L2 Mobile Technologies LLC v. TCL Electronics Holdings Limited. et al, No. 1:2022cv01306 - Document 87 (D. Del. 2024)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Joshua D. Wolson on 3/7/2024. (apk)
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L2 Mobile Technologies LLC v. TCL Electronics Holdings Limited. et al Doc. 87 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE L2 MOBILE TECHNOLOGIES LLC, Plaintiff, v. Case No. 1:22-cv-01306-JDW TCL ELECTRONICS HOLDINGS LIMITED, et al., Defendants. MEMORANDUM L2 Mobile Technologies LLC sued TCL Electronics Holding Limited and several related entities, alleging that TCL infringed three of L2’s patents. Both patents relate to devices used in telecommunication connections. The Parties have presented disputes over the meaning of six disputed claim terms stemming from the following patents: (1) U.S. Patent No. 8,179,913 (‘913 Patent) and (2) U.S. Patent No. 8,054,777 (‘777 Patent). I held a Markman hearing on February 6, 2024 and now resolve the disputed constructions. I. LEGAL STANDARD A. General Principles Of Claim Construction “It is a bedrock principle of patent law that the claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.” Phillips v. AWS Corp., F. 3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quote omitted). Claim construction is a matter of law. See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 574 U.S. 318, 325 (2015). “[T]here is no magic Dockets.Justia.com formula or catechism” for construing a patent claim, nor is a court “barred from considering any particular sources or required to analyze sources in any specific sequence[.]” Phillips, 415 F. 3d at 1324. Instead, a court is free to attach the appropriate weight to appropriate sources “in light of the statutes and policies that inform patent law.” Id. (citation omitted). A court generally gives the words of a claim “their ordinary and customary meaning,” which is the “meaning the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent application.” Id. at 1312-13 (quotations omitted). Usually, a court first considers the claim language; then the remaining intrinsic evidence; and finally, the extrinsic evidence in limited circumstances. See Interactive Gift Exp., Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1331-32 (Fed. Cir. 2001). While “the claims themselves provide substantial guidance as to the meaning of particular claim terms[,]” a court also must consider the context of the surrounding words. Phillips, 415 F. 3d at 1314. In addition, the patent specification “is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis and indeed is often the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 19 F.4th 1325, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (quotation omitted). But, while a court must construe claims to be consistent with the specification, it must “avoid the danger of reading limitations from the specification into the claim . . . .” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323. This is a “fine” distinction. Comark Communications, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 2 F.3d 1182, 1186-87 (Fed. Cir. 1998). In addition, “even when the specification describes only a single embodiment, the claims of the patent will not be read restrictively unless the patentee has demonstrated a clear intention to limit the claim scope using ‘words or expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction.’” Hill-Rom Svcs., Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 755 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted) (cleaned up). A court may refer to extrinsic evidence only if the disputed term’s ordinary and accustomed meaning cannot be discerned from the intrinsic evidence. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Although a court may not use extrinsic evidence to vary or contradict the claim language, extrinsic materials “may be helpful to explain scientific principles, the meaning of technical terms, and terms of art that appear in the patent and prosecution history.” Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Extrinsic evidence is used “to ensure that the court’s understanding of the technical aspects of the patent is consistent with that of a person of skill in the art[.]” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318. The Federal Circuit has cautioned against relying upon expert reports and testimony that is generated for the purpose of litigation because of the likelihood of bias. Id.; see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993) (“Expert evidence can be both powerful and quite misleading because of the difficulty in evaluating it.”) (quotation omitted). 3 B. Construction Of Means-Plus-Function Limitations When construing claim terms, a court must consider whether they are “meansplus-function” limitations. 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) governs the interpretation of means-plusfunction claim terms: An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof. 35 U.S.C. § 112(f). For patents that predate the America Invents Act, the same standard applies under 35 U.S.C § 112, ¶ 6. To determine whether Section 112, ¶ 6 governs a claim, the “essential inquiry” is “whether the words of the claim are understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure.” Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc). 1 If a claim term does not use the word “means,” there is a rebuttable presumption that means-plus-function claiming under Section 112, ¶ 6 does not apply. See id. at 1349. To rebut it, a challenger must demonstrate that a claim term either fails to “recite sufficiently definite structures” or recites “function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function.” Id. “The ultimate question is whether the claim language, read in light of the specification, 1 An en banc Federal Circuit joined the potion of the Williamson decision discussing the applicability of Section 112. See Williamson, 892 F.3d at 1347-49 & n.3. 4 recites sufficiently definite structure to avoid [Section] 112, ¶ 6.” MTD Prods. Inc. v. Iancu, 933 F.3d 1336, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quote omitted). Courts use a two-step process to construe means-plus-function limitations. First, the court must determine the claimed function. See Kemco Sales, Inc. v. Control Papers Co., 208 F.3d 1352, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Second, the court must identify the corresponding structure that the specification discloses to perform that function. See id. When the specification discloses “distinct and alternative structures for performing the claimed function,” the proper construction should embrace each one. Creo Prods., Inc. v. Presstek, Inc., 305 F.3d 1337, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The structure disclosed in the patent specification that corresponds to the claimed function limits the scope of a means-plusfunction claim. See Med. Instrumentation & Diagnostics Corp. v. Elektra AB, 344 F.3d 1205, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 2003). C. Indefiniteness “Indefiniteness is a matter of claim construction, and the same principles that generally govern claim construction are applicable to determining whether allegedly indefinite claim language is subject to construction.” Kyowa Hakka Bio, Co., Ltd. v. Ajinomoto Co., No. CV 17-313, 2020 WL 3403207, at *5 (D. Del. June 19, 2020) (internal quotations omitted). “The internal coherence and context assessment of the patent, and whether it conveys claim meaning with reasonable certainty, are questions of law.” Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 789 F.3d 1335, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2015). A party seeking to 5 reestablishment and does not distinguish reestablishment procedures from reset procedures. This construction is consistent with other statements in the ‘777 Patent that exclude transmitter-side or dual-side reestablishment and apply to reestablishment on the receiving side only. (E.g., ‘777 Patent at 2:15.) TCL bases its proposed construction on a statement from the applicant during prosecution that TCL claims narrowed the claim scope to reestablishment, as opposed to reset, procedure. Although the applicant did distinguish between a reestablishment procedure and a reset procedure in his remarks responding to a non-final rejection, I disagree with TCL’s assertion that doing so limited the patent to reestablishment but not reset. Indeed, in these same remarks, the applicant identified his invention as a singlesided procedure for reestablishing the receiving side. I understand this language as differentiating receiving-side reestablishment from transmitter- or dual-side reestablishment, not excluding reset procedures. 7 Cir. 2002) (quote omitted). There is no “litmus test” to determine whether preamble language is limiting. Bicon, Inc. v. Straumann Co., 441 F.3d 945, 952 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Whether to treat a preamble term as a claim limitation is “determined on the facts of each case in light of the claim as a whole and the invention described in the patent.” Storage Tech. Corp. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 329 F.3d 823, 831 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The preambles to these claims do not animate the claims and thus are not limiting. Indeed, the bodies of each claim lack any reference to the preambles. To the contrary, the body of each claim describes a complete system on its own. The language of the preamble is a descriptor, not a limitation on the claim’s reach. That the preambles and claims refer to “a variable of a Radio Link Control reset procedure” in the former and “a reset procedure variable” in the latter is not enough to show a limitation. First, the plain language of the patent cuts against finding the preambles form antecedent bases for the claims. Using the indefinite article “a” instead of the definite article “the” to modify “variable” tells me that the variables at issue in the preambles and claims are not identical. I won’t find the preamble limiting when it reasonably speaks of a variable different from one mentioned in the claim. Second, to the extent that the claim term “variable” could be interpreted as referencing the preamble, neither party sought to have it so construed. There is no need to construe the term “reset procedure” when the Parties haven’t requested construction of the associated terms “variable” or “reset state variable.” 10 references a “Radio Link Control (RLC) entity having a transmitting side and a receiving side, utilized for accurately reestablishing the receiving side.” (‘777 Patent at Claim 2.) The claim limits then refer back to the receiving side and the transmitting side. Where language in a preamble is “intertwined” with language that provides an antecedent basis for language in claim limits, the language is limiting. Bio-Rad Labs., Inc. v. 10X Inc., 967 F.3d 1353, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2020). However, the phrase “accurately reestablishing the receiving side” is not intertwined with the language that provides an antecedent basis for the claims. Instead, it is an appositive clause that stands apart and provides only a statement of purpose. If I excised it from the preamble, nothing would change. Because it's not intertwined with the parts of the preamble that provide antecedent meaning, the phrase is not limiting. Second, the modifier “accurately” is a binary term: reestablishment either is or is not performed. This does not denote an undefined degree that would render the term indefinite to a person of ordinary skill in the art. TCL insists that I must construe “accurately” to mean a sliding scale. But it ignores the possibility that “accurately” means “correctly.” For example, if someone tells a friend that it is “accurate” to say that he liked a book, he does not use the term to indicate degree. He uses the term to mean “correct” instead of “incorrect.” TCL does not address that possible interpretation, though. Without some evidence that a POSITA would consider the term “accurately” to mean a 12 matter of degree, rather than a binary outcome, TCL cannot satisfy its burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that the term is indefinite. For this reason, TCL’s characterization of “accurately” as analogous to the term “minimal,” which the Federal Circuit found to be an indefinite term of degree in Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1363-64 (Fed. Cir. 2018), fails. In that case, the Federal Circuit held that “minimal” lacks an objective boundary. That term represents an undefined point between some lower and upper bounds. But the same is not true for “accurately,” at least not as it is used here, and I am not convinced by TCL’s suggestion to the contrary. 13 Both intrinsic and extrinsic evidence demonstrate that the term “control circuit” discloses a known structure. Figures 1 and 2 in the ‘777 Patent describe the control circuit. Figure 1 shows a control circuit that contains a CPU and memory, with program code in the memory. Figure 2 then illustrates the program code. These illustrations go beyond merely naming a control circuit as a requisite component of the patented invention. They instead demonstrate the specific subparts of the circuitry that enable the component to perform the role described in the patent specification. In addition, at the time of the invention, the McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Scientific and Technical Terms defined the term “control circuit,” demonstrating that a “control circuit” was a known structure to those skilled in the art. Control circuit, McGraw-Hill Dictionary Of Scientific And Technical Terms 452 (5th ed. 1994). Other courts have concluded that the term “circuit” is itself a specific structure. E.g., Mass. Inst. Of Tech. and Elec. For Imaging, Inc. v. Abacus Software, 462 F.3d 1344, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. L.G. Elecs., Inc., No. 2:14-cv-0911, 2015 WL 6956722 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 9, 2015). It therefore makes sense that a term that is a descriptor-plus-“circuit” would also disclose enough structure. And that’s the case here. Although TCL makes arguments to the contrary, it offers no evidence, even though the burden rests with it to demonstrate that the term is means-plus-function. Without evidence, it cannot carry that burden. 15 message. When the VT(RST) reaches a maximum value, the system terminates the reset procedure. (See id. at 2:10-16.) Thus, the system uses the VT(RST) variable to determine the number of times that the RESET PDU is scheduled to be transmitted because the remaining number of transmissions is the difference between the parameter MaxRST (the maximum number of tries that the system permits) and the variable VT(RST) (the number of tries the system has made). While the number of scheduled transmissions is not necessarily equal to the variable VT(RST), the variable is one part of the arithmetic equation that the system uses. That’s the same thing that Claims 1 and 3 disclose—that the system uses a reset state variable to count the number of times that a RESET PDU is scheduled to be transmitted. Because there’s no inconsistency, and because the system that the claims disclose is definite, I reject TCL’s argument. III. CONCLUSION I will construe the disputed terms as described above. The parties have not otherwise agreed upon any constructions. An appropriate Order follows. BY THE COURT: /s/ Joshua D. Wolson JOSHUA D. WOLSON, J. March 7, 2024 17
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