Flagstar Bank, N.A. v. Santiago et al, No. 3:2023cv02015 - Document 3 (S.D. Cal. 2023)
Court Description: ORDER Denying 2 Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis and Ordering Defendant to Show Cause Why this Case Should Not Be Remanded to State Court. Signed by Judge Janis L. Sammartino on 11/6/23. (All non-registered users served via U.S. Mail Service)(aas)
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Flagstar Bank, N.A. v. Santiago et al Doc. 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 FLAGSTAR BANK, N.A., Case No.: 23-CV-2015 JLS (SBC) Plaintiff, 12 13 v. 14 LEVI SANTIAGO; and DOES 1-100, inclusive, 15 ORDER (1) DENYING MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND (2) ORDERING DEFENDANT TO SHOW CAUSE WHY THIS CASE SHOULD NOT BE REMANDED TO STATE COURT Defendants. 16 17 (ECF Nos. 1, 2) 18 19 Presently before the Court are Defendant Brandon Rustle’s (“Rustle” or 20 “Defendant”) Notice of Removal (“NOR,” ECF No. 1) and Application to Proceed in 21 District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (“IFP Appl.,” ECF No. 2). Defendant, 22 proceeding pro se, removed this unlawful detainer action from the Superior Court of 23 California, County of San Diego, to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441. See generally 24 NOR; ECF No. 1-1. For the reasons that follow, the Court DENIES Defendant’s IFP 25 Application and ORDERS Defendant to SHOW CAUSE why this action should not be 26 remanded to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 27 /// 28 /// 1 23-CV-2015 JLS (SBC) Dockets.Justia.com 1 BACKGROUND 2 Defendant is a tenant residing at a property located in Fallbrook, California, over 3 which Plaintiff Flagstar Bank, N.A., has some claim.1 See ECF No. 1-2 at 32; see generally 4 NOR. On April 3, 2023, Plaintiff initiated an action for unlawful detainer and damages 5 against individuals residing at—or otherwise in possession of—the Fallbrook residence. 6 ECF No. 1-2 at 2. Though Plaintiff did not list Defendant by name in its initial Complaint, 7 see id., it appears Defendant joined the action after filing a “Prejudgment Claim of Right 8 to Possession” form in state court, see id. at 3–4. Defendant later removed the action to 9 federal court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. See generally NOR. 10 11 IN FORMA PAUPERIS APPLICATION I. Legal Standard 12 All parties instituting a civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the 13 United States, other than a petition for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee. 14 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a party’s failure to pay the filing fee 15 only if the party is granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 16 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). A 17 federal court may authorize the commencement of an action without the prepayment of 18 fees if the party submits an affidavit, including a statement of assets, showing that she is 19 unable to pay the required filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 20 As § 1915(a)(1) does not itself define what constitutes insufficient assets to warrant 21 IFP status, the determination of indigency falls within the district court’s discretion. See 22 Cal. Men’s Colony v. Rowland, 939 F.2d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Section 1915 typically 23 requires the reviewing court to exercise its sound discretion in determining whether the 24 25 27 Defendant attached only the first page of Plaintiff’s state court complaint, see ECF No. 1-2 at 2, so the Court does not have access to the full description of Plaintiff’s relationship to the property at issue. Defendant, however, describes himself as the “tenant of a foreclosed landlord.” NOR at 6. It thus appears Plaintiff has foreclosed on the Fallbrook property at which Defendant resides. 28 2 26 1 Citations to ECF Nos. 1-1 and 1-2 refer to the blue pagination numbers assigned by the CM/ECF system. 2 23-CV-2015 JLS (SBC) 1 affiant has satisfied the statute’s requirement of indigency.”), rev’d on other grounds by 2 506 U.S. 194 (1993). 3 “An affidavit in support of an IFP application is sufficient where it alleges that the 4 affiant cannot pay the court costs and still afford the necessities of life.” Escobedo v. 5 Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Adkins v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours 6 & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948)). “One need not be absolutely destitute to obtain benefits 7 of the [IFP] statute.” Jefferson v. United States, 277 F.2d 723, 725 (9th Cir. 1960). 8 “Nonetheless, a plaintiff seeking IFP status must allege poverty ‘with some particularity, 9 definiteness and certainty.’” Escobedo, 787 F.3d at 1234 (quoting United States v. 10 McQuade, 647 F.2d 938, 940 (9th Cir. 1981)). 11 II. Analysis 12 In his IFP Application, Defendant claims he has not, in the past twelve months, 13 received any money from sources including employment; rent payments; retirement, 14 disability, or unemployment benefits; or welfare services. IFP Appl. at 1–2. Defendant 15 also claims to have $1,200 in monthly expenses, which covers payments for utilities, home 16 maintenance, food, and transportation. Id. at 4. 17 Defendant’s IFP Application is, however, far from complete. He fails to respond to 18 any of the Application’s questions regarding, among other topics, the past two years of his 19 employment history, any assets he may hold, and any debts he might owe. See id. at 2–4. 20 These omissions come though Plaintiff was instructed to respond to every question, even 21 if only to answer “none” or “not applicable,” instead of leaving questions blank. Id. at 1. 22 Additionally, some of Defendant’s answers are contradicted by statements contained 23 in other filings. Defendant claims his average monthly income over the past year has been 24 “$0.00.” Id. at 2. But in a “Request to Waive Court Fees” he filed in California Superior 25 Court on April 24, 2023, Defendant disclosed that he worked in “customer service” at “Big 26 O. Tires.” ECF No. 1-2 at 5. Even if Defendant no longer holds that position, any income 27 he may have earned from November of 2022 to April of 2023 would impact the income 28 information requested by the IFP Application. Defendant also contends that he has 3 23-CV-2015 JLS (SBC) 1 received no income from welfare services in the past twelve months, see IFP Appl. at 2, 2 even though he apparently received food stamps earlier this year, see ECF No. 1-2 at 5. 3 The Court also notes that Defendant does not explain how, in the absence of any income 4 whatsoever, his expenses are paid. 5 Given the lack of detail provided by Defendant in his IFP Application—and the 6 inconsistencies in his filings—the Court cannot accurately assess how paying the filing fee 7 would affect Defendant’s ability to afford the necessities of life. Defendant has thus failed 8 to “allege poverty with some particularity, definiteness and certainty.” Escobedo, 787 F.3d 9 at 1234. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant’s IFP Application. 10 11 SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION I. Legal Standard 12 “Federal Courts are courts of limited jurisdiction” and “possess only that power 13 authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 14 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). It is thus “presume[d] that federal courts lack jurisdiction unless 15 the contrary appears affirmatively from the record.” DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 16 547 U.S. 332, 342 n.3 (2006) (quoting Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 316 (1991)). 17 Relatedly, Courts have an “independent obligation” to screen all actions for subject 18 matter jurisdiction, FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990), including 19 actions removed from state court to federal court, see Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. 20 Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32 (2002) (“The right of removal is entirely a creature of statute and 21 ‘a suit commenced in a state court must remain there until cause is shown for its transfer 22 under some act of Congress.’” (quoting Great N. Ry. Co. v. Alexander, 246 U.S. 276, 280, 23 (1918))). The party invoking the removal statute bears the burden of establishing that 24 federal subject-matter jurisdiction exists. Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 25 1195 (9th Cir. 1988). Moreover, courts “strictly construe the removal statute against 26 removal jurisdiction.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). So, 27 “[f]ederal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in 28 the first instance.” Id. 4 23-CV-2015 JLS (SBC) 1 II. Analysis 2 Defendant contends that removal is proper because this Court has subject matter 3 jurisdiction over this action. NOR at 2. Specifically, Defendant argues that “Plaintiff was 4 required to state a cause of action under the [Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act],” or 5 “PTFA,”3 which is a federal statute. Id. at 3. So, per Defendant, this Court has federal 6 question jurisdiction because Plaintiff’s Complaint states a federal claim—“a cause of 7 action in PTFA ejectment.” Id. at 4. 8 Even granting Defendant’s pro se pleadings a “liberal[] constru[ction]”—as is the 9 Court’s duty, Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)—the Court must reject 10 Defendant’s argument. Federal courts may exercise federal question jurisdiction under 11 28 U.S.C. § 1331 when a plaintiff’s claim arises under federal law. E.g., Louisville & 12 Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908). Additionally, federal courts may 13 hear a state law claim when such a claim turns on a “federal issue” that “is: ‘(1) necessarily 14 raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of resolution in federal court 15 without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress.’” Newtok Vill. v. 16 Patrick, 21 F.4th 608, 618 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 258 17 (2013)). This standard, labeled the “substantial federal question doctrine” or “Grable 18 Test,” is met in only a small number of cases. Id. (referring to Grable & Sons Metal Prods., 19 Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005)). 20 Based on the materials before the Court, including Defendant’s description of the 21 case, Plaintiff’s cause of action arises under state law. See ECF No. 1-2 at 2; NOR at 3. 22 As Defendant notes, Plaintiff pleaded “this action as an ‘Unlawful Detainer’” case. Id. 23 And unlawful detainer actions are governed solely by state law. See, e.g., Ralph Partners 24 II, LLC v. Tate, No. 18-CV-03030-LB, 2018 WL 3213974, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2018) 25 26 3 27 28 The citation for the PTFA is Pub. L. 111-22, §§ 701–03, 123 Stat 1632, 1660–61 (2009). Plaintiff cites § 702 of the PTFA. See NOR at 2–3. For context, the Court notes that § 702 “is part of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (‘ESSA’) codified in 12 U.S.C. §§ 5201 et seq.” Zalemba v. HSBC Bank, USA, Nat. Ass’n., No. 10-CV-1646BEN BLM, 2010 WL 3894577, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2010). 5 23-CV-2015 JLS (SBC) 1 (explaining that unlawful detainer actions do not arise under federal law). 2 Further, Defendant cannot secure removal by raising a federal defense. Under the 3 well-pleaded complaint rule, federal question jurisdiction exists only when a plaintiff’s 4 claim is “based upon [federal law].” Mottley, 211 U.S. at 152. Consequently, defenses 5 implicating federal law do not create federal question jurisdiction. See Caterpillar, Inc. v. 6 Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987) (“[I]t is now settled law that a case may not be removed 7 to federal court on the basis of a federal defense . . . .”). Defendant claims, without citing 8 caselaw, that the “PTFA is a not a defense.” NOR at 6. But “every court to consider the 9 issue has held that the PTFA provides at most a federal counterclaim or defense” and “does 10 not transform a state unlawful detainer claim into a federal cause of action.” Standard 11 Summerwood LLC v. Jones, No. 19-CV-02152-JCS, 2019 WL 3363788, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 12 Apr. 23, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. 19-CV-02152-RS, 13 2019 WL 3367534 (N.D. Cal. May 14, 2019). 14 Defendant’s remaining arguments also fail. Defendant asserts that “[P]laintiff 15 cannot defeat removal by omitting necessary federal question [sic] of law.” NOR at 4. But 16 the well-pleaded complaint rule “makes a plaintiff the ‘master of his complaint.’” Valles 17 v. Ivy Hill Corp., 410 F.3d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Balcorta v. Twentieth 18 Century–Fox Film Corp., 208 F.3d 1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000)). Plaintiffs may thus 19 “generally avoid federal jurisdiction by pleading solely state-law claims.” Id. And finally, 20 the question raised by the PTFA-related defense Defendant asserts—whether there was 21 compliance with a 90-day notice period, see NOR at 3—is a “straightforward federal issue” 22 that does not satisfy the Grable Test, Colgate Tr. #2333 v. Winterbower, 23 No. SACV1401709CJCDFMX, 2014 WL 12564028, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2014). 24 25 26 Given the above, the Court finds Defendant has failed to meet his burden of establishing this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. CONCLUSION 27 In light of the foregoing, the Court DENIES Defendant’s IFP Application (ECF 28 No. 2) and ORDERS Defendant TO SHOW CAUSE why this action should not be 6 23-CV-2015 JLS (SBC) 1 remanded to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Defendant SHALL FILE 2 a response to this Order within twenty-one (21) days of the date of this Order. In said 3 response Defendant MUST (1) establish the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction; (2) attach 4 a copy of the entire state court complaint (as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1446); and (3) either 5 pay the required filing fee or file a renewed application to proceed IFP that is accurate and 6 complete. If Defendant fails to demonstrate subject matter jurisdiction and pay the filing 7 fee or file a renewed IFP motion within twenty-one (21) days of the date of this Order, 8 the Court will issue an order remanding this case to state court. 9 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: November 6, 2023 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 7 23-CV-2015 JLS (SBC)
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