Ganey et al v. County of San Diego et al, No. 3:2023cv01448 - Document 15 (S.D. Cal. 2023)
Court Description: ORDER Granting Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 11 ]. Signed by Judge Cathy Ann Bencivengo on 12/8/2023. (All non-registered users served via U.S. Mail Service)(anh)
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Ganey et al v. County of San Diego et al Doc. 15 1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 8 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA MICHELLE DIANE GANEY AND MICHAEL JAMES GANEY, JR., 12 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS Plaintiffs, 10 11 Case No.: 23-cv-1448-CAB-AHG v. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO et al., [Doc. No. 11] Defendants. 13 14 15 16 This matter is before the Court on a motion to dismiss by Defendants Janette Villa, 17 Toree Ruiz, Janea Ayala, Christopher Taylor, Liliana Iribe-Moreno, Jade Nieto, and Nick 18 Macchione (collectively, “Defendants”).1 For the reasons below, the motion is granted and 19 Plaintiffs’ claims against these defendants are dismissed with prejudice. Background2 20 I. 21 Plaintiffs Michelle Ganey and Michael Ganey initiated this lawsuit on August 7, 22 2023, by filing a complaint [Doc. No. 1] along with an application to proceed in forma 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 The County of San Diego and Mary Shehee are listed as defendants, but they have yet to be served and have not appeared in the case. 2 Defendants’ request for judicial notice is proper, and Plaintiff has not filed an opposition. [Doc. No. 112.] As such, this Court takes judicial notice of the public record documents relating to Plaintiffs’ claim. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001) (“A court may take judicial notice of matters of public record without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 1 23-cv-1448-CAB-AHG Dockets.Justia.com 1 pauperis (“IFP”) [Doc. No. 2]. The Court granted the application to proceed IFP but 2 dismissed the complaint without prejudice pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) because 3 the complaint included claims by minors who were not represented by counsel. [Doc. No. 4 5.] Consistent with the Court’s order, Plaintiffs filed the operative first amended complaint 5 (“FAC”) [Doc. No. 7] on October 3, 2023, listing only themselves as Plaintiffs. The FAC 6 purports to assert claims against the County of San Diego along with eight individual 7 county employees who allegedly worked as social workers or social work supervisors on 8 behalf of the County. 9 The FAC does not explicitly allege the relationship between Plaintiffs, but it appears 10 that they were married before divorcing in November 2020, and that at least prior to their 11 divorce, they cared for three children, T.E.W., T.A.W., and M.J.G. (together, “the 12 Minors”). [Doc. No. 7 at ¶ 18.] Michelle is the Minors’ mother. [Id.] According to the 13 FAC, on October 20, 2020, “there was an incident at the PLAINTIFFS’ residence . . . when 14 MICHELLE, felt threatened by MICHAEL, and telephoned 911 for assistance.” [Id.] The 15 local police then arrested Michael and left the Minors in Michelle’s custody. [Id. at ¶¶ 18- 16 19.] The prosecutor dropped the charges against Michael, and he was released from 17 custody and returned home the following day. [Id. at ¶ 19.] 18 On October 30, 2020, Defendants Toree Ruiz and Jenea Ayala, who were Child 19 Welfare Services (“CWS”) caseworkers for the County of San Diego, visited Plaintiffs’ 20 home “and demanded that the parents sign a ‘Safety Plan.’” [Id. at ¶ 21.] Both Plaintiffs 21 signed the “Safety Plan” allegedly under duress. [Id. at ¶¶ 21-22.] Ruiz and Ayala also 22 allegedly required Michael to live separately from Michelle and the Minors and established 23 “an unworkable visitation schedule for the children.” [Id. at ¶¶ 22-24.] 24 On November 13, 2020, “at the urging of the County, to avoid threatened removal 25 of the children,” Michelle filed for a restraining order against Michael in San Diego County 26 Superior Court. [Id. at ¶ 31.] The Superior Court issued a temporary restraining order 27 against Michael covering Michelle and the Minors and ordered no visitation with any of 28 the Minors until a hearing on December 3, 2020. [Id. at ¶32.] On December 3, 2020, the 2 23-cv-1448-CAB-AHG 1 San Diego County Superior Court issued a permanent restraining order for Michelle against 2 Michael. [Id. at ¶ 52.] 3 In the same period that these meetings and hearings were taking place, the FAC 4 alleges that Michelle and Michael were in the process of obtaining a divorce in a state court 5 in Lincoln County, Wyoming. To that end, on October 26, 2020, the Wyoming court issued 6 a default order for divorce. [Id. at ¶ 23.] Then on November 16, 2020, the Wyoming court 7 issued a full decree of divorce, which “granted primary custody of M.J.G. (the parties’ 8 child together) to MICHELLE with reasonable rights of visitation to MICHAEL.” [Id. at 9 ¶ 33.] The order did not address custody of Minors T.E.W. and T.A.W. [Id.] 10 Four days after their divorce was finalized, the County filed a juvenile dependency 11 petition in San Diego County Superior Court for all three Minors. [Id. at ¶ 34.] According 12 to the FAC, in the petition, the County “falsely reported that the MINORS were ‘exposed 13 to violent confrontations,’” that “MICHELLE had a history of domestic violence in the 14 presence of the children,” and that the parents had violated two “Safety Plans.” [Id. at ¶ 15 36.] Michael and Michelle denied the allegations in the County’s petition. [Id. at ¶ 37.] 16 On November 23, 2020, the County allegedly submitted a “detention report” that 17 “made false accusations that MICHAEL and MICHELLE ‘emotionally abused’ the 18 children and that the parents exposed the MINORS to a violent confrontation (which the 19 parents deny). The Agency acknowledged that there had been no further incidents.” [Id. 20 at ¶ 39.] 21 The FAC contains numerous allegations about abuse Michelle and other children of 22 hers suffered at the hands of Michelle’s previous husband, Cyrus Campbell, from whom 23 she obtained a divorce in 2012. [Id. at ¶¶ 40-48.] Michelle allegedly told Ruiz and Ayala 24 about this abuse and about how they could find additional information about it, including 25 proceedings in Utah and Wyoming state courts involving Mr. Campbell. According to the 26 FAC, however, Ruiz and Ayala did not track down this additional information and instead 27 “presented the untruthful, hearsay statements of CYRUS CAMPBELL and the adult 28 children of MICHELLE as true and reliable evidence” in the detention report to the juvenile 3 23-cv-1448-CAB-AHG 1 court, “even though they knew, or should have known, that those statements were false. . . 2 .” [Id. at ¶ 48.] 3 Based on the contents of the detention report, the San Diego County juvenile court 4 “granted the COUNTY Temporary Emergency Jurisdiction of all three children, T.E.W., 5 T.A.W., and M.J.G.” [Id. at ¶ 50.] The juvenile court ordered Michael and Michelle “to 6 live separately, abide by the existing restraining order, provide family information to 7 caseworkers, not to leave the County of San Diego with the children, and to attend a 8 dispositional hearing on December 17, 2020. [Id. at ¶ 51.] At the December 17, 2020 9 hearing, a contested adjudication and disposition hearing was set for February 19, 2021. 10 [Id. at ¶ 53.] 11 Following a January 28, 2021, child and family team meeting attended by Michelle, 12 Michelle’s sister, CWS caseworker Defendant Janette Villa, and other supervisors from the 13 County, Villa filed an addendum report to the juvenile court in which she “reported to the 14 Court false hearsay statements about both parents and said there was continued violence 15 between the parents, even though there was no evidence of any violence.” [Id. at ¶ 57.] 16 The contested adjudication and disposition hearing was held on February 19, 2021. 17 At that hearing, the juvenile court “made a true finding on the petition filed by the 18 COUNTY on November 20, 2020, based on the false evidence submitted by the 19 COUNTY” and ordered placement of the Minors with Michelle as well as family 20 maintenance services. [Id. at ¶ 61.] The juvenile court “did not physically remove the 21 children from [Michelle’s] home.” [Id. at ¶ 64.] Michelle and Michael separately appealed 22 these dispositional findings. [Id. ¶ 65.] 23 After the disposition hearing, Plaintiffs and the Minors sought permission to move 24 to Wyoming. On July 20, 2021, over the objections of the County, the juvenile court 25 ordered that the County allow Plaintiffs and the Minors to move to Wyoming and to 26 transfer supervision of the children to Wyoming. [Id. at ¶ 74.] As of July 27, 2021, 27 Plaintiffs and the Minors were all living in Wyoming. [Id. at ¶ 75.] 28 4 23-cv-1448-CAB-AHG 1 On August 17, 2021, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, ruled 2 in favor of Plaintiffs and ordered the juvenile court to “dismiss the entire petition based on 3 a lack of evidence for a finding under Cal. Wel. and Inst. Code § 300(b)(1) at the time of 4 jurisdiction on February 19, 2021.” [Id. at ¶ 76.] On August 20, 2021, the juvenile court 5 dismissed the petition involving Plaintiffs and the Minors. [Id. at ¶ 82.] 6 II. 7 The familiar standards on a motion to dismiss apply here. To survive a motion to 8 dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 9 as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 10 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Thus, 11 the Court “accept[s] factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe[s] the 12 pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire 13 & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). On the other hand, the Court is 14 “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Iqbal, 556 15 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Nor is the Court “required to accept as 16 true allegations that contradict exhibits attached to the Complaint or matters properly 17 subject to judicial notice, or allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions 18 of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Daniels-Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 19 (9th Cir. 2010). “In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory 20 factual content, and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive 21 of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th 22 Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Legal Standards 23 Plaintiffs are appearing pro se. “[A] pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, 24 must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers and can 25 only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff 26 can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Estelle 27 v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). However, “pro se litigants in the ordinary civil case 28 5 23-cv-1448-CAB-AHG 1 should not be treated more favorably than parties with attorneys of record.” Jacobsen v. 2 Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1364 (9th Cir. 1986). 3 III. 4 The FAC purports to assert five claims against all defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 5 for violations of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, one Monell claim against the County, and 6 several state common law claims. Plaintiffs also ask the Court to declare that California 7 Welfare and Institutions Code § 300(b)(1) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to 8 domestic violence survivors. Seven of the eight individual defendants have moved to 9 dismiss the § 1983 claims because they fail to state a claim, because they are barred by the 10 Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and because they are time-barred. These same defendants move 11 to dismiss the state law claims for failure to state a claim and because Plaintiffs did not 12 comply with the California Tort Claims Act, Cal. Gov’t Code § 810 et seq. 13 14 Discussion A. The FAC Generally Fails to State a Claim Against Any of the Individual Defendants 15 The Court agrees with Defendants that the FAC fails to allege facts sufficient to state 16 a plausible claim for constitutional violations under § 1983 or for violations of state law. 17 Among other things, the FAC fails to distinguish between the two Plaintiffs, treating their 18 interests as completely aligned. Yet, based on the allegations in the FAC: (1) Plaintiffs are 19 divorced; (2) Michelle has or had a restraining order against Michael issued by San Diego 20 County Superior Court (which Michelle sought and which is not the basis for any of the 21 violations alleged in the FAC); (3) Michelle is the biological mother of all three Minors, 22 while Michael is the biological father of only one of them and “has no legal standing or 23 legal rights” as to the other two Minors [Doc. No. 7 at ¶ 33]; (4) a Wyoming court gave 24 Michelle primary custody of their only joint child; and, (5) the Minors were never removed 25 from the physical custody of Michelle, while Michael was required to live elsewhere. 26 Based on these allegations, the Court is skeptical that the Plaintiffs’ interests are even 27 sufficiently aligned for them to be able to appear jointly in this case. It is simply 28 implausible that both Plaintiffs suffered the same injuries resulting from the juvenile court 6 23-cv-1448-CAB-AHG 1 proceedings when the outcome of the proceedings was different for each Plaintiff and when 2 one Plaintiff had a restraining order against the other. 3 Further, the FAC does not put any of the individual Defendants on notice of which 4 of their specific actions give rise to the claims against them. The FAC frequently defaults 5 to making allegations that “the COUNTY” took actions giving rise to the claims without 6 identifying which individual defendants were responsible for these actions. When the FAC 7 does identify individual defendants, it primarily only makes conclusory allegations about 8 their representations to the juvenile court, labeling them as “false” or “perjured” without 9 specifying exactly what each Defendant said and why it was false. Moreover, a careful 10 reading of the allegations in the FAC indicates that Plaintiffs have not alleged that any of 11 the Defendants fabricated evidence presented to the juvenile court. Rather, Plaintiffs 12 simply disagree with the opinions various Defendants expressed to the juvenile court about 13 the care and safety of the Minors and believe that the sources of the evidence Defendants 14 presented to the juvenile court were not credible. For example, with respect to statements 15 of Michelle’s ex-husband Cyrus Campbell that Defendants Ruiz and Ayala presented to 16 the Court, the FAC alleges that Mr. Campbell’s statements were “untruthful” or “false,” 17 not that Ruiz and Ayala fabricated those statements or that Mr. Campbell did not in fact 18 make such statements. [Doc. No. 7 at ¶ 48.] Nor does the FAC adequately allege why 19 Ruiz and Ayala should have known that Mr. Campbell’s statement was false. In sum, the 20 FAC fails to allege specific facts stating plausible claims for holding any of the individual 21 Defendants liable for violations of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. 22 Ultimately, all of these deficiencies support granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss. 23 If these were the only grounds for dismissal, the Court would be inclined to grant Plaintiffs 24 leave to amend because it is conceivable that these deficiencies could be remedied in a 25 subsequent complaint. As discussed below, however, Plaintiffs’ claims are also time- 26 barred. Because Plaintiffs cannot allege facts that would bring their claims within the 27 statute of limitations, any amendment would be futile. 28 7 23-cv-1448-CAB-AHG 1 B. Plaintiffs’ § 1983 Claims Are Time-Barred 2 Section 1983 “does not contain its own statute of limitations.” Bird v. Dep't of Hum. 3 Servs., 935 F.3d 738, 743 (9th Cir. 2019). Thus, the length of the statute of limitations for 4 a § 1983 claim is determined by “the law of the State in which the cause of action arose.” 5 Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). There is no dispute that California’s two-year 6 statute of limitations for personal injury claims applies here. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 7 335.1; [Doc. No. 11-1 at 9; Doc. No. 13 at 21-22]. The only dispute is when the statute 8 began to run on Plaintiffs’ claims. 9 Plaintiffs’ only argument for why their claims are not time-barred is that their claims 10 do not accrue until the County’s legal custody over the Minors ended. Thus, according to 11 Plaintiffs, their claims are timely because they are within two years of when the California 12 Court of Appeal reversed the juvenile court and ordered that the petition involving 13 Plaintiffs’ children be dismissed. “[T]he accrual date of a § 1983 cause of action is a 14 question of federal law. . . .” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007). Under federal 15 law, “a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury 16 that is the basis of the action.” Belanus v. Clark, 796 F.3d 1021, 1025 (9th Cir. 2015). 17 “Thus, an action ordinarily accrues on the date of the injury.” Id. (internal quotation marks 18 and citation omitted). 19 Here, Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries stem from their loss of legal custody over the 20 Minors allegedly resulting from Defendants’ actions at the various juvenile court 21 proceedings related to the Minors. Civil rights claims based on child removal accrue when 22 the child is removed from the parent. Claraty v. Hall-Mills, No. 18-CV-06861-JCS, 2019 23 WL 1228237, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2019) (holding that the plaintiff’s civil rights claims 24 accrued when she lost custody of her children). 25 defrauded the state court to receive” the detention order [Doc. No. 13 at 25], which resulted 26 in the juvenile court exercising legal custody over the Minors (while not removing them 27 from Michelle’s physical custody) following the February 2021 hearing. Plaintiffs were 28 present at these proceedings and therefore aware of both the alleged wrongdoing and of the Plaintiffs assert that “Defendants 8 23-cv-1448-CAB-AHG 1 removal of the Minors from Plaintiffs’ legal custody. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claims 2 accrued no later than the February 2021 hearing. That Plaintiffs did not regain legal 3 custody of the Minors until August 20, 2021, is merely a “continuing impact from a past 4 violation” that does not toll the statute of limitations. See Bird, 935 F.3d at 748 (internal 5 brackets and citation omitted). Because the violations of which Plaintiffs complain 6 occurred no later than February 2021, while Plaintiffs did not initiate this lawsuit until 7 August 2023, their § 1983 claims are time-barred. 8 Indeed, even Plaintiffs’ contention that the California Appeals Court’s decision 9 signifies the end of their continued harm is controverted by the facts they allege. First, 10 Plaintiffs specifically argue that they “do not assert that the Juvenile Court made an error.” 11 [Doc. No. 13 at 25.] Thus, the California Court of Appeals reversal of the juvenile court 12 should be irrelevant to accrual of Plaintiffs’ claims and whether they are time-barred. 13 Second, the FAC alleges that Plaintiffs moved to Wyoming with the Minors no later than 14 July 27, 2021, and that jurisdiction over the Minors was transferred to Wyoming. [Doc. 15 No. 7 at ¶¶ 74-75.] 16 wrongdoing—the Minors being under the legal custody of the San Diego County juvenile 17 court—ended as of July 27, 2021, more than two years before Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit. 18 Accordingly, even under Plaintiffs’ incorrect legal argument, Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims are 19 time-barred. 20 C. Thus, the injury they suffered as a result of Defendants’ alleged The State Law Claims Are Barred By the Tort Claims Act 21 Defendants argue, and Plaintiffs concede, that under the California Tort Claims Act, 22 a plaintiff may not bring an action against a public entity unless the plaintiff first presents 23 a written claim to the public entity within six months of accrual of the claim. Cal. Gov. 24 Code §§ 911.2, 915; [Doc. No. 11-1 at 12-13; Doc. No. 13 at 39]. Here, all of Plaintiffs’ 25 state law claim arise out of the same alleged wrongdoing by Defendants, and resulted in 26 the same alleged harm to Plaintiffs, that forms the basis of the § 1983 claims in the FAC. 27 As discussed above, all of Plaintiffs’ claims (including their state law claims) accrued no 28 later than the February 2021 juvenile court hearing. Plaintiffs did not submit a written 9 23-cv-1448-CAB-AHG 1 claim to the County until September 23, 2023. Because Plaintiffs did not submit their claim 2 within six months of February 2021, their state law claims are barred by the California Tort 3 Claims Act.3 4 IV. 5 As discussed above, the FAC fails to allege facts stating a plausible claim for relief Conclusion Moreover, Plaintiffs’ claims against the individual 6 from the individual Defendants. 7 Defendants are time-barred. No amendment to the FAC could bring Plaintiffs’ claims 8 within the two-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims or allow the state law claims to 9 survive. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion to dismiss is GRANTED, 10 and claims 1-5 and 7-9 in the FAC are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 11 In light of the foregoing, the only remaining claim is Plaintiffs’ Monell claim against 12 the County. The County has not appeared in this action, and the motion to dismiss indicates 13 that the County has not been served. Accordingly, it is further ORDERED that, on or 14 before January 2, 2024, Plaintiffs must either file proof of service on the County of San 15 Diego or SHOW CAUSE why their Monell claim against the County should not be 16 dismissed under Rule 4(m) for lack of prosecution. If Plaintiffs fail to respond to this order, 17 the Court will dismiss Plaintiffs’ Monell against the County and close this case. 18 19 It is SO ORDERED. Dated: December 8, 2023 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 3 Because California Welfare and Institutions Code § 300(b)(1) was first applied to Plaintiffs more than two years before they filed this lawsuit, their claim challenging it as unconstitutionally vague is also timebarred. Further, Plaintiffs moved to Wyoming in July 2021 and have resided there for over two years, meaning they are not subject to this California law and have no standing to challenge the constitutionality of this statute which does not apply to them. Accordingly, their void-for-vagueness claim is dismissed as well. 10 23-cv-1448-CAB-AHG
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