiction ovcrthe Dom estic Defendants. 39 a) TransferorActions Plaintiffsallege,andtheDomesticDefendantsagree(orotherwisedonotcontest)thatthe Transferor Com plaints w ere filed in states where the D om estic D efendants are incorporated or hold their principalplaces of business. For instance,the D winnells and Brugaletta Com plaints w ere filed in the Eastern D istrict of M ichigan, and Plaintiffs allege in the Boyd and W hitaker Com plaints- and FCA and G eneral M otors agree- that FCA and General M otors keep their principalplacesofbusinessin Michigan.(SeeD.E.2758at!27;D.E.2983at11-12;D.E.2759 at!28;D.E.2981 at29.) Next,theM aestriComplaintwasfiled in the Northern Districtof Georgia,the M cBride Complaintwastiled in the Eastern DistrictofVirginia,and the Krmpotic andA lters Com plaintsw ere filed in the D istrictofN ew Jersey.A nd Plaintiffsallege in thePuhalla Com plaint- and the Dom esticDefendants do notcontest- thatM ercedes-Benz USA,LLC kept itsprincipalplaceofbusinessinNew Jerseyuntil2015(atwhichtimeitmovedtoGeorgia),that V olkswagen Group of Am erica is incorporated in N ew Jersey and keeps its principalplace of business in Virginia, and that A udi of A m erica, LLC keeps its principal place of business in Virginia.(SeeD.E.2762at!!27,29,33;D.E.2988at21,38.) Therefore,because the TransferorCom plaints were filed w here each respective D om estic Defendantisjurisdictionally liathome,''the Courtfindsthateach transferorcourtcan exercise generaljurisdiction over the appropriate Domestic Defendants. Consequently,as an M DL transfereecourt,thisCourtcan exercisegeneraljurisdiction overtheDomesticDefendantsasto theTransferorActions. SeeIn reAgentOrangeProd Liab.Litig.,818 F.2d at 163, *In reAuto. RehnishingPaintAndtrustLitig.,358F.3dat297n.11. b) Direct-FileActions lt naturally follows from the preceding analysis that the Courtcannot exercise general 40 jurisdiction overtheDomestic Defendantsasto the Direct-File Actionsbecause none ofthese Defendants are incop orated orhold theirprincipalplacesofbusinessin Florida. SeeBNSF Ry. Co.,137S.Ct.at1558(6çTheSparadigm'forumsinwhich acorporatedefendantisçathome,'we explained,arethecorporation'splaceofincoporation anditsprincipalplaceofbusiness.'').And Plaintiffs do notargue otherw ise. There are,however,Sçexceptionalcaselsj''where a corporate defendant's operationsin anotherforum Sûm ay be so substantialand ofsuch a nature asto renderthe corporation athom e in thatState.''fJ.at1558(quotingDaimlerAG,571U.S.at139 n.19).Butthisisnotoneofthose exceptionalcases.Seeid.(citingPerkinsv.BenguetConsol.M ining Co.,342U.S.437,447-48 (1952)asan exceptionalcircumstancebecausewarforced thedefendantcorporation'sownerto tem porarily relocate the enterprise from the Philippines to Ohio,which then becam e the center of thecorporation'swalimeactivities).Again,Plaintiffsdonotargueotherwise. Therefore,theCourtcannotexercisegeneraljurisdiction overtheDomesticDefendantsas to the D irect-File A ctions. A sa result,the Courtm ustfind thatitcan exercise ifspecific''orçicase- linked''jurisdictionoverthem. 2. Foreizn D efendants- Transferor and D irect-File A ctions To exercisegeneraljurisdiction overtheForeign Defendants,theCourtmustdetermine theiraffiliationswith theUnited StatesareStso çcontinuousand systematic'asto rendergtheml essentiallyathome''intheUnitedStates.DaimlerAG,571U.S.at127(quotingGoodyear,564 U.S.at191). Regarding the Foreign Defendants,Plaintiffs argue thatçdthe transferor courts,and by extension thisCourt,may exercisespecificjurisdiction,ascontrasted with generaljurisdiction, overPlaintiffs'claims.'' (D.E.3034at52.) Thus,PlaintiffsconcedethatneitherthisCourt,nor 41 thetransferorcourts,can exercise generaljurisdiction overtheForeign Defendants. The Court agrees with the Plaintiffs. Consequently,the Courtm ustfind thatit,and the transferorcourts,can exercise isspecific''orlscase-linked''l 'urisdiction overthe Foreign Defcndants. 3. C onclusion Fortheforegoing reasons,theCourtcan exercisegeneraljurisdiction overtheDomestic Defendants as to the Transferor Actions;butitcamaotexercise generaljurisdiction overthe D om esticD efendantsasto the D irect-File Actions,oroverthe Foreign D efendants asto eitherthe Transferor orD irect-File A ctions. N ow ,the Courtw illaddress whether it can exercise specific J'urisdiction. D. SPE CIFIC PER SO NA L JU RISDIC TION W here a districtcourtdoesnotconductan evidentiary hearing on the question ofpersonal jurisdiction,theburdenisonthePlaintiffsto establishaprimafaciecaseofpersonaljurisdiction overthe nonresidentD efendants. See Consol.D ev.Corp.v.Sherritt,Inc.,216 F.3d 1286,1291 (11thCir.2000)(citingM adara v.Hall,916 F.2d 1510,1514 (11th Cir.1990)). A primafacie caseofpersonaljurisdiction isestablished ifPlaintiffspresentksenough evidencetowithstand a m otion fordirected verdict.''1d.TheCourtmustacceptallegationsastnle,to theextentthatthey arcuncontrovertedbytheDefendants'affidavitsand depositions,and mustconstrueallreasonable inferencesin favorofthePlaintiffs. Id The Courtcan exercise speciticjurisdiction overa norlresidentdomestic defendantif authorized by a state long-arm statute ora federalstatute.See Courboin r.Scott,596 F.App'x 729,732 (11th Cir.2014).W henanalyzingamotiontodismissforlack ofpersonaljurisdiction underRule 12(b)(2),the Courtmustitfirstdeterminewhetherthe applicable statutepotentially confersjurisdiction overthedefendant,and then detenninewhetherthe exerciseofjurisdiction compol'tswithdueprocess.''Republicofpanama v.BcclHoldings(Luxembourg)S.A.,119F.3d 42 935,942(11thCir.1997)(citingSunBank,1 W.,v.E.F Hutton drCo.,Inc.,926F.2d 1030,1033 (11th Cir.1991);Go-video,Inc.v.AkaiElec.Co.,Ltd.,885F.2d 1406,1413 (9th Cir.1989)). Thus,the Coul'tm ustdeterm inew hetherthereisastatutory and a constitutionalbasisforexercising specificjurisdictionovereachnonresidentDefendant. 1. D om estic D efendantsin D irect-File A ctions PlaintiffsarguethisCourtcanexercisespecificjurisdictionovertheDomesticDefendants underthe Floridalong-arm statute,oralternatively underthe RICO statute'snationwideserviceof processprovision.Defendantscontesttheexerciseofspecificjurisdictiononbothofthesebases. a) FloridaLonz-Arm Statute PlaintiffsarguetheFloridalong-arm statutegivesthisCourtspecificjurisdiction because thecausesofaction arisefrom theDomesticDefendants:(1)Stgolperating,conducting,engaging in,orcarrying on abusinessorbusinessventurein Floridaqorhaving an office oragency in Floridal'';or(2)Stlcjomittingatortiousactwithin Floridal.''(D.E.3034at55(quotingFla.Stat. j48.193(1)(a)(1)-(2).) FCA,Mercedes,and Volkswagen challenge the exercise ofspecific jurisdiction underthe Florida long-ann statute with respectto a1lthe Plaintiffs'claims. (See D.E.2983at30-34;D.E.2988at38-41.) GeneralMotors,ontheotherhand,onlychallengesthe exerciseofspecificjurisdictionoverthcnon-FloridaPlaintiffs'claims.(SeeD.E.2981at28-32.) To establish a defendantis çicarrying on business''under Section48.193(1)(a)(1),the activitiesoftheD efendantsttm ustbeconsidered collectively and show a generalcourse ofbusiness activity in the stateforpecuniary benefit.''Hard Candy,LLC v.Hard Candy Fitness,LLC,106 F. Supp.3d 1231,1239(S.D.Fla.2015)(quotingFutureTech.Today,Inc.v.OSF HealthcareSyl., 218F.3d 1247,1249(11thCir.2000)).Relevantfactorsinthisanalysisincludeidthepresenceand operation ofanoflicein Florida ...,thepossession andm aintenanceofalicensetodo businessin 43 Florida...,thenumberofFloridaclientsserved...,andthepercentageofoverallrevenuegleaned from Floridaclients.''Id (quotingHorizonAggressiveGrowth,L.P.v.Rothstein-Kass,P.A.,421 F.3d 1162,1167 (11th Cir.2005:. Otherrelevantfactorsare the Defendants'marketing and advertisinginFlorida.1d.(citingCarmeldrCo.v.Silverfsh,LLC,2013W L 1177857,at*3(S.D. Fla. M ar. 21, 2013)). To establish defendant committed tdtortious act'' under Section48.193(1)(a)(2),aplaintiffmustallegefactualmattershowingtheDefendants'actscaused injurywithinFlorida---eveniftheDefendantscommittedtheactoutsidethestate.Id (citingfouis VuittonMalletier,S.A.v.Mosseri,736F.3d 1339,1353n.9(11thCir.2013:. lm portantly,the Florida long-arm statute Ssm ust be strictly construed''and Ssany doubts about applicability of the statute must be resolved in favor of the defendant and against a conclusionthatpersonaljurisdiction exists.''Kestonv.Firstcollect,Inc.,523 F.Supp.2d 1348, 1352 n.2 (S,D.Fla.2007)(quoting Gadea r.StarCruises,Ltd ,949So.2:11143,1150 (F1a.3d DCA 2007)(citingSeabrav.1nt1SpecialtyImp.,Inc.,869So.2d732,733(Fla.4thDCA 2004))). Here,evenwhenacceptedastrue,Plaintiffs'allegationsfailtoestablishaprîmafaciecase of specifcjurisdiction underthe Florida long-arm statute. Plaintiffs'ktexplicitjurisdictional allegations''(D.E.3034 at58),arethat,collectively,theDomesticandForeignDefendants: gclonductsubstantialbusinessinthisDistrict;someoftheactionsgivingrisetothe Complainttook place in thisDistrict' ,and some ofPlaintiffs'claims arise outof D efendants operating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a business or businessventure in thisstate orhaving an oftice oragency in thisstate,com m itting atortiousactinthisstate,andcausinginjurytopropertyinthisstatearisingoutof Defendants'actsand om issionsoutsidethisstate;and atoraboutthetime ofsuch injuriesDefendantswere engaged in solicitation orservice activitieswithin this state,or products,m aterials,or things processed,serviced,or m anufactured by Defendants anywhere were used or consum ed within this state in the ordinary courseofcommerce,trade,oruse.ThisCourtalsohaspersonaljurisdiction over Defendantsbecausethey consentedtojurisdictionby registeringtodobusinessin Florida. ThisCourthaspendgelntorsupplementalpersonaljurisdiction overthe claim sofnon-FloridaPlaintiffs. 44 (SeeD.E.2762 at!22;seealsoD.E.2758at!23;D.E.2759at!24.) Looking to allegationsleveled againstspecific D om estic D efendants,Plaintiffs allege that General M otors t'designlsl, buildgsj, and sellls) cars, trucks, crossovers and automobilegsl...worldwide''throughaStdealernetworktoretailcustomers.''(D.E.2759at!30.) Plaintiffsthen allege V olkswagen Group ofA m erica asçda w holly-owned U .S.subsidiary''ofits G erm an based parentcorporation Volksw agen AktiengesellschaA- dsengagesin businessactivities in furtherance of the interest of' Volksw agen A ktiengesellschafl, including dcthe advertising, marketingandsaleofVolkswagenautomobilesworldwide.''(D.E.2762at!27.) Plaintiffsassert that Audi of Am erica,LLC- as a çsw holly-ow ned U .S.subsidiary of'its Germ an based parent corporation A udiA ktiengesellschaft Sçengages in business,including the advertising,m arketing andsaleofAudiautomobiles,in al150states.''1(1at!29.Next,PlaintiffsallegethatM ercedesBenz USA, LLC colleciively with its German based ûsparent corporation'' Daimler AG Ssengineered, designed, developed, m anufactured, or installed the D efective Airbags in the M ercedes-branded ClassV ehicles,and approved the D efective A irbagsforuse in those vehicles,'' and also itdeveloped,reviewed,and approved them arketing and advertising campaignsdesigned toselltheseClassVehicles.''ld at!33.Plaintiffsdonotassertanyanalogousallegationsagainst FCA.(SeeD.E.2758at!27.) N one ofthese allegations specify or establish any Slgeneralcourse of businessactivity''in Florida çkforpecuniary benefit.'' Hard Candy,LLC,106 F.Supp.3d at1239 (quoting Future Tech.,218F.3d at1249). Nordo anyoftheseallegationsspecifyorestablish Sçthepresenceand operation ofan office in Florida,''çsthe possession and m aintenance ofa license to do business in Florida,''Slthe num ber of Florida clients served,''or içthe percentage of overallrevenue gleaned from Floridaclients.''Id (quotingHorizonAggressiveGrowth,L.P.,421F.3d at1167). 45 Plaintiffsdirectthe Courtto severalallegationsregarding the advertising and marketing of theDomesticDefendants'vehiclesthatwerepurchasedby FloridaPlaintiffs.(SeeD,E.3034at 55;seealsoD.E,2762at!!47,52,73,8l,86,90,108,114-15,118-19,220-221.) Specifically, PlaintiffsallegetheFloridaPlaintiffstsviewed orheard comm ercialstluoughtelevision and radio'' orfsconducted extensive internetresearch on and read m agazine articles aboutthe quality,safety, and durability''ofthe D om estic Defendants'vehicles. Butthese allegations do noteven identify the Dom estic Defendantsasthe source orproducers ofthe advertisementsseen orheard by the FloridaPlaintiffs letalonethattheadvertisem entswereseen orheard in Floridaorweredirected tow ard Florida citizens. The vaguely alleged connection betw een the advertisem ents and the FloridaPlaintiffsarefurtherhighlighted by severalallegationsthatdsspecific''representationswere made in variousmarketingmaterialsin brochuresSsdistributedatdealerships''(seeD.E.2762 at !!220(a)-(g),221(e)-(g)),andsetforthinçdpressreleasegsl''ontheDefendants'ktwebsitegsj,''see /t@ at!!221(a)-(d). ln short,Plaintiffs'allegations,even taken astrue,failto establish the D om estic D efendants directed theiradvertising and m arketing ofthe allegedly defective vehicles tow ard the Florida Plaintiffs. ln addition,Plaintiffsdirectthe Courtto severalallegationsthatcertain Plaintiffspurchased orleascd theirvehiclesin Floridafrom theDomesticDefendants.(SeeD.E.3034 at55-56;see alsoD.E.2762at!!47,52,73,81,86,90,108,114,118-19,123.) ButnoneOfthcseallegations establish thatthePlaintiffspurchased orleased theirvehiclesfrom authorized dealerships,orthat the dealerships were acting as agents ofthe Dom estic Defendants. See id. Atbest,Plaintiffs allege again conclusorily,and in the limited context of certain state 1aw implied warranty claims theyhadûssufficientdirectdealingswith eitherDefendantsoritsagents(dealerships)to establish privity ofcontract.'' (See,e.g.,D.E.2762 at!!344,701.) These allegationscannot 46 establish an agency relationship between thedealershipsand the Domestic Defendantssuch that theCourtcanexercisespecificjurisdiction undertheFloridalong-arm statute.SeeHard Candy, LLC,l06 F.Supp.3d at1241(notingthatçigalgency-based personaljurisdiction existswherethe parententity exercisesoperationalcontroloverasubsidiary,''in otherwords,ikday-to-day control oftheinternalaffairsorbasicoperationsofthesubsidiary'')(quotingYellow PagesPhotos,Inc.v. Ziplocal,LP,2012 W L 5830590,at*3(M .D.Fla.Nov.16,2012:;cf Consol.Dev.Corp.,216 F.3dat1293(notingaparentcorporationiûisnotsubjecttothejurisdictionofaforum statemerely becauseasubsidiaryisdoingbusinessthere'). Despite failing to allege (çspecific facts to fit within'' Sections48.193(1)(a)(1)-(2), Plaintiffsarguetheycanplead aprimafacieshowingofpersonaljurisdiction byddtrackgingjthe languageofj48.193,withoutpleadingsupportingfacts.''(D.E.3034 at55 (quoting Gregory v. EBF drAssocs.tL.P.,595F.Supp.2d 1334,1339(S.D.Fla.2009).) TheCourtdisagrees,asthe Eleventh Circuit has held that such (svague and conclusory allegations ...are insufûcient to establishaprimafaciecaseofpersonaljurisdiction.''Snow v.DirecTljlnc.,450F.3d 1314,1318 (11th Cir.2006)(citing Posnerv.Essex Ins.Co.,Ltd ,178F.3d 1209,1217-18(11th Cir.1999) +ercuriam4);seealsoCatalystPharm.,Inc.v.Fullerton,748F.App'x944,946(11thCir.2018) (ksvagueandconclusory allegationsdonotsatisfy''aplaintiff'sburdentoitmakeoutaprimafacie caseofjurisdiction'')(citingSnow,450F.3dat1318). R elying on Snow, courts in the Eleventh Circuit have repeatedly declined to exercise specificjurisdiction overa nonresidentdefendanton the basis ofgeneralized and conclusory allegations like those advanced by Plaintiffs here. See,e.g.,Castillo v.Allegro ResortM ktg., 603F.App'x913,916(11thCir.2015)+ercuriamj(affirmingdistrictcourt'sdismissalforlack ofpersonaljurisdiction whereplaintiffalleged thatdefendanthad ç'contactswith gFlorida)24/7 47 and365 daysayear,''yetClmadenospecificfactualallegationsofthesecontacts'');Leon,301F. Supp.3dat1216& n.6 (fnding generalallegationsthatHondadûconductgedjsubstantialbusiness in this District''insufficientto allege specificjurisdiction underthe Florida long-arm statute becausethecom plaintcontained $tno detailto supportthisstatement,''which leftthecourtfdunable to infer which of Honda's contacts with Florida supportged) specific personaljurisdiction'l; AccurateIns.Grp.,Corp.v.AccurateIns.Servs.Inc.,2015W L 11233072,at*2 (S.D.Fla.Mar. 2,2015)(findingallegationthatSr efendant'sfalseassertionsofinfringementweredirectedtothe PlaintiffintheStateofFloridaandassuchDefendantissubjecttothepersonaljurisdiction ofthis Court''to be dtvague and conclusory allegations...wholly insufficient to establish personal jurisdictionoverDefendantunderFlorida'slong-arm statute');Bul pit,LLC v.Decanio,2013W L 12126313,at*4(S.D.Fla.J.une7,2013)(findingtdnobasis''toexercisespeciûcjurisdictionunder Floridalong-arm statutewhereplaintiffallegedthedefendantçtconductgedjbusinessthroughout interstatecommerceand in a11fifty statesofthe United States...and in particularconductgedl businessinthe Southern DistrictofFlorida');Vision1nt'1Prod.Inc.v.fitecoS.R.L.,2007W L 9700539,at*4 (S.D.Fla.Aug.8,2007)(findingallegationsthatdefendantdkofferedforsaleand continued to offer for sale in this District and elsewhere in the United States dispensing capsules...covered by oneormore ofthepatentsin suit''tobeSkformulaicconclusoryavennents insufficientto satisfy Plaintiffs'burden''ofestablishing adigeneralcourse ofbusinessactivity in theStateforpecuniarybenefit,''asrequiredbytheFloridalong-arm statute). Therefore,forthese reasons and the additionalreason thatthe Florida long-arm statute (tmustbestrictlyconstnzed''with dlanydoubtsaboutapplicabilityofthestatutegbeing)resolvedin favorofthedefendantandagainstaconclusion thatpersonaljurisdiction exists,''Keston,523F. Supp.2dat1352n.2(quotingGadea,949So.2(1at1150(citingSeabra,869So.2dat733))- the 48 CourtfindsnobasistoexercisespecificjurisdictionovertheDomesticDefendantsastotheDirectFile A ctions under the Florida long-ann statute.11 Consequently,the Courtneed notdetermine whetherexercising specificjurisdiction undertheFloridalong-arm statute would comportwith dueprocess.SeeHard Candy,LLC,106F.Supp.3d at1250n.7. b) RICO NationwideServiceofProcessProvision As an alternative to the Florida long-arm statute,Plaintiffs assertthe Courtcan exercise specificjurisdiction overtheDomesticDefendantsasto theRICO claimspursuanttotheRICO statute'snationwideserviceofprocessprovision in 18U.S.C.Section 1965(d).Plaintiffsfurther contend thatonce the Courtexercisesspecificjurisdiction overthe RICO claims,itcan then exercisependentpersonaljurisdictionovertheremainingfederal,state,andcommon-law claims. Defendantschallengebothapplicationsofjurisdiction. D efendantsvigorously oppose Plaintiffs'theory,arguing thattheRICO nationw ide service ofprocessprovisioncannotprovideabasisforspecificjurisdictionbecausePlaintiffsfailtostate plausible RICO claim s. Butthe Sigeneralrule''is thatcourts dkaddress issues relating to personal jurisdiction beforereachingthemeritsofaplaintiff'sclaims.''Republicofpanama,119F.3dat 940(citingMadara,916F.2d at1513-14& n.1;CharlesA.W right& ArthurR.M iller,Federal PracticeandProcedure,Civil2d j1351,at243-44 (1990))(emphasisadded).Therationalefor thisruleisthatSçgaqdefendant...notsubjecttothejurisdiction ofthecourtcannotbeboundby 11Eventhough GeneralM otorsonlychallenged theexerciseofspeciticjurisdiction over thenon-Floridaplaintiffs'claims(seeD.E.2981at28-32),theCourtstillfindsitlacksspecific jurisdictionundertheFloridalong-arm statuteastoa1lplaintiffsadvancingclaimsagainstGencral MotorsintheDirect-FileComplaints.SeeCourboin,596F.App'x at735($dA districtcourtmay on itsown m otion dismissan action astodefendantswhohave notm oved to dismisswhere such defendants are in a position sim ilarto thatofm oving defendants orwhere claim s againstsuch defendantsareintegrallyrelated.'')(citingfoman Dev.Co.v.DaytonaHoteldrM otelSuppliers, Inc.,817F.2d1533,1537(11thCir.1987))Tazoev.AirbusS.A.S.,631F.3d 1321,1336(11thCir. 2011)). 49 itsrulings.''ld (citingM adara,916F.2d at1514).Consequently,theCourtmustdetermineifit hasthepowertobindtheDomesticDefendantswith aruling beforeitcan reach thesufficiency of Plaintiffs'RICO allegations.See id. Section l965(d)can serveasStthestatutory basisforpersonaljurisdiction.''12 Id at942 (citingInreChase& SanbornCorp.,835F.2d 1341,1344(11thCir.1988),rev'donothergrounds sub.nom,Granhnanciera,S.A.v.Nordberg,492 U.S.33 (1989);Lisak v.MercantileBancorp, Inc.,834 F.2d 668,671(7th Cir.1987:.ThisSection providesthatprocessmay beserved Ston anypersoninanyjudicialdistrictinwhichsuchpersonresides,isfound,hasanagent,ortransacts hisaffairs.'' 18 U.S.C.j1965(d). ButPlaintiffsare Slentitled to take advantage ofgRlCO's1 nationwide service of process provision''only Slinsofar as''the underlying RICO claim çiis not wholly immaterialorinsubstantial.'' Republic of Panama,119 F.3d at942. ln othcrwords, whether a basis exists forexercising specific jurisdiction under Section 1965(d) depends on whether the D irect-File A ctions state ticolorable''RIC O claim s. Courboin,596 F.A pp'x at732 (citing Republic ofpanama,119 F.3d at942). Itnccessarily follows,then,thatdetermining w hether the D irect-File RICO claim s are lscolorable'' or çdnot w holly im m aterial or insubstantial'' is a separate and distinctquestion from w hether the RICO claim s are plausibly alleged. See Am.H eritage Enters.,Inc.r.A m.Param ountFin.,Inc.,2011 W L 13225179,at #3- 4 (S.D.Fla.Feb.14,2011)(addressing whethertheplaintifpsRICO claim waslscolorable''for jurisdictionalpurposes,beforeaddressing whethertheRICO claim wasplausiblyalleged under 12UnderFederalRule ofCivilProcedure4(k)(1)(C),Cigslerving a summonsorfiling a waiver ofservice establishespersonaljurisdiction overa defendant...when authorized by a federalstatute.'' Here,Plaintiffsand allDefendantsstipulated to waiverofservice. (See D.E. 2840.) Therefore,theserviceofprocessrequirementissatisfied.Importantly,atthetimeservice waswaived,Defendants Ssexpressly reservegdja11argumentsand defenses with respectto the actions,including astojurisdiction.'' 1d.at2 n.1. Thus,theCoul' tfindsthatDefendantshave properlypreservedtheirjurisdictionchallenges. 50 Twombly,Iqbal,and FederalRule ofCivilProcedure9(b)). Accordingly,atthisjuncture,the Courtwillonly determ ine whethertheRICO claim sare Ctnotwholly imm aterialorinsubstantialr'' and willlateraddressthesufficiency oftheRICO claims. (1)Sscolorable''Claims TheCourtfindstheRICO claimsassertedagainsttheDomesticDefendantsarettnotwholly im m aterial or insubstantial'' because the underlying allegations are sufficiently sim ilar to allegations this Courtpreviously determined to state plausible RICO claims. See In re Takata AirbagProd Liab.Litig.,2015W L 9987659,at#1-2(denyingTakata'sandHonda'smotionsto dismissRICO claims). Thislimited finding simply meansthe Direct-File Plaintiffsmay istake advantageof'theRICO nationwideserviceofprocessprovision.Republicofpanama,119F.3d at942. Now theCourtmustdetermine whetherSection 1965(d)çdconfersjurisdiction''overthe DomesticDefendants.Id (citingSunBank N A.,926F.2d at10339Go-video,Inc.,885F.2dat 1413). (2)StatutoryBasis Section 1965(d)requires thatthe Courtexamine the Domestic Defendants'çdaggregate contacts with the nation as awhole,''asopposed to theirlicontactswith the forum state.'' 1d.at 946-47. ThisisbecausethefederalRICO statutewasenacted to dsbestow jurisdictionon federal coul' ts over nationalconspiracies.'' BanW tlantic r.Coastto Coast Contractors,Inc., 1997 W L 33807846,at*3(S.D.Fla.Nov.30,1997).Thus,totdensurethatfar-tlungconspiraciesgcouldjbe triedtogetherinoneaction,''thestatutecreatedtispecialvenuerulesand gajnationwideserviceof Processprovision.'' 1d. 51 lnthiscase,theDom esticDefendantsdo notdisputethatthey conductsubstantialbusiness throughouttheUnited States.l3Accordingly, theCourtfindsSection 1965(d)providesastatutory basisforexercisingspecificjurisdictionovertheDomesticDefendantsastotheRICO claims.See Republicofpanama,119 F.3d at948 (concluding sameasto U.S.based corporatedefendant); feon,301F.Supp.3dat1230-31(same). (3)ConstitutionalBasis The Courtmustnow decidewhctherexercising specificjurisdiction comportswith due process. Republic of Panama,119 F.3d at942. To evaluate whetherthe Fifth Amendment requirem ents of fairness and reasonableness have been satisfied, courts should dfbalance the burdensim posed on the individualdefendantagainstthe federalinterestinvolved in the litigation.'' Id at946 (citingAsahiMetalIndus.Co.v.SuperiorCourtofcalfornia,Solano C/y.,480U.S. 102,114(1987);World-Wide VollcswagenCorp.v.Woodson,444U.S.286,292(1980:.But,the Courtm ustengage in thisbalancing tionly ifadefendanthasestablished thathisliberty interests actuallyhavebeen infringed. Only whenadefendantchallengingjurisdiction hasSpresentledja compellingcasethat...wouldrenderjurisdictionunreasonable,'should courtsweighthefederal interestsfavoringtheexerciseofjurisdiction.''1d.(quotingBurgerKing Corp.v.Rudzewicz,471 U.S.462,477(1985)), In determ ining whether the Dom estic Defendants have metthe burden of establishing constitutionally significant inconvenience,the Courtconsiders the factors used in determining fairness under the Fourteenth Am endm ent. fJ. Even though the D om estic D efendants have m inim um contactswith theUnited Statesasa whole,thisdoesnotddautomatically satisfy the due 13This standsin contrastto the heavily disputed,generalized and conclusory allegations thattheDomesticDefendantscaused injuriesin Florida,and conducted businessactivityin and directed toward Florida. 52 processrequirementsoftheFifthAmendment''becauseSsgtlherearecircumstances,althoughrare, in which a defendantm ay havesufficientcontactswith the United Statesasa whole butstillwill beundulyburdenedby theassertionofjurisdictioninafarawayandinconvenientfonlm.''1d.at 947.Butdsitisonly inhighlyunusualcasesthatinccmveniencewillrisetoa levelofconstitutional concelm.''Id (citingAsahl.M etalIndus.Co.,480U.S.at116 (1987)(Brennan,J.,concurringin partandconcurringinthejudgment)(notingthatonlyin çsrarecases''willinconveniencebecome constitutionallyunreasonablell).Ultimately,Sfltjheburdenisonthedefendanttodemonstratethat the assertion of jurisdiction in the fonzm will lmake litigation 'so gravely difficult and inconvenient'thatghe)unfairlyisataiseveredisadvantage'incomparisontohisopponent.'''1d. at948(quotingBurgerKing Corp.,471U.S.at478). Here,the Dom estic Defendants'm oving papers fail to dem onstrate tdconstitutionally signiicant inconvenience.'' lndeed,m odern m eans of com m unication and transportation have lessened the burden ofdefending a lawsuitin a distantforum . World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S.at292-93 (citing McGee v.Int1LfeIns.Co.,355 U.S.220,222-23(1957:. Given m odern comm unication and transportation,the Courtconcludes that defending this law suitin Florida willnotbe tdso gravely difficultand inconvenient,''orputthe Domestic Defendantsata ûkseveredisadvantage''relativetothePlaintiffs.Assuch,theCourtneed notevaluate whetherthe Fifth Am endment requirements of fairness and reasonableness have been satisfied by klbalanceging)the burdensimposed on the individualdefendantgslagainstthe federalinterest involvedinthelitigation.''Republicofpanama,119F.3d at946(citingAsahiM etalIndus.Co., 480U.S.at114, *World-WideVolkswagenCorp.,444U.S.at292). N ow, FCA argues the Court m ust follow a prior nlling in this case, which dism issed directlyfiledpersonalinjurycasesforlackofspecificjurisdiction.(D.E.2983at29(citingD.E. 53 887).) But that ruling dismissed personal injury claims against defendants where Stthe accidents...didnottakeplacein Floridaand Plaintiffsfailgedlto indicateanyrelevantconduct linkingtheDefendantsto Florida.'' (D.E.887at3.) Thatis,theCourtdismissed thosepersonal injury cases because the Plaintiffs did not allege isfacts thatwould give the Courtspecific jurisdiction overDefendants.'' Id at2-3. The criticaldistinction here isthattheDirect-File Com plaints assertclaim s underthe R IC O statute,which containsa nationw ide service ofprocess provision thatcan serveastdthestatutorybasisforpersonaljurisdiction.''Republic ofpanama, l19F.3dat942(citationsomitted).Asaresult,thepersonaljurisdiction calculusinthissituation isentirelydifferentthaninthecontextofpersonalinjuryclaims.Thus,dismissalon thisground isnotappropriate. Furtherm ore,FCA suggests thatforthe Courtto rem ain consistentwith its prior ruling- andthusdismissthedirectlyfiled claimsforlackofspecificjurisdiction theCourtmustadhere to itsow n w ordsthatSiinefficiency doesnotcircum ventD efendants'rightto have suitsfiled against them inanappropriatecourt.''(D.E.2983at29(quotingD.E.887at3n.1).)ButtheCourt'slatest order- which ruled thatthe TransferorActions would be rem anded to the transferorcourtsfor trial resolvedthiscontention.(SeeD.E.3394at19(ûdgW lhenpretrialproceedingsend,theCourt willsevert()rrecommendthattherludicialPanelonM ultidistrictLitigationjsever)anyremaining claim sasserted by the TransferorPlaintiffs including any claim sam ended directly in thisM D L proceeding.'l.) Furthermore,theCourt'spersonaljurisdictionrulinghereisnotpremised on any efficiency rationale;the ruling isbased on theRICO nationwide service ofprocessprovision and binding interpretive case law . Therefore,the Court finds that the Fifth Amendm ent's Due Process clause does not precludeexercisingspecifcjurisdictionovertheDomesticDefendantsastotheRICO claimsin 54 theDirect-FileActions;subject,ofcourse,toPlaintiffsadequatelyallegingRICO claims. 2. Foreian D efendants in Transferor and D irect-File A ctions PlaintiffsarguetheCourtcan exercise specificjurisdiction overtheForeign Defendants underFcderalRuleofCivilProcedure4(k)(2),thefederallong-arm statute. ButRule4(k)(2)is applicable only ifSçthe defendantisnotsubjectto jurisdiction in any state's courtsofgeneral jurisdiction.''Fed.R.Civ.P.4(k)(2)(A);seealsoM erialLtd.v.ClplaLtd.,681F.3d 1283,1294 (Fed.Cir.2012)(iigolnepreconditionforapplyingRule4(k)(2)isthatthedefendantmustnotbe subject to personaljurisdiction in the courts of any state (sometimes called thc tnegation requirement'l.''l.l4 Thus,the Courtmustfirstaddressspecificjurisdiction underthelong-arm statute ofeach state wherePlaintiffscommenced theirlegalactions Le.Florida,Georgia,New Jersey,and V irginia. Before beginning this analysis, the Court notes that while the parties briefed the applicability ofthe Florida long-arm statute,they did notbriefthe applicability ofthe Georgia, N ew Jersey, and V irginia long-arm statutes. This is because the parties did not interpret the Plaintiffs'strategic decision to file complaintsin thetransferorcourtsand to also filecom plaints directly in this m ultidistrictlitigation proceeding as creating separate legalactions,which require additionallayersofjurisdictionalanalysis.Thepartiesdid,however,fullybriefwhetherexercising specificjurisdictionovertheDefendantssatisfiedconstitutionaldueprocess.Assuch,theCourt's analysis beginsw ith constitutionaldue process. a) ConstitutionalDueProcess 14 As an aside,this is the reason that Rule4(k)(2)does not apply to the Domestic Defendants,a11ofwhicharesubjecttothegeneraljurisdictionofcertainstates.SeesupraSection II.C.1.a. Relatedly,Rule4(k)(1)(C)doesnotprovide a basisforspecificjurisdiction overthe Foreign Defendants because the RICO service of proccss provision is lim itcd to nationwide service,anddoesnotextend to worldwideservice. 55 ln DaimlerAG v.Bauman,theSupreme Courtreversed theNinth Circuit'sagency theory ofjurisdictionthatwouldhaveçtswegpt)beyondthetsprawlingview ofgeneraljurisdiction'''that wasrejectedinGoodyear.SeeDaimlerAG,571U.S.at136(quotingGoodyear,564at929).The Ninth Circuit's agency theory would have subjected foreign-based DaimlerAG to the general jurisdictionofCaliforniastatecourtsbecauseDaimlerAG'sdomestic-basedsubsidiaryM ercedesBenz U SA ,LLC w hich wasD aim ler'sexclusive im porterand distributorin the U nited States had multiple California-based facilities and was the largest supplier of luxury vehicles to the California market. Id at123,136. ln reversing theNinth Circuit,the Suprem eCourtexplained thattheN inth Circuitttpaid littleheed to therisksto internationalcom ity''thatitskdexpansiveview ofgeneraljurisdictionposed.''Id at141.TheSupremeCourthighlightedthatinthepast,çéforeign governments' objections to some domestic courts' expansive views of generaljurisdiction ghad)...impeded negotiations of international agreem ents on the reciprocalrecognition and enforcementofjudgments.''Id at141-42 (citingBrieffortheUnited States(citingJuenger,The AmericanLJw ofGenerallurisdiction,2001U.CHI.LEGALFORUM 141,161-62)).Inconclusion, theSupremeCourtelaborated thattdlcjonsiderationsofinternationalrapport...reinforced ritsj determinationthatsubjectingDaimlertothegeneraljurisdictionofcourtsinCaliforniawouldnot accord with the Sfairplay and substantialjustice'dueprocessdemandredq.''ld at142 (quoting 1nt' 1ShoeCo.v.Washington,326U.S.310,316(1945:. TheSupreme Court'scautiousapproach tothe exerciseofjurisdiction overnonresident defendants reemerged in Bristol-Myers,thistime in the contextofspecific jurisdiction. discussed above,the Supreme Courtin Bristol-Myers ruled thatfor a California state courtto exercisespecificjurisdiction overanonresidentdefendant,tstheremustbeanaffiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy,principally,ganlactivity oran occurrencethattakes 56 placein the forum Stateand istherefore subjectto the State'sregulation.'' 137 S.Ct.at1780 (quotingGoodyear,564 U.S.at919). ln applying Stsettled principleslofjspecificjurisdiction,'' theSupremeCourtnotedthatthefsprimaryconcern''ofjurisdictiongenerallyiststheburdenonthe defendant,''and lcgalssessing thisburden obviously requires a courtto consider the practical problem s resulting from litigating in the forum ,butitalso encom passes the m ore abstractm atter ofsubm itling to the coercive pow erofa State thatm ay have little legitim ate interestin the claim s in question.'' Id at 1780 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.,444 U.S.at292). Thus, firestrictionson personaljurisdiction Saremorethan aguaranteeofimmunity from inconvenient ordistantlitigation.They are a consequence ofterritoriallim itationson the pow eroftherespective States.'''1d.(quotingHansonv.Denckla,?57U.S.235,251(1958)). M indfuloftheSupreme Court'sconcernsforinternationalcom ity,andthepracticalissues ofsubjectingforeignentitiestothecoercivepoweroffederalcourts,theCourtwillnow address specificjurisdictionovertheForeignDefendants. lsDue process requires thata nonresidentdefendanthave certain m inim um contacts w ith thefol'um sothattheexerciseofjurisdiction doesnotoffend traditionalnotionsoffairplayand substantialjustice.''Meierexrel.M eierr.Sun1nt1Hotels,Ltd,288F.3d 1264,1274(11th Cir. 2002)(citingInt1Shoe,326U.S.at316;Consol.Dev.Corp.,216F.3dat1291).SkgAjfundamental elementofthespeciicjurisdictioncalculusisthatplaintiff'sclaim mustariseoutoforrelatetoat leastoneofthe defendant'scontactswith the forum .'' fouis Vuitton M alletier,S. A .,736 F.3d at 1355-56(quotingFraserv.Smith,594F.3d842,850(11th Cir.2010)).Thus,theCourtlooksto the i'affiliation betw een the fonzm and the underlying controversy,''focusing on any liactivity or...occurrencethat(took)placeintheforum State.'' Waitev.AllAcquisition Corp.,901F.3d 1307,1314(11th Cir.2018)(quotingBristol-Myers,137S.Ct.at1780). 57 lnspecificpersonaljurisdiction cases,theCourtappliesathree-parttest,which examines: (1)whetherthePlaintiffs'claimsûkariseoutoforrelateto''atleastoneoftheDefendants'contacts with theforum;(2)whetherthenonresidentDefendants(dpurposefullyavailed''themselvesofthe privilege ofconducting activitieswithin the forum state,thusinvoking the benefitofthe forum state's laws;and (3)whetherthe exercise ofpersonaljurisdiction comportswith çstraditional notionsoffairplayandsubstantialjustice.''LouisVuittonMalletier,S.A.,736F.3dat1355(citing BurgerKing Corp.,471U.S.at472-75;HelicopterosNacionalesde Colombia,S.A.v.Hall,466 U.S.408,413-14 (1984);1nt,1Shoe Co.,326 U.S.at316). ThePlaintiffsbeartheburden of establishing the firsttw o prongs,and ifthey do so,theD efendantstim ustm ake a ûcom pelling case' thatthe exercise ofjurisdiction would violate traditionalnotions offairplay and substantial justice.'' Id (quotingDiamond CrystalBrands,Inc.v.Food MoversInt'l,Inc.,593 F.3d 1249, 1267(11thCir.2010)). Here,Plaintiffs generally allege that the Dom estic and Forcign Defendants:itconduct substantialbusinessin thisDistrict;some oftheactionsgiving rise to the Complainttook placein this D istrict, and som e of Plaintiffs' claim s arise out of D efendants operating, conducting, engagingin,orcarryingonabusinessorbusinessventurein(Florida)or...committingatortious actin gFloridaq....''(D.E.2762 at!22.) ThePlaintiffsalso generally assertthateachForeign Defendant is in the business of designing,developing,m anufacturing,m arketing,and selling automobiles. Seeid at!! 26,28,32. ln addition,Plaintiffsgenerally allegethateach Forcign DefendantisaGerm an corporation with aprincipalplaceofbusinessin Germ any,seeft ;l,andthat each Dom estic Defendantis $$a wholly-om zed U.S.subsidiary''ofits Foreign Defendantparent coporation,id at!(!27,29,orthattheForeign DefendantistheparentcompanyoftheDomestic Defendantcounterpart,id.at!33. 58 Asto specific Foreign Defendants,Plaintiffsgenerally allege thatVolkswagen Group of America (as the domestic subsidiary of the foreign based Volkswagen Aktiengesellschafl), Slengagesin businessactivitiesin furtheranceoftheinterestsof'Volkswagen Aktiengesellschafl, Skincluding the advertising, marketing and sale of Volkswagen automobiles worldwide.'' fJ.at!27. W ith respectto Audi,Plaintiffsgenerally allege AudiofAmerica(asthedomestic subsidiary of the foreign based AudiAktiengesellschaft),dtengages in business,including the advertising,marketingandsale ofAudiautomobiles,in all50states.''Id at!29.Plaintiffsdo notsetforth any allegations specific to M ercedes,butinstead generally allege- asthey allege against V olksw agen and Audi- that the dom estic and foreign parent corporations collectively ççengineered,designed,developed,m anufactured,orinstalled the DefectiveAirbags''in the class vehicles,andisapprovedtheDefectiveAirbagsforuseinthosevehiclesr''whilealsoStdevelopging), reviewlingl,andapprovginglthemarketingandadvertisingcampaignsdesignedtoselltheseClass Vehicles.''1d.at!!31,33. The Courtfinds these generalized allegationsare devoid ofspecificity,and thereby failto establish that the Foreign Defendants C'purposefully availed''themselves of the privileges of conducting activity in Florida,Georgia,New Jersey,orVirginia. See Castillo,603 F.App'x at 916 +er curiam) (affrming districtcourt'sdismissalfor lack ofpersonaljurisdiction where plaintiffSsmadenospecificfactualallegationsofgdefendant'sqcontacts''with Florida);feon,301 F,Supp.3dat1216& n.6 (rejecting(igeneralizedstatements''thatweredddevoidofspeciticity''as failingto establish specificjurisdiction undertheFlorida long-arm statutel;AccurateIns.Grp., Corp.,2015 W L 11233072,at*2 (rejecting çsvague and conclusory allegations...gaslwholly insufticienttoestablish personaljurisdiction overDefendantunderFlorida'slong-al'm statute'); Bulpit,LLC,2013W L 12126313,at*4(finding Ssnobasis''tocxercisespecificjurisdiction under 59 Florida long-arm statute based on generalized allegationsl;Vision 1nt'1Prod.lnc.,2007 W L 9700539,at*4(rejectingdçformulaicconclusoryaverments''astkinsuftscient''toestablish specifc jurisdiction underFloridalong-arm statutel;seealso CJA?/. , Pv.Fry' sElecs.,Inc.,736F.Supp.2d 1352,1369@ .D,Ga.2010)(adoptingrecommendationthatnonresidentdefendantbedismissed where plaintifftdgenerally allegegdjthatthe harm he suffered as a result of gthe norlresident defendant'slallegedactionswerecausedbyanactoromissionoutsideGeorgia'');Zelmav.Burke, 2017W L 58581,at*3(D. N .J.Jan.4,2017)(çdplaintiffs'spcculativeand conclusory allegations againstthernonresidentjDefendantsareinsufficientto meettheirburden to proveaprimafacia case ofspeciticjurisdiction with reasonableparticularity.''l;Peterson v.HVM LLC,2016 W L 845144,at*4(D. N .J.M ar.3,2016)(ssotherthan ...basicdescriptors,thecomplaintisdevoidof allegations relating to the investors. These allegations are insufficient to establish general or specific jurisdiction overthe investors.'');FN Herstal,S.A.v.ClydeArmory,Inc.,2012 W L 12977880,at*3 & n.3(E.D.Va.M ay30,2012)(finding allegationsthatnonresidentdefendants 'stransactgedlbusinessin thisdistrict,oroffergedjto selltheirproductsorgmadejtheirproducts available or rpromoted) the infringing mark to prospective purchasers within this district'' insufticientto establish aprimafaciecase ofgeneralorspecificjurisdiction);Askuev.Aurora Corp.ofAm.,2012 W L 843939,at *4 (N.D.Ga.M ar.12,2012)(finding allegationsthata defendantm anufacturerthatsold products in a m arket çkundoubtedly derived substantialrevenue from the sale ofthese products,''and d'engaged in a persistent course of conduct in G eorgia by engagingadistributorto sellitsproductsin thism arket,''were idwhollyconclusory andinsufficient tosustainaûndingofjurisdictionunderthelong-arm statute''). Therefore,the CourtfindsthatPlaintiffsfailto establish aprimafacie case ofspecific jurisdictionovertheForeign Defendants. 60 TheForeignDefendantsalsoarguethatPlaintiffsattempttoestablish specificjurisdiction overthem underatheory ofagency Le.thattheCourtcanexercisespecificjurisdiction simply because the Dom estic Defendantsconductbusinessin the United States and are wholly-owned subsidiaries of the Foreign Defendants. éslt is wellestablished thatas long as a parentand a subsidiary areseparateand distinctcorporateentities,thepresenceofonein aforum statem aynot beattributedtotheother.''Consol.Dev.Corp.,216F.3dat1293(11thCir.2000)(citingCannon Manufacturing Co.v.Cudahy Packing Co.,267U.S.333,337(1925)).Thus,ç$aforeignparent corporation isnotsubjecttothejurisdictionofaforum statemerelybecauseasubsidiaryisdoing businessthere.'' 1d. H ere,Plaintiffs'allegations failto overcom e these presum ptions. Plaintiffs set forth no allegationsestablishing the nature ofthe corporate relationship between the subsidiary D om estic D efendants and their parents,the Foreign Defendants;no allegations that individual plaintiffs purchased or leased their vehicles from dealershipsdirectly owned oroperated by the Foreign Defendants; and no allegations that Class V ehicles w cre ékengineered, designed, developed, m anufactured,or installedr''or thatthe advertising or m arketing cam paigns were itdeveloped, reviewcd,gorlapproved,''inorforFlorida,Georgia,New Jersey,orVirginiacitizens.Forthese reasons,Plaintiffs'allegationsdo notdemonstrateany Staffiliation betweentheforumlsland the underlyingcontroversriesj''based onany (çactivitriesjor...occurrencegsjthatgtookjplaccinthe forum Stategsl.''Waite,901F.3dat1314 (quotingBristol-Myers,137S.Ct.at1780). Therefore,theCourtconcludesthatbasedontheseallegations,nocourtinFlorida,Georgia, New Jersey,OrVirginiacanexercisespecificjurisdictionovertheForeignDefendantsinharmony with constitutionaldue process. The Plaintiffs'failure to plead allegations sufticientto satisfy constitutionaldue process would allow the Courtto avoid addressing whethertheirallegations 61 satisfyany ofthestatelong-arm statutes.ls Nevertheless,theCourtfindsthatPlaintiffs'allegations againstthe Foreign Defendants w ould failto satisfy the Georgia,N ew Jersey,and V irginia long- arm statutes forthe sam e reasonsthatPlaintiffs'allegations failto satisfy the Florida long-anu statute. See supra Section II.D .1.a. b) FederalLong-Arm Statute Plaintiffs also attemptto justify the exercise ofspecificjurisdiction overthe Foreign Defendants under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2), the federal long arm statute. tsllule4(k)(2)wasimplementedtofi11alacunain çtheenforcementoffederallaw inintemational cases.'''Thompsonv.CarnivalCorp.,174F.Supp.3d1327,1337(S.D.Fla.2016)(citingPorina v.M arwardShi pping Co.,521F.3d 122,126 (2dCir.2008)(citingFed.R.Civ.P.4(k)advisory committee'snotesto 1993 amendmentsl). SsYet,itisarare occurrence when a courtinvokes jurisdiction undertherule.''ld Here,theForeign Defendantsarenotsubjecttothegeneraljurisdiction ofanystatecourt. Seesupra Section 11.C.2.Furtherm ore,the Foreign Defendantshavenotidentifed any otherforum wherethey areamenableto suit.Thus,theCourtisentitledto useRule4(k)(2).See Oldheld v. PuebloDeBahiaLora,S.A.,558F.3d1210,1218& n.22(11thCir.2009)(1$g11f...thedefendant contendsthathe cannotbe sued in the forum stateand refusesto idcntify any otherwhere suitis possible,thenthefederalcourtisentitledtouseRule4(k)(2).'')(quoting Isllnt'l,Inc.v.Borden LadnerGervaisLLP,256F.3d 548,552 (7th Cir.2001:. Accordingly,theCourtcanaggregate 15 See Castillo, 603 F.App'x at916 (ti Because (plaintiftl failed to plead allegations sufficientto satisfydueprocess,weneednotaddresspersonaljurisdiction underFlorida'slongarm statute.'');see also Christian Tours v.Homeric Tourss239 F.3d 366 (5th Cir.2000)+er curiam)(decliningtoanalyzestatelong-arm statutebecauscplaintifffailedtosatisfyconstitution aldueprocess);ISO ClaimsServs.,Inc.v.Bradford Techs.,Inc.,2011W L 13176209,at*5(M .D. Fla.Sept.28,2011)(same). 62 the Foreign Defendants'nationwide contacts to allow for service ofprocess provided thattwo conditions are met:(1) Plaintiffs'claims dçarise underfederal1aw'', 'and (2)the exercise of jurisdiction is Sçconsistentwith the Constitution and lawsoftheUnited States.'' Consol.Dev. Corp.,216F.3dat1291(citingFed.R.Civ.P.4(k)(2)).BecausethereisnodisputethatPlaintiffs' RICO and M agnuson-M ossW arranty Actclaim sariseunderfederallaw,orany disputethatthe RICO statuteallowsfornationwideserviceofprocessunderSection 1965(d),then theCourtcan exercise specificjurisdiction overthc Foreign Defendantsso long asitisitconsistentwith the Constitution and lawsoftheUnited States'';thatis,comporting with dueprocess.ld In specificpersonaljurisdictioncases,theCourtappliesathree-parttest,whichexamines: (1)whetherthePlaintiffs'claimsûsariseoutoforrelateto''atleastoneoftheDefendants'contacts withtheforum;(2)whetherthenonresidentDefendantsSû purposefullyavailed''themselvesofthe privilege ofconducting activities w ithin the forum state,thus invoking the benefitof the forum state'slaws;and (3)whetherthe exercise ofpersonaljurisdiction comportswith çstraditional notionsoffairplayandsubstantialjustice.''LouisVuittonMalletier,S.A.,736F.3dat1355(citing BurgerK ing Corp.,471 U .S.at472-73,474-75;H elicopterosN acionales de Colom bia,S.A.,466 U.S.at413-14;Int' 1ShoeCo.,326U.S.at316).ThefirsttworequirementsareSstheconstitutional benchmarksofthe minimum contactsanalysisand ensurethatadefendantisonly burdened with litigation in a fortzm w herehis iconductand connection with the forum ..,are such thathe should reasonably anticipate being haled into courtthere.''' Oldheld,558 F.3d at1220-21 (quoting World-WideVolkswagen Corp.,444U.S.at297). W heretheCourt'spersonaljurisdiction isinvoked basedon afederalstatuteauthorizing nationwide or worldwide service ofprocess,S'the applicable fonzm forthe m inim um contacts 63 analysisistheUnited States.''ld at1220 (quoting Consol.Dev.Corp.,216F.3d at1291n.6)). A s the FederalCircuitrecognized: Rule4(k)(2)closed a loopholethatexisted priorto the 1993amendmentsofthe FederalRulesofCivilProcedure. Before the adoption ofRule4(k)(2),a nonresidentdefendantwho did nothave(lminimum contacts''with any individualstate sufficienttosupportexerciseofjurisdiction,butdid havesufficientcontactswith the United States as a whole, could escape jurisdiction in a11 fif'ty states. Rule4(k)(2)wasadopted toensurethatfederalclaimswillhavea U.S.forum if sufficientnationalcontactsexist. Touchcom,Inc.v.BereskindrParr,574F.3d 1403,1414 (Fed.Cir.2009)(citingSynthes(U S.A.) v.G.M DosReisJr.Ind.Com deJk/zfJ7.Medico,563 F.3d 1285,1295 (Fed.Cir.2009)(citing Fed.R.Civ.P.4(k)(2)advisorycommitteenotesto 1993amendmentl). H ere,Plaintiffs fail to allege facts establishing the Foreign D efendants have sufficient contactswiththeUnited States,such thattheyStpurposefully availed''them selvesoftheprivileges and law s of the U nitcd States. Plaintiffs set forth several generalized allegations that fail to dem onstrate specificconductby the Foreign Defendantsthatoccurred in,orwastargeted toward, theUnited States. Forexample,Plaintiffsgenerally allege thateach Foreign Defendantisin the business of designing, developing,manufacturing,marketing,and selling automobiles (see D.E.2762 at!!26,28,32) buttheseallegationstakenastruedonotestablish thattheForeign Defendants conducted thisactivity in,or targeted ittoward,the United States. Asfor speciûc Foreign Defendants,Plaintiffsgenerally allege thatVolkswagen Group ofAm erica and Audiof America Scengagel)in business''activities,such as (tthe advertising,marketing and sale of' VolkswagenandAudiautomobiles,id at!27,29- buttheseallegations,againtakenastrue,say nothing aboutthe Foreign Defendants'specificconduct,1etalonethatthe conductoccurred in,or w astargeted tow ard,the U nited States. Furtherm ore,Plaintiffsgenerally allege that,collectively, the dom estic subsidiariesand the foreign parentcom orations çdengineered,designed,developed, 64 m anufactured,or installed the Defective Airbags''in the class vehicles,and ûdapproved thc Defective Airbags for use in those vehicles,'' while also (Cdeveloplingl, reviewgingq, and approvlingjthemarketingandadvertisingcampaignsdesignedtoselltheseClassVehicles,''id at !!31,33.Oncemore,theseallegations,takenastrue,failtoestablishanyspecificconductbythe Foreign Defendantsthattook placein,orwastargetedtoward,theUnited States. The closest Plaintiffs com e to alleging conduct in the U nited States concenzs only the Dom estic Defendants buteven these allegationsare lim ited to the tiadvertising,marketing and sale''ofonly VolkswagenandAudivehicles. Id at!!27,29.Notably,theseallegationsfailto specify the nature of the Foreign D efendants' involvem ent in, or control over, creating and m arketing the Stadvertisements and promotionalmaterials''thatdescribed the ClassVehiclesas d%safeandreliable,whileunifonuly omittinganyreferencetotheIntlatorDefect.''Id at!!219222. AndwhilethePlaintiffsallegethey çkviewed orheard comm ercials''prom oting theddsafety,'' kçdurability,''and Stdependability''of the Class Vehicles,see generally id. at !!39-127,it necessarily follow sfrom the deficientadvertising and m arketing allegationsthatPlaintiffsfailto allege the Foreign Defendantshad any contactsw ith the U nited Statesrelated to these prom otional m aterials. Put sim ply, even when taking Plaintiffs' generalized allegations as true, they do not establish that the Foreign Defendants had contacts with the United States, such that thcy klpurposefully availed''them selvesofthe privilegesand lawsofthe United States.SeeLeon,301 F.Supp.3d at1229(ruling coul' tlacked specificjurisdiction Overnonresidentdefendantswhere complaint alleged tsonly that the Airbag M anufacturer Defendants distributed their products generallyacrossthecountryand advertisedtheirproductsovertheinternet''). c) ddstrcam ofCommerce''Theory 65 Plaintiffs also argue the Courtcan exercise specifcjurisdiction underthe çsstream of commerce''theory. Thatis,Plaintiffsarguethatspecifcjurisdiction isappropriatebecausethe Foreign Defendants designed and m anufactured m illions ofClassVehicles containing defective Takataintlators,which werethen soldto theDomesticDefendantsforsalenationally intheUnited States,and thustheForeign Defendantsinvokedthcbenefitsand protectionsoftheUnited States. (SccD.E.3034at59-62.) In a plurality opinion in AsahiM etalIndustry Co.,the Suprem e Courtdetenuined: The placem entofaproductinto the stream ofcomm erce,withoutm ore,isnotan act of the defendant purposefully directed tow ard the forum State. A dditional conductofthe defendantm ay indicate an intentto sen'e the m arket in the forum State,for example,designing the product for the market in the fonlm State, advertising in the forum State,establishing channelsforproviding regularadvice to custom ersin the fonlm State,orm arketing the productthrough a distributorwho hasagreedto serve asthesalesagentintheforum State. 480U.S.at112(plurality).Subsequently,courtscoinedthistheddstream ofcommerceplus''test. See Vermeulenv.Renault,US.A.,lnc.s985F.2d1534,1548(11thCir.1993)(findingjurisdiction underdistream ofcommerceplus''analysis). The Suprem e Courtrevisited thisçcstream ofcommerce''analysis in J M clntyre M ach., L/t; Iv.Nicastro,564U.S.873(2011).lnanopinionwrittenbyJusticeKennedy,apluralityofthe Suprem e Court opined that a defendant's ûitransm ission of goods perm its the exercise of jurisdictiononlywherethedefendantcanbesaidtohavetargetedtheforum;asageneralrule,it isnotenough thatthe defendantmighthave predicted thatitsgoodswillreach the forum State.'' Id at882(plurality).lnanopinionconcurringinjudgment,JusticeBreyer,joinedbyJusticeAlito, concluded itwasûsunwise to almounce aruleofbroad applicability withoutfullconsideration of them odern-day consequences,''which JusticeBreyerconcluded the record inJ M clntyredid not Present. 887-88 (Breyer,J.,concurring injudgment). Underexisting Supreme Court 66 precedents and the im m ediate factualrecord,Justice Breyerconcluded thc l'ssomething m ore,' such as special state-related dcsign, advertising, advice, m arketing, or anything else,'' was lacking andthustherewasnojustificationforexercisingjurisdictionovertheforeigndefendant. Id at889. Because J Mclntyre did notproduce a majority opinion,the Courtmustfollow the narrow estholding am ong the plurality opinionsin thatcase. See M arks v.Unitedstates,430 U .S. 188, l93 (1977). The narrowestholding comes from Justice Breyer's concurrence,which determ ined lsthe 1aw rem ainsthe same afterM clnt yre.'' See AFTG-TG,LLC v.Nuvoton Tech. Corp.,689 F.3d 1358,1363 (Fed.Cir.2012). Accordingly,the Courtmustfollow applicable precedentfollow ing the Suprem e Court's existing stream -of-com m erce analysis. Id Plaintiffs' stream of com merce argum ent relies on the Eleventh Circuit's ruling in Vermeulen v.Renault, U S.A .,lnc.,where the courtapplied the 'istream of com m erce plus''test from the plurality opinion in Asahi. 985 F.2d at1548-52. ln Vermeulen,a G eorgia plaintiffwho suffered debilitating spinalinjuriesin a caraccidentsued the French state-owned automobile manufacturer Regie Nationale Des Usines Renault IISRNUR''Iand its American distribution affiliate pursuantto the Foreign Sovereign Im m unities A ct,alleging design defects in the vehicle thatshewasdriving when shewasinjured. 1d.at1537. TheEleventh Circuitdetermined the exerciseofspecificjurisdiction overRNUR satisfied due processbecause 'SRNUR intended its LecarstobebroughttotheUnited Statesandtooknumerousajhrmativestepstobringthatresult about....''16lat1550(emphasisinoriginal). ln determining thatRNUR purposely availed itselfoftherightsand privilegesofthelaws ofthe U nited States,the Eleventh Circuitem phasized thatRN U R ûsdesigned the RenaultLecarfor the Am erican m arket,''as the record showed thatRNUR m odified its vehicles içspecifically to 67 accom modate''American consm ers. Id at1549. The Eleventh Circuitalso focused on the fact that RNUR t'advertised its product in the United States,''tihad a large hand in directing''the nationwideadvertisingcampaign,andeven Cdreservedtherighttoveto''anyadvertisingcampaigns. Id Furthennore,the Courtnoted thatRNUR Stestablished channelsforproviding regularadvice to custom ers in the United States,''which included establishing dealerships thatCûincorporated Renault'sstrategiesand vision regarding the distribution ofitsproducts.''Id RN U R also tûcreated and controlled the distribution network thatbroughtitsproductsinto the United States,''and the record reflected in Distributor Agreem ents that RNUR çkretained ultimate control''over the network. Id at1550 (emphasisin original). Finally,theEleventh Circuitnoted thatRNUR'S involvem entwas further evidenced by Stthe extensive financialsupportrendered''to its dom estic distributor. In short, the Eleventh Circuit determ ined that the plaintiffs sufficiently demonstratedtheidsomethingmore''thatjustisedexercisingfederaljurisdictionoverRNUR. H ere,in contrastto Verm eulen,and asoutlined supra,Plaintiffsdo notallege any factsthat the Foreign D efendants:designed the Class V ehicles in or specifically for the United States; directed any advertising campaign;established any channclsforadvising custom ersin theUnited States;created the distribution network in the U nited States;provided any financialsupportto its distributor;orotherwise controlled the Domestic Defendants. Indeed,Plaintiffs allege no facts explaining the corporate relationship,or specifying any contractual agreem ents,betw een any of the subsidiary Dom estic Defendantsand theirrespective foreign-based parents. Plaintiffsthus leave the Courtto inferwhich ofthe Foreign Defendants'contactssupporta finding ofspecific jurisdiction.C/ feon,301F.Supp.3dat1216& n.6(notingthelackofjurisdictionalallegations leftthecourtSsunabletoinferwhichofHonda'scontactswithFloridasupportgedjspecificpersonal jurisdiction'). W hilePlaintiffsallegetheDefendants,collectively,marketed and advertised the 68 ClassVehicles in the United States(D.E.2762 at!!27,29,31),and thatPlaintiffsobserved advertisementsabouttheClassVehicles,id at!!39-127,theseallegations,asdiscussedabove, failto delineate any ofthe Foreign Defendants'involvementorcontroloverthe marketing and advertising cam paigns in the United States. In short, Plaintiffs do not allege the necessary itsomethingmore''toinvokethisCourt'sjurisdiction overtheForeignDefendants. Plaintiffs rely on several other non-binding stream of com m erce cases, but each is distinguishable.Forinstance,PlaintiffscitelnreDepuy Orthopaedics,Inc.,PinnacleH i p Implant Prod.Liab.Litig., 888 F.3d 753, 780 (5th Cir.2018) for the proposition that it lscalmot be ...nonm anufacturing parents categorically lie beyond the stream of com m erce no m atterthe nature oftheircontributions.'' (See D.E.3034 at49.) Butthere,the Fifth Circuitfound the nonm anufacturing parent corporation defendant engaged in numbcr of factors that lûdistinguishgedl(itslrolefrom thepassiveparent-subsidiary relationship''thattheFifth Circuit holdsto be kûinsufficientto supportjurisdiction.'' See id at780 (discussing severalfactors, includingbutnotlim ited to,am erger,integrated design team s,patentassignm ents,and num erous jointadvertising and marketing efforts). Butas discussed above,Plaintiffs'generalized and conclusory allegations failto dem onstratethe Foreign D efendantsengaged in anything m ore than aSkpassive parent-subsidiaryrelationship.'' Next,Plaintiffsrely on two Northern DistrictofAlabama caseswhich,actually,reached opposite conclusionsregarding the exercise ofspecificjurisdiction overforeign-based vehicle m anufacturers. Plaintiffs cite Tom as v.Bayerische M otoren W erkeA G ,2018 W L 4052177,at*3 (N.D.Ala.Aug.24,2018),where the districtcourtinitially found itcould exercise specific jurisdictionoveraç'foreign manufacturergthatlsolditsvehiclestoarelatedentity,whichitknew tohaveanationwidedistribution channelin theUnited States.'' (SeeD.E.3034at50n.6.) But 69 upon reconsideration,the Tomas courtapplied the Eleventh Circuit'sStstream ofcomm erceplus'' testforthe firsttime and reached the opposite conclusion. See Tomas v.Bayerische M otoren WerkeAG,2018 W L 6181172,at*3-4 (N.D.Ala.Nov.27,2018).Specifically,thecourtnlled thatitpreviously en'ed in relying on S'hypotheticalevidence,''which asked thecourtto ûsspeculate'' as to the num berof vehiclessold in Alabam a. Id at *4. The courtalso explained that(teven assum ing''BM W A G lkûundoubtedly derived substantialrevenue from the sale ofthese productss' thiscontentiongwaslstilldconclusoryandinsufficienttosustainafindingofjurisdictionunderthe long-arm statute.''' To reach this conclusion, the Tomas court distinguished Johnson v. Chrysler Canada Inc.,24 F.Supp.3d 1118 (N.D.Ala.2014)- the othercasePlaintiffscitein support(seeD.E.3034at60& n.22).ln sodoing,thecourtin TomasreliedonAskuev.Aurora Corp.ofAm.,whereadistrictcourtinGeorgiaruledthatallegationsthatadefendantmanufacturer dtundoubtedly derived substantial revenue from the sale of ...products'' and Ctengaged in a persistentcourse ofconductin Georgia by engaging adistributorto sellits products in thgatl market''were i'wholly conclusory and insufûcientto sustain a finding ofjurisdictionunderthe long-ann statute.'' 2012 W L 843939,at*4. Aside from these authorities,the weight of federalCircuit authority demonstrates that speciticjurisdiction underthestream ofcommercetheorywillnotbesustainedupon unspecitic and generalized allegations. See,e.g.,Shuker v.Sm ith & Nephew,PLC,885 F.3d 760,780 (3dCir.2018) Csdeclinging)to adoptthe gplaintiffs'j stream-of-commerce theory of specific personaljurisdiction''and noting thatçsgtqhebarefactthat(a nonresidentdefendantjcontracted withagresident)distributorisnotenoughtoestablishpersonaljurisdictionintheState'')(citations omitted);Lesnickv.Hollingsworth drVoseCo.,35 F.3d 939,945(4th Cir.1994)($tTo permita statetoassertjurisdictionoveranypersoninthecountrywhoseproductissoldinthestatesimply 70 because a person must expectthat to happen destroys the notion of individualsovereignties inherentin our system of federalism. Such a rule would subjectdefendants to judgmentin locations based on the activity ofthird persons and notthe deliberate conductofthe defendant, makingitimpossiblefordefendantstoplan andstructuretheirbusincsscontactsandrisks.');St. Jarrev.HeidelbergerDruckmaschinen,A.G.,19 F.3d 1430 (4th Cir.1994)(afûrmingdismissal oflawsuitforlackofpersonaljurisdictionwheretherewasnoevidencetheforeignmanufacturer defendantd'designed the productsforthe m arketin Virginia,advertised in Virginia,established channelsforproviding regularadviceto custom ersinVirginia,ormarketed theproductthrough a distributorwho agreedtoserveasthesalesagentin Virginia''l;BridgeportMusic,Inc.v.StillN TheWaterPub.,327F.3d472,484n.11(6thCir.2003)(affirmingdismissalofallactionsagainst nonzesidentdefendantNTW understream ofcom merce plusapproach whereplaintifffailed to demonstrategroundsforjurisdictionbecausetsnocontractlanguagegwaslpresented''andbecause plaintiffdid notsetforth Slsufficientfacts''to find thatNTW Stactually required rdistributorjto market,distribute,orlicense''the infringing work in theapplicable forum);Palnikv.Westlake Entm 't,Inc.,344F.App'x 249,252(6th Cir.2009)(affirmingdismissaloflawsuitagainsttwo nonresident defendants under stream of com m erce theory- which required focus lton the distribution relationship'' because plaintiff's allegations did not provide tttreasonable particularity'as to''Sçthe relationship between the defendants'''and declining to 'iinfer thatan agreementofthesortnecessaryforjurisdictionunderBridgeport...existed'). ln short,Plaintiffs'generalizedandconclusory allegationsfailto adequatelyplead thatthe Foreign Defendants purposefully availed them selves of the laws and privileges ofthe United States.Therefore,theCourtfindsthatundertheseallegations,exercisingspecifcjurisdictionover theForeignDefendantsunderRule4(k)(2)wouldnotcomportwith dueprocess. 3. C onclusion Forthe foregoing reasons,the Courtfinds thatPlaintiffs'allegationsfailto establish a primafaciecaseofspeciicjurisdiction overtheForeign Defendàntspursuanttoeitherthestate long-arm statutesorthe federallong-arm statute. Therefore,allthe claim s asserted againstthe Foreign Defendants in the Transferor and Direct-File Actions are DISM ISSED for lack of personaljurisdiction. JUR ISDICT IO NA L D ISC O V ERY Buried in the Om nibus Response,Plaintiffs argue that in the event the Courtdtis not convinced thatPlaintiffs'allegationsestablish personaljurisdiction,''the Courtshould Skdefer ruling ...untilthe partiescompletejurisdictionaldiscovery.'' (D.E.3034 at65.) Defendants oppose the Plaintiffs'conditionalrequest. iilFjederalcoul'ts have the power to order,attheir discretion,the discovery offacts necessary to ascertain theircom petency to entertain the m erits.'' Eaton v.D orchester D ev.,Inc., 692 F.2d 727,729 (11th Cir.1982)(citationsomitted). Sélljurisdictionaldiscovery is favored wherethereisagenuinedisputeconcerningjurisdictionalfactsnecessaryto decidethequestion ofpersonaljurisdiction;itisnotan unconditionalrightthatpennitsaplaintiffto seek factsthat would ultimatelyn0tsupportashowingapersonaljurisdiction.''Bernardelev.Bonorino,608F. Supp.2d 1313,1321(S.D.Fla.2009).Forseveralreasons,theCourtdoesnotfinditappropriate todeferrulingonthependingMotionstoDismissinordertocompletejurisdictionaldiscovery. First,the Eleventh Circuithas explained thatin certain cases district courts should not çsresel'verulingongapendingjmotiontodismissinordertoallow theplaintifftolookforwhatthe plaintiffshould havehad- butdidnot- befozecomingthrough thecourthousedoors,even though thecourtwould havethe inherentpow erto do so.'' Low ery v.Alabama Pow erCo.,483 F.3d ll84, 1216 (11th Cir.2007).Andindeed,theparty who invokesfederaljurisdictionhastheburden of 72 establishing suchjurisdiction. Seeid (citing Fed.R.Civ.P.8(a)(1)($çA pleading thatstatesa claim for relief m ust contain ...a short and plain statem ent of the grounds for the court's J -' LICI -Sdiction....'')). fJwcry'sguide appliesto casesinvolving invocation offederalpersonal jurisdiction overnonresidentdefendants. See Yepez v.RegentSeven Seas Cruises,2011 W L 3439943,at*2 (S.D.Fla.Aug.5,2011)(denying motion to stay ruling on motion to dismiss pendingjurisdictionaldiscoveryandnotingthelltypesoffactsplaintiffsareexpectedtoinvestigate prior to filing suit''include facts related to issues of personaljurisdiction over a foreign corporation)(citingftpwcry' ,483F.3dat1216).Here,thePlaintiffswerewell-awareofthefactintensive analysisthatfederalcourtsapply when deciding issuesofpersonaljurisdiction over nonresidcntdefendants. In lightofPlaintiffs'failure to investigate,collect,and allege sufficient factspriorto initiating thisstage ofthisnow 4-year-old com plex m ultidistrictlitigation lawsuit, the Courtdeclinesto deferruling on the pending M otionsto Dism iss.See,e.g.id.;Thompson,174 F.Supp.3dat1338-39(rulingplaintiffwasdtforeclosedfrom pursuingjurisdictionaldiscoveryin an attem ptto m arshalfacts thathe Cshould have had- butdid not- before com ing through the courthouse'doors.'')(quotingftpwcry,483F.3dat1216). Second,Plaintiffs'informal(and conditional)requestfailsto itspecify whatinformation gplaintiffshavejsoughtorhow thatinformation would bolsterrtheirjallegations.'' See Iz rzb//'v. Celebrity Cruises Inc.,683 F.App'x 786,792 (11th Cir.2017)(ruling districtcoul'tdid not improperly deny jurisdictionaldiscovery). For instance,Plaintiffs summarily assert(igtjhe jurisdictionaldiscoveryrequestsPlaintiffshaveservedaim toidentify Defendants'contactswith theUnitedStatesandvariousjurisdictions,aswellastheconnectionbetweenthesecontactsand Plaintiffs'claims.''(D.E.3034at66-67.) W ithoutmore,theCourtisunwillingtodeferrulingon the pcnding M otions to Dismiss. See I zJW/ .J; 683 F. App'x at 792;Instabook Corp. 72 Instantpublisher.com,469 F.Supp.2d 1120, 1127 (M .D.Fla.2006) (denying request for jurisdictionaldiscovery andgrantingdefendant'smotiontodismissforlackofjurisdictionwhere plaintiffdidnottdexplainglhow suchdiscoverywouldbolsteritscontentions''). Third,thereisnogenuinefactualdisputeconcerningpersonaljurisdictionbecausenoneof the parties subm itted affidavitor declaration evidence in supportof,or in opposition to,the exerciseofpersonaljurisdictionovertheDomesticorForeignDefendants.W ithoutsuchadispute, it is unwarranted to extend this protracted litigation any longer by deferring a ruling on the othcrwise fully and extensively briefed M otionsto Dism iss. SeeBernardele,608 F.Supp.2d at 1321 (i%gljurisdictional discovery is favored where there is a genuine dispute concerning jurisdictionalfactsnecessary todecidethe question ofpersonaljurisdiction ....'');Peruyero v. Airbus,S.A.S.,83 F.Supp.3d 1283,1290 (S.D.Fla.2014)(denying requestforjurisdictional discovery and granting motion to dismissforlack ofspecificjurisdiction wheretherewaslkno genuinedisputeonamaterialJ'urisdictionalfact''). Fourth,Plaintiffs'hedged request is procedurally im proper. lnstead of form ally m oving the Courtto deferruling on the pending M otionsto Dism iss,Plaintiffsbul' y theirrequestwithin theirOm nibus Response a requestthatisthen eonditioned upon the Courtnotbeing Stconvinced thatPlaintiffs'allegationsestablish personaljurisdiction.'' See D.E.3034 at65;United Techs. Corp.v.Mazer,556 F.3d 1260,1280-81(11th Cir.2009)(affirming districtcourt'sdenialof jurisdictional discovery where the plaintiff tknever formally moved the district court for jurisdictionaldiscoverybut,instead,buried suchrequestsinitsbriefsasaproposedalternativeto dismissing(defendantjonthestateofthecurrentrecord'). Finally,in addition to never form ally ûling a motion,Plaintiffsalso never attempted to supplementtheirpositionwithanyjurisdictionaldiscovery,orotherwisesignaledtotheCourtthat 74 adeferredl' ulingwasappropriate.SeeUnited Techs.Corp.,556F.3d at1281(affirmingdistrict court'sdismissalon personaljurisdiction groundspriortojurisdictionaldiscovery becausethe plaintiffSlshould have taken every step possibleto signalto the districtcourtitsim mediate need forsuch discovery,''butfailed to take any ''reasonable stepsto seek discovery,ora deferralofa ruling pending discovery''during the severalmonthsthatthemotion to dismisswaspending). M oreover, this litigation has been pending for over 4 years and discovery has indeed been undertaken.Thus,Plaintiffshavehad many opportunitiesto supplem entthcrecord on thisissue. Thefactthatthey have notisindicativethatthere isno factualdispute on thisissue. Forthesereasons,Plaintiffs'informalrequesttodeferruling on personaljurisdiction if the Court is not tsconvinced that Plaintiffs' allegations establish personaljurisdiction'' is D EN IED . C O N CLU SIO N In short,theCourtûndswith respectto the TransferorActionsthatthetransferordistrict courtscan exercisegeneraljurisdiction overtheDomesticDefendants;butthey cannotexercise generalorspeciicjurisdiction overtheForeign Dcfendants.AsfortheDirect-FileActions,the CourtfindsitlikewisecannotexercisegeneralorspecifcjurisdictionovertheForeignDefendants, butthatitcan exercisespecificjurisdictionovertheDomesticDefendantsastotheIUCO claims. W hethertheCourtcanexercisependentpersonaljurisdictionovertheDomesticDefendantsasto thePlaintiffs'remainingfederal,state,and com mon-law claim sintheDirect-FileActionsdepends upon whetherPlaintiffssufficiently plead plausibleRICO claims. See Koch,847 F.Supp.2d at 1377-78(notingthatCtiftheonlyjurisdictionally suffcientclaim isdroppedordismissed ...the pendentclaim should be dismissed aswe11''). The Courtwillnow addressthe sufficiency of Plaintiffs'RICO allegations. 111. RICO 75 A. (dPATTERN OF RACKETEERING ACTIVITY''- SECTION 1962(C) Plaintiffs assert federalRICO claims under 18 U.S.C.Section 1962(c) against each Defendant.TostateaplausibleSection 1962/)claim,PlaintiffsmustallegethatDefendants:(1) engagedinconduct(2)ofanenterprise(3)throughapattern (4)ofracketeeringactivity.Williams v.MohawkIndus.,Inc.,465F.3d 1277,1282(11thCir.2006),abrogatedonothergroundsbyRay v.SpiritAirlines,Inc.,836 F.3d 1340,l349(11th Cir.2016). Racketeering activity isdefined as anyactindictableunderanyofthestatutoryprovisionslistedin 18U.S.C.Section 1961(1),which includes m ailand w ire fraud in violation of 18 U .S.C .Sections 1341 and 1343. See K emp v.Am . Tel.& Tel.Co.,393F.3d 1354,1359(11thCir.2004).A lipatternofracketeeringactivity''requires thecommissionofatleasttwosuchactswithinaten-yearperiod.See 18U.S.C.#196145), *Ralput r.City Trading,LLC,476F.App'x 177,180(11thCir.2012). Plaintiffs'pattern of racketeering claim s are predicated on m ailand w ire fraud,and thus dtmustcomplynotonly with theplausibilitycriteriaarticulated in Twombly and Iqbal,butalsowith Fed.R.Civ.P.9(b)'sheightened pleading standard,which requiresthat$gijn alleging fraud or m istake,a party m ust state with particularity the circum stances constituting fraud Or m istake.''' Amer.DentalAss'nv.CignaCorp.,605F.3d1283,1291(1lthCir.2010)(quotingAmbrosiaCoal tf Constr.Co.v.PagesM orales,482F.3d 1309,1316n.10(11th Cir.2007:.klGiventheroutine useofmailandwirecommunicationsinbusinessoperations...g,1CRICO claimspremisedonmail orwire fraud m ustbeparticularly scrutinized because ofthe relative ease with which a plaintiff m ay m old a RICO pattern from allegations that, upon closer scrutiny, do not support it.''' Crawford v.Franklin CreditMgmt.Corp.,758F.3d 473,489 (2d Cir.2014)(quotingEh'on v. Embassy Suites(PuertoRico),lnc.,223F.3d 12,20(1stCir.2000)). TocomplywithRule9(b),Plaintiffsmustallege:$$(1)theprecisestatements,documents, ormisrcpresentationsmade;(2)thetime,place,andperson responsibleforthestatement, '(3)the 76 contentandmannerinwhichthesestatementsmisledthePlaintiffs;and (4)whatthedefendants gained bythealleged fraud.'' Brooksv.BlueCrossdrBlueShield ofFla.,Inc.,116 F.3d 1364, 1380-81(11th Cir.1997)+ercuriam)(citation omitted). In addition,theplaintiffmustallege particularfactswith respectto each defendant'sparticipation in the fraud. 1d.at 1381. ln other words,aplaintiffisrequired to setforth specitic allegationsasto each defendantthatwillfulfill the liwho,what,when,where,and how''pertaining to the underlying fraud. Garfeld v.NDC HealthCorp.,466F.3d 1255,1262(11th Cir.2006)(citationomitted).Atbottom,thepurposeof the particularity rule isto alertdefendantsto theirprecise misconductand protectthem against baseless chargesoffraudulentbehavior.See D urham v.Bus.M gmt.Assocs.,847 F.2d 1505,1511 (11th Cir.1988)(citingSevilleIndus.M ach.Corp.v.SouthmostMach.Corp.,742F.2d786,791 (3dCir.1984)). Here,Plaintiffsfailto plead w ith sufficientparticularity thatany ofthe Defendantsengaged in a pattern of racketeering activity prem ised on m ail and w ire fraud. Far from Ctprecise,'' Plaintiffs' allegations describe in general term s the contents of the D efendants' internal com munications,and the Defendants'comm unicationswith Takata,governmentauthorities,and the public. By w ay ofexam ples,Plaintiffs allege D efendants'dtpattel' n ofracketeering activity in violation of the mail and wire fraud statutes'' include, inter alia' . internal comm unications concerning itdeviations from''and Stapproved deviationsfrom ''USCAR Specifications,and the ç'repeatedfailureofTakata'sintlatorstomeettheUSCAR Specifications''(D.E.2758at!!211(a), (c);D.E.2759at!217(a);D.E.2762 at!J314(b)(iii));internalcommunicationsconcerning lithe instabilityandvolatilityofammonium nitrate''(D.E.2762at!!280(a)-(b));communicationswith Takataregarding Skcountlessshipmentsof,andpaymentsfor,millionsofinflators''(D.E.2758at !J211(b);D.E.2759at!217(b);D.E.2762at!!279(b),313(b));andcommunicationswithTakata 77 concerningtsaninflatorrupturethatoccurred duringtesting''(D.E.2758at!211(d);D.E.2759at !2l7(d)). Taken together as true, while Plaintiffs' allegations dem onstrate Defendants had knowledge ofissueswith Takataairbags- and knowledgeisnotsubjectto Rule9(b)pleading requirements,Fed.R.Civ.P.9(b) beyond this,the allegations(çprovideno basisin factupon whichtheCourtcouldconcludethatanyspecificactofanyspecificDefendantg)isindictablefor mailorwirefraud,''Brooks,116 F.3d at1381. Forinstance,Plaintiffs'allegationsfailto explain how theStdeviationsfrom''orlsfailuretom eet''theUSCAR specificationshad any connection with vehicle safety or nationwide recalls based on the intlator defect,let alone how those alleged deviations or failures constitute m ailor w ire fraud. And Plaintiffs'allegations aboutpurchases and shipmentsofinflatorsseem to assum ethesecomm unicationsare fraud based,butthey donot allege additional details explaining how these otherw ise routine business com m unications constitute fraud. Plaintiffs'failure to link FCA 'S and V olksw agen's alleged com m unicationsto fraudulent conductare highlighted by the lack ofa single quote,from a single communication on a specific date,between any specificpersonnelatFCA orVolkswagen,with Takata personnel,with federal regulators,orwiththepublic.Consequently,Plaintiffsfailtoallegetheûswho,what,when,where, andhow''pertainingtothealleged fraud.Garheld,466F.3dat1262;seealsoBrooks,116F.3d at 1380-81 (noting that a plaintiff must allege Slthe precise statements, documents, or misrepresentationsmade,''andçlthetime,place,andpersonresponsibleforthestatemenf'). A s forthe allegations against General M otors and M ercedes,Plaintiffs include only a handfulofallegationsinvolving specificpersonnel. Buttheseallegationsareseparately deficient because the Plaintiffs stillfailto allcge either ''the precise statements...ormisrepresentations 78 made''orfailtoallegetheçscontentand mannerin which theg)statementsmisled thePlaintiffs.'' Brooka,116F.3dat1380-81;seealsoLawriev.GinnDev.Co.,LLC,656F.App'x464,474(11th Cir.2016)($ûRule9(b)requiresmore than an allegation thata misrepresentation wasmade;it requiresaplaintifftoidentify withprecisionwhatthemisrepresentationactuallywas.''). TheallegationsagainstGeneralM otorsinclude only a single com munication involving a specific GeneralM otorsem ployee. Plaintiffsallege thatLeo K now lden ofG eneralM otors senta communication to (an unspecified person)atTakatathatkddemanded thatTakata çputthe story togetherthatmay potentially lim itthe scope'ofa recall,following the field nzpture in a 2013 ChevroletCruze.'' (D.E.2759at!217(i).) Plaintiffsthen ccmclusorily allege thatKnowlden's statem entwasmadeSiin orderto concealthescopeand natureofthelntlatorDefectand to promote thepurported safetyofGM vehicles.''Id Plaintiffsdonotallegewith particularity,however,hOw this singular statem ent which issusceptible to num erousexplanations---constitutesfraud. Then,while Plaintiffs'allegations against M ercedes reference several comm unications w ith greater specificity than other Defendants,upon close inspection,these allegations are also deficient. First,Plaintiffsreference multiple em ailcomm unicationsbetween M atthiasHaupt,a vicepresidentofTakataAG,andotheremployeesofTakata(D.E.2762at!!314(e)-(9,andone em ail exchange betw een H aupt and M ike Rains, the G overnm ent A ffairs Specialist at TK Holdings,lnc.,id at!317(h). In these internalTakata communications,Hauptdiscussesan upcom ing visit by Professor Rodolfo Schöneburg, Head of Vehicle Safety, Durability and Corrosion Protection atM ercedesCars,with Takata'sProductSafety Group.'' 1d.at!314(e). Hauptalso describesdtanotherhigh lcvelm eeting with M ercedesCarsPurchasing''asgoing dtvery welldespite the bad news''aboutcertain inflatorm odels,and thatdr aimlerstays comm itted to keep (Takataj $as aplayerin the industry.''' 1d at!314(9. Then,Hauptand Rains discuss 79 N HTSA'S(Cprelim inary Evaluation''ofintlators,and questionnaire,asappliedtoM ercedes.f#.at !314(h).Specifically,RainsinformsHauptthattdDaimlerwasgmistakenlylincludedonourletter to NHTSA yesterday. Ourrecordsshow thatthey are notaffected by therangesweposted.''Id (alterationinoriginal).RainslatertellsHauptthatTakatad'verballytold IINHTSAJthatDaimler shouldnotbeonthelist.''ItL (alterationin original).W hiletheseallegationsincludethedtperson responsible''forthe statem ents,none ofthe personsinvolved in these com m unications worked for M ercedes. Furtherm ore,while these comm unications m ay help supporta RICO claim against Takata,Plaintiffsdo notexplain how these internalTakata com municationscan be extended to supportaclaim thatM ercedescomm itted mailorwire fraud. Second,Plaintiffs allege multiple internal communications between specific M ercedes employeeson specificdates.1d.at!!314(b)(ii),(iv)-(vi).) Butthistim e,the contentsofthese com m unications are described,atbest,in generalterm s. For instance,Plaintiffs allege Brandon M arriott, a Product Engineer fOr Daim ler Chzysler, com m unicated to Steve Stram , another engineer at Daim ler Chzysler,thata Takata am m onium nitrate inflator had perform ance issues'' andthatSsshot'inflators''used intestsçûhighlightan ongoing quality issue.'' 1d.at!314(b)(ii). PlaintiffsthenallegethatStram madeothercommunications(tounknownrecipients)dkregarding'' variousissues,including tsTakata inflatorvariability,''çideploymentsin which intlatorfragm ents wereexpelled,''andTakata'sfailuretotdcomply with USCAR requirements.''Id at!314(e)(v). Plaintiffs also allege Stram m ade other communications to Takata that Ssdiscussed additional performanceissueswithTakata'sintlators''andCçregardledqhisinspectionoftheMonclovafacility afteritsammonium-nitrate-fueled explosion.'' Id at!!314(e)(iv),(vi). Holding asidewhether 80 thestatementsm adeby DaimlerChryslerl6em ployeescan beattributedto M ercedes,thecontents ofthese comm unicationstaken togetherdonotallege fraudulentconductby M ercedes- letalone with requisiteparticularity. lnstead,Plaintiffsleave ittotheCourtto fillin theblanks. Finally,Plaintiffs do allege one communication between a specific M ercedes employee and a specificTakataemployee,on a specificdate,thatincludesspecificcontents: lnanemaildatedJanuay 21,2016,from DanielFahrbach,ExecutiveAssistantto theExecutiveVicePresldentofMercedesCarsProcurementandSupplierQuality atDaimlerAG,tootherDaimleremgloyeesandTakataemployeesinGermanyand the U nited States, including M atthlas H aupt of Takata, Fahrbach sum m arizes a January 19, 2016,m eeting between Daimler and Takata and notes that,as a tdtechnicalupdate''onthetûActualSituationAirbagInflators,''(1)(tltlhehigherthe temperatureisthemorelikelyistheruptureoftheintlatorinthefield'';(2)aSifield ruptureofaSD1M odulein South Carolina''(amoduleusedbyiigtjhesprinter''dtat thedriverairbaf');and(3)$ç3 (PSDI51inflatorswererupturedduringtestingthis week ....700.000M B carsintheU.S.havethismodule'';and(4)d'Daimlerstates clearly thatthereisastrong willto continuebusinesswith Takata. fJ.at!314(g).Again,though,Plaintiffsdonotallegehow thesespecificstatementsconstituted fraud. Indeed,Plaintiffs failto allege any statem ents m ade by M ercedes to federalregulators or to the general public, w ith requisite particularity, that w ould allow the Court to infer that M ercedes'sinternalcomm unications,oritscom municationswith Takata,constitutem ailorwire fraud. See Lawrie,656 F.App'x at474 ($tRu1e9(b)requires more than an allegation thata m isrepresentation was made; it requires a plaintiff to identify with precision what the misrepresentationactuallywas.''). 16 A sM ercedes points outin its M otion to Dism iss,som e ofPlaintiffs'allegations against Mercedes,such asthese,çiappeartorelateto a separateand distinctChryslercompany.'' (D.E. 2988 at 48 n.22.) Mercedes argues that the Plaintiffs diconflate two distinct companies: DaimlerchryslerAG and DaimlerchryslerCorporation.'' Id Mercedesgoeson to arjuethat DaimlerchryslerCorporation tûdesigned,manufactured and sold (and purchased airbag lnflators for)Chrysler,Dodgeand Jeep vehiclesuntilitsbankruptcy in 2009,''and (sgaltnotime...ever designgcdl,manufacturerdj,or(soldjM ercedes-Benzvehicles.''I6l ltappearsthatthePlaintiffs' Om nibus Response doesnotchallenge orotherwise clarify M ercedes's argum enton thispoint. 81 The problem with the overall lack of specificity in Plaintiffs' allegations is further compounded by the fact that Plaintiffs imprecisely lump together each of the Defendants' corporate families. As a prime example,Plaintiffs define tivolkswagen''to include both the domestic-subsidiarycorporations(VolkswagenGroupofAmericaandAudiofAmerica,LLC)and the two foreign-based parent corporations (Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft and Audi Aktiengesellschaft)(seeD.E.2762at!!30,280(a)-(l)).Plaintiffsdothesameastothecorporate familiesofGeneralMotorsandM ercedes.(SeeD.E.2759at!!2,217(a)-(n);D.E.2762atj!33, 314(a)-(i).) A s the Eleventh Circuit has explained,because çdfair notice''is perhaps the m ost basic consideration underlying Rule9(b),plaintiffs who plead fraud kçmust reasonably notify the defendantsoftheirpurportedroleinthescheme.''Brooks,116F.3dat1381(intelmalcitationsand quotationsomitted). Thismeansthatin a case involving multiple defendants,dtthe complaint shouldinform cach defendantofthenatureofhisallegedparticipationin thefraud.''Id (quoting Divittorio v.Equidyne Extractive Indus.,Inc.,822 F.2d 1242,1247 (2d Cir.1987));see also ViridisCorp.v.FCW Glob.CreditM asterFun4 LP,155F.Supp.3d l344,1362(S.D.Fla.2015) (noting that when plaintiffs advance RICO claims premised on mail and wire fraud, the tdDefendants are entitled to know the specific allegations thatare being brought against each individualDefendant....''). For this additional reason, the Court finds that Plaintiffs' RICO claim s, which are predicated on m ail and w ire fraud,are not alleged w ith sufficient particularity as required by Rule9(b). SeeBrooks,116 F.3d at1381(aftirming dismissalofRICO claimsunderRule9(b) standardsbecauseplaintiffsçssimply tlumped together'a1loftheDefendantsin theirallegationsof 82 fraud'')(quoting Vicom,lnc.v.HarbridgeMerchantServs.,lnc.s20F,3d771,778(7thCir.1994)), . Viridis Corp.,155 F.Supp.3d at1362. To be clear,though,theCourtdeclinesto dismissPlaintiffs'RICO claim ssolely on group pleading grounds- asM ercedes and Volkswagen request(see D.E.2988 at48-50)- because using collective references isnotan im perm issible pleading form perse. See SprintSols.,Inc.v. Fils-Amie,44 F.Supp.3d 1224,1227 (S.D.Fla.2014)CûgA)plaintiffmay plead claimsagainst multiple defendants by referring to them collectively,for example by referring to a group of defendantsasidefendants,''')(citing Crowev.Coleman,l13F.3d 1536,1539 (1lth Cir.1997)); Toback,2013W L 5206103,at*2 Cs-fhoughPlaintiffreferstoDefendantscollectivelyasSGNC,' he has alleged sufficient factual detail to put D efendants on notice of the nature of the claim s againstthem,satisfyingtherequirementsofRule8.'').W henplaintiffsusecollectivereferences, they çsareconstruedasapplyingtoeach defendantindividually,''thatis,theyStsimplysignalg)that D efendants are both alleged to have participated in the conductatissue.'' SprintSols.,Inc.,44 F. Supp.3dat1227(citingCrtpwc,113F.3dat1539).Butcollectivelyreferencingdefendantsksmost often creategslproblems when broad allegationsare directed ata large and diverse group of defendants,leavingunclearjustwhoisallegedtohavecommittedwhichacts.''1d.Here,theCourt findsPlaintiffs'unspecificallegationsçsrunlqafoul''ofRule9(b)pleadingstandardsinpartbecause theallegationsfailto givethcindividualDefendantssuffcientnotice ofthefraud they arealleged to have comm itted.Seeid. ln short,w hile Plaintiffs advance extensive allegations to supporttheir substantive RICO claim,Rule9(b)requiresthatPlaintiffspleadtheseallegationswithparticularity.Asshownabove, Plaintiffshavefailed todo so. And Rule9(b)doesnotpermittheCourttoassemblePlaintiffs' allegationsSûinto acollageoffraud.''fawrie,656 F.App'x at474. 83 N ow,theCourtism indfulthatitpreviously declinedto dismissRICO claim sinthiscase. See In re Takata Airbag Prod.Liab.Litig.,2015 W L 9987659,at*2. Butthe Court'sprevious ruling isnotinconsistentwith finding thatPlaintiffs'RICO allegationsagainstthese Defendants lack therequiredparticularity underRule9(b).Duringtheopeningactofthislitigation,4years ago, the consum er plaintiffs asserted only tw o claim s for violations of RICO :a claim under Section l962(c)againstTakata,and aclaim underSection l962(d)againstTakataand Honda. (SeeD.E.579at150,162.)TheconsumerplaintiffsdidnotallegeviolationsofRICO againstany ofthe otherautom otivem anufacturing and distributing defendantsthatwere previously involved inthislitigation(e.g.BM W ,Ford,Mazda,M itsubishi,Nissan,Subaru,orToyota).(Seegenerally D.E.579.) lnstead,theconsumerplaintiffslimitedtheirsubstantiveRICO claim toTakata the defendant unequivocally at the center of this litigation- and their RICO conspiracy claim to Takata and a single automotive manufacturerand distributor(e.g.Honda). The Courtreadily acknowledges that the plausibility of the allegations underlying those lim ited RICO claim s presented a close question. But ultim ately, the Court found those allegations sufticiently particularizedunderRule9(b)to survivaldismissal. ln thisact,4 years laterand w ith the opportunity to conductdiscovery and supplem entthe record,the Consumer Plaintiffs here asserteightclaim s forviolations of RICO:claims under Sections1962(c)and 1962(d)againsteach ofFCA,GeneralM otors,Mercedes,andVolkswagen. (And thisdoesnotincludethetwenty claimsforviolationsofRICO asserted by theçsRecycler Plaintiffs,''which comprise claimsunder Sections1962(c) and 1962(d)againsteach ofFCA, GeneralM otors,M ercedes,Volkswagen,BM W ,Honda,M azda,Nissan,Subaru,and Toyota.) Despitethebenefitofyearsofdiscovery,the substantive RICO allegationsagainsttheimmediate Defendants are considerably m ore generaland conclusory than the allegationsasserted against 84 TakataandHonda,whichjustsurvivedRule9(b). (CompareD,E.2758at!!211(a)-(k)(FCA), and D.E 2759 at!!217(a)-(n)(GeneralM otors),and D.E.2762 at!!280(a)-(1),314(a)-(i) (Volkswagen andM ercedes),withD.E.579at!!427(a)-(u).) Consequently,theCourtfindsthe m ore generaland conclusory allegationspresented here certainly lack the speciticity required to satisfyRule9(b). Therefore,Plaintiffs fail to allege w ith suffcient particularity a pattern of racketeering activityunderSection 1962(c).Furthermore,becausethefailuretopleadapatternofracketeering doomsPlaintiffs'Section 1962(c)claims,the Courtneednotreach Defendants'argumentsthat Plaintiffs failto plead association-in-factor proxim ate causation. As a result,the M otions to DismisstheSection 1962(c)claimsareGRANTED;Count2intheBoyd Complaint,Count2in the WhitakerComplaint,and Counts 1and 3 in thePuhalla ComplaintareDISM ISSED. B. SdCONSPIRACY TO VIOLATE RICOM-SECTION 1962(D) Plaintiffs also assert RICO conspiracy claims under Section 1962(d) against each Defendant. Section 1962(d)makesitSçunlawfulforanyperson toconspireto violate anyofthe provisionsofsubsection(a),(b),or(c)ofgsection 19621.5' 18U.S.C.j 1962(d).TheDefendants argue thatPlaintiffs fail to adequately plead a RIC O conspiracy claim . ln addition,FCA and GeneralM otorsarguethatPlaintiffs'conspiracy claim smustalso failbecausethePlaintiffsfailto adequately pleadtheirsubstantiveRICO claims. Contral'y to FCA 'Sand GeneralM otors'ssuggestion,thereis$tno controllingauthority''in the Eleventh Circuit or in the Supreme Courtthat requires this Court to dismiss Plaintiffs' conspiracy claim ssim ply becausethesubstantiveRICO claim swere deficiently alleged.SeeAm. DentalAss'n,605 F.3d at 1296 n.6. lnstead,the Eleventh Circuithas txplained thatSiwhere a plaintiff fails to state a RICO claim and the conspiracy count does not contain additional allegations,gthenltheconspiracyclaim necessarilyfails.''Rogersv.Nacchio,241F.App'x 602, 85 609(11thCir,2007).Uponclosereview oftheAmendedConsolidatedClassActionComplaints, theCourtfindsthatPlaintiffs'conspiracy(oritovel' tacts'')allegationsdonotkdcontain additional allegations.'' ltappears the tsovertacts''allegations w hich substantially rehash the pattern of racketeering allegations simply refram ethepattern ofracketeering allegationsin the contextof a conspiratorialagreem ent. Thus,the Courtcould dism issPlaintiffs'conspiracy claim son this basisalone. Buteven ifPlaintiffs'l'ovel' tacts''allegationsdo ûkcontain additionalallegations''separate from thepattern ofracketeering contentions,the CourtstillfindsthatPlaintiffsfailto plausibly allegea RICO conspiracy involving any oftheDefendants. Sé-l-he essenceofa RICO conspiracy claim is that each defendant has agreed to participate in the conduct of an enterprise's illegal activities.'' Solomonv.Blue Cross& BlueShieldAss'n,574F.Supp.2d 1288,1291(S.D.Fla. 2008)(citing 18 U.S.C.j 1962(d))(emphasisin original). ThisCourthaspreviously held that iiproofoftheagreementisattheheartofaconspiracyclaim.''1d.(quotingInreM anaged Care Litig.,430F.Supp.2d 1336,1345(S.D.Fla.2006)).Plaintiffscanestablish aRICO conspiracy claim byshowingaDefendant:(1)agreedtotheoverallobjectiveoftheconspiracy;or(2)agreed to committwo predicate acts. Am.DentalAss'n,605 F.3d at 1293 (quoting Republic of #J?7J?nJ,119F.3dat950).A IUCO agreementnecdnotbeestablishedby directevidence;itmay be inferred from the conductoftheparticipants.Id Unlike Section 1962(c) claims predicated on fraud, conspiracy claims under Section 1962(d) must satisfy Rule8 pleading requirements. See id.at 1290-96 (evaluating Section 1962(d)claim underRule8,andfraud-basedSection 1962(c)claim underRule9(b));see alsoAssociatedIndus.Ins.Co.v.AdvancedMgmt.Servs.,Inc.,2014W L 1237685,at*7n.7(S.D. Fla.M ar.26,2014)('1Ru1e9(b)'sparticularity requirementdoesnotapply to RICO conspiracy 86 clain' 1s-''l.UnderRule8,though,RICO conspiracy claim scannotbesupported by allegationsthat are içrnerely conclusory and unsupported by any factualallegations-'' Solom on,574 F.Supp.2d at 1291(quotingRepublicofpanama,119F.3dat950). Here,Plaintiffs'conspiracy allegations fare no betterthan theirpattern of racketeering allegations. Plaintiffs generally allege that each Defendant Cdwas associated with''a RICO enterprisethatttagreedandconspiredtoviolate 18U.S.C.j1962(c),thatis,agreedtoconductand participate, directly and indirectly, in the conduct of the affairs''of the RICO enterprise. (SeeD.E.2758at!219;D.E.2759at!;225;D.E.2762at!!288,322.) Plaintiffsthen generally allegethateach Defendantand Takata: (SlharedinformationabouttheDefectiveAirbags'inherenttlaws,theirinabilityto m eetsafety speciscations,and abnorm alairbag deploym ents experienced by other autom akers;delayed and/orprevented therelease ofinculpatory inform ation;and m aintained a consistentpublic posture as to the scope ofvehicles affected by the DefectiveAirbagsand thesafetyrisksthose airbagsposed. (SeeD.E.2758at!220;D.E.2759at!226;D.E.2762 at!!289,323.) Plaintiffsf' urtherallege thatD efendants'and Takata's diclose cooperation on issues sunounding the lntlator Defect,their concealmentofthenatureandscopeofthelntlatorDefect,andtheirjointparticipationinpredicate acts ...is evidence ofthe conspiracy.'' 1d. Lookingbeyond thesegeneralcontentions,Plaintiffsalso assertallegationsagainstspecific Defendants. Like the pattern Ofracketeering allegations,Plaintiffs allege thatFCA Stengineers continued to approve the use ofammonium nitrate intlators''çûgdlespite being presented with deviation requestsand testresultsfrom Takata showing thatthe amm onium nitrate intlatorsdid notmeettheUSCAR specitications.'' (D.E.2758at!222(b).) Plaintiffsthen allegethatafter çienergetic disassemblies''occurred during testing and in the field between 2010 and 2013,that FCA dtdid notcom m ence an officialrecallforitsvehicles until2014,'5and even then,çilim ited the 87 scopeoftherecalltohumidpartsofthecountry.''1d.at!!222(c)-(e).Finally,Plaintiffsallege thatFCA Sffalsely claim ed thattheriskscaused by the lntlatorDefectdisappeared to thenorth of som earbitrary latitude in theAm erican South''and also l'm ischaracterized the lnflatorDefectas theproductofidiosyncraticmanufacturingtlaws.''ld at!222(e). Next,PlaintiffsallegethatGeneralM otorsknew theywereusingTakataairbagscontaining ammonium nitrateand tlexpressed concel' n to TakataaboutçAN gammonium nitrate)propellant stability,'''butSsultim ately did nothing to rem edy the problem and keptpurchasing intlators from Takata.''(D.E.2759at!227(b).)AswithallegationsagainstFCA,PlaintiffscontendthatGeneral M otorsw asaware of dtenergetic disassem blies''thatoccurred in testing,and in the field,between 2010 and 2014,butthatGeneralM otorsfsfailed to take properaction and concealed from Plaintiffs and Classmemberstheirknowledge ofthese events,''and then along with Takata,Sideceptively blamed ganqairbag ruptureon amanufacturingproblem andissued only alimitedrecall.''f#.at !!227(c)-(d). Plaintiffs then allege thatGeneralMotorsikdid notcommence recallsfortheir vehiclesuntilapproxim ately Febnzary2014,''and thenm ischaracterized thelntlatorDefectasthe productofidiosyncraticmanufacturingflaws.''Id at!227(e). A s to V olksw agen,Plaintiffs allege that V olksw agen and Takata Ssknew thatpropellant degradation,including through moisture and tem perature,could lead to over-pressurization and nzpture,''and kçdiscussed ...adversetestresults''regarding ûsinflatorsnzptured during testing''in October2004 andFebruary2009.(D.E.2762 at!!290(a),(c),(9.) Plaintiffsf'urtherallegethat the SttGroup of Five W orking Com mittee,'of which Volkswagen was a member, discussed am monium nitrate propellantwith Takata,including m odule testing,helium leak testing,and temperature-and moisture related failure modes.'' Id at!220(d). Then Plaintiffsassertthat Volkswagen and TakataSkcomm unicated variousconcel' nsabouttheinflators''followinga Takata 88 airbag rupturein testing conductedby Volkswagen inApril2009.Id at!220(e). Collectively, Plaintiffsallege V olksw agen tifailed to tim ely disclose these factsand eventsto the public in order toconcealthenatureandscopeoftheInflatorDefect.''Id at!!220(c)-(h). ln addition,Plaintiffsalso advance severalallegationsconcerning Takata's S'predicate acts in furtherance oftheconspiracy.''1d.at!291.Notably,theseallegations- which arerecycled againsteachoftheDefendants(seegenerally D.E.2758 at!!223-24;D.E.2759 at!228;D.E. 2762 at!!291,326-327)- d0notinvolve any communicationsbetween Takata and any ofthe Defendants. lnstead,these allegationsfocusentirely on Takata's comm unicationswith Honda, federalregulators,and class vehicle ow ners. Even taking the allegations againstFCA,GeneralM otors,and Volkswagen astnze,the Coul'tcannotconclude thatany ofthese Defendantsentered into an agreementwith Takata $%o commitacriminalact.'' ViridisCorp.,155F.Supp.3dat1366(notingthatfailuretoallegeSlan agreem ent...to com m ita crim inalactisa glaring deticiency''in pleading a civilconspiracy claim under R1CO). These allegations demonstrate FCA,GeneralM otors,and Volkswagen had knowledge thatTakata airbagsinstalled in theirvehiclescould be defective- butthe allegations do notrise to the levelof demonstrating thatthese Defendantsentered into an agreementwith Takata to commitwire ormailfraud. The allegationsagainstM ercedespresentacloserquestion. In addition to severalgeneral allegationsaboutM ercedes'sknowledgeofthe alleged intlatordefects- which are insufficientto plead an agreementto comm ita criminalact- plaintiffsallegethatM erccdesdtm odified itsown spccifications forthe Takata inflators so thatthey w ould be easierforTakata to m eet,by agreeing to deviationsin orderto getthe lnflatorsapproved forinstallation.'' (D.E.2762 at!325(c).) Plaintiffs also allcge that M ercedes and Takata:itdecided together to forego key perform ance 89 requirem ents and resolve testing failures that they knew should have rendered the Defective Inflators unfit for approval''; tsagreed to ignore tests related to ballistic perform ance at hot temperatures'';and laterSçworked togetherto try to convinceNHTSA to reduce the scope ofthe recall.''1d.at!!325(d),(g)-(h),(p).Notably,noneoftheseallegationsincludeasingledateor identifyasinglepersonactingonbehalfofM ercedesorTakata.Seeid.at!!325(a)-(p). W hile Plaintiffs do plead a relationship beyond sim ple inform ation sharing,they stillfail to plausibly allege thatM ercedesentered into an agreementwith Takata to commitwire orm ail fraud. Earlierin this litigation,this Courtallowed RICO conspiracy claim sto proceed against Takata and Honda because the plaintiffsalleged thatTakata and Hondatook a series ofjoint actionsoverthe courseofa decade.See In re TakataAirbag prod.Liab.Litig.,2015 W L 9987659, at*2. Notably,the plaintiffs'allegations %juxtaposeldlcommunicationsbetween Honda and Takatawith atimeline ofTakata'salleged conspiratorialconductto implicatethatHondaacted in agreementwiththeobjectivesofthealleged conspiracy.''1d. For instance,there, the plaintiffs alleged that after an airbag in a 2002 Honda A ccord exploded in 2004,ésllonda and Takata investigatedthe incident''and Honda ktimm ediately shared a11availableinformation''with Takata.'' (D.E.579 at!438(a).) Theplaintiffsalso allegedthat within thesame year,t'Takata concealed and destroyed negativeresultsfrom secretairbagtestsit conducted in responseto the explosion,''and thatçsl-londawasaware ofTakata'ssecrettesting'' because Honda and Takata com municated aboutthe incidentand 'sagreed to describe the 2004 incident...asan 'anomaly.''' 1d.at!438(b). Theplaintiffsthen alleged thatin 2007,Honda Streported three airbag nzptures,al1causing injuries,to Takata,''and thatin addition to Honda deciding çsnotto ordera recallbutratherto awaitthe results ofa çfailure mode analysis'to be perform ed by Takata,''Honda and Takata tsagain chose to keep vitally important,safety-related 90 informationbetween onlythetwo ofthem.''Id at!438(c).Theplaintiffsassertedthat,alsoin 2007,Hondaçûbegan collecting inflatorsretunzedtodealers''and dçfrom scrapyards''and sentthem to Takata forinvestigation,allwithoutinform ing vehicle ownersorregulators,''forwhattum ed outtobeayear-longstudyoftheIntlatorDefect.fJ.at!438(d).Theplaintiffsalsoallegedthat inSeptember2011,ttl-londaandTakatainitiatedajointanalysisintoan çoutsideofrange'incident thatoccurred''thesameyear.1d.at!438(h). Additionally,theplaintiffspleadedthatin2009TakataandHondatjointlydraftedaletter toNHTSALI''inresponsetoarequestforinformationregarding Honda'srecalls- which didnot include inform ation about the secret 2004 aizbag tests or the issues w ith Takata's M onclova, M exico m anufacturing plant- and thusHonda and Takata dçin concert,know ingly and consciously om itted and withheld crucial infonnation from governm ent regulators in order to prevent regulatory action that would have resulted in a broaderrecalland possibly regulatory sanctions.'' 1d at!438(9.And finally,theplaintiffsallegedthatalsoin2011,beforetdmassiveHondarecall expansions ginlDecember2011,Takataand Hondatjointly settled atleastonepersonalinjury lawsuit''where shrapnelfrom an exploding airbag severed the driver'scarotid artery,suggesting dtthejointdesireandeffortbyTakataandHondatoconcealtheexistenceoftheInflatorDefectand therisksposedbyitfrom regulatorsandfrom thepublic.''1d.at!438(g). Takentogetherastnle,theallegationsagainstTakataandHondashowedthattheytjointly and secretly'' investigated possible causes of certain airbag deployments, Cçdelayed and/or prevented the release of inculpatory inform ation,'' lsm isled regulatory authoritiesr'' and lçm aintained a consistent public posture as to the scope of vehicles affected by the Defective Airbagsand the safety risksthose airbagsposed.'' In re Takata Airbag Prod.Liab.Litig.,2015 W L 9987659,at*2. ln stark contrast,Plaintiffs'allegationsagainstM ercedes,even when taken astrue,do not demonstrate:ajointeffortby M ercedes and Takata to mislead regulatory authoritiesand the general public by restricting the release of,or exposure to,incriminating conduct, 'a joint investigation byM ercedesand Takatato detenninethecausesofafield airbag rupture;any after- the-factsharingofusedinflatorsfortestingpurposes;oranyjointpublicposition concerningthe inflatorissues letalone downplaying a field rupture incidentasan ûûanom aly.''N ()rdo Plaintiffs' allegationsinclude any dates,oridentify any speciticM ercedesorTakatapersomwl,thatwould enabletheCourtto Sjuxtaposecommunicationsbetween (MercedeslandTakatawith atimeline ofTakata'salleged conspiratorialconductto implicatethatgM ercedeslacted in agreementwith theobjectivesoftheallegedconspiracy.''1d.lnshort,theseglaringpleadingdeficiencies- which apply with equal vigor to the allegations advanced against FCA , General M otors, and Volkswagen- lead theCourtto find thatPlaintiffs'allegationsfailto sufficiently allegethatany oftheDefendantsentered into an agreementwith Takata to commitwire ormailfraud. Therefore,theM otionstoDismisstheSection 1962(d)claimsareGRANTED;Count3in the Boyd Complaint,Count3 in the Whitaker Complaint,and Counts 2 and 4 in the Puhalla Com plaintare D ISM ISSED . IV . R EM AIN IN G CLA IM S IN DIR ECT -FILE A C TIO N S - PEN D ENT PE R SO N A L JU R ISD ICTIO N Finally,an issueremainsasto whethcrtheCourtcan exercisepersonaljurisdiction over the Domestic Defendants as to the Direct-File Plaintiffs' rem aining claim s, which include M agnuson-M oss W arranty Act claim s, and various state statutory and com mon-law claim s. Plaintiffsarguethe Coul'tmay exercisependentpersonaljurisdiction overtheseclaimsbecause they Ssclearlyarisefrom Sacommonnucleusofoperativefacts'''astheRICO claims.(D.E.3034 at56-57.) Defendantsassel'tthe Coul'tcarmotexercisependentpersonaljurisdiction overthe 92 remainingclaimsbecausePlaintiffs'RICO claims theonlyjurisdictionally sufticientclaims areinadequatelypleaded andm ustbedism issed. The doctrine ofpendentpersonaljurisdiction arisesStwhere a federalstatute authorizes nationwideserviceofprocessand thefederaland stateclaim s Sderive from a comm on nucleusof operativefacts'....''Azalp LLC,2015 W L 12711232,at*5(quotingKoch,847F.Supp.2dat 1374). lnsuch acase,Sçthedistrictcourtmay assertpersonaljurisdiction overthepartiestothe relatedstatelaw claimsevenifpersonaljurisdiction isnotothenviseavailable.''Id However,Ctif theonlyjurisdictionally suficientclaim isdroppedordismissed,particularly ifthatoccursearly in the litigation,the pendentclaim should be dismissed aswe1l.''Koch,847 F.Supp.2d at1377- 78(quoting4A.W right& Miller,FederalPracticeandprocedurej 1069.7,p.236(2002)). EarlierinthisOrder,theCourtfound thatitcould exercisespecificjurisdiction overthe D om estic D efendants as to the R IC O claim s in the D irect-File A ctions pursuant to the- RICO nationw ideservice ofprocessprovision.Seesupra Section 1l.D .1.b. Separately,though,the Court dism issed the Plaintiffs'RICO claim sasinsufficiently pleaded.Seesupra Section 111.A sa result, Plaintiffs'remaining claimsagainstthe Domestic Defendants are çisubjectto dismissalunless (theyqcan 'independentlyestablish personaljurisdictionwithrespectto thoseclaims.''' Prou v. Giarla,62F.Supp.3d 1365,1374(S.D.Fla.2014)(quotingKoch,847F.Supp.2dat1378). TheCourtfindsthatPlaintiffscannotindependentlyestablishpersonaljurisdictionoverthe D om estic Defendants as to the Direct-File A ctions. First,unlike the federalRICO statute,the M agnuson-M ossW arranty Act- thePlaintiffs'lastremaining federalclaim---doesnotprovidefor nationwideserviceofprocess.SeeBluewaterTrading LLC v.FountainePajot,S.A.,2008W L 2705432,at*2(S.D.Fla.July9,2008)(idr-l-jheM agnuson-MossActdoesnotauthorizenationwide service.''),aff' d,335F.App'x 905(11th Cir.2009).Andsecond,theCourtalreadyfoundthatit 93 cannotexercisepersonaljurisdictionovertheDomesticDefendantspursuanttotheFloridalongarm statute. See supra Sed ion l1.D .1.a. Asaresult,becausePlaintiffs'onlyjurisdictionallysufficientclaimshavebeendismissed, itnecessarily followsthatPlaintiffs'pendentclaims mustalso be dism issed. See Leon,30lF. Supp.3d at 1236 (stW ithout a surviving RICO claim on which to base pendent personal jurisdiction,theCourtcannotconsiderPlaintiffs'remainingstate1aw claims.'');Prou,62F.Supp. 3dat1374 ($çHadPlaintiffproperlypledhisFederalRICO claims,theCourtwouldhavebeenable to exercise personaljurisdiction overhisremaining state law claims...underthe doctrine of pendentpersonaljurisdiction.'')(citingKoch,847F.Supp.2dat1377-78CdgllfthePlaintiffhad adequately pled aRICO causeofaction,underthedoctrineofpendentpersonaljurisdiction the Courtcould have exercised personaljurisdiction overDefendantswith respectto the state-law Clairn. s....'')). Therefore,theCourtDISM ISSES forlack ofpersonaljurisdiction a11remaining claims assertedbytheDirect-FilePlaintiffsl7againsttheDom esticDefendants.Consequently,theDirectFile A ctions are D ISM ISSED in theirentirety. C ON CLU SIO N Based on theforegoing,itis 17AsdelineatedintheCourt'spriororder(seeD.E.3394at4-5& n.3),theFloridaDirectFilePlaintiffsinclude:VictorKhottry(Boy+ ;DavidW hitaker(Whitaker);andJacquelineCarrillo, Steven Levin,HarperTucker,M ichaelC .K aufm an,M ary Jackson Robinson,Bladim irBusto,Jr., RamoncitoIgnacio,SilviaGil,StephaniePuhalla,andCharlesSakolsky(Puhalla)(seeD.E.2758 at23-24;D.E.2759at30, *D.E.2762at56-57). Thc non-Florida Direct-File Plaintiffs,a1lfrom the Puhalla Complaint,include:Efrain FerrerandSeanM cGinity(California);LindaDean (Kentucky);PattieByrd@ ew Jersey);Glenn M iller@ ew York);ChristopherAllen CobbandM ichaelRiddick (NorthCarolina);AngelaCook (Ohio);AngelaDickie and AntoniaDowling (South Carolina);and Alandrix Hanis,LateciaJ. Jackson,andChloeW allace(Texas).(SeeD.E.2762at56-57.) 94 ORDERED AND ADJUDGED thattheDefendants'M otionstoDismissareGM NTED IN PA R T and DEN IED IN PA R T as follow s: (1) M ercedes's and General M otors's M otions to D ism iss for lack of standing are D ENIED . (2)Volkswagen'sMotion toDismissforlackofstandingisGRANTED- bUtonly asto the claim s brought by the purported A udi sub-classes against V olksw agen,and the claim sbroughtby thepurportedVolkswagen sub-classesagainstAudi.Accordingly: (a)A11claimsasserted by AudiownersorlesseesagainstVolkswagen in Countsl2, 31, 32, 52, 53 are D ISM ISSED . ln addition, as for the com m on-law claim s asserted against V olkswagen by A udi owners or lessees: Counts 6 and 8 are DISM ISSED astotheAlabama,M ichigan,and Virginiasub-classes;and Count7 isD ISM ISSED asto the V irginia sub-class;and (b)Allclaimsasserted byVolkswagen ownersorlesseesagainstAudiin Counts 13, 14,15,16,17,18,19,23,24,26,40,42,43,46,47,48,and 55 are DISM ISSED . ln addition,as forthe comm on-law claim sasserted againstAudiby Volkswagen ownersorlessees:Count6isDISM ISSED asto theArizona,Arkansas,California, Connecticut,Indiana,Kentucky,Ohio,South Carolina,and W isconsin sub-classes; Count 7 is DISM ISSED as to the Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Indiana, Kentucky,Ohio,and W isconsin sub-classes;and Count8 isDISM ISSED asto the A rizona, A rkansas, California, Connecticut, lndiana, K entucky, Ohio, Pennsylvania,South Carolina,and W isconsin sub-classes. (2)M ercedes'sandVolkswagens'M otiontoDismissforlackofsubject-matterjurisdiction onpreemptionandprimaryjurisdictiongroundsisDENIED. (3)Defendants'M otionsto Dismissclaimsasserted by thenonresidentPlaintiffsin the TransferorandDirect-FileActionsunderBristol-MkersareDENIED. (4)TheForeignDefendants:A1lclaimsintheTransferorandDirect-FileActionsasserted against the Foreign Defendants (Daimler AG, Audi Aktiengesellschafl, and Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft)arc DISM ISSED for lack ofpersonaljurisdiction. Consequently, D efendants D aim ler A G ,A udi Aktiengesellschah, and V olksw agen AktiengesellschaftareDISM ISSED. (5)TheDirect-FileActions:TheDircct-FileActionsareDISM ISSED in theirentirety forlackofpersonaljurisdictionovertheDomesticDefendantsandForeignDefendants. (6)TheTransferor Actions:A11RICO claimsasserted againstFCA,GeneralM otors, M crcedes,A udi,and V olksw agen are D ISM ISSED ,specifically:Counts2 and 3 in the Boyd Com plaint;Counts 2 and 3 in the W hitaker Com plaint;and Counts 1,2,3,and 4 in thePuhalla Com plaint. 95 The Courtreserves nzling on the sufficiency ofPlaintiffs'remaining claims againstthe DomesticDefendantsin theTransferorActions. DONEAND ORDEREDinChambers, M iami,Florida,this VdayofJune,2019. v.y' .. A zyV FE A .M oREx o tm til!o STATESDISTRICTJUDGE Copiesfurnished to: CounselofRecord 96

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